

**The Importance of Being Macedonian:
Origins and Consequences of the “Name Issue”
between Greece and Macedonia**

THESIS

submitted at the Graduate Institute
in fulfilment of the requirements of the
PhD degree in Development Studies

by

Vera LALCHEVSKA

Thesis N° 1189

Geneva

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INSTITUT DE HAUTES ETUDES INTERNATIONALES ET DU DEVELOPPEMENT
GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

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Sur le préavis de Mme Isabelle SCHULTE-TENCKHOFF, professeur à l'Institut et directeur de thèse, de M. Mohamed Mahmoud OULD MOHAMEDOU, professeur associé à l'Institut et membre interne du jury, et de Mr Todor CEPREGANOV, Professor, Faculty of Educational Sciences, Institute for Archeology and History, Goce Delcev University, Republic of Macedonia et expert extérieur, le directeur de l'Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement autorise l'impression de la présente thèse sans exprimer par là d'opinion sur son contenu.

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Philippe Burrin

Directeur

RESUME / ABSTRACT

L'importance d'être Macédonien : les origines et les conséquences du
"problème du nom" entre la Grèce et la Macédoine

Cette thèse a commencé comme une tentative de répondre à la question « qu'est-ce que le prétendu "problème du nom" signifie pour les Macédoniens? » Dans un premier temps, elle aborde et analyse les aspects politiques, historiques et juridiques (y compris la dimension des droits de l'Homme) du problème, avant d'explorer ses conséquences tant pour les citoyens de la République de Macédoine que pour les Macédoniens vivant en Grèce et ailleurs. La thèse est également devenue un recueil de témoignages cueillis auprès de témoins et de victimes des causes profondes du problème, ainsi que de leurs répercussions. Au final, cette thèse est l'histoire d'une lutte, celle du peuple macédonien, pour le droit à son identité et à sa langue dans l'ordre politique international en tant que citoyens de leur propre État souverain, la République de Macédoine. Elle est aussi l'histoire du combat du peuple macédonien pour le droit à son identité et à sa langue en tant que minorité dans un pays voisin, la Grèce. A ce titre, cette thèse témoigne d'une enquête sur les droits culturels et identitaires (ou leur absence) dans le cadre du débat sur le droit à l'autodétermination au XXI^e siècle autant que celui portant plus spécifiquement sur les droits des minorités au sein de l'Union européenne.

The Importance of Being Macedonian: Origins and Consequences of the
"Name Issue" between Greece and Macedonia

This thesis started as an attempt to answer the question, "what does the so-called 'name issue' mean to Macedonians?" It went on to analyze and portray the political, historical, legal and human rights aspects of the "name issue" between Greece and Macedonia and to depict its effects on the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, as well as on Macedonians in Greece and beyond. Along the way, it became a collection of the testimonies of the witnesses and victims of the root causes of the "name issue" and the repercussions thereof. It ended as a story about a people's struggle for the right to their identity and language in the international political world order, as citizens of their own sovereign country – the Republic of Macedonia – and of that same people's struggle for the right to their identity and language as a minority in neighboring Greece. As such, this thesis is also an inquiry into the aspects of (or lack of) cultural rights and the right to an identity – both ethnic and national – as a part of the right to self-determination in the 21st century world, and as a part of the rights of minorities in the European Union.

To my mother and father, Violeta and Dimitar, who nurtured within me the importance of being Macedonian, and whose cosmopolitan nature and intellectual wisdom are written on every page. Their generous love, patience and kindness have inspired me and kept me going all my life.

To my brother Goran, whose addictive laughs, genius mind and shining star are an endless source of motivation, and who is more Macedonian than he thinks.

To my niece Sofia, who was my first interviewee, and who was barely three when she captured the essence of this story in one phrase: "My name is Sofia. Sofia is my name."

To my fellow Macedonians, wherever you may be, for you will always be.

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INTRODUCTION

When Macedonian-born Academy Award-nominated New York film director Milco Mancevski arrived in Venice to present his film *Before the Rain* at the Mostra del Cinema in 1994, he was greeted by a curious incident. It was to become one of the first of thousands of such episodes that have occurred to Macedonians throughout the world. “Allow me to tell you what happened the first time I came to Venice,” Mancevski said. “The first day, I was summoned to the offices of the Festival. I was told that there was a diplomatic “issue.” Namely, the Greek embassy in Italy has complained to the Festival, demanding that they remove the name “Macedonian” when describing the name of the language spoken in my film. The Greek embassy had claimed that such a language did not exist. I asked the very nice lady representing the Festival whether I looked like a character from a cartoon. One that does not exist. We both laughed and concluded the matter then and there.”¹

Unfortunately for other Macedonians, however, the incidents would grow in size and number, and were not to be concluded so quickly and easily. Some ten years later, on September 28, 2006, when, as Secretary of the Macedonian Delegation to the Summit of the International Organisation of the Francophonie (OIF) in Bucharest, Romania, I walked into the conference room early in the morning before the Summit was to begin, in order to distribute some promotional brochures about Macedonia, I was also greeted by a curious incident. First, it took me a good twenty minutes to find where we were to be seated. As things went by alphabetical order, I naturally and instinctively first looked under “M” for Macedonia. To my dismay (and evidently, lack of experience in diplomacy at the time), I did not find Macedonia, when suddenly it dawned upon me that following the practice of the United Nations, we were now referred to by the so-called “provisional reference” – “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” – by the OIF, as was the case with almost all regional and international organizations. Although I regularly heard about such incidents occurring to Macedonian representatives in the news, it was the first time I felt it “on my own

¹ Interview with Milco Mancevski, *La rivista di engramma*, December 2011.

skin,” so to speak. So after this “discovery,” I rushed over towards the “Ts,” (for “the”) and not finding Macedonia there, I quickly went over to the “Fs” (for “former”). Not finding Macedonia under “F” either, I started to panic, when, finally, just after the “Fs” I saw our name-tag: “Ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine” it said. Of course! We were at the Summit of the Francophonie and I had been looking for our name-tag in English! How silly of me! By now you are thinking, losing half an hour to find where in the room your country’s delegation is to be seated at an international conference may be quite annoying but not so tragic after all.

On a more serious note, however, there was another incident at that Summit which was not quite as “trivial” as the one I have just described. Namely, when I came back to the conference room with my delegation a couple of hours later, I found that the brochures about Macedonia which I had distributed around the tables had all vanished. This was quite an unpleasant shock, not only because I had physically carried all the brochures in my suitcase, but because this Summit was an extremely important one for Macedonia. It was precisely during this Summit, that the fifty-nine Member States of the Francophonie were to vote on whether or not Macedonia was to become a fully-pledged Member State of the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie. It was therefore crucial to lobby the Member States, and one of our delegation’s lobbying mechanisms were the brochures entitled “Macédoine: la terre de la nature, le berceau de la culture.” But when I asked the Secretariat of the Summit what had happened to the brochures, I was told that they had been confiscated because the Greek delegation had complained to the Secretariat, saying that the name indicated on the brochures was an exclusively Greek name.

Incidentally, Greece had also been invited to become a fully-pledged Member State at this Summit, however it had much less history in the Francophonie than Macedonia. As a matter of fact, Greece had entered directly into associated membership status only two years earlier, during the Summit in 2004. Meanwhile, Macedonia had been in the Francophonie since 1997, when it became an observer state during the Summit in Hanoi. In 1999, it had gained associated membership status, after which there had been a period of stagnation and up until 2006, Macedonia had not been invited to become a fully-pledged Member State. According

to unofficial diplomatic sources, the stagnation was due to the “inappropriate” behavior by the Macedonian Ambassador in France during a meeting who, outraged by the idea that his country would still be called under the so-called “provisional reference” when invited for fully-pledged membership, had caused a scandal thereby insulting the Secretary General of the Organisation. Apparently, Macedonia had been given the opportunity to apply for fully-pledged membership but under the pretext that it keep the provisional reference, until the resolution of the “name issue” under the auspices of the United Nations. The Summit of 2006 was the first one following the end of the mandate the Ambassador with the “scandalous” affair, and therefore the first plausible opportunity to become a fully-pledged Member State. The Secretary General seemed positive, and the ambiance was ripe. Macedonia was willing to become a fully-pledged Member State under the provisional reference, as this status would enable it to participate in the political meetings, which were of critical importance to the country. In addition, if Greece was to become a fully-pledged Member State before Macedonia, there was a danger that, there too, as in other organizations, Greece would block Macedonia’s membership and ensure that the country is isolated from yet another international organization. In the end, both Greece and Macedonia became fully-pledged Member States at the Summit in Bucharest – Macedonia, of course, under the “provisional reference.” We never did recover the brochures, however, and I wonder, in retrospect, how many brochures are printed about Macedonia and carried throughout the world, never to be seen on the tables, let alone opened.

At another Summit in Bucharest, two years later, Macedonia did not fare so well. On April 2, 2008, when upon an invitation from the NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Macedonia arrived at the NATO Summit in Bucharest with the intention of seeing to it that his country officially become a member state of NATO, the Prime Minister received quite a blow: Greece vetoed Macedonia’s entry in the organization. The official Greek reason, which was accepted by the military alliance, was the “name issue.” Apparently, an opinion poll that had recently been published in Athens by the daily newspaper *Kathimerini* had suggested that almost ninety percent of Greeks would favor a veto on Macedonia's

entry in NATO if no solution was found regarding the name. According to the CNN, "Athens has long argued that the name Macedonia implies territorial claims on its northern province of the same name – the birthplace, also, of Greece's most revered ancient warrior, Alexander the Great." The news channel further elaborated that the United Nations special envoy, who had been appointed to negotiate between the two countries, had proposed five alternative names for Macedonia to consider, to no avail. The negotiations in New York had failed yet again after seventeen years of dispute.²

This unpleasant surprise had been anticipated by NATO Secretary General Scheffer, who had tried to urge Macedonian officials to come to a settlement, stating a month earlier for CNN, "that Macedonia's hope of joining the military alliance could be dashed if it fails to settle a 17-year-old name spat with Greece, a long-time NATO member."³ This is indeed what happened. To make things worse, not only was Macedonia's admission vetoed at the Summit of Bucharest, but its chances for future entry were tarnished with the adoption of a Declaration at the Summit which imposed an additional condition for Macedonia's membership – namely a mutually acceptable solution to the "name issue:"

"We recognise the hard work and the commitment demonstrated by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to NATO values and Alliance operations. We commend them for their efforts to build a multi-ethnic society. Within the framework of the UN, many actors have worked hard to resolve the "name issue", but the Alliance has noted with regret that these talks have not produced a successful outcome. Therefore we agreed that an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be extended as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the "name issue" has been reached. We encourage the negotiations to be resumed without delay and expect them to be concluded as soon as possible."⁴

² Anthee Carassava, *op.cit.*

³ Anthee Carassava, "Greek name fury threatens NATO bid," *CNN*, March 3, 2008, Athens, Greece.

⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Bucharest Summit Declaration – Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April, 2008.," Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm (quotation marks around "name issue" added)

Another incident occurred in October of 2011, when the European Commission issued its latest report on the progress made by the Republic of Macedonia in its preparation for membership to the European Union. The Republic of Macedonia had been the second country (after Croatia) from the former Yugoslavia to sign the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union in 2001, and one of the first to receive a positive “avis” from the European Commission in 2005 on its preparedness to enter the European Union. Since then, the Commission has been reporting to the European Council and the European Parliament on an annual basis, on the progress made by Macedonia and the rest of the countries in the region regarding the criteria to be fulfilled to join the European Union. What was distinctively evident in this report, however, as opposed to the European Commission’s initial reports, was to find that the eighty-four-page document did not pronounce the adjective “Macedonian” at all, except once – to denote one of the two ruling coalition parties, namely the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO-DPMNE) which was evidently unavoidable. Instead, it spoke of the “country’s government,” the “country’s citizens,” and so forth, replacing the word “Macedonian” or “Macedonians” by generic terms.⁵ By contrast, the 139-page European Commission Paper on Serbia for the same year included the adjective “Serbian” one hundred forty times, to describe the “Serbian parliament,” “Serbian government,” “Serbian citizens,” “Serbian authorities,” “Serbian senior officials,” and so forth.⁶ Although the practice of avoiding the adjective “Macedonian” had been seen in the 2008, 2009 and 2010 reports, by 2011 it had become frustratingly clear that the European Union’s policy on Macedonia was becoming increasingly more prejudiced against Macedonia. Whereas the European Commission’s “2005 Analytical Report and Opinion on Macedonia [used] the adjectives ‘Macedonian’ and ‘ethnic Macedonian’ [...], in the 2006 and 2007 [Reports] ... [these terms] were used again only this time the adjectives were all

⁵ *Commission Staff Working Paper: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2011 Progress Report*, Brussels, 12 October, 2011 SEC (2011), 1203 final, 6, Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/mk_rapport_2011_en.pdf

⁶ *Commission Staff Working Paper ... Opinion on Serbia's application for membership of the European Union*, Brussels, 12 October 2011, SEC(2011) 1208, Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/sr_analytical_rapport_2011_en.pdf

italicized. Starting in 2008 ... the EC Progress Reports have excluded the adjectives 'Macedonian' and 'ethnic Macedonian' [altogether]."⁷

The 2011 Report provoked a reaction by all segments of society, in the form of a letter of protest, including by President Gjorge Ivanov, who voiced his "dissatisfaction with the selective application of the guidelines of the United Nations, with the omission and non-use of the adjective 'Macedonian.' 'I am sure, Mr. Barroso' [he wrote to the European Commission President] that it is clear to you that this practice deeply offends the feelings of Macedonian citizens because of the way in which their language and the ethnic identity is referred to, both of which are issues of the respect of basic human rights and questions of human dignity. I once again stress that this kind of practice does not help in the efforts that the Republic of Macedonia has undertaken to find a mutually acceptable solution to the imposed issue with which the Euro-Atlantic integrations of my country will be unblocked."⁸

Finally, a more recent incident occurred on July 2nd, 2014, during a press conference at the European Parliament in Strasbourg which marked the end of the six-month Greek Presidency of the European Union and the beginning of the Italian Presidency. Namely, the Greek Prime Minister, Antonis Samaras, stated in response to a question from a Macedonian journalist, that "[he] did not know [...] that a Macedonian language existed..." When the Macedonian journalist retorted that the Macedonian language did exist, that it was spoken by the Macedonian minority in Greece, and that the Greek state did not recognize it – even though the European Commission had recorded this case – the Greek Prime Minister insisted "il y a un tas de choses que les communistes ont inventé..."⁹ Meaning that the Macedonian language had been invented by Tito and the Communists, which was one of Greece's official arguments regarding the "name issue."

⁷ United Macedonian Diaspora, "UMD Criticizes European Commission Over Omission of Macedonian in Progress Report," October 14, 2011 – Washington, D.C., Available at <http://www.umdiaspora.org/index.php/en/eu-contents/511-umd-criticizes-european-commission-over-omission-of-macedonian-in-progress-report>

⁸ "Ivanov sent a Letter of Protest to Barroso." *Dnevnik*, October 13, 2011, Available at: <http://dnevnik.mk/default.asp?ItemID=5FCC7E9D3FC6DD4A95F84D6FDCC5ACE4>

⁹ Video recording of the European Parliament Session in Strasbourg of July 2, 2014, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D7SYc1xqAFI>, seen on July 15, 2014.

By now, there was unambiguous, official, written and spoken evidence, by both Greek representatives as well as representatives of the European Union and NATO, that the “name issue” was not only about the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia, but about the national and ethnic identity of the Macedonian people and their language. It had also become clear that Greece not only had a problem with the name of the Republic of Macedonia and the identity of its citizens and their language, but it had a problem with the Macedonian minority in Greece, which, according to Greek authorities, simply did not exist. It appears, then, that behind the seemingly trivial and technical “name issue,” there stood a concern with wide-reaching international legal and human rights dimensions, including the right to self-determination, cultural rights and minority rights. It also appears that with the “name issue,” Macedonia faced a battle not only with Greece, but with the entire “international community.” The “name issue” was not just a bilateral dispute between Macedonia and Greece, but the main subject on which the relations of Macedonia with key regional and international organizations, such as the European Union, NATO, the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, and the United Nations, depended. The “name issue” had, de facto, quarantined Macedonia from membership in the world’s most important regional and international organizations. These, in turn, used their power of conditionality to pressure Macedonian authorities into negotiating their country’s name, as well as their peoples’ ethnic and national identity and language, in exchange for membership. To be sure, such an indecent proposal had never been placed on the international negotiating table before.

PROBLEMATIQUE

The so-called “name issue” between Greece and Macedonia was brought to life on the international scene on April 7, 1993, with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 817/93, following Greek protests against the recognition of the newly independent Republic of Macedonia. Previously, these protests had been voiced in the European arena, causing a series of decisions by the European Community not to recognize Macedonia, and thus provoking other types of “scandals.” In January 1993,

for example, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, the Danish Foreign Minister, presented the European Community work programme of his government and said, among other things, that “the European Community, as a hostage of the Greek right to a veto within the Council of Ministers, was unable to act with regard to the *Macedonian question*. Although the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia in the meantime fulfilled all preconditions, it could not be recognized by the European Community...”¹⁰

When the Republic of Macedonia gained its independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, its top priority was to be recognized as an independent state and gain membership to the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO. On April 7th, 1993, following Macedonia’s application for membership to the United Nations, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 817/1993 with which it recommended to the General Assembly that “the State whose application is contained in document S/25147 be admitted to membership in the United Nations, this State being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as ‘the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the State.”¹¹ The Security Council urged the two parties, namely Greece and Macedonia, to co-operate with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee¹² of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia to come to a speedy settlement of this difference, and requested the Secretary General of the United Nations to report to the Security Council on the outcome on the initiative taken by the Co-Chairmen. Twenty-two years later today, the two parties have still not come to a “settlement” of the “difference” over the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia. In the meantime, the “difference” came to be popularly known on the

¹⁰ Jens Reuter, “Policy and economy in Macedonia,” in *The New Macedonian Question*, ed. James Pettifer (New York: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999, 2001), 43. (italics added)

¹¹ U.N. Security Council 3196th Meeting, “Resolution 817, (S/RES/817/1993) 7 April 1993.

¹² This was an international entity which included the United Nations, the European Union (EU), the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and was created as a follow-up to the Peace Implementation Conference. It was to remain active until a final settlement of the problems in the former Yugoslavia. It first convened in London, UK, from 26 to 28 August 1992, adopted a Statement of Principles, established (under the overall direction of the Co-Chairmen of the ICFY), and a Steering Committee to supervise its six working groups. The Co-Chairmen (a.k.a., Permanent Co-Chairmen) were the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the head of State or Government of the Presidency of EU. (<http://unterm.un.org/DGAACS/unterm.nsf/8fa942046ff7601c85256983007ca4d8/a8a3902250e66e18852569fa00006c92?OpenDocument>)

international scene as the “name issue”, and it soon reached global and critical dimensions.

These critical dimensions continued to grow and affect all segments of society, including individuals, organizations and businesses alike, and both locally, and internationally. They continued to humiliate Macedonians in all kinds of circumstances, including in the international media. Just a week ago, for example, the *Foreign Policy Magazine* had a rather unpleasant article entitled “Greece Doesn’t Like Macedonia’s Name. We Have Ideas for a New One,” in which the authors proposed the following names for Macedonia: “Land of Ostentatious and Ripped-Off Monuments; Alexanderland; Teresadonia; Rotteneggoslovakia; and The Hard One.”¹³ As ridiculous as it may sound, this article epitomizes the scale of the international and outlandish dimensions of the “name issue”. It did, after all, make it to the *Foreign Policy* magazine, and was forwarded to me by an Australian friend living in Vietnam via WhatsApp.

Over the past two decades, then, one can detect a certain pattern that has developed in the international and regional arenas when it comes to designating the “Republic of Macedonia,” as well as the adjective “Macedonian” to label the language, the ethnic identity and the nationality of the majority of the citizens of the country, as well as of the Macedonian minority in Greece. This pattern starts with avoiding the use of the word “Macedonia” or “Macedonian” by officials who represent the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO, officials who represent the Member States of these and other international and regional organizations, and various other diplomats and politicians. As time goes by, the pattern is intensified with a de-facto and de-jure interdiction to use, pronounce or say the name “Macedonia” – an interdiction addressed to these foreign officials, but also to Macedonian officials, diplomats, politicians, representatives of organizations or business entities, and citizens, during international and regional summits, conferences, seminars, business meetings, and other venues. The end result of this pattern is the imposition of the conditionality to negotiate the name with Greece in order to become a Member State – hence the isolation of the Republic of Macedonia from the international and regional scenes –

¹³ Siobhan O’Grady, “Greece Doesn’t Like Macedonia’s Name. We Have Ideas for a New One,” *Foreign Policy*, December 16, 2015, available at: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/16/greece-doesnt-like-macedonias-name-we-have-ideas-for-a-new-one/>

and, more tragically, the imposition of a feeling of inferiority, humiliation, and degradation. For such is the effect on any individual, when, as he takes a seat at a roundtable, he must hide his country's nametag, or has been given a nametag that does not represent him; or when, as he steps up to the podium to speak in front of governments from the whole world, he knows he must not pronounce his country's name, or the name of his ethnic identity and his language.

As opposed to the bilateral level, at which the Republic of Macedonia enjoys recognition by over a hundred and thirty nation states as the "Republic of Macedonia" (its constitutional name), at the international and regional levels, the country is referred to as the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" – a "provisional reference" pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 817/1993. "By March 2013, over 136 countries in the world ha[d] recognized Macedonia under its official name including three UN Security Council permanent members (China, Russia and the US). However, these recognitions remained on the bilateral level only while in multilateral organizations the country was admitted under the provisional reference."¹⁴ Moreover, while some organizations such as the United Nations or the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie have already accepted the country as a Member State under the "provisional reference" with the idea that it would be referred to by a permanent name as soon as the "name issue" was resolved, others, such as the European Union and NATO, have made resolving the "name issue" a precondition for membership. The statements of their high-level representatives are explicitly in this direction, as is evidenced by the speech of NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer quoted above, and by the following announcement by European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, on his visit to Macedonia on April 9-10, 2011. "His main message to Macedonian leaders was to find a solution to the name dispute with Greece as soon as possible. Local media noticed that Barroso failed to use

¹⁴ Miso Dokmanovic, "What's in a Name? Analyzing Macedonian-Greek Relations after the Fall of Yugoslavia," *Macedonian Political Science Forum e-Proceeding of Papers*, Year 1, Number 2, Skopje December 2014, 46.

the constitutional name of the country, Republic of Macedonia, and avoided diplomatically questions related to the topic.”¹⁵

I recently had the opportunity to ask Mr. Barroso in person why the European Union had still not opened negotiations with Macedonia for membership, and why the “name issue” was a precondition for membership. His answer was short, simple, and pragmatic. He did not get into the root causes of the issue – if he was aware of them at all. He basically told me what we all know – that membership to the European Union by an aspiring candidate country was based on a unanimous vote by all Member States of the European Union. “You have no choice,” he said. “If you don’t negotiate with Greece on the “name issue,” Greece will veto your entry in the European Union. It’s as simple as that.”¹⁶

Thus, the pattern that I refer to has developed into a pre-condition for the Republic of Macedonia’s membership in regional and international organizations, namely to change the name of the country. Whereas a decade ago, these organisations would not dare to put that precondition in writing, they are becoming increasingly bold. The 2014 European Commission Progress Report for Macedonia, for example, brings up the “name issue” on the very first page, preceding the text of the Report, under the following heading: “In its Communication ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014-15’, the Commission put forward the following conclusions and recommendations on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.” While in previous reports, the “name issue” had always been under the chapter on political criteria for membership in the European Union, under the sub-heading “Regional issues and international obligations,” it had now been promoted to the cover page on “conclusions and recommendations” stating that: “[i]t remains essential that decisive steps are taken towards resolving the ‘name issue’ with Greece. The failure of the parties to this dispute to reach a compromise after 19 years of UN mediated talks is having a direct and adverse impact on the country’s European aspirations.” It adds, in favor of Macedonia, that “[r]esolute action is required, as well as proactive support

¹⁵ Evelyn Topalova, “Barroso Urges More Reforms from Macedonia and Bosnia,” April 14, 2011 Sofia, EUINSIDE – European Parliament on your website.

¹⁶ José Manuel Barroso, “Les défis de l’Union européenne,” Public Lecture, November 2, 2015, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva.

from EU leaders. The Commission recalls its view that, if the screening and the Council discussions on the negotiating framework were under way, the necessary momentum could have been created which would have supported finding a negotiated and mutually accepted solution to the “name issue” even before negotiating chapters were opened.”¹⁷

The 2015 Progress Report follows along the same lines. In the Introduction to its 2015 Progress Report, the European Commission notes that “[t]he “name issue” with Greece needs to be resolved as a matter of urgency.”¹⁸ Unsurprisingly, this little sentence in the 81-page 2015 Report made headline news in Macedonia, as the title of the following article on the front page of the oldest and most widely-read daily newspaper, *Nova Makedonija*, suggests: “The European Commisison Report is Finally Published: The Recommendation is Conditioned, Issue with Greece Must be Resolved Urgently.”



“The European Commission Report is Finally Published: The Recommendation is Conditioned, Issue with Greece Must be Resolved Urgently,” *Nova Makeodnija*, November 11, 2015.

¹⁷ “Commission Staff Working Document: The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2014 Progress Report,” SWD(2014) 303, Brussels, 8 October, 2014, 1, Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-the-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia-progress-report_en.pdf

¹⁸ Commission Staff Working Document: The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2015 Progress Report” SWD(2015) 212 Brussels, 10 November 2015, 5, Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_the_former_yugoslav_rpublic_of_macedonia.pdf

But was that all? Was changing the constitutional name of the country the only requirement Macedonia had to fulfill as a precondition for membership? By refusing to pronounce the adjective “Macedonian” in its 2011 Progress Report on Macedonia, for the fourth year in a row, the European Union revealed an uncomfortable fact that had not become so manifest before and that was becoming painfully evident: that what was at stake behind the “name issue” was not just the name of the country, but the Macedonian identity, language and nationality; moreover, the European Union seemed fully aware of, and even supported, this fact.

It was with the 2011 European Commission Report that “the masks fell,” then, to use the words of my father who had called me the same evening following the news of the report, still stricken with disbelief. At this point it became clear that not only was the “name issue” at its core about something very subtle and profound – the Macedonian language, ethnic and national identity – but that the European Union, NATO, the United Nations and the international community at large entertained a preconceived opinion about the issue. As the Washington, D.C.-based United Macedonian Diaspora wrote in reaction to the Greek Prime Minister’s statement, “Prime Minister Samaras’ statement confirms the fears of many Macedonians that Greece’s political opposition extends beyond a simple “name issue,” but rather is oriented around a failure to recognize the history and culture of a distinct Macedonian language and identity.”¹⁹ Other evidence in support of this statement was seen in the 2009 negotiating position of Greece, which, among other requirements, insisted that “the new name be for all purposes (*erga omnes*) – external and internal ... at home and abroad...; that what should be discussed is an “adjective”... that determines the nation, an adjective that determines the language, and an adjective that determines the ethnicity ... ; and that Greece wants the Greek toponyms to be officially used in Macedonia.”²⁰

¹⁹ “UMD Strongly Condemns Greek PM’s Remarks on Questioning the Existence of the Macedonian Language”, United Macedonian Diaspora Official Website, <http://www.umdiaspora.org/index.php/en/>, created on Monday, 07 July 2014 11:41, visited on Wednesday, 10 July 2014.

²⁰ Excerpt from the Negotiating Position of the Hellenic Republic on the “name issue,” instructed by the alternative Minister of Foreign Affairs Droutsas, agreed with Prime Minister Papandreou, 13.11.2009, New York. Source: confidential.

The European and international silence when it comes to pronouncing the official name of the Republic of Macedonia, the ethnic identity of the majority of its citizens, and their language, is strongly reminiscent of their silence regarding the population exchange, the abduction of children, the exodus, and the assimilation of hundreds of thousands of Macedonians that occurred in Greece at different periods of time throughout the past century since 1913 – the year of the Treaty of Bucharest. In fact, Macedonians in Greece are to this day being told by Greek authorities that they do not exist, and that there is no such thing as a Macedonian ethnicity or language. All of this remains generally ignored by the international community, which, at times also acts as an accomplice in the crime. The repercussions of these past and present policies are dire. There are, for instance, Macedonians who have been assimilated to such a degree that even they themselves believe that what they are speaking in the privacy of their homes is the “local” language, and not the Macedonian language. Whether from fear or by habit, some of the Macedonians I interviewed in Greece spoke to me in Macedonian, and claimed that this was just “the language of this place.” They called it *tukasno* in Macedonian, and *dopii* in Greek, which means “local” or “from here.” Yet, we spoke Macedonian.

One of the main themes in the book *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia 1870-1990* by Greek anthropologist Anastasia Karakasidou, addresses precisely these curious consequences of the assimilationist policies in Greece over its population in the past hundred years. In fact, she starts her book explaining that she had never understood why her father would ever so often tune into a Turkish radio and listen to Turkish music, when all her life, he had told her she was a pure Greek. It was this book, published in 1997, along with the 1994 Report by Human Rights Watch entitled *The Macedonians of Greece: Denying Ethnic Identity*, which first brought international awareness to the human rights violations carried out by Greek authorities towards the Macedonian minority in Greece.

That the authors of the Human Rights Watch report found it necessary to write in their acknowledgements page that “Macedonian rights activists were very helpful in providing interviews and information, sometimes at considerable risk,” and that “in many cases activists and others interviewed by the mission requested that their

names not be used, for fear of retaliation by authorities,”²¹ should arouse intellectual curiosity.²² That Anastasia Karkasidou’s book, ready to be published by Cambridge University Press, was pulled back at the last minute, causing a scandal and the resignation of no less than three members of the Cambridge University Press editorial board in order to dissociate themselves from the publishing house, should be enough to hint that something had gone terribly wrong, not only in Greece, but also on the international level, when it came to gaining a better understanding of the situation of Macedonians in Greece. As Fred Barbash, the *Washington Post* correspondent in London stated on February 3, 2006, “One of the world’s most prestigious book publishers confronted a rebellion today among some of its academic advisers for canceling publication of a study about Greece because of fear of reprisals from nationalist extremists there.”²³

Given these findings, it is astonishing that academics as well as politicians have failed to correlate what was happening in Greece as publicized by a respectable scholar and a reputable human rights organization in the 1990s, with the “name issue” which was raised at approximately the same time. In 2008, for example, the Report by United Nations Independent Expert on Minorities Issues on Greece revealed that “[t]he [Greek] Government does not recognize the existence of a Macedonian ethnic minority living in Central and West Macedonia,” that “[s]uccessive governments have pursued a policy of denial of the ethnic Macedonian community and the Macedonian language,” and that “those identifying as ethnic Macedonian still report discrimination and harassment.”²⁴ It was during that same year that NATO refused Macedonia’s membership, and that its Secretary General urged Macedonia to negotiate its name with Greece; while the following year, United Nations-appointed negotiator Mathew

²¹ Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, *Denying Ethnic Identity: The Macedonians of Greece*, New York/Washington/Los Angeles/ London, Human Rights Watch, 1994, viii.

²² In fact, when I met with the Macedonian Ambassador to Greece, he had an even stronger reaction, and asked me to keep whatever he had told me as strictly confidential and not to use it in my research – which request I respected.

²³ Fred Barbash, “Advisers to Publishing House Protest Rejection of Macedonia Book,” *The Washington Post*, Section A, February 3, 1996.

²⁴ U.N. Human Rights Council, *Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development: Report of the Independent Expert on Minority Issues, Gay McDougall – Addendum, Mission to Greece* (8-16 September 2008), A/HRC/10/11/Add.3, 18 February, 2009.

Nimetz brought Greece's position to Macedonia (quoted above), in which Greece stated that it wanted Macedonia to change its name, language, ethnic and national identity, to use that new name for domestic and international purposes, and to only use Greek names for the toponyms cited above! Now if *that* did not wake up the entire academic world to smell the coffee, I do not know what will.

Indeed, it seems obvious that there are historical elements regarding the Macedonian minority in Greece that are crucial to understanding the "name issue" and that converge two Greek policies: Greek foreign policy vis-à-vis the Republic of Macedonia which aims to pressure the country into changing its constitutional name and the name of its official language, its citizens' nationality and their ethnic identity on the one hand; and Greek domestic policy vis-à-vis the Macedonian minority in Greece, which denies their ethnic identity, their language, and their cultural rights in general. Closer scrutiny of these two policies leads to the same conclusion: that they have the same purpose – namely the denial, and ultimately, the technical elimination, of the existence of a separate ethnic and national Macedonian identity and a separate Macedonian language.

HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

My first hypothesis is, therefore, that the Greek foreign and domestic policies vis-à-vis the Macedonians are correlated and that we are witnessing the technical elimination of an ethnic and a national identity and a language at both the domestic level (with a state's policies towards its minority) as well as at the international level (through the instruments of international and regional organizations and their power of conditionality on a non-member state that is aspiring to become a member). Consequently, the "name issue" ought to be analyzed as the convergence of the violation of the cultural rights of a minority on the one hand, and the violation of the right to self-determination of a people of an independent nation-state on the other hand.

Beyond addressing the political, legal and the historical dimensions of the "name issue" through primary and secondary sources, it is the interviews that make

my work original and that help me bring about this hypothesis. Namely, over the course of four years, between 2011 and 2015, I conducted over seventy interviews during several trips to both Macedonia and Greece, which portrayed the repercussions of the “name issue” on the individual and collective levels, and shed light onto the sources of the “name issue.” It was mainly through the interviews I conducted with Macedonians in Greece, and Macedonians who had been born in Greece but who had fled during the Greek Civil War (the so-called “Refugee Children”), that I was able to support this hypothesis. Consider the following quote from one of the “Refugee Children:”

Here is a book where you will find many things about Setina and Popadija [two Macedonian villages in Greek Macedonia]: where they are situated, the citizens, the traditions in the village... Here you will find how many children were taken to orphanages [the refugee children, taken either outside of Greece, or taken by the Queen to the paidopoleis in Greece]. It has them by name and surname – and here are the ones who were killed. I have an uncle, my mother’s brother who died. My father also died, as well as my uncle, brother of my father. They buried him alive at 17. My mother used to say the rifle was bigger than him. Here this guy is an uncle of my father, so he’s my first cousin. This one is another uncle of mine. They all were killed young. One child survived. They were fighting for the Democratic Party. But they were betrayed. They told them “fight together with us, and after we will give you rights.” They promised them autonomy. This here is the school, in 1933. They were all Macedonian. In that village there was nothing but Macedonians.²⁵

It was while I was interviewing these people that I realized that there was another – historic – dimension to the “name issue” which could not be ignored. It was this historic angle, as perceived from my interviews as well as primary and secondary sources, that motivated me to conclude that there was a convergence of Greek domestic and foreign policies, thereby leading me to my first research question: is the “name issue” a bi-product of past and present Greek domestic policy vis-à-vis its Macedonian minority?

In addition to the negative repercussions of the “name issue” on Macedonia’s place in the international world order (i.e. its membership in, or isolation from,

²⁵ Interview with Anonymous Refugee Child 2, born in 1938 in Setina/Popadija, Northern Greece. Skopje, 5 December 2014.

international and regional organizations), on the development of the country, on the future ethnic identity and nationality of the majority of its citizens, on the name of their language, and ultimately, on the fate of the Macedonians in Greece and beyond, the “name issue” has also had profound effects on the psychological health of Macedonians. To be precise, not only has it made them feel humiliated and deprived of their human dignity, but it has instilled upon them a permanent feeling of insecurity, a mistrust in the future, and a mentality of living by the day. In other words it has made lives of Macedonian citizens comparable to lives of refugees living in a protracted refugee camp situation – the camp being their country – in which their life is placed “on hold” for the duration of the negotiations. Only, these negotiations, and thus the “on hold position” have persisted for over two decades, making it virtually impossible for people to make plans for the future when they have no idea whether their country will persevere, and if it does, for how long it will exist, and under what circumstances. Consider the following quote from P.H. Liotta and Cindy Jebb’s book *Mapping Macedonia: Idea and Identity*, which illustrates the precariousness of Macedonia in the eyes of its citizens:

“In 1996, the first U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Macedonia toured a household appliance factory soon after his arrival in the country. Five years after the nation’s independence from Yugoslavia, the factory’s director asked the ambassador, ‘Do you think we will make it?’ The factory, located in the poorest of the former Yugoslav republics, was a decrepit monstrosity designed to service the now lost Yugoslav market and was one of at least a dozen in Macedonia that the World Bank had insisted be either closed permanently or sold. As the ambassador stepped into the courtyard, he responded gently, “Well, if you get that electrical motor contract in Turkey ...” The factory director interrupted to correct the misunderstanding: “No”, he said, “I mean the country. Do you think Macedonia will make it?”²⁶

A consequence of the continuous degradation and these qualms about the future triggered by the “name issue” has been to force Macedonian citizens to feel that they have to choose between their name and identity on the one hand, and their future and the future of their children on the other hand. Under the pressure of international diplomats, leaders of the European Union, the United Nations, and NATO

²⁶ P.H. Liotta and Cindy R. Jebb, *Mapping Macedonia: Idea and Identity* (Westport: Praeger, 2004), xi.

to negotiate their name and their identity as a prerequisite for membership to the European Union and NATO so that the country can move on and be secure (as they see it), some citizens are considering giving up their identity for their future. This either-or choice has given rise to two dilemmas: an internal one, within each individual, and a national dilemma, with the polarization of the entire nation between two factions. The internal dilemma, or contradiction is: should I be a proud Macedonian and keep my name, my identity, and thus my dignity and let the entire world go to hell, or should I bend my head down, and forsake my identity and thus my dignity for the benefit of my children, who will live more prosperous and safer lives if Macedonia is not isolated from the European Union and NATO? As almost every citizen suffers from this internal dilemma of having to choose between his identity and the future, it is reflected on the national level, leading to a polarization between “pro-EU (pro-future) Macedonians” on the one hand and “pro-name (pro-identity and dignity) Macedonians” on the other hand. The results are heated arguments and debate among citizens of every age group and educational and professional background as one camp accuses the other of wanting to sell Macedonia’s soul to the West, while the other camp accuses the first of wanting to drag the country down into isolation, poverty and insecurity. My second hypothesis, therefore, is that the “name issue” has induced serious psychological repercussions on the individual and collective levels through forcing Macedonian citizens to choose between their identity on the one hand, and their future on the other. In other words, the individual and collective trauma that I infer from my interviews as well as primary and secondary research, are a direct result of the internal contradictions and national polarization induced by the “name issue.”²⁷ Consider the following quote by the former CEO of the Macedonian Bank for

²⁷ According to HelpGuide.Org - A trusted non-profit guide to mental health and well-being, “Emotional and psychological trauma is the result of extraordinarily stressful events that shatter your sense of security, making you feel helpless and vulnerable in a dangerous world. Traumatic experiences often involve a threat to life or safety, but any situation that leaves you feeling overwhelmed and alone can be traumatic, even if it doesn’t involve physical harm. It’s not the objective facts that determine whether an event is traumatic, but your subjective emotional experience of the event. The more frightened and helpless you feel, the more likely you are to be traumatized... An event will most likely lead to emotional or psychological trauma if: ... you felt powerless to prevent it; ... it happened repeatedly; ... someone was intentionally cruel; ... Emotional and psychological trauma can be caused by single-blow, one-time events, such as a horrible accident ... Trauma can also stem from ongoing, relentless stress, such as living in a crime-ridden neighborhood ...” (Emotional and Psychological Trauma: Symptoms,

Reconstruction and Development expert which illustrates the internal contradictions of citizens:

The issue is irrational – that’s for sure. But I divide my thinking on this issue. In a normal situation, you have to have the same opinion. But one thing is to think as a man who lives in this country, and feels as a Macedonian, and another thing is to think as an expert and about the future of our young generations... As a citizen I would not want to discuss the “name issue”, but as an expert and as a person who takes care of the younger generations, I really do think that a compromise solution should be found, which must not touch the identity and the language, while it would enable our Euro-Atlantic integration, which would enable this country to feel as part of the environment to which it naturally belongs [i.e. the European Union and NATO].²⁸

A career diplomat who had been involved in the negotiations on the “name issue” at one point during his career, said something along the same lines: “Of course, no one will be able to rename me, rename us, because we are the ones who determine our identity. But it is different with the name of the country, where you come out with it on the marketplace, in an international competition. That hurts us – it hurts me personally. However, you will compromise the name in exchange for your present and your future. You shouldn’t understand me that I am for changing our name. I am for a rational way of thinking, about how we will defend our name.”²⁹

Although most of my interviewees in the “pro-EU” camp have said that they are not for a change in the identity, but rather, just the name, all citizens are increasingly aware that the true intention of the “name issue” is changing the ethnic and national identity and language of Macedonians. This silent truth sits in the back of the heads of both camps, eating them up from the inside, and further exacerbating the internal and collective quandaries.

Treatment, and Recovery, available at <http://www.helpguide.org/articles/ptsd-trauma/emotional-and-psychological-trauma.htm>). Most of my interviewees have mentioned the word “powerless” or some synonym of it; the insupportable longevity of the “name issue” and the repeated “no” for membership to the European Union that results directly from it; as well as the feeling that the “Greeks,” “Europe” and/ or the “international community” are intentionally cruel to them. Therefore, I can conclude that, at least if my interview sample is representative – and we are assuming that it is, as I used the random sampling approach – the “name issue” has caused individual and collective trauma on the national level.

²⁸ Interview with Vlado Naumovski, Skopje, 10 September 2013.

²⁹ Interview with Ambassador Viktor Gaber, Skopje, 2 September 2013.

The collective trauma is visible through trigger events that have occurred in continuation at various points of time throughout the 25-year existence of Macedonia as an independent state. One such trigger event was 2011 European Commission Progress Report discussed previously, which for the fourth year in a row excluded the adjective “Macedonian,” and which led to the mobilization of thousands of citizens, and dozens of organizations, associations, businesses, and other entities across the country and beyond, in signing a protest note addressed to Stefan Fule, the European Commissioner for Enlargement, as is conveyed by the title of the following article: “Letters with Sharp Reactions are Filling Up Fule’s Mailbox.”³⁰ One of the most widely read newspapers, *Utrinski Vesnik* tried to capture the reaction to Brussels in the following words:

“Long letters to Brussels from all sides: Reactions surrounding the failure to name the Macedonian language in the European Commission Report are heating up. Following the students and deans of faculties, now even the sports federations, institutions, and even the informal Union of Yugoslavians in Macedonia are writing to Brussels to protest the omission of stating the Macedonian language. Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski reacted sharply immediately after the report due to the omission of the adjective “Macedonian”, and an official answer from Brussels is expected in the coming period. Yesterday the Macedonian PEN Centre also reacted: “We reject and strongly condemn the recent denials, pressures, threats and attacks on linguistic, cultural and national identity of the Macedonian people expressed in the European Commission report on Macedonia, in which issues of the highest importance are declared with unprecedented ease as ‘technical,’” reads the response from the PEN Centre...”³¹

Voice of America reported on the more poetic side of the story and covered the statement issued by the Struga Poetry Evenings International Festival:

“They say that for the poet, the language is his fatherland. The Macedonian language is our fatherland. The Steering Committee and the Directorate of the Struga Poetry Evenings condemn the incomprehensible and unacceptable deed,” stands in

³⁰ “Писма со остри реакции го полнат сандучето на Филе.” (Letters with Sharp Reactions are Filling Up Fule’s Mailbox.” Ohrid News, October 24, 2011, Available at <http://daily.mk/vesti/dolgi-pisma-od-site-strani-do-brisel>

³¹ “Long letters to Brussels from all sides,” *Utrinski Vesnik*, October 24, 2011, Available at: <http://daily.mk/vesti/dolgi-pisma-od-site-strani-do-brisel>

the reaction of the Steering Committee and the Directorate of the Sturga Poetry Evenings. The writers Slave Gorgo DImoski, President of the Steering Committee and Danilo Kocevski, Director of the Poetry Festival, underline that one of the oldest poetry festivals in the world, this year marked its five-century anniversary with the participation of 300 poets from five continents. Tens of poets from the world are translated into the Macedonian language, with which the dignity of their ideas and messages is preserved. But, the inverse – poetic vibrations in the Macedonian language – are also present in the world through numbers of translated works from Macedonian authors, and especially the song 'Longing for the South, from Konstantin Miladinov. It is translated in languages of a hundred or so countries in the world. Poetry of the wreath-holders: Neruda, Montale, Alberti, Enzensberger, Ricos, Voznesenski...³²

Even the Washington, D.C. - based United Macedonian Diaspora, published an open letter in which it:

“...requests that the European institutions clearly recognize the Macedonian identity, language, and people. Self-determination is a basic human right guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which all EU member-states are party to as members of the United Nations. UMD urges the European Commission to immediately correct the inconsistencies within its 2011 Progress Report on Macedonia and to publicly apologize to the Macedonian people for the practice of negating the Macedonian identity in the last three years of Progress Reports.”³³

Other trigger events included the 2014 Greek Prime Minister's pronounced denial of the existence of the Macedonian language in front of European Parliament, which provoked another wave of mobilization. Humiliating and degrading incidents – such as Greek border officials obliging a busload of Macedonian senior citizens en route to Greece get off the bus and clean the border area with brooms – have also activated the collective Macedonian nerve button, resulting in numerous rallies, protests, concerts and all kinds of other activities throughout the years, under mottos such as “Macedonia, Macedonian, Macedonians: That is the Only Thing We Accept,” –

³² “Letters of protest to Stefan Fule and the European Commission,” Voice of America in Macedonia, October 24, 2011, Available at <http://daily.mk/vesti/dolgi-pisma-od-site-strani-do-brisel>

³³ United Macedonian Diaspora. “UMD Criticizes European Commission Over Omission of Macedonian in Progress Report,” October 14, 2011 – Washington, D.C. Available at: <http://www.umdiaspora.org/index.php/en/eu-contents/511-umd-criticizes-european-commission-over-omission-of-macedonian-in-progress-report>

the slogan during the name protest in February, 2008, on the main square in Skopje.³⁴ Numerous songs have been written, with titles such as “We Have One Name” sung by long-time famous pop star Kaliopi with the finest jazz players, the Tavitijan Brothers, or “Song for Macedonia,” sung by rising rock star Aleksandra Pileva, in which the lyrics call out to “everyone [to] sing for Macedonia,” and ask “God [to] protect Macedonia from evildoers and tyrants.”³⁵ These patriotic songs are not sung by marginalized folk artists heard by some underground minority: Kaliopi is one of the most celebrated pop stars not only in Macedonia but in the wider Balkans region and has been admired by a very diverse and widespread public for almost two decades now. “We Have One Name” has become the unofficial anthem of the Macedonian National Basketball Representation. Kaliopi also sings it during the 20-year anniversary of the independence of Macedonia, on September 8 2011;³⁶ at the concert “The Macedonian Heart Beats 7/8ths” on the occasion of Independence Day September 8, 2012; at a protest on the main square in Skopje, the capital, in 2013, and on many other occasions. Garo, one of the Tavitijan Brothers, is one of the best drummers in Europe. Aleksandra Pileva is one of the most “in” rock stars in Macedonia and the Balkans today. There was also the song, “Macedonia, Sing Outloud” sung in 2007 by all the most celebrated song artists in Macedonia in all different genres (in the style of Michael Jackson’s We are the World), with the refrain “we sing to you Macedonia,” and lyrics such as “from generation to generation, preserved from enemies.” In fact every year at least one more new song is written along these lines. The fact that every musician – be they jazz, pop, folk or rock – has at least one “Macedonia” song on their website and these popular stars “dare” to sing such patriotic songs is telling of several things: that this is what is wanted by the public – young and old, cool and old-fashioned alike. This is a sign of a cultural and national renaissance, which is a relatively normal characteristic in the post-independence stage of newly sovereign countries, and could be observed with all former Yugoslav and Soviet Republics. However the fact that it is still going on, and the choice of the words of the songs, are also telling of a people who need to reaffirm their national

³⁴ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PLk5i5ly_Ak

³⁵ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uYN5sASyFN0>

³⁶ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vTcqYaGezWc>

consciousness and belonging – a people who are afraid they will lose their country and their identity, and who are preoccupied with preserving them. At the website <http://mn.mk/pesni-za-makedonija> one can find 311 songs about Macedonia, with titles such as “I exist!” or “Accused without having committed a crime.” All this, and not to mention the massive amount of blogs, websites, and you-tube videos one can find on the internet. A recent facebook message that was shared on my wall by someone saying, “This is Macedonia: we eat skara, we drink pivo and we speak Macedonian,” conveys the message clearly.

All these are a collective response to, or a sign of protest against, humiliating policies and attitude on behalf of Greece, the United Nations, the European Union, NATO, and other international and regional organizations regarding the name of the country and the identity and language of the people. Not a week has passed by in the last two decades, in which a newspaper or a TV news channel in the Republic of Macedonia did not report on the “name issue”. In the recent years, even Government officials lost their nerve and their diplomatic vow of silence – a vow that had been taken for fear of spoiling the negotiations with Greece and endangering Macedonia’s chances to enter the EU and NATO. On the 20th anniversary of the independence of Macedonia from Yugoslavia (September 8, 2011), the Macedonian Prime Minister said: “We shall not accept ideas and proposals that would compromise the Macedonian national identity, the uniqueness of the Macedonian nation and the Macedonian language. We shall not allow any kind of solution to be accepted by politicians or civil servants, government or parliament, without the expression of the will of the Macedonian citizens through referendum, at which the majority of the citizens who have come out to vote would have accepted the possible solution. Let us all unite around this. Let this be our red line.”³⁷

Yet no researcher has undertaken the task to analyze the feelings and opinions of Macedonians regarding the “name issue.” Having all this in mind, then, as well as the fact that little, if any in-depth study has been done to analyze the multifaceted and underlying historical root causes of this highly topical issue, it goes without saying

³⁷ Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, Speech during 20th Anniversary of Independence from Yugoslavia, 8 September 2011, on the main square in Skopje, Macedonia.

that the “name issue’s” wide-ranging scope and complexity require academic research in view of understanding it more thoroughly and, possibly contributing to potential solutions in the future. My aim, then, is to contribute to the clarification of an issue which, albeit being of essential and daily concern to the majority of the citizens of one country and to the minority of the citizens of four other countries, as well as to a worldwide diaspora, has not benefited from academic research, and has been mistakenly understood by many, to be simply a “technical” issue regarding the label of a country.

POSITIONING

I started my doctoral research with the following questions in mind: What does the “name issue” imply for Macedonians? How does it make them feel? What kind of repercussions does it have on them and on their country? What, if any, implications does it have on their right to their Macedonian identity and on their right to self-determination? I decided to use the snowball approach and started asking, then slowly interviewing close contacts, then friends, then eventually friends of friends, and some people I had noted either on television, in newspapers, or through the existing literature – in view of acquiring a feel for the topic. I simply wanted to test the waters, to see whether I was perhaps exaggerating the importance of the “name issue,” or whether I had been correct in assuming that it created collective anxiety among my fellow citizens. My suspicions came to life when I started speaking to people. It was as if they had been waiting for someone to talk to – someone to share their anguish with. It was while I was speaking to one of Macedonia’s most renowned poets, Eftim Kletnikov, who invited me to his home, together with his wife, that I grasped the magnitude of the issue for Macedonians. As this elderly couple sat there, offering me coffee and cookies, and sharing with me their fears, I thought to myself, I am hearing the same words that I hear at home, from my mother and my father, the same words that I hear when I visit my aunts and uncles, my cousins and friends – the same words that I hear every time I return to my home country, to Macedonia. It is not

just my parents who are tormented by the “name issue” – it is, indeed, the entire country, as expressed through the words of the multitude of citizens I interviewed:

We are under constant pressure. I think that Macedonia, in its entire history, has never been under such pressure as today. We are pressured by whole continents: by so-called international communities. ... America, England, France, Germany....The Macedonian problem is that someone wants to destroy a small people – I don't know, we simply don't know why. The problem is irrational, it is from science-fiction. It has grotesque dimensions if you look at it phenomenologically, from the aspect of international law, humanity – all these things that are promoted by Western civilization, which gives itself the right to promote humanity, to be progressive, to be Cartesian. It's shocking. This is why I'm hurt – when I hear the term “Europe,” I associate it with something evil. Why? Because it is very hypocritical.³⁸

My own interest in the “name issue” is not naïve, I must admit. Being born in the Republic of Macedonia, and feeling a sense of belonging to the Macedonian identity, I cannot pretend to be a neutral witness. On the contrary, my very interest in the dispute derives from my longing to see it come to an end. Throughout the twenty-three years of its existence, like most other citizens of Macedonia, I have become more and more frustrated at its stagnation, and ever more so, at the absence of well-grounded academic research that would portray the Macedonian side of the story. I came to realize one day, that if I, as a citizen of Macedonia, did not roll up my sleeves and tackle this academic absence, then why would anyone else? Why would anyone dedicate four years of their life, to a problem that they were not, in some way or another, concerned about? It was with this determination in my mind that I set out to apply for a PhD on the same topic. In fact, what I had noticed was that no matter how hard I tried to explain the Macedonian side of the story to an outsider, they would perceive my version as a biased version – and perhaps rightly so, as I spoke out of my heart and not from my mind. It dawned upon me then, that no one would believe the Macedonian version of the problem – and thus the dispute would never be resolved – if individuals such as myself, did not invest in clarifying it through well-grounded, academic research. As I started looking at the issue through the analytical, academic

³⁸ Interview with Eftim Kletnikov, Skopje, 11 February 2011.

prism, I also realized that I, myself, was able to see things differently – to grasp connections I may not have otherwise noted before. Therefore, I gladly took the opportunity to remove myself, and to analyze the subject from the lens of a researcher. In addition, conducting most of my research and writing from Geneva has helped me keep a physical and emotional distance from Macedonia and has been a pivotal element in my being able to undertake academic research on the subject. Likewise, the advantages that Geneva has as a world capital of human rights, have been key in keeping me in tune with the greater picture of things, and not enwrapped with the day-to-day problems faced by citizens in Macedonia. One of these advantages were the conferences and discussions on human rights issues that were directly or indirectly related to my topic. Another advantage were the archives of the League of Nations, which, though not cited extensively throughout my work, were instrumental in enlightening me on the vicissitude of international events and interests that influenced the fate of the Macedonian people in the first half of the 20th century.

At the same time, perhaps the perceived weakness of being Macedonian gave me a unique strength – an added value that a non-Macedonian would not have had. My comparative advantage, especially while conducting field work in Macedonia, was that I was one of them – I had access to the thoughts of the Macedonians, without their suspicion as to what I could be trying to derive from them and for what purposes. In addition, thanks to the fact that Macedonian is my mother tongue, I was not only able to reach the citizens on a very comfortable level, but also listen to and read the news – an indispensable source for this topic for two reasons. For one, much of the information that could be potentially gathered from public institutions such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is still considered confidential (as the issue is ongoing), and thus most of the information on the ongoing negotiations and on the positions of Greece or Macedonia, was either formally announced in press releases, or leaked through the news agencies. The second, and perhaps even more important reason, however, is that the media are a mirror of the climate in the country and the concerns of the citizens – and perhaps this is why so many outsiders have not been able to grasp the gravity of the issue for Macedonians. They have not been able to sense that the “name issue” is, without dramatizing, an obsession of every citizen on an every-

day basis. It is what the elderly gossip about in the privacy of their homes, and what the teenagers rant about on the streets; it is what students joke about in the cafes and what the middle-aged criticize in their offices. It is, as much an obsession for academia as it is for politicians and for factory workers. In short, the “name issue” is the incarnation of a nation-wide bewilderment – the incomprehension of a people who are trying to understand, with disbelief, the indecent proposal they have been offered by their Greek neighbors, and, even more alarmingly, by the international entities they trusted as the guardians of human rights, and the doorkeepers to prosperity and security: the European Union, the United Nations, and NATO. Who else could better understand the gravity of the Macedonians’ awkward state of affairs, than one of them? My added value to the issue, then, has been being able to present it from the perspective of Macedonians, through my field work. In this way, I hope to have revealed some of the characteristics of the dispute which were not visible to the eye of the international academic community, as well as the worldwide public opinion and political thought.

One of the shortcomings of being a Macedonian, on the other hand, was conducting interviews with Greeks. On a positive note, I must admit I was surprised by the readiness with which most of my Greek interlocutors were willing to be interviewed and did not seem threatened by me or my questions – partly because I approached them in their own environment, i.e. their country, while I was part of an English-speaking group of students from Switzerland. In other words, I approached them on a friendly note and from a more international, rather than a bilateral perspective. I imagine, however, that if I had been Greek, they would have confided in me and told me things they did not dare tell a student in Switzerland with Macedonian background. In other words, I felt that, had I been an insider, I would have gathered more diverse categories. Instead, most of my Greek interlocutors were on the “defensive” in trying to prove to me (not only a foreigner and an outsider, but *the other*), why the Greek point of view made sense. In addition, my pool was limited because I did not have a network of friends, and disposed of a limited amount of time. Therefore I chose random people, mostly in bars and shops, while I was out with the rest of the group of students from Switzerland. As such, these turned out to be mostly

men, which were indeed more approachable in bars, but which do not account for a diverse pooling sample. Finally, my sample was limited in terms of cities – Athens and Lesbos – while my first choice of cities would have been Thessaloniki and Florina, for example. However I did not have much choice, as I had purposefully decided to go with on a study visit with the group from Switzerland, knowing that I would be able to approach people much more easily as part of an international group. The only exception to these interviews with Greeks was my interview in Geneva with Dr. Panayote Dimitras, one of the most outspoken human rights activists in Greece, who is highly respected in Europe, and who had an intellectual background and a well-established view. His view, however, represents a very rare opinion in Greece, and is therefore not representative for other reasons.

Given that most of my interviews were conducted in Macedonian, I translated them into English during my transcription. The interviews, therefore, as most of the literature and other documents that were in Macedonian, are my translations. The reader will also notice that many of the interviews are anonymous, while others are not. Thanks to my familiarity to enter into contact with several distinguished individuals, including politicians, analysts, professors, historians, poets and artists, these agreed to have their names disclosed. Many of my other interviewees, however, wished to remain anonymous. I have therefore respected each individual request. In Annex I, I provide a Table of Interviews which gives an overview of all the relevant data of the individuals I interviewed, as well as the date and city in which the interviews took place. The Table of Interviews is separated in eight parts which correspond to the eight trips I undertook to conduct interviews. For clarification's sake, the individuals who wished to remain anonymous have been labeled anonymous according to the five categories in which I have separated my Macedonian interviewees, which are explained in Chapter XIII. Thus, Anonymous Refugee Child 2, is my first anonymous interviewee from Category V (The Refugee Children), while Anonymous Hesitant Tukasni 2 is my second anonymous interviewee from Category III (The Hesitant Tukasni). As I did not place the my Greek interviewees under categories, they are simply referred to as Anonymous Greek 1, and so forth – where they wished to remain anonymous. For those who did not wish to remain anonymous,

whether Macedonian or Greek, their name appears in both the footnote and the Table of Interviews.

On a final methodological note, I would like point out that any written work that concerns Macedonia warrants an explanation of the terms used, as many of these terms, including names of national and ethnic identities, languages, place names, geographic names, names of individuals, origins of peoples and historic figures, and so forth, are referred to and defined differently according to who writes them. This has been the case for work written by foreign and domestic authors alike, and since the 18th century until today. Therefore, in an effort to simplify the task for the reader, I have tried to weave some clarifications in throughout the text.

PART I. THE “NAME ISSUE:” CONTEXT, OVERVIEW, AND POLITICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS

I. THE EXISTING SETTING

“Men have had every advantage of us in telling their own story... the pen has been in their hands. I will not allow books to prove anything.”³⁹

Before delving into the subject matter of this thesis, setting the scene is in order. But setting the scene for this topic requires a bird’s eye view, in addition to a detailed assessment, because a closer examination will only show us that we are too close to the trees to see the forest – as is the case with many other issues. Therefore, in order to paint a well-rounded and well-informed picture of the “name issue”, I deem it necessary to provide at the onset what, to me, are the essential elements for understanding it thoroughly: the foreign interests, their views, and their influence; the neighboring preoccupations; and the domestic political environment – all of which, as one would imagine are, interconnected.

FOREIGN INTERESTS AND THE FOREIGN PEN

*When the West sees us, in other words, the philosophers, the anthropologists, the sociologists, the political scientists – all from their own aspect, they are a bit confused where to stand. When someone is writing something, they have a thesis. They choose a thesis that suits them, as you will when you write your thesis, so as to be able to show, based on their background, that their thesis is valid.*⁴⁰

As we will see in the historical part, many authors – wherever they hail from – link the current “name issue” to the “Macedonian Question,” which was born in the nineteenth century. In fact, the idea that the “name issue” is a revival of the “Macedonian Question” is perhaps the only point on which all authors agree. In addition, they all agree that the “Macedonian Question” was a product of foreign interests. As such, by process of deductive logic, if the source of the “name issue” is the

³⁹ Jane Austen, in *Persuasion*.

⁴⁰ Interview with Ambassador Viktor Gaber, Skopje, 2 September 2013.

“Macedonian Question,” and if the “Macedonian Question” is a product of foreign interests, then the “name issue” is a product of foreign interests.

If it is not a product of foreign interests, then its protracted lifetime and continuous resurrection are at least partly due to foreign interests, and consequently, the foreign pen. Indeed, had there been no foreign interest in Macedonia, we would not have had so much conflicting literature on the region and its people, and so many wayfarers who “happened” to pass through and depict Macedonia and the characteristics of its people starting from the nineteenth century until today in such drastically different ways. It is due to these contributors to the proliferation of literature on the “Macedonian Question” that today the Italians call their fruit salad a *macedonia*, and the French call their vegetable mix a *macédoine de legumes*. But make no mistake: most of these wanderers were not just innocent observers, but emissaries of foreign powers who wrote with a purpose, and that purpose served to defend the interests of their governments. With the exception of a few individuals, such as Miss Stone, the American Protestant Missionary who was kidnapped by the Internal Macedonian-Adrianople Revolutionary Organization and became “America’s first modern hostage crisis” and thereby a legend, most of these writers depicted the peoples and the territory of Macedonia with a certain postulate – namely that Macedonia was a mix of ethnic groups, which were everything but Macedonians.

Those few wayfarers who were not paid emissaries, simply wrote according to what they read and saw, how it was explained to them and how they understood it - based on their linguistic skills, their knowledge (or lack of) and interpretation of history, their professional and academic backgrounds, and so forth. Simply by writing, with all their baggage, they contributed to the proliferation of views and opinions on a topic. Only, the topic was not about pumpkins or the weather – it was about the destiny of a people. It was about who the Macedonians really were, what language they really spoke, and, consequently, who Macedonia really belonged to. At a time when the world romanticized the idea of self-determination (much like it romanticized the idea of democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s), the national self-awareness or ethnicity of peoples went hand in hand with their territorial rights. If the majority of a people on a certain land had a certain national self-awareness, then

that land naturally belonged to that national group. So when these passers-by – innocent or paid – wrote about Macedonia and depicted its peoples, they created the “Macedonian Question,” and by doing so, paved the way to the “name issue.” Only this time, the “question” or “issue” is not so much about the Macedonian territory (at least not overtly) but about the legacy of ancient, medieval, and recent Macedonian history. What remains the same in both “questions” or “issues” is that there is an effort to prove or disprove the identity of the Macedonian people and their language, in order to have exclusivity over the land of Macedonia in the first case, and the history of Macedonia in the second case.

Let me explain what I am trying to say here. I started off this part in an attempt to provide an overview of literature on the “name issue.” However when I started writing, I could not stop feeling disturbed at my recollections of the foreign literature I had read, and how these foreign authors had perceived and depicted Macedonia and Macedonians. I kept analyzing the background of these authors and trying to discern the underlying reasons for their positions. I realized that these were exactly the thoughts and feelings of injustice – of being discriminated against – that I should share in this thesis.

As I mentioned earlier, little scholarly study has been done on the “name issue”; there was certainly much more interest in the “Macedonian Question” a century ago, although this is beginning to change. James Pettifer will note in 1999 that “[a]s one of the states emerging from the collapse of the second Yugoslavia, between 1990 and 1995, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (*FYROM*) has attracted intermittent newspaper and other media coverage in connection with the protracted disputes about its name, but little scholarly study compared with the Balkan states which have been militarily involved in the ex-Yugoslav crisis in the last decade. Nevertheless, the territory of *FYROM* occupies an important strategic point in the southern Balkans, and the ‘Macedonian Question’ in its historic dimension has been one of the most intractable and difficult Balkan conflicts...”⁴¹

⁴¹ James Pettifer, “Introduction,” in *The New Macedonian Question*, ed. James Pettifer (New York: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999, 2001), xxxvii. (emphasis added: please note that *FYROM* is an acronym that is seen as condescending by Macedonians)

At best, there are isolated articles published in acclaimed and not so acclaimed journals here and there, between 1993 and 2015, as well as articles within edited books. However it has been very rare to find a book written by a single author who dedicated his or her entire research to the “name dispute.” From what does exist, there are diversified and sometimes even contradictory analyses of the situation, and the authors embrace mixed interests in depicting it, much like the work written the nineteenth and twentieth centuries on the “Macedonian Question.”

Indeed, even one of the earliest edited volumes dedicated to the “name dispute,” precisely James Pettifer’s *The New Macedonian Question* published in 1999, which rightly traces the roots of the “name issue” to the “Macedonian Question,” does not escape this plight of controversy. For starters, although Pettifer engages in a genuine attempt to describe the situation, he still calls Macedonia *FYROM* which is seen as condescending my Macedonians. Incidentally, at the time of publication, he was a Visiting Professor in the Institute of Balkan Studies, in Thessaloniki, Greece.

In “The Origin of the Macedonian Dispute” – the first chapter in Pettifer’s edited volume – Elisabeth Barker traces the roots of the “name dispute” to the nineteenth century, and, more precisely, to the “Macedonian Question,” which she defines as the result of Great Power interests, and which, as mentioned earlier, most authors, Macedonian and foreign alike, have agreed upon. One can detect, however, the complete absence of the mention of Macedonians in her text. Instead, she refers to “Slavs” which we will consider as Macedonians for the purposes of this thesis, especially when citing texts referring to that period of time. The reason will become more clear as one reads along, but suffice to say that it appears that when an author could not quite prove that a people was Serb, Bulgarian or Greek, they simply used the generic term “Slav” for political and geostrategic purposes. Denoting the people as Macedonian, in a land called Macedonia, would have sabotaged any territorial interests that involved any of these three countries, and their allies from among the Great Powers.)

I would like to point out here the influence of past texts regarding the “Macedonian Question” on current foreign authors’ use of the word “Macedonians,” and thereby, their absence of acknowledgment of the existence of a separate

Macedonian identity. Although all use the word “Macedonians” at some point or another, they do so with caution, substituting it mostly with the word “Slavs” and sometimes rather ambiguously contradicting their own previous statements. Take the following examples as cases in point. Barker, in a section entitled “Macedonia: the country and the people,” states that “[i]n regard to their own national feelings, all that can safely be said is that during the last eighty years many more Slav Macedonians seem to have considered themselves Bulgarian, or closely linked with Bulgaria, than have considered themselves Serbian, or closely linked with Serbia (or Yugoslavia). Only the people of the Skopje region, in the north-west, have ever shown much tendency to regard themselves as Serbs. The feeling of being Macedonians, and nothing but Macedonians, seems to be a sentiment of fairly recent growth, and even today is not very deep-rooted.”⁴²

This kind of depiction of the reality ignores the political circumstances on the ground and the fact that, in the absence of having their own independent nation-state, the Macedonians, as we shall see in the historical analysis part, had to lobby the interests of their neighboring countries’ in order to strive for their own ultimate cause. It also portrays the author’s leanings – and thus the pro-Bulgarian and anti-Serbian interests of Great Britain. Incidentally, Barker was a leading British authority on South East Europe for many years, and worked as a Reuters correspondent in the Balkans and as a Diplomatic Correspondent for the BBC.⁴³

Four pages on, speaking about the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 and the 1895 Supreme Committee organized in Sofia, Bulgaria, by Macedonian refugees to struggle for the “liberation” of Macedonia, as she puts it, Barker contradicts herself. At first, she correctly explains that to this Committee, the “liberation” of Macedonia meant its annexation to Bulgaria. But she omits many of the political nuances, which had to do with Macedonians satisfying strategic partners’ interests, in order to win their support momentarily. Thus, the fact that this Committee had plans to annex to Bulgaria did not mean that it had no secret plan to gain autonomy from Bulgaria after Bulgaria had freed Macedonia from the Ottoman Empire. Although there are several

⁴² Elisabeth Barker, “The origin of the Macedonian dispute,” in *The New Macedonian Question*, ed. James Pettifer (New York: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999, 2001), 5.

⁴³ James Pettifer, “Notes on the contributors,” in *The New Macedonian Question*, *op.cit.*, xxxii.

contradictory versions of the ultimate goal of this particular group – whether autonomous Macedonia or annexation to Bulgaria – any unbiased author would have at least made readers aware of different versions. Where Barker contradicts herself, is when she states that “Next year, however [1896], a more genuinely Macedonian body was formed: the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, led by two Macedonians, both nationalist-minded school-teachers, Damian Gruev and Gotse Delchev.”⁴⁴ How is it possible, that in 1950, when Barker first writes her contribution, she states that “The feeling of being Macedonians, and nothing but Macedonians, seems to be a sentiment of fairly recent growth,” when several pages down, she talks of a “genuinely Macedonian body” formed more than fifty years earlier, in 1896, “led by two Macedonians, both nationalist-minded?” Incidentally, in the same volume, Jens Reuter places the birth of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation in 1883, in Salonica (Thessaloniki, Greek Macedonia), which at that time was one of the three vilayets of Macedonia of the Ottoman Empire. I think that the reader begins to understand the inconsistencies within one author’s depiction of Macedonia and Macedonians, not to mention the discrepancies between several authors. I purposefully point out these contradictions, because they have contributed to over a century of confusion about the Macedonian identity, which kept the “Macedonian Question” alive and today keep the “name issue” kindling.

Another contradiction appears several pages down. Speaking of the alliances of Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria with the Great Powers in quest for Macedonian territory, Barker states that “[t]he Bulgarians might have resented the loss of Skopje to Serbia, but they would have received reasonable compensation in the south-east half of Slav Macedonia where the population was most nearly Bulgarian.”⁴⁵ Two pages down, speaking of WWI in 1915 when Bulgaria joined the Axes Powers, and occupied the whole of “Serbian Macedonia and the eastern section of Greek Macedonia,” Barker states that “The Bulgarian authorities set to work ‘Bulgarising’ the Slavs of Macedonia, and incidentally forcing them to change their surname suffixes to ‘-ov.’”⁴⁶ If these “Slavs” were not Bulgarian and had to be Bulgarised, then who were they? Why does

⁴⁴ Elisabeth Barker, *op.cit.*, 9-10.

⁴⁵ Elisabeth Barker, *op.cit.*, 11.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

she not simply call them “Macedonians” but instead uses the generic term “Slavs” which could mean any people living in the region extending from the Vardar River to the Ural Mountains, and beyond?

Like Barker and most of the other foreign authors, Pettifer also falls into the trap of alluding to the Macedonians as an amorphous mass, a population without an identity: “... unlike Serbia or Greece, in Macedonia there was basically no homogeneous population that could form the basis of a new nation-state. There was, however, and still is, a plainly dominant majority in the cultural sense, in that there are more people of Slavonic origin living there than of any other group – but only within a patchwork of extreme complexity, with Turks, Greeks, Albanians, Vlachs, Pomaks and Gypsies living alongside the Slavonic majority; and, moreover, that majority is itself subdivided into Serbian, Bulgarian and ‘Macedonian’ elements.”⁴⁷ Note how he recognizes that there is a Macedonian element, but he puts it in quotation marks, as opposed to Serbian and Bulgarian.

Further on, Pettifer makes another contradictory remark, as with the many authors, when referring to the population statistics, which, as we will also see in the historic part, have varied widely: “Under the Ottoman regime no detailed statistics were kept of the Macedonian population, and substantial changes in numbers were caused by the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 [following which previously Ottoman Macedonia was divided into four parts, each acquired by Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Albania]. But according to Foreign Office papers from 1918 there were in the ethnic territory of Macedonia, before 1912, about 1,150,000 Slavs, 400,000 Turks, 120,000 Albanians, 300,000 Greeks, 200,000 Vlachs, 100,000 Jews and 10,000 Gypsies. Although these figures would probably be disputed, then and now, by partisans of the different nationalities, there seems to be no reason why they should not be taken as at least a rough approximation of the position at that time. Although there have been substantial changes since, they have not produced a more homogeneous population, merely changed the mixture. [T]he main developments have been ... the open split of the Slavonic group into Serbian and Macedonian identities.”⁴⁸ Here is where the

⁴⁷ James Pettifer, “The new Macedonian question,” in *The New Macedonian Question*, *op. cit.*, 16.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 16–17.

contradiction regarding Macedonians lies. At first, he mentions the existence of a “subdivided majority into Serbian, Bulgarian and ‘Macedonian’ elements,” when referring to the population during the Ottoman Empire and until 1918, and then, on the next page, when speaking of current demographic statistics, he argues that there was a “split of the Slavonic group into Serbian and Macedonian identities.”⁴⁹ How could there have been a split, when these same peoples earlier in the century, identified themselves as being either Serbian or Macedonian, as he himself writes?

This contradictory stance and the constant cautiousness around the subject of the existence of a separate Macedonian people has plagued Macedonians for a long time, and is really the crux of the matter of the “name issue,” when Macedonians are concerned. The policy of “*not* calling a spade a spade” is perhaps the most exasperating burden on Macedonians throughout these past two centuries, and it is partly this burden that has made the “name dispute” for Macedonians so heavy to bear. This frustration is depicted by the following opening words of a newspaper entitled *Macedonian Nation*, which had been initiated in 1971, under Yugoslavia, the publication of which was re-launched in 2009:

“[...] ‘*Macedonian Nation*.’ The newspaper which was long awaited by all Macedonians worldwide. The paper, in which they could read about themselves, about their country, about their loved ones. But also the paper whose main role was to talk about that which was forbidden. To speak the truth about the Macedonians, the truth about Macedonia, the truth that was concealed. The truth about religion, history, national belonging ... about us Macedonians expelled, silenced, tortured and killed. The truth about Macedonia, its independence, the role of foreign countries, the role of neighboring countries. The truth about everything that contributed to voice the opinion of the conscious Macedonians. Macedonians who love their country, their piece of land, their language and their identity.

You might say too many similarities for a period of fifty years !? Definitely so, it’s a fact. But it’s also a fact that the quest of Macedonians never dies. It lives in all of us. It lives in these turbulent times, when, once again, someone is trying to take away our dignity; our guiding thoughts, which we have nurtured for years back; our right to our own thought and determination.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

They say, time changes everything, but the pain remains. And it is true. Now at the time of democracy in Europe we again face the same, only modified pain.

Again someone wants to say that we are something else.

Again someone wants to take our feeling of happiness.

Again someone wants to change history, to neglect the facts, to distort things. But we will not allow it.

We know that we are Macedonians. We know that we cannot be anything else but Macedonians. Great or small as you wish!

That is why again, '*Macedonian nation*.'⁵⁰

All of the foreign literature referred to above not only refuses to recognize the existence of a separate ethnic Macedonian identity, but thereby ignores the incredible movement for the Macedonian self-determination and autonomy since the end of the eighteenth century. Ironically, at that time, world leaders such as Lord Byron did recognize Macedonians – and even called for their independence as we will see in the historical part – while the Macedonian movement for autonomy was buttressed by some of the most courageous uprisings and most terrible terrorist attacks in Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The recently produced Macedonian movie which is set in 1907 in Macedonia, *To the Hilt (Do Balcak)*, depicts these times.⁵¹

To establish a parallel, it would be like non-recognizing the Irish as a separate ethnic and linguistic group, in spite of their ethnic and linguistic differences from the English, and in spite of manifest declarations of feeling different and wanting to be separate, including terrorist attacks. In other words, it would be like calling the Irish “English” or “Anglo-Saxons” – and refusing to pronounce the word “Irish” to designate them. Yet no one seems to question the existence of a separate ethnic group called the Irish, in spite of the fact that in greater part of the 20th century, most of them spoke English and not a word of Gaelic – a trend which drastically began to change thanks to the rise of awareness of the danger of extinction of many languages in Europe, and various policies by the European Union in this direction.

⁵⁰ Mane Jakovleski, “Why ‘Macedonian Nation?’”, *Macedonian Nation*, 17 June, 2009, Available at <http://www.mn.mk/zosto-makedonska-nacija-2009>

⁵¹ *To the Hilt (Do Balcak)*, 2014, Official Movie Trailer, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=35q1sKuUypw>

Like the rest of contributors to the Pettifer volume, Jens Reuter also has his contradictions, or, shall we say, his preconceived ideas about when the Macedonian consciousness was really born. “In the 1930s there was a split within the ranks of VMRO. One, more influential wing of VMRO rejected the pro-Bulgarian orientation and proclaimed a distinct Macedonian national consciousness, wishing to combine the three parts into a single united and independent Macedonia.”⁵² This distinct national consciousness, according to Macedonian authors, as we will see in the historic part, came much earlier than the 1930s. Reuter continues to say that in fact, the Macedonian national sentiment was created by Tito’s Yugoslavia:

“But this national consciousness did not include all Macedonians. The midwife to the Macedonian national sentiment was the Yugoslav Communist Party, which at the end of the Second World War established a Macedonian constituent republic. This act of the establishment of an individual nation with the right to a unified nation-state, resulted, according to Troebst, in the anchoring of the new Macedonian national ideology in the people; all this, even though the Yugoslav Communist Party leadership had to give up its initially offensive Macedonian policy with regard to Greece and Bulgaria. The establishment of the Republic of Macedonia was later presented in Yugoslav statements as the ‘final settlement of the Macedonian national question.’ In addition to the statehood thus won, the development of an individual literary language was of special significance. Philologists accepted the assigned task, sticking to the principle that the new language must differ as far as possible from Bulgarian. Historians also tried to present a picture of a nation which had always existed. The establishment of an autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church in 1958, which was not recognized by Greece, Bulgaria or Serbia, followed the same line.”⁵³

This line of thinking also concords with the official Greek point of view. Needless to say, the Macedonian point of view – official, academic, and social – drastically differs from this, but more will be said on it in the historical section.

Interestingly, then, the proliferation of ideas about Macedonian identity which was ignited by the “Macedonian Question” in the nineteenth century, is starting to

⁵² Jens Reuter, “Policy and economy in Macedonia,” in *The New Macedonian Question*, ed. James Pettifer (New York: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999, 2001), 30.

⁵³ Jens Reuter, “Policy and economy in Macedonia,” *op.cit.*, 30.

repeat itself with the “name issue” in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This brings me back to my own deduction from this short and incomplete but telling literature analysis, namely that foreign authors who have been interested in the “Macedonian Question” and the “name dispute” fail to analyze the issue from the aspect of the right of the Macedonian people to self-determination. What is more, they either circumvent this issue entirely, or briefly touch upon some version of previous foreign texts, most of which place the rise of a Macedonian self-consciousness as part of a Bulgarian project in the nineteenth century, or Yugoslav project in the twentieth century. Very few authors – with a handful of notable exceptions – dedicate the rise of the Macedonian self-consciousness as a purely Macedonian initiative, and rare are those who define the predominant population of the region of Macedonia, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as Macedonians. Apart from the geo-strategic interests that these authors refer to regarding the “Macedonian Question,” they too have a contribution to the “name issue”, by non-recognizing the Macedonian identity, or constantly referring to Macedonians in an ambiguous manner. As Andrew Rossos would point out in an ambitious volume on the history of Macedonia and the Macedonians:

“The struggle for Macedonia—an irreconcilable competition for Macedonians’ “hearts and minds” by Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian nationalisms—did not increase the knowledge about and understanding of the land and its people. It only made a bad situation worse: it transformed ignorance into confusion. By denying Macedonian identity or by claiming the Macedonians, the Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs created two false but lasting perceptions: first, that the Macedonians were Bulgarians or Greeks or Serbs and, second, that Macedonia was a hopeless ethnic mix, a *mélange*.”⁵⁴

A TRIVIAL COMEDY FOR SERIOUS DIPLOMATS?

I try not to diminish people’s international conflicts as silly ... but if Mexico decided to call itself Kentucky I would be fine with it. It is incomprehensible for an American. We have a Georgia in America, and former Soviet Republic is now also Georgia, and so what?! It’s all cool! There’s New York which used to be New Amsterdam... Then the Dutch

⁵⁴ Andrew Rossos, *Macedonia and the Macedonians: A History* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press Publication, 2008), xix.

sold it to the British, so they had to come up with a name. And there you have it, there's a York in England and a New York in the United States, and the Brits don't care. I'm from Illinois, we have a Cairo and a Vienna in Illinois, but I guarantee to you that the population in Cairo in Illinois is not Egyptian, though there may be an Egyptian driver here and there. There's a Val d'Aosta in the American Georgia, except, as opposed the one in Italy, they just rammed all the letters together, and left out one of the "a"s, so it's Valdosta. ... I understand the Greeks though. But there are a lot of Greek names that are in places where there are no ethnic Greeks. There's an Athens in Georgia! And an Ithaca in New York. I'm just trying to point out that if it's annoying to have a different ethnicity living in a place that has a name from your culture, then there's a whole lot of annoyance to be had. I mean, spread it around a little!⁵⁵

Not only do foreign authors and foreign interests play their part in the creation of the "Macedonian Question" and thus the "name issue"; but at the same time, they diminish its importance as minor and technical. Interestingly enough, although as just described, throughout the last two centuries there seems to have been, a vested interest in Macedonia on behalf of neighboring countries and the Great Powers on a continuous basis – this vested interest being translated into the "Macedonian Question" which in turn is being increasingly diagnosed as the precursor to the "name issue" – the "name issue" is being perceived by these same actors as "silly" or "unimportant," to use their words.

Take for instance, the following example. When during a lecture at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva on October 12, 2011, I asked former President of the Swiss Confederation and President of the United Nations General Assembly, Joseph Deiss, what he thought about the "name issue", he replied that there were other, more important issues to be concerned about in the international affairs of the day. If only he knew how much importance his predecessors had given to the "Macedonian Question" in the late 1940s, during the Greek Civil War, when the question was resurrected for the second time. If only my anonymous American interviewee had known how much importance his own diplomats had allotted to this same question. But I shall refer to these in more detail in another chapter.

⁵⁵ Interview with an American, Geneva, December 29, 2015.

THE CURRENT POLITICAL BACKGROUND

In the past few months, Macedonia has been besieged by destabilizing factors, from within as well as from the outside, which culminated in the resignation of Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski on January 24, 2016, the instauration of a “technical government” in his stead, and preliminary elections planned for April 24, 2016 subsequently delayed until December 11, 2016. How did it all start? In October 2014, political opposition party leader Zoran Zaev, publicly announced that he had compromising material against all members of Government and Parliament, the media, and other political leaders from both the Government and the opposition, in the form of telephone recordings, which he called “bombs,” and which he had received in cooperation with a specific foreign intelligence service. Since September, 2014, he had met with the Prime Minister on several occasions, threatening him to accept his request to form a technocratic government, and to later organize preliminary parliamentary elections. If the Prime Minister accepted this proposal, the opposition party leader would not publish the recordings.⁵⁶ The opposition party had been boycotting the parliament during the previous months, with the argument that they did not recognize the parliamentary elections (which had occurred in April, 2014). The Prime Minister refused to give in to the blackmailing, and Zaev pursued to issue the taped telephone conversations. He started in February and has not stopped since. This created an ambiance of hatred between supporters of the opposition party, and those of the Government in power.

Then on April 21, 2015 at 2:30 AM, several policemen who were on duty in the border patrol police station near the village of Gosince (Lipkovo County), on the Macedonian border with Kosovo, were attacked by 40 well-armed and masked gunmen with Kosovo Liberation Army insignia on their uniforms, who spoke Albanian amongst themselves. According to the spokesperson of the Macedonian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the gunmen captured four policemen, handcuffed them, repeatedly hit

⁵⁶ Александра Митевска, “Пуч пукна пред бомбата, *Утрински Весник*, 01.02.2015 (Aleksandra Mitevaska, “A putsch fired before the bomb,” *Utrinski Vesnik*, February 1, 2015): <http://www.utriniski.mk/?ItemID=0068DE9987468D488C89086D6A094F64>

them, and recorded a video in which the leader, speaking in Albanian, with a translator who spoke in a broken Macedonian with Serbian words in it, who said: “We are the Kosovo Liberation Army. Send the message that neither Ahmeti nor Gruevski can save you. We want our country and we don’t want the Ohrid Agreement. No one shall be allowed to come north. If you, or anyone else is caught again, we will liquidate all of you.”⁵⁷ The armed group took the weapons from the police station, broke the phones, and ordered the policemen to stay put for thirty minutes, while they left. This event was reminiscent of the 2001 incident which nearly sparked a full-scale civil war in Macedonia. The Ministry of Interior classified it as a terrorist attack.

Even more recently, on May 9, 2015, at 4:30 AM, in the neighbourhood of “Divo Naselje” in the city of Kumanovo, also near the Kosovo border, a massive shootout began between policemen and an estimated 70 armed men,⁵⁸ resulting in the death of 8 policemen, and 37 injured.

What is interesting to note here is the international response to these incidents. Much to the contrary of what one may have expected on the issue of recorded phone conversations between government officials (which made Nixon resign due to the Watergate scandal, and which has earned WikiLeaks author Julian Assange an international arrest warrant), in the Macedonian case, the West has applauded the opposition party leader for attempting to topple a “non-democratic” regime. Meanwhile, western media sources seem to have launched a media campaign depicting Macedonia as an authoritarian state. This, despite of the fact that the party in power was elected and re-elected by an overwhelming majority twice, and despite of the fact that the Prime Minister consistently ranks highest in popularity among all politicians in Macedonia. As *EurActiv*, the leading EU news source put it in an article entitled “EU, US ‘cast serious doubt’ on Macedonia’s commitment to democracy:”

“The United States and major European powers on Monday [11 May] questioned the Macedonian government’s commitment to democracy and European values over its failure to address

⁵⁷ “Вооружена група од Косово ја нападна караулата во Гошинце,” *Вест*, 21.04.2015. (“Armed group from Kosovo attacks the border patrol police station in Gosince,” *Vest*, 21 April 2015) <http://www.vest.mk/default.asp?ItemID=80BD3FAA8B868048AA8C2A30D1A7356F>

⁵⁸ Дванаесет повредени полицајци во престрелка во Куманово, *Vest*, 09 May 2015 : <http://24vesti.mk/dvanaeset-povredeni-policajci-vo-prestrelka-vo-kumanovo>

allegations of abuse of power, piling pressure on leader Nikola Gruevski following a weekend of bloodshed. The unusually strong rebuke follows months of damaging opposition disclosures from taped conversations involving Gruevski and his closest allies that the West says raise serious questions about the state of democracy in the ex-Yugoslav republic. Gruevski's government on Saturday ordered a police operation at dawn against what it called ethnic Albanian 'terrorists' in the northern, ethnically-mixed town of Kumanovo, triggering a gun battle in which eight police and 14 alleged gunmen died. The bloodshed recalled an ethnic conflict in 2001 that took Macedonia to the brink of civil war before Western diplomacy intervened. But it also drew accusations from the country's Albanian minority and Gruevski's opponent that the government was trying to create a diversion."⁵⁹

While some taped conversations may raise some eyebrows, there is nothing that would give room to such a strong, quick, determined, and one-sided reaction by Western states. Note how the newspaper succinctly uses words that imply that the government cannot be trusted, that it created a diversion, that the gunmen were alleged gunmen, and so forth. This portrays the European Union perspective, and the fact that this Government, which has been in power since 2006, has not been a favorite of the West. This also seems to hint, as some analysts have implied, that there are higher interests at stake, and that the current Government in power does not satisfy them. The author goes on to state that "The West called for a thorough investigation of what went on, and the ambassadors of the United States, the European Union, Britain, Germany, France and Italy met Gruevski on Monday for talks scheduled prior to the weekend violence. In a statement read out by U.S. ambassador Jess Baily, the envoys criticized Skopje's failure to address the 'many allegations of government wrongdoings arising from the disclosures' published by opposition leader Zoran Zaev. 'This continued inaction casts serious doubt on the government of Macedonia's commitment to democratic principles and values of the Euro-Atlantic community,' they said, adding that lack of concrete action will 'undermine

⁵⁹ "EU, US 'cast serious doubt' on Macedonia's commitment to democracy." *EurActiv*, May 12, 2015. <http://www.euractiv.com/sections/enlargement/eu-us-cast-serious-doubt-macedonias-commitment-democracy-314518?hootPostID=36287270b539e6b81244f5a689471577>

Macedonia's progress toward EU and NATO membership.”⁶⁰ The article was written one day after the terrorist attack on Macedonia.

Western news sources and politicians were quick to put the blame on the Macedonian Government, without so much as waiting for a proper analysis of the situation. This attitude, in spite of serious recent allegations of human organ trafficking by the Kosovo Liberation Army during the Kosovo Crisis, as investigated by the 2011-established international Special Investigative Task Force (SITF). As is cited in the same news site, EurActiv, “European Union Special Investigative Task Force (SITF) Chief Prosecutor Ambassador Clint Williamson said on Tuesday [May 12, 2015] that the SITF has found “compelling evidence” of serious violations of international humanitarian law, including crimes against humanity and war crimes, against former senior officials of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).”⁶¹ Incidentally, members of the Kosovo Liberation Army were implicated in the 2001 conflict in Macedonia, and in the recent, April 24th and May 9-10, 2015 shootouts.

It is interesting to take note of the Russian analytical point of view on the situation. As Balkans expert Konstantin Kachalin argues in an article entitled “США готовят в Македонии «цветную революцию» против «Турецкого потока»” (USA cooking a “colored revolution” in Macedonia against the “Turkish Stream”) in the popular Russian federal online news service Regnum, the United States is preparing a revolution in Macedonia to stop the natural gas pipeline plans that would connect Turkey and Russia via Macedonia. “Washington is igniting a ‘Bulgarian spectacle’ in Skopje,” reads the subtitle. Kachalin states that it was the opposition party which seized government buildings, with over 2,000 protesters burning garbage containers, bringing down the fence of a Government building, and causing the injury of 20 people, including 13 policemen. These, he says, were tied to an external factor: “Americans are clearly not satisfied with the country’s current Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski... After the February riots organized by ‘Soros –backed’ Zoran Zaev, the State Department has not calmed down. United States Ambassador Jess Bailey sided with

⁶⁰ “EU, US ‘cast serious doubt’ on Macedonia’s commitment to democracy,” *op.cit.*

⁶¹ “‘Compelling indications’ of human organ trafficking during Kosovo war, say EU investigators.” *EurActiv*, May 13, 2014. <http://www.euractiv.com/video/compelling-indications-human-organ-trafficking-during-kosovo-war-say-eu-investigators-307754>

the leader of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) Zaev, and pumped him with money and instructions and decided to push back against the authorities immediately after Macedonia agreed upon the construction of the Turkish section of the stream on its territory. This is not included in the plans of the White House. Obama does not want 'Gasprom' to take root in the Balkans. Washington prevented the construction of the South Stream in Bulgaria through his ward, Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov, who constantly blackmailed Moscow. Now the Bulgarian show 'is playing in Skopje.' Bad luck only that Gruevski is an experienced politician. He does not give in to blackmail, behaves as honestly and says to his constituents that he will never allow Macedonia to be led by people who are funded by the United States. In late winter the Americans tried to organize a "color revolution" in the country. This attempt was a failed 'putsch.'"⁶² Kachalin goes further to state that the United States had made several attempts in overthrowing Gruevski, through Zaev. According to Kachalin, the United States strategy was that if the opposition failed to dismantle the government, then the Albanian factor would, and this, with the help of Kosovo's leader Hachim Thaci, who had extensive experience in the business of creating conflict. Allegedly, Pristina and Tirana did not hide the fact that they were ready to create a zone of instability in Macedonia, and that Albania had helped create the war in 2001, when the north-west part of Macedonia was under full control of the National Liberation Army, commanded by Thaci's friend, Ali Ahmeti, who is today leader of the most powerful Albanian party in Macedonia, and Member of Parliament. Kachalin makes a parallel to the events in Tunisia and to Tahrir square in Cairo.⁶³

The Russian theory may not be too far from the truth. In any case, some francophone analysts also seem to align with that point, as the following title of an article hints, "Troubles en Macédoine : une main étrangère de plus en plus visible."⁶⁴ This article, which was published by the political association "Egalité et Réconciliation" created in France in 2007, quotes the television station RT (Russian

⁶² Konstantin Kachalin, "США готовят в Македонии 'цветную революцию' против 'Турецкого потока,'" (USA cooking a "colored revolution" against the "Turkish Stream" *Regnum*, May 7. 2015.) <http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1922213.html>

⁶³ Konstantin Kachalin, *op.cit.*

⁶⁴ "Troubles en Macédoine: une main étrangère de plus en plus visible ?" *Egalité et Réconciliation*, 15 mai 2015. <http://www.egaliteetreconciliation.fr/Troubles-en-Macedoine-une-main-etrangere-de-plus-en-plus-visible-32916.html>

Television) article published on May 14, 2015, the subtitle of which reads: “Alors que le gouvernement macédonien rencontre les dirigeants de l’opposition pour négocier la résolution d’une profonde crise politique qui secoue le pays, certains analystes se demandent si l’Occident ne tire pas les ficelles en sous-main.” The author continues : “Alors que les Etats-Unis et l’Union européenne ont mis en doute dans une déclaration officielle ‘l’attachement de la Macédoine au principes démocratiques et aux valeurs de la communauté euro-atlantique’, le réalisateur serbo-américain Boris Malagurski a estimé dans une interview à RT que ce message confirme que la crise politique que connaît le pays est orchestrée depuis l’étranger. ‘C’est une allusion qui dit que soit les autorités macédoniennes font ce que les Etats-Unis veulent, soit ils verront leur pays déchiré par les violences, la déstabilisation et la guerre civile’, a déclaré Malagurski, en soulignant que le projet russe de faire passer le gazoduc ‘Turkish stream’ par le territoire de la Macédoine inquiétait passablement Washington qui voit d’un mauvais œil la montée de l’influence russe dans ce pays.”⁶⁵

On June 2, 2015, Victoria Nuland, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs at the United States Department of State (interestingly, the same woman who was accused of stirring the conflict between Ukraine and Russia), flew into Macedonia to mediate a resolution between the Government and the opposition. After a full night of talks, the government, the opposition and Victoria Nuland came out at 4:00 AM, with a “solution.” The solution was that the current Government resign in January, 2016, and a “technical government” be put in place for three months, until April, 2016, when new elections would be held. In the meantime, the Government was pressured to change its Minister of Interior, the Public Prosecutor, and several other key positions. Some speculations in the media suggested that the Government had shot itself in the foot with this “solution,” under pressure from the United States. Apparently, during the three months before elections, the Prime Minister and other key party members would be arrested on grounds of corruption – this being the only period during which the current (democratically elected) Government would not enjoy immunity.

⁶⁵ “Macédoine: et si la controverse ethnique n’était pas la seule raison de la crise?” RT en français, 14 mai 2015. <http://francais.rt.com/international/2378-macedoine-pourparlers-etats-unis-crise>

On July 13, 2015, Victoria Nuland paid another visit to Macedonia, meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and leaders of the main political parties, in order to confirm the strategic determination of Macedonia's membership in NATO and the European Union. Just before her second visit to Macedonia in a month, she had spoken at a forum in Dubrovnik, Slovenia, where she said: "Our message to Macedonia is equally tough: every opportunity for unity and prosperity awaits you; NATO and EU membership await you. But the major political forces must stop squabbling and get on the path to democratic reform sketched out by EU Commissioner Johannes Hahn with US support, and then move on to settle the "name issue" with Greece. Again, don't squander this moment."⁶⁶

In November, 2015, the European Commission came out with its latest annual Progress Report for the readiness of Macedonia to enter the European Union, in which it stated clearly that it recommends Macedonia for membership, however that changing the name would be a condition for this membership.

On December 16, 2015, *The Guardian* published an article with the following headline: "Macedonian PM open to dialogue on name dispute to end 24-year row with Greece."⁶⁷ According to the article, the Prime Minister had said he was willing to reopen dialogue on the issue with Greece, provided that a referendum was organized to ask the Macedonian citizens' opinion first: "'We would like as soon as possible to go to dialogue with Greece to find a solution, and if we find a solution we have to go to the citizens and organize a referendum,' said Gruevski. Through dialogue we have to find some solution, and after that to ask the citizens: is this right or not right?' [The authors of the article continued to state that] "on both sides there are other signals that the long-running dispute could be solved. Ahead of a visit to Athens on Thursday, Skopje's foreign minister, Nikola Poposki, voiced optimism, telling the leading Greek daily, Kathimerini, that 'conditions are more than ripe' for the name row to be resolved. The visit, the first in 15 years, suggests that with Greece on its knees

⁶⁶ "Victoria Nuland will visit Macedonia," Kurir.mk (Macedonian Online News Agency), posted by Kristina, 13 July, 2015, Available at <http://kurir.mk/en/?p=47530>

⁶⁷ Helena Smith and Patrick Kingsley, "Macedonian PM open to dialogue on name dispute to end 24-year row with Greece," *The Guardian*, December 16, 2015, viewed at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/16/macedonia-open-to-changing-its-name-to-end-24-year-dispute-with-greece>

economically and Europe's refugee crisis engulfing both, the Balkan neighbors are finally laying the ground for compromise."⁶⁸

Whether – and if so, how – all these events are correlated, is unclear. It does seem awkward, however, that after 24 years, there should be such an urgency on the part of the Macedonian government to resolve the “name issue”, when the context of political unrest would logically be the worst moment to ask the Macedonian citizens for their vote on an issue of such importance to their future. It seems certainly unfair on the part of the European Union and the United States to pressure a small country to take such a big step at such a difficult and inconvenient time.

It appears that the Balkans continue to be a playground for the “Great Powers” of the old times, and that incidents ignited from the outside continue to play a role in sparking political inter-ethnic tensions, and ultimately civil war. Take, for example, the incident in October 2014, when a drone carrying the Albanian flag was flown over the Belgrade stadium in the middle of the football match between Serbia and Albania. Although the European Commission labelled it as a “provocative” incident, many analysts in the Balkans, accused the European Union for having a role in it.⁶⁹ In whose interest and for what reason another conflict in the Balkans would be, is out of scope of this thesis, although it would be interesting to view the “name dispute” from that angle as well.

Meanwhile, the Macedonian Government saw the attack as an external attempt to destabilize Macedonia and to create inter-ethnic tensions. Macedonian President, Gjorge Ivanov, blamed the partnering (NATO alliance) countries that they did not cooperate with Macedonia to break up the terrorist group. As is stated in the online version of the newspaper *Republika* “Macedonia's National Security Council extended condolences Sunday afternoon for the lost lives and strongly condemned the attempt to destabilize Macedonia, stated Macedonia's President, Gjorge Ivanov in his address to the public after the Council's meeting. Ivanov said that foreign state bodies have had information on the dangerous group and had been making consults, while Macedonia had sent cooperation requests to 17 partnering countries, but none of

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ “EU denies 'role' in Serbia-Albania football match flag stunt.” *EurActiv*, October 10, 2014. <http://www.euractiv.com/video/eu-denies-role-serbia-albania-football-match-flag-stunt-309209>

them had replied in a manner that might help prevent the clash in Kumanovo and the loss of human lives.”⁷⁰

Paradoxically, while the Macedonian President called on 17 EU and NATO partner countries to help Macedonia handle the terrorist situation, and to speed up the procedure of getting Macedonia on board NATO and the EU in order to ensure more stability,⁷¹ these same entities warned the Macedonian Government that if it did not respond “democratically” to the attacks launched by the opposition party (which interestingly enough came at the same time as the armed group attacks) then the country’s chances to become a member of either organization would be minimized.

How to explain these diametrically opposed views of the same situation? Without getting into more details of these incidents, they suffice to depict the full picture of the context in which the “name issue” is continuously being dealt with. In spite of the attempt of the Government to focus on the economic development of the country, and to shed another light on it, other than the one of yet another powder-keg in the Balkans, which is the thesis promoted by many so-called analysts. Indeed, the Government had done everything to put Macedonia on a more flourishing path, including the establishment of a Foreign Investment Agency with a fresh Harvard graduate at its head, and the opening of two new ministerial positions with the title “Foreign Investment Minister” at which Macedonian American businessmen were named. Following years of grueling work, the reforms paid. In 2015, over fifty foreign investors had just given their oaths to invest in Macedonia, and in the past ten years many companies had set sail in the country’s free economic industrial zone, including Johnson Matthey and Johnson Controls, to name a few. This was buttressed by a media campaign, with clips on CNN depicting “Macedonia [as] Timeless” and articles in all financial newspapers in the world enticing investors to “Invest in Macedonia.” The World Bank Doing Business Report consistently ranked Macedonia as one of the best destinations to do business in, and in 2015, placed Macedonia as the 3rd Best

⁷⁰ “President Ivanov: Partnering countries did not cooperate with Macedonia to break the terrorist group.” *Republika*, May 11, 2015 (<http://english.republika.mk/president-ivanov-partnering-countries-did-not-cooperate-with-macedonia-to-break-the-terrorist-group/>)

⁷¹ “Иванов: Најостро осдуен терористичкиот напад во Куманово, нема да дозволиме ескалирање на состојбата.” *Дневник*, 10.05.2015 (Ivanov: We strongly condemn the terrorist attack in Kumanovo; we will not allow the situation to escalate.” *Dnevnik*, May 10, 2015).

Destination for Starting a Business in the World, and Best for starting a business in the Region, while the World Economic Forum ranked it the 4th Friendliest Destination to Foreigners in 2013. Price Waterhouse Coopers and the World Bank Group Study ranked Macedonia 1st in total tax rates in the world in 2015, and 7th in overall paying taxes.⁷² Furthermore the capital, Skopje, was revamped with new buildings, statues, and squares, all of which, although controversial, shed a different, mostly positive light on Macedonia when tourism was in question. Tourists came to see the reconstruction of Skopje (with the famous project Skopje 2014)⁷³ which had taken merely four years. Some foreign newspaper reporters even went so far as to say that the amount of reconstruction that had taken place in Macedonia was the equivalent of Haussmann's renovation of Paris, which took seventy years. A tourism portal named Macedonia as the fourth best destination for tourists who considered all of the following three indicators as important: safe, cheap and friendly.⁷⁴ Even the *New York Times* quoted Macedonia as the best tourist destination, which angered Greece. As the author of the article entitled "Greeks still angry at *New York Times* over Macedonia" in the Macedonian newspaper *Republika* put it, "Although the article was published in January 2015, Greeks can still not forgive the *New York Times* for including Macedonia in the list of places worth seeing in 2015, in which they refer to the country using its constitutional name – the Republic of Macedonia. 'In its provocative article, the *New York Times* – which has millions of readers worldwide, does not only exclude Greece from 2015 travel destinations, but it also refers to Skopje as Macedonia,' Greek media comment."⁷⁵ The *New York Times* had placed Macedonia 10th out of 52 countries it recommended across the world. And in its October 2016, the *Vogue Magazine* featured an article entitled "Why Macedonia is Becoming a Foodie Destination."⁷⁶ All this shows the extent to which the current Government had been able to pull Macedonia out of the shadows of an "ex-Yugoslav" "barbaric" "war-torn" image. To be sure, new and exciting things were happening, which managed to not only overshadow the "inter-

⁷² <http://www.investinmacedonia.com/factsmac>

⁷³ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iybmt-iLysU>

⁷⁴ <http://www.kimeshan.com/2013/07/11/cheap-safe-and-friendly-countries>

⁷⁵ "Greeks still angry at 'New York Times' over Macedonia." *Republika*, April 1, 2015. <http://english.republika.mk/greeks-still-angry-at-new-york-times-over-macedonia/>

⁷⁶ Claire Volkman, "Why Macedonia is Becoming a Foodie Destination," *Vogue Magazine*, October 21, 2016

ethnic, tension bereaved” image that was often so swiftly professed by Western media and analysts, but cast Macedonia as one of the world’s top tourist destinations and economic miracles.

Incidents such as the ones above, however, keep dragging Macedonia back. This, in addition to the other issues that the remaining neighboring states have with Macedonia, is the context which makes the “name dispute” all the more relevant and difficult for Macedonia and the Balkans. As James Pettifer states in the introduction to his book *The New Macedonian Question*, “International attitudes to ‘FYROM’ and its government have varied greatly but the decisive factor in the situation has been the effects of the surrounding Balkan crisis, particularly in Kosovo, and the fact that relations with neighboring states have not generally been easy, with many outstanding difficulties in relation to the country’s name (with Greece), border delineation, religion and cross-border trade during UN sanctions (with Serbia), national minority issues and education (with Albania), and language and national minority difficulties (with Bulgaria).⁷⁷ As Kyril Drezov adds in another chapter of the book, “[t]he identity of this state, its name, symbols, languages and history, emerged as one of the most contentious issues in the Balkans. Even the most moderate Greek historians and politicians reject the use of the unqualified adjective ‘Macedonian’ in describing the state that has emerged north of their border, and its majority population and language. Bulgarian academics and politicians accept the name ‘Macedonia’ as a legitimate geographic and state designation, but unanimously reject the existence of a separate Macedonian nation and language before 1944, and many of them deny their existence even after that date. Even the most level-headed Serbian intellectuals remain skeptical about the historical existence of any fixed ethnic identity among Slavs in present-day Macedonia before the twentieth century. In turn, Macedonian intellectuals and politicians project the contemporary reality of their statehood, nation and language on to the nineteenth century and before, many of them going as far back as ancient Macedonia. All these ‘schools of thought’ are accepted in varying degrees by non-Balkan academics and politicians, who rarely remain even-

⁷⁷ James Pettifer, “Introduction”, in *The New Macedonian Question*, *op.cit.*, xxxviii.

handed and instead consciously or unconsciously take sides in the ongoing Balkan 'debate' on the Macedonian identity."⁷⁸

As we will see later on, these schools of thought will prove crucial in kindling the "Macedonian Question" and thus, the question about the identity of the population of Macedonia.⁷⁹ One can image then the fragile national and regional context in which the "name issue" is currently being played out, ever since Macedonia's independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, and to this very day. Added to the continuous academic streams on the "existence" or "non-existence" of a Macedonian identity throughout the past two centuries and until today, the viability of the nation-state is constantly being put to test, as various factors from the outside and within, attempt to destabilize it.

THE REGIONAL CONTEXT

THE "GREATER NEIGHBOURS" OR "FOUR WOLVES" EFFECT

As longtime diplomat and former Ambassador of the Republic of Macedonia, Risto Nikovski would write for the newspaper *Nova Makedonija* in 2010, "[i]t is by no means a coincidence that, after the breakup of Yugoslavia, Macedonia is holding on to the edge of a deep abyss. Everything that was happening all these years, and is still happening, unequivocally asserts this. That's likely because: a) we are a major obstacle to all-Albanian unification ; b) we have the golden brand - Macedonia , for which Greece cannot forgive us ; c) (an important) part of Serbian cultural, historical and especially ecclesiastical heritage is with us; and d) we are part of "the most romantic period" of Bulgarian history."⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Kyril Drezov, "Macedonian identity: an overview of the major claims," in *The New Macedonian Question, op.cit.*, 47.

⁷⁹ Identity, in its turn, is as important today as it was in the nineteenth century for it was based on the identity on the majority of the population of territories, that territorial boundaries were drawn and that peoples were given the right to self-determination, in the era of nation-state building. Today, this remains the case, as the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia show.

⁸⁰ Risto Nikovski, "Only the fittest survive," *Nova Makedonija*, April 22, 2010, <http://novamakedonija.com.mk/NewsDetal.asp?vest=422101021107&id=13&setIzdanie=21965>

Jens Reuter identifies the aspirations of the four neighboring countries for territory – or for becoming a Greater Albania, Bulgaria, Serbia or Greece – as destabilizing factors for Macedonia. He calls them the “four wolves,” and arrives at the conclusion that the “Macedonian Question” has been revived. “Albania maintains diplomatic relations with Macedonia, but bilateral relations between Skopje and Tirana have been complicated by the problem of the Albanian minority. Bulgaria has diplomatically recognized Macedonia, but still disputes the existence of the Macedonian nation. Official Serbia has indeed never expressed territorial claims to Macedonia’s territory, but has so far failed to recognize the country. Some extreme Serbian nationalists such as the leader of the Radical Party, Vojislav Seselj, have openly demanded the division of Macedonia between its four neighbors.”⁸¹ Since then, Serbia recognized Macedonia, but problems remain between the two churches. “Accordingly, as a result of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, we once again have Macedonia as the region of conflict, after it had seemed in the early 1950s that the traditional ‘Macedonian Question’ was no longer a problem.”⁸²

Although I will not get into the Greater Albania matter which is referred to above, as it merits in depth study on its own, it is true that it has had repercussions, whether direct or indirect, on the “name issue”, and this to the negative effect for Macedonia. To put it simply, the Greater Albania idea would rather see a Macedonia halved and an Albania that spreads throughout the territory of Macedonia. This territory would thus be called Albania and not Macedonia, and while it is true that most ethnic Albanian politicians in Macedonia are careful not to be labeled as “for the Greater Albania cause,” it is also true that if one needed to, one could find an instance where many of them has promoted this cause. Whereas Greek politicians have pointed out the same for Macedonian politicians (who, they say, are for a Greater Macedonia), this does not have the same resonance, having in mind the recent independence of Kosovo, the separatist movements within Macedonia which sparked the 2001 civil conflict, as well as the recent armed group events, and the general support Albanians

⁸¹ Jens Reuter, “Policy and economy in Macedonia,” *op.cit.*, 28.

⁸² *Ibid.*

enjoy by the Great Powers. Macedonia, in this respect, has a history of being attacked but not attacking.

Thus, although there is something to worry about when all the other neighboring countries and their aspirations for a Greater Serbia, Bulgaria or even Greece are concerned, the aspirations for a Greater Albania are different and more worrisome in that there is at present a large Albanian minority in Macedonia, which is not at all the case for Serbians, Bulgarians or Greeks, and which can be, and has been, a destabilizing factor from within.

James Pettifer refers to Reuter's notion of the "Four Wolves" as the "greater neighbors effect": "Although now all four neighboring states have said that they have no claim on Macedonian territory, there are substantial political parties in all of them, with the partial exception of Greece, who do have claims over Macedonian territory or who want a revision of the position of their compatriot minorities that would have a profoundly destabilizing effect on the new Macedonia."⁸³ Here, in fact, Pettifer is referring to the Albanian minority in Macedonia, and in this respect he is right. The topic of the Albanian minority in Macedonia, like the "Greater Albania" idea in the Balkans, is rather extensive, and merits its own research. For the purposes of this thesis, I have chosen not to go into that matter as it would complicate things and distract from the focus of the thesis. What should be known is that there has always been an Albanian minority in Macedonia, and that at some periods of time, especially following the Kosovo Crisis in 1999, some segments of this minority have been swayed, partly by external factors in nearby Kosovo, to more radical and extremist pursuits, including the secession of a part of Macedonia (Western Macedonia). In addition, the old hope for a "Greater Albania" (which would unite Albania with Kosovo, Western Macedonia, the Presevo Valley of Serbia, Southern Montenegro and Northwestern Greece) is very much still alive, in some circles in the Balkans, both intellectual and non-intellectual. Radical Albanians can be found anywhere – and again, although this is true for the other neighboring countries, including Macedonia, they do not resonate the same way following Kosovo. Read the following quote which

⁸³ James Pettifer, "The new Macedonian question," *op. cit.*, 17.

is a reader's response to the *EurActiv* article from May, 2015 entitled "EU, US 'cast serious doubt' on Macedonia's commitment to democracy," cited above:

"By : [toralb](#) – Posted on : Tue, 12/05/2015 - 17:28

There is so much dis-information in this article. What is the source of this information? ohhh just noticed the name of the publisher....greek? what else do you expect from a greek? is there an editor around to verify what is written is correct? obviously not as what is written here is bullsh!t.there will be no justice in the fake country of macedonia until the albanians which make 1/3d of the populations are treated with respect or leave the experiment country called macedonia and join albania. The albanians have been in the region since the beginning of time. the mixture so called macedonai made of albanians, bulgars, greeks, serbs, turks is fake and there is no way will exist. Let everyone go their own way. this started when the old b!tch called europe decided to donate the albanian lands to the slavs and the greeks. NO JUSTICE NO PEACE"⁸⁴

In 2001, Macedonia was on the brink of civil war which was sparked by an incident similar to the one in May of 2015. Namely, a truck carrying soldiers was attacked by the so-called National Liberation Army – a sister organization to the Kosovo Liberation Army, whose men were hiding in the mountains. Several Macedonian soldiers were brutally tortured and killed in the operation. The swift involvement in a settlement of the conflict by the international community prevented a wholesale war, but led to a power-sharing agreement which the Macedonian side saw as unfair. The concessions that the Macedonian side had to make included giving amnesty to the Albanian fighters, in addition to some cultural concessions and positive discrimination in state and local institutions. As such the first coalition government which was brokered by the international community involved "Commandant" Ali Ahmeti who became a leading politician among the Albanian population in Macedonia. Looking in retrospect, the Ohrid Agreement of 2001 was probably based on the 1998 Friday Agreement regarding Northern Ireland. Only in February, of 2014 however, did the British press leak that over 200 IRA soldiers had been pardoned, which shocked British society as Tom Whitehead noted in the Daily Telegraph: "Royal pardons, signed by the Queen, were granted to escaped IRA

⁸⁴<http://www.euractiv.com/sections/enlargement/eu-us-cast-serious-doubt-macedonias-commitment-democracy-314518>

terrorists as part of the Northern Ireland peace deal, it has emerged. Republican killers and fanatics who escaped prison and went on the run were allowed to go back to their normal lives without any recall.”⁸⁵

A sentiment similar to the snapshot of this British journalist prevails among the majority of the ethnic Macedonian population in Macedonia, due to which, to this day, there is relative unease about the genuine aims of the Albanian population in Macedonia, and whether they secretly want secession even if they are an integral part of society and continuously seek and implement reforms to their benefits. In addition, while the majority of the ethnic Albanian population is disinterested in the “name issue,” some vocal politicians from among the ethnic Albanians have called for an immediate name change. The disinterested stance is understandable, as the Albanian population has no real connection with the name in the same sense that the ethnic Macedonians do. Furthermore, their identity is not at stake. In fact, for a radical politician who has a vision of a Greater Albania, a name change would be viewed quite positively. To add to this feeling of mistrust are the demographic statistics of the Albanian minority, which is on the rise due to the high incidence in birthrates. As Pettifer notes, in the 1981 Yugoslav census, the population of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia consisted of 1,281,195 Macedonians and 377,726 Albanians. “The main change since then has been the inexorable rise in Albanian numbers, which may now amount to as much as a quarter of the whole population, with a disproportionate age bias towards youth so that over the next 20 years or so the Albanian element is certain to increase further.”⁸⁶

The Albanian factor, then, should be seen as yet another both external and internal factor which provides a feeling of insecurity. It would have been interesting to research this further, and provide the ethnic Albanian point of view. However I decided early on to limit the scope and focus of the thesis, as it was easily becoming dispersed.

⁸⁵ Tom Whitehead, “Escaped IRA terrorists handed Royal pardons as part of peace deal,” *The Daily Telegraph*, 27 February 2014. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10666040/Escaped-IRA-terrorists-handed-Royal-pardons-as-part-of-peace-deal.html>

⁸⁶ James Pettifer, “The new Macedonian question,” *op.cit.*, 17.

II. YUGOSLAVIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Jens Reuter defines the “name issue” in the following simple terms: “Greece claims a monopoly on the name Macedonia and denounces the Republic’s right to use it as the name of the state. The failure by the European Community to recognize Macedonia to date has been a result of the influence of Athens.”⁸⁷ But how do the interests of a neighboring country affect the internal matters of another country and why? More importantly, what does the European Union have to do with all this?

It should be known that the European Community (EC), the organization which preceded the European Union, reacted swiftly to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, even though it was taken by surprise by the declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia and the events that ensued immediately thereafter. “Within seventy-two hours, a ‘troika’ of EC Foreign Ministers (those of Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) mounted two rapid missions to Yugoslavia.’ The EC negotiators received repeated promises of cease-fires, but violence erupted again as federal troops continued to consolidate their positions in Slovenia. On midnight of June 30, the rotating presidency of the EC passed from Luxembourg to the Netherlands and shortly afterwards EC governments sent a third mission, this time composed of senior diplomats from Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal, ‘to see if they could help monitor a new and durable cease-fire in Slovenia and a withdrawal of Federal forces...’”⁸⁸ Following this, the Council of Ministers of the European Community called for an emergency meeting of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).

This shows the keen interest on behalf of the Member States of the European Community in the developments in Yugoslavia. It is interesting to note that the disintegration of Yugoslavia occurred at approximately the same time as the transformation of the European Community into the European Union (the Treaty of Maastricht establishing the European Union was agreed upon in December 1991,

⁸⁷ Jens Reuter, “Policy and economy in Macedonia,” *op.cit.*, 28.

⁸⁸ Marc Weller, “The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” *American Journal of International Law* Vol. 86, No. 3 (1992), 570-571.

signed in 1992 and entered into force in 1993) and the transformation of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe into the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that the principal role of these two regional organizations in the events immediately following the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the evolution of their structures and policies not only influenced the outcomes of the resulting independent states, but also became crucial to the reconstruction, evolution and the formation of an identity of these institutions themselves. It was almost as if the disintegration of Yugoslavia gave them a “raison d’être.” It is with this in mind that the aftermaths of the former Yugoslav republics should be viewed, including those of the Republic of Macedonia.

The topic I am writing about would probably never have seen the light of day, if Yugoslavia had not fallen apart. This is also how Janko Bacev, one of the few Macedonian authors to dedicate a comprehensive academic work on the “name issue,” starts his book. The relevance of the “name issue”, then, stems from the break-up of Yugoslavia, and the aftermaths that followed. In retrospect, it is easy to see how events unfolded, and why Greece and the European Union had a say in the internal matters of Macedonia. It is also easy to see how differently things could have turned out, for the better or for the worse, had other factors played a larger role, and had internal and external interests been different.

THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF MACEDONIA

I opened the embassies of Macedonia in Tirana, Rome and Australia. I had in fact been Minister Counsellor and second person in the Yugoslav Embassy in Tirana at the time of Yugoslavia, when the Yugoslav Ambassador passed away. So for one year I served as the first person in the Yugoslav Embassy - Charge d’Affaires – and then I got kicked out. Well, of course, it was normal, with the dissolution of Yugoslavia and Macedonia declaring independence from Yugoslavia. So the next week, I came back to Tirana from Skopje, with a flag and a sign. I put them up outside of my apartment and formally opened the Macedonian Embassy in Tirana. ...

We have not opened an Embassy in Brazil because it becomes very expensive, and the orientation of the Government is the European Union. When I came back from Tirana, we had 450,000 Deutsche Marks in our

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs, you know! Now we have about 18 million Euros. That is development. Diplomacy is expensive!*⁸⁹

The late eighties were times of change for the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. They began with the amendments of the 1974 Constitution, which enacted a pluralist party system, instead of the one-party system that had been practiced hitherto. As such, the Republics within the Yugoslav Federation, including the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, started organizing multi-party elections. The first such elections in Macedonia were held on 11 November 1990, with the greatest number of votes being received by VMRO-DPMNE (“Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity”)⁹⁰ a centre-right party, with an agenda that clearly promoted the Macedonian identity and national consciousness. In spite of some inter-party skirmishes and disagreements about the concrete immediate future steps for the country, it was clear that the overwhelming majority of the political leadership and the population of the Republic of Macedonia were ready for a political option that would promote the Macedonian national cause and independence. As such, the first step in this process was the Declaration of Independence of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia which was unanimously adopted by the Macedonian Parliament (with all 120 votes “for”) and the consensus of all political parties on January 25, 1991. This Declaration established the sovereignty of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia in line with the constitutional provisions for independence and territorial integrity of the Macedonian country, as well as the right of the Macedonian people to self-determination, including the right to secession, all of which were part of the 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia. The Declaration also called for the adoption of a new Constitution which would determine, amongst other things, the social structure and future symbols of statehood of Macedonia, as well as the protection of the rights of Macedonian people who live outside of their own country, should the need arise.⁹¹

⁸⁹ Interview with Ambassador Viktor Gaber, Skopje, 2 September 2013.

⁹⁰ Janko Bacev, *Macedonia and Greece – A Battle for the Name: The Legal Mechanisms in the United Nations for the Return/Use of the Name – Republic of Macedonia* (Skopje: Makedonska Rec, 2012), 17-20.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 23.

The second step in the re-establishment of the Macedonian State as a subject of international relations (the first State being the People's Republic of Macedonia in 1944 proclaimed by ASNOM- the Anti-Fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia)⁹² came with the adoption by the Parliament of a Resolution on August 6, 1991, to call a referendum for the independence and sovereignty of Macedonia. The referendum question was "Are you for a sovereign and independent country Macedonia with the right to enter into a future union of the sovereign countries of Yugoslavia?"⁹³ Although the first part of the question clearly asked the people whether they wanted independence, President Gligorov had announced that the second part was of tactful nature, and had the aim to neutralize the dissatisfaction of the Yugoslav political and military leadership. In order to clarify the real intention of the referendum question President Gligorov wrote a letter to the Arbitration Commission for the Former Yugoslavia in which he stated that "the idea of the referendum was for Macedonia to be a sovereign and independent country, and not to enter into association with the Yugoslav states."⁹⁴

The referendum was held on September 8, 1991, with 1,074,658 citizens who came out to vote, out of the total of 1,495,626 eligible voters, or 71.85%. From those that voted, 95.09% said "yes" to the referendum question.⁹⁵ Its results were confirmed with a Parliamentary Declaration on September 17, 1991, and two months later, on November 17, 1991, the Parliament adopted a new Constitution. According to Opinion 11 of the Arbitration Commission this was the date on which the Republic of Macedonia became a sovereign country.⁹⁶ Already in 1991, then, it was clear that the overwhelming majority of the Macedonian population was eager to come out of the "shell" of Yugoslavia and finally have their own country.

In addition, in the words of Janko Bacev, "[t]his is how the Macedonian country as a subject in international relations began and was re-established in several successive phases: step by step adoption of several declarations, a referendum, the

⁹² Technically there was also a previous short-lived Macedonian Republic, namely the August 3-10, 1903 "Krushevo Republic" which was established the Ilinden Uprising against the Turks during the Ottoman Empire.

⁹³ Janko Bacev, *Macedonia and Greece, op. cit.*, 25.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 27-30.

adoption of a new Constitution, international recognition and entry in the United Nations and other international organisations.”⁹⁷

TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION

The principles of territorial integrity and self-determination were greatly discussed and invoked by the international community, and, more specifically, the regional bodies, which gave themselves the authority to arbitrate the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1991, namely, the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the European Community, and the Arbitration Commission under the chairmanship of Robert Badinter. These were to also set the context for the “name issue”.

In an article entitled “International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” Marc Weller sets the scene for this context.

“The principle of territorial integrity, borrowed in terminology from Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, confirmed obligations of states and possibly expanded upon them by adding ‘the unity of participating States’ as an object of protection. However, it is an obligation, albeit in the case of the CSCE⁹⁸ a nonbinding obligation, established among states. It protects them from threats to their territorial integrity from outside, but not from challenges from within. *Of course, if a state contains peoples entitled to invoke the right to self-determination, the principle of territorial integrity might possibly prohibit outside support for those exercising that right. This, it is suggested, is the meaning of the appendage to CSCE Principle VIII concerning equal rights and self-determination of peoples.* According to that principle, states will respect the right of peoples to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 23.

⁹⁸ The CSCE or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was opened on July 3, 1973 in Helsinki, and closed with the Helsinki Final Act on August 1975, leading to an agreement by all participants to hold regular meetings in order to implement the Act, which in turn led to the establishment of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1995. Interestingly, the first such meeting was held in Belgrade, in 1977. Interestingly, too, there is a Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the U.S. Helsinki Commission, which is an independent agency of the United States Government, and which monitors compliance with the Helsinki Accords and advances comprehensive security through promotion of human rights, democracy, and economic, environmental and military cooperation in the OSCE region. I put this as a sidenote to keep in mind, when analyzing the US and EU interest in a later part.

international law, including those *relating to territorial integrity of States*."⁹⁹

As we will see later, in the case of the “name issue”, Greece invoked the principle of territorial integrity in the sense that it is understood and interpreted in the appendage to CSCE Principle VIII referred to above, very early on. In fact, Greece invoked this principle almost immediately after Macedonia proclaimed independence from Yugoslavia, namely by requiring Macedonia to change the clause in its Constitution which stipulated that Macedonia would protect Macedonians within as well as outside of Macedonia (i.e. Macedonians in Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, Serbia). This clause and the amendment to it will be discussed in detail in the following part. The fact that Greece insisted that this be a precondition for the recognition of Macedonia by the European Community is yet another factor that proves that the core of the “name issue” for the Greek side is related to the Macedonian minority in Greece. However, by securing the “name issue” under the confines of territorial integrity, Greece not only undermined the right to self-determination of its Macedonian minority, but the right to self-determination of the Macedonians in the Republic of Macedonia. Yet, it was able to do so because of the pre-existing context, and the strong support of the European Community and its Member States. Part of this pre-existing context was namely the Helsinki Act, on which Europe depended, especially in the aftermaths of a war – i.e. the breakup of Yugoslavia. As a matter of fact, territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers are the very core of the first part of the Preamble to the Helsinki Act, entitled “Questions relating to Security in Europe.” If we read this part, it becomes easier to see how Greece was able to make the concept of territorial integrity for its own country an important in this context – and how it was able to promote its interests within the European Community:

- “1. (a) Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States
 - I. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty
 - II. Refraining from the threat or use of force

⁹⁹ Marc Weller, “The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” *op.cit.*, 571-572. Emphasis added.

- III. Inviolability of frontiers
- IV. Territorial integrity of States
- V. Peaceful settlement of disputes
- VI. Non-intervention in internal affairs
- VII. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief
- VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples
- IX. Co-operation among States
- X. Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law”¹⁰⁰

The independence of the former Yugoslav states was thus immediately underpinned by the principles upheld by the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe. “The protection of the territorial integrity of states was defined in greater detail in Principle IV [territorial integrity]: The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States. Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of any participating State, and in particular from any such action constituting a threat or use of force.”¹⁰¹

The Arbitration Commission for the Former Yugoslavia established by the Council of Ministers of the European Community on August 27 1991 with the aim to provide legal advice to the Conference on Yugoslavia (popularly referred to as the Badinter Commission in reference to its chair Robert Badinter, President of the Constitutional Council of France) had come up with a similar definition of self-determination in which it basically stated that although peoples had the rights to self-determination, the territorial integrity of the states had to be respected:

“... [T]he Arbitration Commission had already considered whether the Serbian minorities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were entitled to self-determination. The [C]ommission found that *in actual practice international law did not define the precise consequences of that right or its scope of application*. On the other hand, *the right to self-determination on no account involved the*

¹⁰⁰ Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act, Helsinki, 1975, page 2 (Preamble), Available at <https://www.osce.org/mc/39501?download=true>

¹⁰¹ Marc Weller, “The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” *op.cit.*, 571.

*modification of borders as they existed at the moment of independence (uti possidetis), except by common consent. The commission confirmed that all members of minorities were entitled to benefit from minority and human rights established in international conventions. Understood in this sense, self-determination was part of the body of human rights law-an interpretation confirmed, in the commission's view, by Article 1 common to the two 1966 Human Rights Covenants. This provision was taken to grant each individual the right to claim, as a matter of choice, an "appurtenance to an ethnic, religious or linguistic community."*¹⁰²

If the Arbitration Commission's findings were seriously taken, they should have relieved Greece in its fears pertaining to its Macedonian minority, because the Commission was clear in interpreting the "self-determination" enumerated in common Article 1, as not the right to secede, but rather the individual right to choose one's "appurtenance to an ethnic, religious, or linguistic community." However, as will be conveyed in the historical part, Greece does not give Macedonians in Greece the right to choose appurtenance to a Macedonian ethnic or linguistic community – according to official Greek policy, such a language or ethnicity does not exist, in Greece or anywhere else in the world. Furthermore, Greece only recognizes a religious minority. Therefore, it does not recognize the Turkish minority either, although it does recognize the existence of a Turkish language. If we take this further, it means that not only does Greece deny the right to self-determination – in the Badinter Commission interpretation sense, i.e. appurtenance to an ethnic, religious or linguistic community – to its Macedonian minority, but to an entire country. The European Community played along – despite the fact that the Badinter Commission advised it to recognize the Republic of Macedonia, and thus, its right to self-determination. Seen this way, then, by not recognizing Macedonia, Greece and the European Community violated the right to self-determination of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, and continue to violate it by refusing to accept the Republic of Macedonia under the name its citizens chose, and refusing to grant them the right of appurtenance to an ethnic Macedonian community with an ethnic Macedonian language. This, in spite of the fact there was clearly no evidence of the existence of a territorial threat from

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 592. Emphasis added.

within (i.e. there has been no claim for secession by the few Macedonians that do remain in Greece and who have not been assimilated), or from without (neighboring Macedonia had no army and had literally just declared independence when Greece proclaimed a territorial threat). Weller continues:

“In consequence, ‘on the basis of the agreements between the republics, the members of the Serbian populations of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia could. . . obtain recognition of the nationality of their choice with all the rights and obligations deriving therefrom in relation to all States concerned.’ In conclusion, the commission affirmed, first, ‘that the Serbian populations of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia have the right to benefit from all the rights recognized as belonging to minorities and ethnic groups by international law and by the provisions of the draft Convention of the conference on peace in Yugoslavia’; and second, ‘that the republics ought to grant to the members of these minorities and ethnic groups the totality of human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized by international law, including, as the case may be, the right to choose their nationality.’ In essence, therefore, the [C]ommission in this case defined the right to self-determination not as a people’s right to independence but as a human right of minorities and groups. *Upon the formation of a new state, the right to opt for a desired nationality, in accordance with certain procedures, devolved on members of minorities and groups.* In a sense, individuals belonging to an ‘ethnic, religious or linguistic community’ were seen to be entitled to sever their links with the newly established state, or at least to sever the tie of national allegiance; but they were not entitled to do so collectively, by territorially seceding from that state.”¹⁰³

Thus, the Badinter Commission concluded that the territorial integrity of already established states had to be respected. If we widen the scope of interpretation of the Commission, this includes Greece as an already established State. It was with the help of the international community, and, more specifically, the European Union, then, that all the former Yugoslav Republics gained independence and were recognized. However, in spite of the fact that Macedonia and Slovenia were the only states that fulfilled the criteria for recognition established by the Badinter Commission and were recommended for recognition, Macedonia’s recognition by the

¹⁰³ *Ibid.* Emphasis added.

European Union came much later than that for the rest of the former Yugoslav republics.

It was in this context of preoccupation by the European Community – and later on, the international community – of the relationship between the concepts of self-determination and territorial integrity following the break-up of Yugoslavia, that the “name issue” was introduced by Greece. Territorial integrity was a key element following the break-up of Yugoslavia, and it played a key role in the “name dispute” between Greece and Macedonia. As will be seen later, not only was Greece able to frame the “name dispute” in territorial integrity terms in the European Community, but also in the United Nations, where the issue was undertaken by the United Nations Security Council, to which, the Secretary General was to report on the undertakings regarding the “name issue”.

RECOGNITION OF MACEDONIA: THE BADINTER COMMISSION VS THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

In its role as legal advisor to the European Community on the recognizability of the breakaway states of Yugoslavia, the Badinter Commission “found that Slovenia and Macedonia had fully met the EC [European Community] requirements, but that Croatia needed to incorporate the terms of the EC Draft Convention into its constitution, and that Bosnia-Herzegovina needed to hold a referendum of all its citizens under international supervision in order to meet the EC requirements. Nevertheless, the EC in fact recognized Slovenia and Croatia on 15 January [1991] while withholding recognition from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. Subsequently, Bosnia-Herzegovina held a referendum as called for by the Commission and was recognized by the EC on 6 April [1991]. Recognition of Macedonia, in principle, followed in May, though hedged with conditions relating to its name, which was objected to by Greece as implying territorial claims on the province of Macedonia within Greece.”¹⁰⁴ As a matter of fact, the European Community had held this view on

¹⁰⁴ Malgosia Fitzmaurice, “Badinter Commission (for the Former Yugoslavia),” Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law [MPEPIL]. Article last updated: December 2010. Accessed at

December 16, 1991, during an extraordinary Ministerial meeting in Brussels which will be discussed shortly.

The Badinter Commission's recommendation for recognition of Macedonia is outlined below:

“Having regard to the information before it, and having heard the Rapporteur, the Arbitration Commission delivers the following opinion:

[...]

2. Following a request made by the Arbitration Commission on 10 January 1992 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia stated in a letter of 11 January that the Republic would refrain from any hostile propaganda against a neighbouring country which was a Member State of the European Community.

[...]

4. On 6 January 1992 the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia amended the Constitution of 17 November 1991 by adopting the following Constitutional Act:

‘These Amendments are an integral part of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia and shall be implemented on the day of their adoption.

Amendment I

1. The Republic of Macedonia has no territorial claims against neighbouring states.

2. The borders of the Republic of Macedonia could be changed only in accordance with the Constitution, and based on the principle of voluntariness and generally accepted international norms.

3. Item 1 of this Amendment is added to Article 3 and Item 2 replaces paragraph 3 of Article 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia.

Amendment II

1. The Republic shall not interfere in the sovereign rights of other states and their internal affairs.

2. This Amendment is added to paragraph 1 of Article 49 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia.’

5. The Arbitration Commission consequently takes the view:

- that the Republic of Macedonia satisfies the tests in the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe

and in the Soviet Union and the Declaration on Yugoslavia adopted by the Council of the European Communities on 16 December 1991;

- that the Republic of Macedonia has, moreover, renounced all territorial claims of any kind in unambiguous statements binding in international law; that the use of the name “Macedonia” cannot therefore imply any territorial claim against another State; and

- that the Republic of Macedonia has given a formal undertaking in accordance with international law to refrain, both in general and pursuant to Article 49 of its Constitution in particular, from any hostile propaganda against any other State: this follows from a statement which the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic made to the Arbitration Commission on 11 January 1992 in response to the Commission’s request for clarification of the Constitutional Amendment II of 6 January 1992.

Paris, 11 January 1992

(signed)

R. Badinter¹⁰⁵

Note how the amendments made are related to the territorial integrity clauses referred to earlier. In effect, the principle of territorial integrity “prohibits outside support for those exercising the right to self-determination,” which is one of the Greek fears depicting its position on the “name issue” (i.e. Greece is afraid of support by the Republic of Macedonia to the Macedonian minority in Greece).

Thus, in 1992, the Badinter Commission – a European Community-appointed body of international legal experts – not only certified that the Republic of Macedonia had all the necessary pre-requisites for an independent state and recommended it be recognized by the international community, but it used the name “Republic of Macedonia.” Furthermore, it clearly stated that Macedonia had undertaken all steps to prove that it did not have any territorial aspirations, and that indeed, the Commission deemed it did not. At the same time however, the European Community (which in 1993 became the European Union with the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht), stalled the recognition of Macedonia, and placed the “name issue” on the negotiating

¹⁰⁵ 1488 Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia [January 11 and July 4, 1992] + Cite as 31 I.L.M. 1488 (1992) + Introductory Note by Maurizio Ragazzi. http://www.pf.uni-lj.si/media/skrk_mnenja.badinterjeve.arbitrazne.komisije.1_10.pdf

table for the first time, with the European Community Declaration Concerning the Conditions for Recognition of New States adopted at the Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting in Brussels on 16 December 1991.¹⁰⁶

This would set the context not only for Macedonia's position within the European Union, but also for its position within the entire international community, and notably, the United Nations.

As Jens Reuter notes, "Branko Crvenkovski [the Macedonian Prime Minister at the time] has bitterly concluded that only those three of the former Yugoslav republics in which there has been war – Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina – have received international recognition. Macedonia, on the other hand, where not a single bullet has been fired and from which the Yugoslav People's Army withdrew peacefully, must still await its recognition. This is difficult to understand, bearing in mind that the Badinter Commission, constituted of 5 Presidents of Constitutional Courts from Western countries, was clearly in favour of Macedonia's recognition."¹⁰⁷

As notes Miso Dokmanovic, citing Ramcharan in 1997, "The political decision of the EC to delay the recognition of Macedonia had opened a long-standing process in which the EC, under strong pressure of Greece, would attempt to recognize the Republic without the term "Macedonia."¹⁰⁸ According to him, by 1992, Greece had three main terms for recognition of Macedonia: "(1) that it should not insist on the appellation "The Republic of Macedonia"; (2) it should renounce the territorial claims and (3) should withdraw its allegation that Macedonian ethnic minority existed in Greece."¹⁰⁹ In 1993, following Macedonia's entry in the United Nations under the provisional reference, Greece demanded continuation of talks regarding the difference as well as adoption of appropriate confidence-building measures, including the termination of the use of "Greek symbols" such as the star of Vergina on the Macedonian flag (which was used from 1992 until 1995).

Reuter also underlines this point: "[u]nder pressure from Greece, the European Community demanded on December 16, as a precondition for its recognition, that the

¹⁰⁶ Miso Dokmanovic, "What's in a Name?," *op.cit.*, 36.

¹⁰⁷ Jens Reuter, "Policy and economy in Macedonia," *op.cit.*, 34.

¹⁰⁸ Miso Dokmanovic, "What's in a Name?," *op.cit.*, 37.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

Republic gave constitutional guarantees that it has no territorial claims. In addition, any kind of 'hostile propaganda' had to cease, including the use of a denomination which might imply territorial claims. This lengthy and obscure text did not indeed mention the term 'Macedonia' but it implicitly contained the demand for renouncing that name."¹¹⁰ The Constitution was immediately amended to accommodate Greek concerns. As Reuter points out "the Parliament in Skopje reacted immediately and as early as January adopted three amendments to the Constitution which stated that Macedonia has no territorial claims against its neighbours, that it considered existing borders as inviolable and that it would not 'interfere in the sovereign rights of other states or in their internal affairs.'"¹¹¹ These were precisely Amendments I and II to the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, amending Articles 3 and 49, as referred to in the Badinter Commission Opinion cited previously. Here is what the articles looked like before and after the amendments (*the amendments in slanted*):

Article 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia before Amendment I of January 6 1992:

"The territory of the Republic of Macedonia is indivisible and inalienable.

The existing border of the Republic of Macedonia is inviolable.

The border of the Republic of Macedonia can be changed only with accordance with the Constitution."

Article 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia *after* Amendment I of January 6, 1992:

"The territory of the Republic of Macedonia is indivisible and inalienable.

The existing border of the Republic of Macedonia is inviolable.

The Republic of Macedonia has no territorial pretensions towards its neighbouring countries.

The border of the Republic of Macedonia can be changed only in accordance with the Constitution, *and on the basis of the principle of goodwill and in accordance with the generally accepted international norms.*"¹¹²

¹¹⁰ Jens Reuter, "Policy and economy in Macedonia," *op.cit.*, 41.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² Устав на Република Македонија со Амандманите на Уставот I-XVIII, 2003 Скопје (ЈП Службен Весник на Република Македонија, 2003) (Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia with

Article 49 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia before Amendment II of January 6, 1992:

The Republic cares for the status and rights of the Macedonian people in neighboring countries and for the Macedonian expatriates, assists their cultural development and promotes the ties with them.

The Republic cares for the cultural, economic and social rights of citizens of the Republic which are abroad.”

Article 49 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia after Amendment II of January 6, 1992:

“The Republic cares for the status and rights of the Macedonian people in neighboring countries and for the Macedonian expatriates, assists their cultural development and promotes the ties with them.

The Republic will not interfere in the sovereign rights of other states and in their internal affairs.

The Republic cares for the cultural, economic and social rights of citizens of the Republic who are abroad.”¹¹³

Note that these amendments came barely three months after the adoption of the new Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia on November 17, 1991, following its declaration of independence from Yugoslavia. Thus, the swift reaction speaks towards the willingness of the country to appease neighboring Greece and get on with regional and international recognition. Please also note the content of Article 49: it is about the cultural development of Macedonians in neighbouring countries and promoting ties with them, and about the cultural, economic and social rights of citizens of the Republic which are abroad. This cultural aspect is, in my view, the key to the “name issue,” and will be discussed more in depth in the historical and legal parts. It is intensely connected to the identity aspects of the “name issue,” and conveys what Greece is really worried about in my opinion, namely its own Macedonian minority whose cultural rights have been suppressed. In the event that neighbouring Macedonia would become a Member State of the European Union, this Macedonian

Amendments to the Constitution I-XVIII, Skopje, JP Official Journal of the Republic of Macedonia, 2003), 31-32. Emphasis added.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 56-57. Emphasis added.

minority would be able to travel back and forth to neighbouring Macedonia (without fear of being documented and having repercussions on jobs etc etc), exchange and promote its cultural ties with Macedonians, and eventually, reaffirm its Macedonian identity. However this will be discussed more in depth in the historical and legal parts.

Thus in spite of eagerness of the Macedonian people for independence and recognition, and ability of its political leaders to abide by all international standards and appease any neighboring concerns, Macedonia's recognition by the European Community was stalled. This is perhaps the first telltale sign that what was in the interest of Greece was not necessarily a name change, but fear of an independent Macedonia within the European Union, with Macedonians freely crossing the border and re-establishing long-lost (and forbidden) ties. This, more than anything, seems to be the true fear of Greek authorities, as we will see later on. And this fear was reflected in the policy of the European Union, which, acting as the guardian of the birthplace of European civilization, never seemed to be satisfied enough with the efforts put forth by Macedonia. As Daniel Högger points out:

“Macedonia [...] applied for recognition. However a dispute with Greece over the name of ‘Macedonia’ complicated this claim. Greece accused the former Yugoslavian republic of having irredentist plans towards the northern parts of Greek territory, Aegean Macedonia. Thus, they demanded exclusive property of that name and opposed the recognition of the republic as ‘Macedonia. Thus, due to Greek pressure, the EC demanded from Macedonia ‘prior to recognition’ and, in addition to the other requirements in the Declaration on Yugoslavia, ‘to adopt constitutional and political guarantees ensuring that it has no territorial claims towards a neighboring community State and that it will conduct no hostile propaganda activities versus a neighboring community State including the use of a denomination which implies territorial claims.’ The Badinter commission based its opinion on the declaration of 19 December 1991 by the Macedonian Assembly concerning recognition and the Macedonian constitution of 27 December 1991 with the amendments of 6 January 1992 reaffirming its abstention of territorial claims. Eventually, the commission found that Macedonia satisfied all requirements of the Guidelines and the Declaration of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the commission stated that Macedonia renounced all territorial claims and ‘the use of the name ‘Macedonia ‘cannot therefore imply any territorial claim against another State. Still the

EC was not satisfied, and while recognizing Slovenia and Croatia, it refrained from granting recognition to Macedonia at that time. However, after discussions at a ministerial meeting on 1-2 May 1992 in Guimaraes, Portugal, the EC issued a statement declaring that the EC and its members are willing to recognize Macedonia 'under a name that can be accepted by all parties concerned.' The European Council was even more explicit when declaring to recognize 'that republic' but only 'under a name which does not include the term Macedonia..'"¹¹⁴

This May 1992 "Guimaraes Statement" was the result of the so-called "Pinheiro Package" (named after the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs) which had been drawn up by the Portuguese Presidency of the European Union following instructions of the EU Foreign Ministers meeting at Lisbon in 17 February, 1992. Evangelos Kofos, one of the most prolific Greek authors on the "name issue," who is also Special Adviser on Balkan affairs at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy in Athens, Greece, tells us that Pinheiro had produced two texts, after repeated consultations with Greek and Macedonian politicians. "The first was a draft treaty 'confirming the existing borders' ... The second, was a letter from *FYROM*'s [Macedonia's] government to the Greek government in which it unilaterally undertook to meet all of the latter's demands of renouncing any territorial claims and preventing activities against Greek Macedonia, as well as to repudiate the related actions of the former Yugoslavia, pledging itself not to resort to or tolerate such activities in the future. It also promised to neither make minority-related demands, nor to foster the idea of a unified Macedonian state in the future. These two documents quite accurately reflected the traditional concerns and apprehensions of the Greek side on the issue of 'security'. Less important, but still present, were the Greek demands in the cultural domain, as Skopje was to undertake to discourage actions which might assail 'the cultural and historical values' of the Greek people."¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ Daniel Högger, *The Recognition of States: A Study on the Historical Development in Doctrine and Practice with a Special Focus on the Requirements* (Münster: LIT Publications, 2014), 64-65. (emphasis added)

¹¹⁵ Evangelos Kofos, *The Unresolved 'Difference over the Name:' a Greek Perspective*. (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and Museum of the Macedonian Struggle Foundation, 2005), 134-135. Available at <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=13759>

Miso Dokmanovic adds that “The most extreme position regarding the recognition issue by the EC was adopted during the Lisbon summit held in June 1992. The Greek pressure resulted in the Lisbon Declaration which conditioned the recognition of the country ‘under a name which does not include the term Macedonia.’” It was obvious that this EU position was formulated under a strong influence of Greece and at the same time represented the strongest diplomatic strike on the Macedonian diplomacy in the process of international recognition of the country. Furthermore, EC did not make any significant progress on the issue in 1992 and as a result the solution of the issue was handed over to the UN.”¹¹⁶

It was thus in Lisbon that it all started. In a documentary entitled “A Name is a Name: A Film About a Nation Held Hostage Because of its Name,” the director, Sigurjon Einarsson, from Iceland, interviews the Prime Minister of Macedonia, who says, among other things, that many European leaders today are ashamed of that statement in Lisbon in 1992.¹¹⁷

The meeting of Heads of State or Government of the European Community (referred to as the European Council) held in Lisbon on 26 and 27 June concluded the following on Macedonia: “The European Council reiterates the position taken by the Community and its Member States in Guimaraes on the request of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to be recognized as an independent State. It expresses its readiness to recognize that republic within its existing borders according to their Declaration on 16 December 1991 under a name which does not include the term Macedonia. It furthermore considers the borders of this republic as inviolable and guaranteed in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and the Charter of Paris.”¹¹⁸ Here again, then, we see reference to borders and thus, to the territorial integrity of Greece.

Weller concludes that “[t]he Republic of Macedonia applied for recognition on December 20, 1991, enclosing documentation on the referendum concerning independence, national legislation and policy. Macedonia stated that its constitutional

¹¹⁶ Miso Dokmanovic, “What’s in a Name?,” *op.cit.*, 38.

¹¹⁷ Sigurjon Einarsson, *A Name is a Name: A Film About a Nation Held Hostage Because of its Name*, Macedonia Foundation Production, 2009, Available at <http://www.anameisaname.net/EN/index.html>

¹¹⁸ The European Council, Lisbon, 26-27 June, 1992, Reproduced from the Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 6/1992, 22. Available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1420/1/Lisbon_june_1992.pdf

law established its adherence to international law, that it accepted obligations devolving upon it as a successor to Yugoslavia, that extensive provision for human and minority rights had been made, and that it had confirmed, in a parliamentary declaration, its acceptance of present boundaries and the renunciation of the use of force to modify boundaries. This renunciation of territorial claims was reinforced on January 6, 1992, by a constitutional amendment. Macedonia also embraced nonproliferation and disarmament commitments and affirmed its willingness to settle disputes peacefully. At the request of the commission, Macedonia reaffirmed that it would abstain from all hostile propaganda against neighboring states. In opposition to the views of Greece, the commission found that Macedonia had "renounced, in unambiguous and internationally binding declarations, all territorial claims which it might have; ... ever since, the use of the name 'Macedonia' could not be taken to imply any territorial claim with respect to another State.' The commission ruled that Macedonia had satisfied the conditions for recognition, but the EC failed to take action by the deadline of January 15. Similarly, recognition was not forthcoming on April 6, the second EC deadline for recognition. Almost a month later, an informal meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs at Guimaraes adopted a Declaration on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In that EPC declaration, the Community and its member states indicated the following:

"They are willing to recognize that State as a sovereign and independent State, within its existing borders, and under a name that can be accepted by all parties concerned.

...

The Community and its member States look forward to establishing with the authorities of Skopje a fruitful cooperative relationship . . . capable of improving political stability and economic progress in the area. Simultaneously, they urge that the parties directly involved continue to do their utmost to resolve the pending questions on the basis of the Presidency's package."

In essence, "this Solomonic compromise confirm[ed] that Macedonia [was] indeed a state, and it permit[ed] recognition of that state by individual EC members. The question of the state's name was diplomatically circumvented and left to be settled in later negotiations on "Macedonia's" future relationship with the

Community.”¹¹⁹ This future relationship seems to have reached another stalemate point. Namely, since 2005, in spite of positive reviews by the European Commission on Macedonia’s preparedness to enter the European Union, the Council of Ministers of the European Union (which meets every six months and makes important decisions, including on membership of a new state) continuously refuses to give Macedonia a date to start negotiations for becoming a Member State of the European Union. The latest development in this relationship has been that this year, as opposed to previous years, the European Commission loudly stated (in the Report, as was discussed earlier), that Macedonia had to change its name and made this a precondition to membership. Whereas before, this had been done by the political body of the European Union, namely the Council, now the supposedly non-political body – the secretariat of the European Union – even put it in writing.

Jens Reuter points out that “[i]t is in this predominantly irrational fear, as it seems, that the motives of Greece lie when it tests the patience of the EC countries and shatters the bases for its future economic cooperation with Macedonia. But it is the states of the European Community itself that must be blamed for allowing themselves to be blackmailed as regards the *Macedonian question*. The Greek Foreign Minister made the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht conditional on accepting ‘the special Greek interest concerning Macedonia’ by the European Community. As a result of that, the statements of the European Community no longer referred to Macedonia but to ‘Skopje. At the same time, the Community proposed some compromise solutions such as ‘New Macedonia’ or ‘Macedonia’ for internal, and ‘Skopje’ for external use.”¹²⁰

If the European Council and the European Commission had been loud and clear in terms of their bias towards Greek interests in the “name issue”, the same could not be said for the European Parliament. As a matter of fact, the European Parliament – incidentally, the only democratically elected institution in the European Union – has been vocal in calling for a start to negotiations for membership of Macedonia to the European Union, while individual Members of Parliament have overtly supported Macedonia. This has come as a relief to Macedonians who, by now, know the names of

¹¹⁹ Marc Weller, “The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” *op.cit.*, 593-594.

¹²⁰ Jens Reuter, “Policy and economy in Macedonia,” *op.cit.*, 42. (italics added)

these Members of Parliament and celebrate them as heroes. The subtitle of the following press release, says it all: “Foreign Affairs Committee MEPs voting on Tuesday once again called on the Council to set a date for starting EU accession negotiations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.”¹²¹ However, this, too is starting to change. The MEPs had stressed that “further delay could create an unreasonable disparity in the region, potentially posing further risks to good inter-ethnic relations” and that bilateral issues had to be addressed as early as possible in the accession process and “preferably before the opening of talks and ask for more concrete results in establishing good neighbourly relations between Athens, Sofia and Skopje.”¹²² In fact, the European Parliament is now also calling for a resolution of the “name issue” before accession. Another new development that this excerpt shows is that the relationship between Macedonia and the European Union is getting even more complicated, as now Bulgaria, which became a Member State in 2008, has also joined forces with Greece. This situation of the neighbouring “wolves,” which was discussed before, is becoming all the more worrisome.

We have seen the role the European Community (now Union) played in inciting the “name issue” on the regional level. As Evangelos Kofos told us, the Pinheiro Package had proposed the “New Macedonia” but this had been rejected by the Council of party leaders chaired by President of the Republic Constantine Karamanlis. “And thus ended this first international mediatory mission.”¹²³ Let us now see how the issue was internationalized.

THE UNITED STATES AND ITS RELATIONS WITH MACEDONIA

Historically, the United States have always had a strategic interest in the Balkans, and in Macedonia in particular. The fact that Victoria Nuland, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, flew in to Macedonia twice to settle the most recent skirmish between the Macedonian Government and the

¹²¹ “Progress of FYROM, Montenegro and Bosnia & Herzegovina: committee vote,” AFET Press release, Enlargement, 21.01.2014

¹²² <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20140120IPR33121/Progress-of-fyrom-montenegro-and-bosnia-herzegovina-committee-vote>

¹²³ Evangelos Kofos, *op.cit.*

opposition in summer 2015 speaks volumes to this fact. In addition, one of the largest US Embassies, possibly in the world, is in Macedonia (although these are speculations).¹²⁴ Another circumstance which points to this interest is the fact that the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the oldest institute for foreign relations in the United States, founded in 1910 published, in 1993, in the height of the war in Yugoslavia, a second edition of the Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars. The first edition of this Report was issued in 1914, following the eight-week visit of the Commission of Inquiry established by the Carnegie Foundation, to inquire into the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. As will be discussed in another chapter, the Balkan Wars were fought over the territory of Macedonia. Thus, interest one hundred years ago, and interest today.

Morton Abramowitz, President of the Carnegie Endowment describes how the Commission was sent to the Balkans in the first place, in his preface to the second, 1993 edition of the book. "I retrieved a copy from the Endowment's archives, along with other documentation indicating that *New York Times* dispatches and interviews in July 1913 described terrible atrocities occurring in the Balkans. Those accounts prompted Nicholas Murray Butler, one of the Endowment's leaders and president of Columbia University, to send an urgent telegram to the president of the Board of Trustees, Elihu Root, then a U.S. senator and formerly secretary of war and secretary of state. 'Amazing charges of Bulgarian outrages attributed to the King of Greece,' Butler told Root, 'give us great opportunity for prompt action. If you approve I will send notable commission at once to Balkans to ascertain facts and to fix responsibility for prolonging hostilities and committing outrages. Please reply ... today if possible.'

Root approved by midnight. In a remarkably short span of little more than a month, an International Commission of Inquiry was on its way to Belgrade. When the second Balkan war ended a week later, the inquiry turned into a study of the "causes and conduct" of the two wars."¹²⁵

¹²⁴ "World's Biggest USA Embassy in Macedonia," Above Top Secret Blog. Available at <http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread424954/pg1>

¹²⁵ Morton Abramowitz, "Preface," in *The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with a New Introduction and Reflections on the Present Conflict* by George Kennan. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993), 1.

Following the Second World War, the United States showed renewed its interest in Macedonia, as can be seen in several issues of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* – a publication which constitutes an “official record of the foreign policy of the United States,” whose volumes include “all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State’s responsibilities,” which was edited by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State.¹²⁶ As is cited in the Department of State Policy Statement of July 1, 1949 summarizing the United States’ policy towards Bulgaria, in a chapter entitled “Bulgaria: Events Leading to the Severance of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Bulgaria in 1950” of the 1949 Volume V publication on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union:

“Two other problems may require US policy decisions in the near future:

1) The *Macedonian question*, which has now emerged through Kremlin instigation as a trouble spot of importance involving Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia, should be carefully watched. The US position toward any Soviet efforts to create an “independent” Macedonia or a South Slav Federation will necessarily depend upon the circumstances and scope of such endeavors, and should take account of our interest in the integrity of Greece and in widening the breach between Yugoslavia and the USSR.”¹²⁷

Thus, the United States diplomats were weary of an independent Macedonia as early as 1949! What’s more, they were worried about the territorial integrity of Greece. What this shows is that in the eyes of United States diplomats an independent Macedonia would be a significant threat to Western interests, as it would lead to the spread of Communism in the Balkans, encompassing, as is referred to in the passage above, three countries – namely Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Thus, it was obvious that at that time, Macedonia was viewed in terms of geographical territory, as well as population, as a potentially dangerous mass when united. The fear of Communism thus also became a fear of “Macedonianness,” which, as we shall see later on, was

¹²⁶ “Preface,” in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1949 Volume V: Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union*. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1976), iii.

¹²⁷ “Bulgaria: Events Leading to the Severance of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Bulgaria in 1950” in *Foreign Relations of the United States, op.cit.*, 339. (italics added)

reflected in the Greek Civil War. As Vassiliki Vassiloudi and Vassiliki Theodorou relate, “Communism was perceived as the continuation of Pan-Slavism—“a disguise of Slavism” against Greekness—and, consequently, the regions of Thrace and Macedonia were turned into a constant battlefield.”¹²⁸

Further on, Heath, the Minister in Bulgaria to the United States Secretary of State, will write in his confidential note telegram written in Sofia on December 22, 1949, “Most of my Western colleagues share my belief that Bulgarian Government’s action was due to Kremlin’s unwillingness to have US break relations at this precise time and over this precise issue, and I might add, in this particular country. I believe that Kremlin accepted loss of face for Communist regime here rather than do anything which might operate to handicap eventual action against Tito for which Bulgaria must be an important base. There are signs here that Kremlin may use Bulgaria in an endeavor to agitate Macedonian issue. There are no local signs as yet of preparation for overt military attack on Yugoslavia but certainly Soviets must have considered such action as a possible last resort in case of other efforts against Tito failed.”¹²⁹

The Macedonian issue reappears in state department correspondence on the Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. On January 31, 1949 in Belgrade, United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Cannon) will write that “Re aid to Greek bandits, we see only slight probability of obtaining assurances while Yugoslavs still fail to acknowledge grave risks in their long-range situation. Any arrangement now entered into would be both unstable and deceptive. Actual extent present Yugoslav aid seems largely undetermined and we wonder whether we could rely on promises of interruption of supply routes to have decisive effect on Markos fortunes. (Markos Vafiades, Premier and Minister of War in the so-called Provisional Greek Democratic [pro-Communist] Government from December 1947 to January 1949.) We should not overlook fact that such arrangement would definitely weaken Yugoslav Government

¹²⁸ Vassiliki Vassiloudi and Vassiliki Theodorou, “Childhood in the Maelstrom of Political Unrest: The Childtowns (Paidopoleis) and the Experience of Displacement in Thrace during the Greek Civil War (1946-1949),” *The Journal of the History of Childhood and Youth*, Vol. 5, No 1 (2012), 122.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 379.

position in whole Macedonian area now under increasing Soviet pressure from their pincer of Albania and Bulgaria.”¹³⁰

Then, on March 17, 1949 in Moscow, the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the United States Secretary of State writes, “We do not believe Soviet Union will make any aggressive move with armed forces this year likely to embroil it in major hostilities with west powers. Kremlin will, however, organize, support and supply so-called local and liberation forces, notably Greco-Macedonians in north Greece and south Yugoslavia.”¹³¹

What is being referred to in the last two passages above is the Macedonians who were trying to gain independence from Greece during the Civil War in Greece. The Macedonians joined the Communist movement in Greece which promised Macedonians cultural rights, as will be seen in the historical part. The Western powers, however, were weary of the communist influence in Greece, and therefore supported the Royalists, which had previously been affiliated with the Nazis. As a matter of fact, one of the earliest uses of napalm bombs, one of the most flammable liquids used in warfare, the use of which against civilian populations was banned by the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in 1980, was precisely in Greek Macedonia. Napalm B “was ... used during the Greek Civil War between the Greek Army and Communist rebels. During 1949, the last year of the war, the United States increased its military aid to the Greek Government by introducing a new weapon to finish off the war: napalm B. The first napalm attack in Greece took place on the mountain of Grammos, which was the stronghold of the Communist rebels.”¹³²

From the passages above, it is clear that the United States has not only been continuously interested in Macedonian matters, but even militarily involved in them, thereby influencing the future of Macedonia. In fact, the “Macedonian Question” re-appears in all the correspondence and policy recommendations of the United States diplomats referred to above in Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. This is the extent to which it was an important question – both in and of itself, and as a tool for

¹³⁰ “Yugoslavia” in *Foreign Relations of the United States, op.cit.*, 860.

¹³¹ “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics”, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, op.cit.*, 596.

¹³² Robert M. Neer “Napalm: An American Biography”, *Nature* (April 2013), 496.

greater geo-strategic goals in the Cold War. The same can also be said about the current interest of the United States in Macedonia, and how these have shaped the “name issue”.

In recent years, the United States has changed its allies in the Balkans. Initially, the strong Greek lobby in the United States ensured that the United States refer to Macedonia under the provisional reference. As is recounted by Hanna Rosin in the *New Republic* article from June, 1994, “On February 9, at the State Department's behest, President Clinton announced that the United States would recognize the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. Less than a month later, however, Clinton backpedaled...” Rosin continues to explain that “[t]he key players [in the Greek lobby group] on the Macedonian issue were Senator Paul Sarbanes of Maryland, the nation's highest-ranking Greek-American elected official; Representative Michael Bilirakis of Florida; and several prominent Greek-Americans with links to the Democrats, including lobbyist Andrew Manatos, an assistant secretary of commerce under Carter who was once paid \$100,000 by Greece for ‘advice on tourism.’”¹³³

In 2004, however, policy changed. “On November 4, 2004, the Department of State spokesman announced that the United States had decided to refer to Macedonia officially as the ‘Republic of Macedonia,’ its chosen constitutional name. Macedonia will thus no longer be referred to as the ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,’ the formula adopted at the time of the breakup of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.’ The U.S. action was criticized in Greece, which objects to the use of the name ‘Macedonia’ for the Macedonian state, viewing it as a sign of that state's territorial ambitions to the northern Greek province of Macedonia.”¹³⁴

The current foreign policy of the United States vis-à-vis the Republic of Macedonia is ambiguous. On the one hand, the United States recognized Macedonia early on in 1994 (even though this was under the provisional reference), and that same year, it became actively involved in the negotiations process between Macedonia and Greece through the appointment of Mathew Nimetz as a special envoy of President Clinton on the “Macedonian Question.” Mathew Nimetz later became the

¹³³ Hanna Rosin, “Why we flip-flopped on Macedonia,” *New Republic* (13 June 1994).

¹³⁴ State Diplomatic and Consular Relations Section, “U.S. Relations with Republic of Macedonia,” *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 99, No. 1 (2005), 254

United Nations Secretary General's Special Envoy on the "name issue", and remains so to this day. Furthermore, "as a result of the intensive American initiative carried out by Richard Holbrooke, after long negotiations and intensive round of shuttle diplomacy, on 13 September 1995, Greece and Macedonia ... signed the Interim Accord."¹³⁵ In 2004, the United States recognized Macedonia under its constitutional name, which was a big step for Macedonia. According to a Canadian source, following US recognition, the Greek Government had emphasized that it would block Macedonia from joining NATO or the EU unless the dispute was resolved. Dokmanovic underlines that "NATO enlargement with ... Macedonia was strongly supported by the US and was placed very high on President Bush's agenda. In that direction, one day before the historic [NATO] Summit, US President Bush announced that a 'historic decision for the NATO enlargement with the new countries – Macedonia, Albania and Croatia – would be adopted at the NATO Summit in Bucharest."¹³⁶ This, of course, never happened for Macedonia. On the other hand, it seems as though Macedonia is not always the United States' favorite player in the Balkans, as can be seen from the current events analysis in the previous part.

III. THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE "NAME ISSUE"

The latest [Greek] requests, which include a change of the identity, are problematic, because they want the change of the Macedonian language, and so on. And also, more importantly, the question of the minorities – the Macedonian minority in Greece, in Bulgaria, in Albania, in Serbia – will become absurd. Because it will turn out that there is no longer a "Macedonian" minority in these countries as a "Macedonia" does not exist, nor does a "Macedonian" language exist.¹³⁷

How did such an unprecedented issue on the name of a country, as well as on the ethnic and national identity of its people and their language, sneak into the international world order? And why?

¹³⁵ Miso Dokmanovic, "What's in a Name?," *op.cit.*, 40.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 43.

¹³⁷ Interview with Prof. Dr. Dimitar Mircev, Skopje, 21 August 2011.

When the Republic of Macedonia gained its independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, one of its first priorities was to gain membership to the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO. This would at the same time, reaffirm its sovereignty and security, and consolidate its recognition. As we saw earlier, Macedonia “requested recognition from the European community (EC) in December 1991 within the framework set by the Guidelines for Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the Declaration Concerning the Condition for Recognition of New States.”¹³⁸ We also saw how under the pressure of Greece, the recognition of Macedonia by the European Community was delayed and conditioned with an added phrase in the Declaration, which required Macedonia to adopt political guarantees that it had no territorial claims towards any neighbouring country, and that it would conduct “no hostile propaganda activities versus a neighbouring community State, including the use of a denomination which implies territorial claims.”¹³⁹ How was this conditionality transferred to the United Nations?

On April 7th, 1993, following Macedonia’s application for membership to the United Nations, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 817/1993 with which it recommended to the General Assembly that the “State whose application is contained in document S/25147 be admitted to membership in the United Nations, this State being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as ‘the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the State.”¹⁴⁰ The Security Council urged the two parties to co-operate with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (Mr. Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen) to come to a speedy settlement of this difference, and requested the Secretary General of the United Nations to report to the Security Council on the outcome on the initiative taken by the Co-Chairmen. Today, twenty-two years later, the two parties have still not come to a “settlement” of the “difference” over the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia. In the meantime, this “difference” came to be popularly known on the international scene as the “name issue.” At the

¹³⁸ Miso Dokmanovic, “What’s in a Name?,” *op.cit.*, 37.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ U.N. Security Council 3196th Meeting, “Resolution 817, (S/RES/817/1993) 7 April 1993.

same time, on the basis of the Security Council Resolution, on April 8, 1993 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 47/225 for admission of Macedonia as the 181st member of the United Nations.¹⁴¹

This kind of unprecedented conditionality for membership on behalf of the Security Council was justified by the Security Council as a security issue, with the following words: “that a difference ha(d) arisen which needs to be resolved in the interest of maintenance of peaceful and good-neighborly relations in the region.”¹⁴² The fact that the Secretary General had to report to the Security Council reinforced the idea that this “difference” was a “territorial integrity” issue. This notion confined the “name issue” to the realms of security and territorial integrity from the very beginning – which was not at all the way the problem was viewed from the Macedonian side. According to the Security Council, then, the name “Republic of Macedonia” posed a threat to peace and good-neighborly relations in the Balkans.

Three months after the adoption of Security Council Resolution 817 (1993), the Security Council issued another resolution, namely 845 (1993), following the Report of the Secretary General on the outcome of the initiative that had been taken by Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia as in accordance with Resolution 817/93. The Secretary General’s Report contained, among other things, a summary of the “discussions with the parties,” which had taken place “against the background of earlier work done within the framework of the European Community conference on the former Yugoslavia, and in particular:

- Opinion No. 6 on the recognition of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia by the European Community and its member States rendered by the Arbitration Commission presided over by Mr. R. Badinter (annex III);

- Draft Treaty for the Confirmation of the Existing Frontier, prepared by Sir Robin O’Neill, Envoy of the President of the European Community (annex IV).¹⁴³

The Opinion, as discussed earlier, recommended the recognition of Macedonia under its constitutional name, which, according to the Badinter Commission, did not

¹⁴¹ U.N. General Assembly 98th Plenary Meeting, Resolution 47/225 (A/RES/47/225) 8 April 1993. Available at: <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r225.htm>

¹⁴² U.N. Security Council 3196th Meeting, “Resolution 817, (S/RES/817/1993) 7 April 1993.

¹⁴³ U.N. Security Council, “Letter Dated 26 May 1993 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/25855, 28 May 1993, 2-3.

pose a territorial threat. The Draft Treaty recalled, in its first paragraph, “the principles of inviolability of frontiers and the territorial integrity,” of the Final (Helsinki) Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which as discussed earlier, was the view promoted by the European Community under the influence of Greece. The Treaty called upon the two parties to confirm the existing borders, respect their sovereignty and territorial integrity, and refrain from the use of force.¹⁴⁴

The Report also informed on the positions of the two parties, and the Draft Treaty that had been elaborated by the two Co-Chairmen based on these positions, which later formed the basis of the Interim Accord. The Co-Chairmen had met with the parties on several occasions throughout April and May, 1993, for initial, and then technical discussions, which were followed by a working paper that had been submitted to the two parties. “Discussions on the working paper were held with the two delegations between 27 and 29 April at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. On 29 April, the Co-Chairmen submitted to the two sides a draft treaty Confirming the Existing Frontier and Establishing Measures for Confidence Building, Friendship and Neighbourly Cooperation.”¹⁴⁵ The Secretary General informs us in the Report that the Co-Chairmen had prepared the Draft Treaty on the basis of extensive consultations with the two parties. The main point of contention, however, remained the constitutional name of Macedonia:

“12. With respect to the name to be used by the State that was admitted to the United Nations with the provisional name of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which name was of particular concern to the Security Council in adopting its resolution 817 (1993), the position of the two parties was far apart:

(a) The Greek delegation stated its position that the other part should not use a name [in its international relations,]* that included the word “Macedonia”; it indicated, however, that if that term were to be included in a name to be used for both domestic and international purposes, then the name “Slavomacedonia” could be envisaged.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

(b) The delegation of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia prefers that the name used for all purposes be that set out in the Constitution: “The Republic of Macedonia”; it was, however, prepared to discuss the modalities of the use of a name for international purposes only.

13. Mr. Vance and Lord Owen consider that the name to be used should be the name for all official purposes, both domestic and international. Taking into account the continuing disagreement of the parties as to what that name should be, and the number of alternatives that were proposed at one time or another by one of the parties or by the Co-Chairmen, all of which proposals were rejected by one or both parties, Mr. Vance and Lord Owen have proposed the following name: “The Republic of Nova Makedonija”, to be used for all official purposes, domestic and international.”¹⁴⁶

*Mr. Vance and Lord Owen understood that the Greek position included the bracketed phrase. However on checking this point with the Greek delegation after Lord Owen had already left for Moscow, the delegation indicated that the bracketed phrase should be excluded.”

Resolution 845 (1993) which was adopted by the Security Council on the basis of the Secretary General’s Report, recalls Resolution 817/93, “1) ... commends to the parties as a sound basis for the settlement of their difference the proposals set forth in annex V to the report of the Secretary-General; 2) Urges the parties to continue their efforts under the auspices of the Secretary-General to arrive at a speedy settlement of the remaining issues between them; and 3) Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed ...”¹⁴⁷

The Secretary General then appointed one of the two Co-Chairmen, namely Cyrus Vance, as a Special Envoy, in August, 1993. In December, 1999, Cyrus Vance would be replaced by Matthew Nimetz, to oversee the negotiations and ensure a “speedy settlement of the issue.”¹⁴⁸ The fact that it was Mr. Cyrus Vance who was appointed to this position also shows that for the United Nations, the “name issue” was a continuation of the issues arising from the break-up of Yugoslavia. Thus, it

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁴⁷ U.N. Security Council 3243rd Meeting, “Resolution 845,” (S/RES/845//1993) 18 June 1993.

¹⁴⁸ Tatjana Petrushevska, “Who is Matthew Nimetz?” in *The “Name Issue”: Greece and Macedonia*, by Svetomir Skaric, Dimitar Aspasiiev, and Vladimir Patchev eds. (Skopje: Matica Makedonska, 2009), 430.

reinforces the “territorial integrity” image of the “name issue,” of which only the Greek party to the issue is a proponent. The Macedonian image of the “name issue” is not at all linked to territorial integrity, as we shall see later.

A “name change,” however, was not Greece’s only request from the newly independent country. In fact, as soon as Macedonia gained independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, Greece had challenged Macedonia’s status as a state and accused its *constitution, flag and name* of exhibiting “extraterritorial” ambitions. In 1994, a year after Macedonia became a member state of the United Nations (under the “provisional reference”) Greece placed an embargo on Macedonia. The embargo, according to Miso Domkanovic, was provoked by the United States’ recognition of Macedonia in 1994 (albeit under the provisional reference), and aimed to devastate the Macedonian economy and force the country to make concessions in the “name dispute.” Apparently, the damage imposed on the country due to the embargo amounted to 58 million USD per month.¹⁴⁹ The embargo was lifted only 19 months later, in September of 1995, with the signing of the Interim Accord, which was based on the aforementioned draft Treaty proposed by the Co-Chairmen, and with which Macedonia promised to change its national flag and to reaffirm the interpretation of Articles 3 and 49 as per the Amendments I and II cited earlier, as well as to “continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to Security Council resolution 845 (1993) with a view to reaching agreement on the difference described in that resolution and in Security Council resolution 817 (1993).”¹⁵⁰

Here is how the provision regarding the flag stands, word for word, in the Interim Accord:

- “Article 7
1. ...
2. Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the
Party of the Second Part [Macedonia]

¹⁴⁹ Miso Dokmanovic, “What’s in a Name?,” *op.cit.*, 40.

¹⁵⁰ No. 32193 GREECE and THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA Interim Accord (with related letters and translations of the Interim Accord in the languages of the Contracting Parties), Signed at New York on 13 September 1995, Article 5.1.

shall cease to use in any way the symbol in all its forms displayed on its national flag prior to such entry into force.

3. If either Party believes one or more symbols constituting part of its historic or cultural patrimony is being used by the other Party, it shall bring such alleged use to the attention of the other Party, and the other Party shall take appropriate corrective action or indicate why it does not consider it necessary to do so.”¹⁵¹

As the following title of the New York Times article from September 14, 1995 notes, “Greece to Lift Embargo Against Macedonia if It Scraps Its Flag,” the Interim Agreement committed Macedonia to stop using the Star of Vergina on its national flag – a sixteen-ray sun which is believed to have been a symbol of ancient Macedonia during the times of Philip II. The reasoning was that “Greece contend[ed] that the distinctive symbol ... [was] intrinsic to its own cultural heritage.”¹⁵²

In addition, Macedonia reaffirmed that it would interpret Articles 3 and 49, as well as the Preamble of its Constitution in accordance with Greek demands because according to Greece these constituted a claim to territory beyond its borders, and to interference in the internal affairs of Greece. As was seen earlier, these two articles had already been amended in January 1992 as per European Community requests as a result of Greek pressure. Here is an excerpt from the Interim Accord: “Article 6: 1. The Party of the Second Part [Macedonia] hereby solemnly declares that nothing in its Constitution, and in particular in the Preamble thereto or in Article 3 of the Constitution, can or should be interpreted as constituting or will ever constitute the basis of any claim by the Party of the Second Part [Macedonia] to any territory not within its existing borders. 2. The Party of the Second Part [Macedonia] hereby solemnly declares that nothing in its Constitution, and in particular in Article 49 as amended, can or should be interpreted as constituting or will ever constitute the basis for the Party of the Second Part to interfere in the internal affairs of another State in *order to protect the status and rights of any persons in other States who are not citizens*

¹⁵¹ No. 32193, *Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – Interim Accord (with related letters and translations of the Interim Accord in the languages of the Contracting Parties)* Signed in New York on 13 September 1995, Article 7.

¹⁵² Christopher S. Wren, “Greece to Lift Embargo Against Macedonia if It Scraps Its Flag,” *The New York Times*, September 14, 1995.

of the Party of the Second Part. 3. The Party of the Second Part furthermore solemnly declares that the interpretations given in paragraphs I and 2 of this Article will not be superseded by any other interpretation of its Constitution.”¹⁵³

The Greek concessions in the Interim Accord, on the other hand, were not to interfere in Macedonia’s quest for membership in international and regional organizations. As is stated in Article 11: “1. Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of the First Part [Greece] agrees not to object to the application by or the membership of the Party of the Second Part [Macedonia] in international, multilateral and regional organizations and institutions of which the Party of the First Part is a member; however, the Party of the First Part reserves the right to object to any membership referred to above if and to the extent the Party of the Second Part is to be referred to in such organization or institution differently than in paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council resolution 817 (1993).”¹⁵⁴

It was precisely based on the violation of Article 11 of the Interim Accord following the Greek veto against Macedonia’s entry in NATO in 2008, that Macedonia filed a proceedings against Greece at the International Court of Justice that same year. The Court delivered its Judgment on December 5, 2011, in favor of Macedonia:

“The Court ... by fifteen votes to one, finds that the Hellenic Republic, by objecting to the admission of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to NATO, has breached its obligation under Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995...”¹⁵⁵ It can be said that one aspect of the “name issue” has been resolved through the ruling of the International Court of Justice. Indeed, in the Interim Accord, Greece had promised not to block Macedonia's entry in international and regional organizations, however it vetoed Macedonia's entry in NATO in 2008 due to the “name issue,” thereby breaching the agreement. The judgment may pave the way to Macedonia’s entry into NATO, and even the EU, without having to give its name up,

¹⁵³ No. 32193, *Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – Interim Accord (with related letters and translations of the Interim Accord in the languages of the Contracting Parties)*, Signed in New York on 13 September 1995, Article 6 (emphasis added).

¹⁵⁴ No. 32193, *Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – Interim Accord (with related letters and translations of the Interim Accord in the languages of the Contracting Parties)* Signed in New York on 13 September 1995, Article 11.

¹⁵⁵ *Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)*, International Court of Justice Judgment, 5 December 2011, 48.

during its negotiations on the “name issue.” At the same time, however, there is no guarantee that Greece will not veto Macedonia’s international aspirations yet again, in spite of this judgment.

This is how it all happened. First, Macedonia changed its constitution, then its flag, and now it is being threatened to change its name, or else no European Union and no NATO. But the question Macedonians pose themselves on a daily basis is whether the name is the last request, or whether there is more. What about the all references to the ethnic identity and the language that are progressively creeping up everywhere? What should they make of all the telltale signs, such as the adjective “Macedonian” missing from the European Commission report, which warn that the name is not the last part of their identity they will have to change? Although it is easy for someone from the outside – especially from a well-established country – to brush off the “name issue” as a technical matter, the average Macedonian, as my interviews show, lives in constant fear for his existence.

One may wonder why the Republic of Macedonia accepted to negotiate its constitutional name – one of the most important characteristics of the sovereignty of a nation-state which clearly falls within the domestic jurisdiction of a state and which is indisputably a part of the right of its people to self-determination. There are those, within the country, of course, that viciously criticize this decision. Janko Bacev, for example, believes that the Macedonian government made a mistake in accepting to negotiate on the “name issue” in order to become a Member State of the United Nations, as the entry of Macedonia under the provisional reference on April 8, 1993 was not necessary. Rather, he believes that it was a bad assessment on behalf of the Macedonian Government to insist at any price on the entry in the United Nations, even if under a national name which was different from the name chosen by its people.¹⁵⁶

Having gained its independence from Yugoslavia just two years earlier, in 1991, however, Macedonia found itself in the weak position of attempting to establish itself on the international scene, and becoming a Member State of the United Nations and the European Union was seen as a crucial priority by state authorities. As a result, the newly established Government of the Republic of Macedonia accepted to negotiate

¹⁵⁶ Janko Bacev, *Macedonia and Greece, op.cit.*, 85.

its name with Greece under the auspices of the Special Envoy appointed by the United Nations Secretary General, in return for becoming a Member State of the United Nations, while in the meantime it would “provisionally be referred to” within the United Nations, and consequentially, within most other international and regional organizations such as the European Union, as “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” “pending settlement of the difference.” This state of “stand-by” has contributed to a feeling of insecurity and instability within the Republic of Macedonia, a pessimistic outlook onto its future by its citizens, and consequently, a collective anxiety which eats individuals from within, as well as creating polarization among the population. A weekly analysis into the most read daily newspaper for just two months portrays an obsession regarding the “name issue”, and thus the level of collective anxiety it has created.

NEW ANALYSIS ON THE “NAME ISSUE” FROM THE DAILY NEWSPAPER
DNEVNIK

A simple search for “the name” in the daily newspaper *Dnevnik*, which has online records from 2006 until 2015, showed 14,521 articles on the “name issue”, which means that on average, there were 4 articles on the “name” per day. A more focused search, with “name issue” as a key word, displayed 3,125 articles, which amounts to just about one article per day. If there was only one article per day for the past ten years, it would have amounted to 3,600 articles. This, in and of itself shows the concern by the media, reflected upon citizens and vice versa, of the “name issue.” Here is a sample of quotes from articles from each week in April and May 2015, where the “name issue” is the main subject, to get an idea of the persistent concern surrounding the “name issue.”

On April 24, 2015, the article entitled “The Meeting between Nimetz and Kosoais Ended,” informed that during the last day of his five day visit to the United States, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Nikos Kosoais, had held a meeting in New York with Matthew Nimetz, the special envoy of the United Nations for the Macedonian “name issue.” This, noted the paper, was first meeting between Kosoais and Nimetz.

The April 27, 2015 article entitled “The Last Letter from Jonche from Dobrushevo” was dedicated to the late Jonche, a renowned Macedonian who had been born in the village of Dobrushevo in Aegean Macedonia and who, like many Macedonian refugees from that part of Greece, fled to Australia. Speaking of his activism for the Macedonian cause even before the independence of Macedonia from Yugoslavia (this being forbidden by both Greece and Yugoslavia), the author states that Jonche’s political activism had not stopped in spite of his distance from his birthplace. “In 2008, he created the “Lobby Group for the Protection of the Constitutional Name,” in which he claimed that the fight for the name should be led in front of the International Court of Justice. He was convinced that we would win the dispute. And that we should not withdraw even one millimeter for the name.”

On May 3, 2015, in “American Pie or Russian Roulette,” the author, Daut Dauti (of ethnic Albanian origin) states that “Macedonia finds itself in such a crossroads where there are more and more people who let their emotions counter pragmatism. Emotions pull towards Russia, centre of panslavism. Dauti goes on to state that the political elite no longer consider the European Union as politically -strategically important, but only declare to do so. “The Americans are being seen as evil because they don’t pressure Greece in the “name issue”... But, until now, there is not one proactive role undertaken by Russia vis-à-vis Greece to give up on the name...”

The May 4, 2015 article entitled “No Signature is Needed for a Strong Cross-Party Consensus on Macedonia” informed about the recent agreement between the political leaders of the country on the initiative of the Prime Minister, with regards to five issues on which the government and the opposition, regardless of who was in power and who was in opposition, had to have a party consensus, and which they would not allow to be subject to “daily politics and individual verbal attacks, for the purpose of accumulating of daily political points.” One of these five topics was the “name issue.”

On May 8, 2015, the article entitled “Macedonians are asking the University of Notre Dame to disclaim insults by Greek professor Timis,” in Australia, appeared. In it, the editor stated that “Greek professor at the renowned University of Notre Dame Australia, Anastasios Timis (born in Thessaloniki), in an article published about a

month ago in the Greek newspaper “Neos Cosmos” insulted, ridiculed and negated the Macedonian nation and the Macedonian constitutional name. Timis, who has been head of the Institute for Macedonian Studies, was provoked by the speech of the member of the House of Representatives of Australia, Australian Luke Simpkins before lawmakers in March, when he urged his country to recognize Macedonia under its constitutional name.”

All of these articles were just days apart, and while their constant presence depicts the concern by Macedonian citizens, it also expresses the different aspects of the “name issue” as seen by both the Greeks and the Macedonians – and their official political representatives – that I will outline in the following part.

NEGOTIATIONS AND EXCERPTS FROM NEGOTIATING POSITIONS

Now I am telling you from my own personal experience. Shortly after I was named Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I go to New York on September 1, 1992, together with Ambassador Igor Tosevski, our main negotiator at that moment, and Bidikov, who is our correspondent for the newspaper Nova Makedonija in New York – can you imagine, the official representative of our country to the United Nations is a journalist! He couldn't enter the United Nations. Cyrus Vance [the UN-appointed negotiator preceding Mathew Nimetz] calls us and we go there to negotiate. We are three and they are three – Papoulias, Zachariadis, and Vassilakis. They don't want to enter with us in the same office! What is that country?! We stand in the hallway. You see, international relations are a market. The international laws protect them [Greece] – they are already well-established, they are inside. Then Vance tells them, come on, for God's sake, enter. Finally, they find two offices, one for us and one for them. Vance listens to their proposals, and then comes to us. We say “yok burda” don't be kidding yourselves, we are an independent country from Yugoslavia and so forth. Then he goes there and they don't accept. Now, to show that there is some kind of progress – while there is none – we go out, and there are cameras, and we are standing there – we on one side, they on the other – while Vance, former State Secretary of the United States, gives a press statement. And he says the proposals have been reviewed and so on and so forth ... I can cite you 600 formulations of the name...I just want to tell you that it was really difficult. Someone [Greece] established himself, created an international-legal system, adopted conventions left and right, which defend him – because he

*entered that system already and gave his agreement. You see, it's a question of power. And we just couldn't do what we wanted to. The Security Council is powerful. Even when it comes to a very simple bureaucratic procedure – our request for membership was submitted on July 30 1992, and was not even registered until January 24, 1993!*¹⁵⁷

Although I was not able to access official records of the negotiating positions (they are kept under the “strictly confidential” label in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), several of my interlocutors who were diplomats, politicians, or political advisors, had either direct or indirect experience in the negotiations, and as such, their stories have all the more meaning and character – as seen above. In addition, the very first letters by Greece and Macedonia to the Security Council and the Secretary-General, immediately before and after Macedonia’s membership to the United Nations in April 1993 were published by the United Nations Security Council, and give us a gist of the positions each party had on the “name issue” in the beginning. I have quoted here the first letters in their entirety in order to convey the elements in each party’s position, as well the tone of their authors, which is very telling of the ambiance at the time and the power position each party disposed of.

The letter dated April 6, 1993 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece addressed to the President of the Security Council, referring to Resolution 817/1993 of the Security Council reads as follows:

“I write to inform you that the Government of Greece considers the draft resolution currently before the Security Council an acceptable basis for addressing the issue of the application of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for admission to the United Nations.

My Government considers the three main elements of this resolution, namely the settlement of the difference over the name of the applicant state, the adoption of appropriate confidence-building measures and the procedure for admitting the new state to the United Nations under a provisional name, an integral and indivisible package which alone can resolve the outstanding differences between Greece and the new Republic.

¹⁵⁷ Interview with Ambassador Viktor Gaber, Skopje, September 2, 2013

Indeed, the ultimate objective of the matter is the normalization of the relations between Greece and *FYROM*. Only if this objective is reached, can peace and stability in our region be assured. Our position regarding the causes of these differences and the means to address and permanently eradicate them are included in the memorandum which we submitted to the Secretary-General on 25 January 1993.

One thing must be clear at the very outset. Together with the resolution of the issue of the name, Greece attaches the highest importance to the adoption and implementation of a set of appropriate confidence-building measures by the new state vis-à-vis Greece. Such measures were already included in the so-called Pinheiro Package which was put together by the Portuguese Presidency of the European Community in the spring of 1992. The CBMs must aim at securing, inter alia:

- Legal and political guarantees that the new state harbours no territorial claims against Greece (which should include amendments of certain provisions of the 1991 Constitution of the *FYROM*, as references to the “protection” of non-existing minorities in the neighbouring countries of this new Republic), and guarantees of the existing borders by both sides.

- The cessation of all hostile propaganda, particularly acts which could provoke public opinion and impede efforts towards establishing good neighbourly relations.

- The termination of the use of Greek symbols – such as the Sun of Vergina – as symbols of the new Republic. This is of paramount importance to the Greek people.

Finally, since one of the issues for the confidence-building measures is the question of the flag, I should like to underline – as I have done in verbal communications to your distinguished predecessors – that the hoisting and flying at the United Nations of the flag bearing the Sun of Vergina would result in great damage to the efforts undertaken by the Co-chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and render more difficult, if not defeat, a solution.

I should be grateful to you, Mr. President, if you would bring the serious concerns of my Government to the attention of the Secretary-General so that the problems that might be created by the hoisting of the flag be avoided.

(Signed)

Michael PAPACONSTANTINOU
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁸ U.N. Security Council, “Letter Dated 6 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/25543, 6 April 1993.

Indeed, Macedonia entered the books of the United Nations as the only country in the history of the organization without a flag-raising ceremony at its fateful membership day. In fact, as Janko Bacev recounts, the official entry of Macedonia in the United Nations was quite an embarrassing, hidden little event. It was a unique and absurd example of the international political scene, as not only was there no flag ceremony – and no name – but the affair happened in such a rush, that, instead of being represented by heads of state and government, the Plenary Room of the General Assembly was filled with ambassadors, which is hardly the level of representation for an act of membership of a State to the United Nations. In fact, Macedonian President Gligorov quietly left the United Nations headquarters that day. Moreover, Macedonia was most probably the only country to submit a request for membership to the United Nations twice – once on July 30, 1992, and then again on January 7, 1993, which adds to the absurdity of the case.¹⁵⁹

What is interesting to note in the letter from Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Papaconstantinou above is the assured and confident tone with which he writes, which is telling of a feeling of superiority that is no doubt due to a variety of reasons, including the fact that Greece is already “established” and “in the system” as Ambassador Gaber hints in his interview above. This is precisely the feeling of power Ambassador Gaber refers to – the one against which the newly independent Macedonia was up against, with no funds or human resources – not even access to the United Nations building – not to mention allies and know-how. The one where, imagine, the only representative of the country to the United Nations for a while was the correspondent of a newspaper!

One of my interviewees – a successful British businessman and philanthropist who had arrived to the Balkans to practice defense communications during the Bosnian war, and who had ultimately settled and established himself in Macedonia, underscores this point:

(emphasis added: please note that FYROM is an acronym that is seen as condescending by Macedonians)

¹⁵⁹ Janko Bacev, *Macedonia and Greece, op.cit.*, 125-126.

The initial reason for the name issue being created was two-fold. First of all, it was an internal political act within Greece for popularity – to try and strengthen the leadership at the time. The excuse - the reason why the international community bought into it, was basically, that we don't want the Balkan [Yugoslav] wars spreading south. The Greek argument was if Macedonia lays claims to Thessaloniki through nationalism, then we could watch the Balkan wars go southwards. And [...] the international community really did not understand the Balkans at the time. They had no idea who was fighting for what why where and how. So I think the Balkan politicians were extremely astute at the time, and the Greeks were the most astute. Unfortunately, Macedonia did not have a political pedigree, because they were always under the umbrella of Belgrade. So they didn't have the sophistication of Greece. So, unfortunately, there was no one from Macedonia to defend the Macedonian position at the time, to point out that there were no territorial aspirations...That, basically was the crux of the argument that Greece used to win a lot of heavy-weight support.¹⁶⁰

According to Ray Power, then, Macedonia lost out early in the game because it lacked politicians with a pedigree. At the same time, the astute Greek politicians were able to serve the “territorial integrity” argument to the Europeans, who were afraid the wars would spread further than the Balkans.

In terms of the content of the letter, the Minister outlines that the Greek position regarding the causes of the “differences” and the means to address and permanently eradicate them are included in the Memorandum which Greece submitted to the Security Council on 25 January 1993. This Memorandum contains some Macedonian post-WWII documents, which contain aspirations for a greater Macedonia, including the text of the Manifest of 2 August, 1944, issued at the first session of the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) to the People of Macedonia. The Manifesto reads as follows:

Macedonians under Bulgaria and Greece,
The unification of an entire Macedonian people depends on your participation in the gigantic anti-Fascist front. Only by fighting the vile Fascist occupier will you gain your right to self-determination and to unification of the entire Macedonian people within the framework of Tito's Yugoslavia, which has become a free community of emancipated and equal peoples. May the

¹⁶⁰ Interview with Ray Power, Skopje, 17 August 2011.

struggle of the Macedonian Piedmont incite you to even bolder combat against the Fascist oppressors!¹⁶¹

The Greek Memorandum also quotes “The Proclamation to the people of Macedonia issued by the Communist party of Macedonia” of 4 August 1944, which reads as follows:

“People of Macedonia!

In the course of three years of combat, you have achieved your unity, developed your army and laid the basis for the federal Macedonian state. With the participation of the entire Macedonian nation in the struggle against the Fascist occupiers of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece you will achieve unification of all parts of Macedonia, divided in 1915 and 1918 by Balkan imperialists.”¹⁶²

It is clear to see from these two Macedonian documents that were cited in the Greek Memorandum to the United Nations Security Council as a way of voicing its opposition to the application of Macedonia for membership in the United Nations, that Greece was afraid of a Greek Civil War II scenario. As the Greek Civil War will be discussed in detail in the historic part, I will not go into its details here, only to say that it occurred almost immediately after WWII, namely from 1946-1949, and involved the Communists (a majority of which were ethnic Macedonians, i.e. the same Communists referred to above in the Manifesto and the Proclamation) on the one hand, and the “royalists” on the other. It is important to note that the Greek Civil War was indeed not only an international battle against Communism which played out on the Greek stage, but also very much a domestic battle between Macedonians and Greeks – even though there also were Greek Communists who fought in the war. The current Greek official position on the war, however, is that the Macedonians who fought in it were not “domestic” (i.e. the Macedonian minority in Greece, which according to Greek authorities does not exist) but rather infiltrated spies who came from Yugoslavia.

As a matter of fact, the United Nations had appointed a Special Commission of Investigation concerning Greek Frontier Incidents (whose Report of 30 June 1948 to

¹⁶¹ Snezana Trifunovska ed., *Former Yugoslavia Through Documents: From its Dissolution to the Peace Settlement* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999), 939.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 939-940.

the General Assembly is also partly quoted in the Greek Memorandum of January 25, 1993), which in its Report “noted certain basic issues between Greece and her three northern neighbours, many of which have been of long duration. More recently, it has taken note of certain recent developments in the *Macedonian question*. Radio broadcasts, newspapers and statements of public officials in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have continued to support conflicting claims for the detachment of ‘Greek’ or ‘Aegean’ Macedonia from Greece and for the establishment of a unified Macedonia in some form or another. The Special Committee also noted the statement of the Slavo-Macedonian National Liberation front (NOF) of 3 February 1949, favoring the ‘union of Macedonia’ as an independent and equal Macedonian state’ within ‘the confederation of democratic Balkan peoples.’”¹⁶³

Having the Greek Civil War backdrop in mind, the Greek position regarding territorial integrity becomes evident. But it is still unclear how the name of the country could pose a territorial threat. Or, is the “name issue” perhaps a smoke screen (to use my professor’s words), for a greater interest – namely blocking Macedonia’s existence altogether – in order to subdue a greater fear: the fear of an independent Macedonia within the European Union, with Macedonians crossing the Greek-Macedonian border back and forth according to their whims and sharing their traditions, spreading their culture and speaking their language.

Snezana Trifunovska, who provided the citations of the Greek Memorandum of January 25, 1993¹⁶⁴ in the colossal volume of documents from former Yugoslavia, states that “In the Greek view, the fact that the Macedonian Constitution is based on the ASNOM’s principles of 1944 and that it makes a reference to the possibility of changing the borders – while the territory of the new state remains ‘indivisible and inalienable’ (Article 3) – inevitably contains Macedonian territorial pretensions with respect to neighboring countries.” At the same time, Article 49, which, as was discussed previously, cares for the rights of Macedonians in neighboring countries, according to Trifunovska, “indicates the possibility of intervening in the internal

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 940. (italics added)

¹⁶⁴ The Memorandum can also be found in the Official Document System of the United Nations, however the link to the English version does not function. The link to the French version does work and can be found at: http://unitesearch.un.org/results.php?lang=en&tpl=ods&_ga=GA1.2.991091422.1453911968&_gat=1&gat_TrackerTPL=1&query=A%2F47%2F877#!

affairs of neighboring states on the pretext of issues concerning the 'status and the rights' of minorities,"¹⁶⁵ As we have seen earlier, however, these two articles in the Constitution were amended within months after gaining independence from Yugoslavia (January 1992), and as the Badinter Commission pointed out, as amended, they no longer posed a territorial threat.

In the Greek Minister's letter of 6 April 1993 cited above (six months after the Memorandum), Greece stresses the "integrality and indivisibility" of the admission package. In other words, it warns that only if the three elements are fulfilled simultaneously, (settlement of the difference, adoption of confidence-building measures, and the procedure for admitting Macedonia under a provisional name) can there be a resolution. In this way, emphasizing its point of no return, Greece tied the membership of Macedonia to the United Nations, to a resolution of the differences between it and Greece, which resolution, in turn, was integral to and indivisible from adopting confidence building measures and membership to the United Nations. All this, in turn, was indispensable for "peace and stability in the region." As such, the "settlement of the difference" and these "confidence-building measures" were in stone, for the sake of "peace and stability in the region." Because of a name. One may say "much ado about nothing," to quote Shakespeare. But perhaps it is too early to jump to conclusions at this point.

So what were these "confidence building measures?" Were the amendments to the Constitution of January 6, 1992 not sufficient by way of building confidence? After all, Amendment I modifying Article 3 stipulated that Macedonia had no territorial pretensions against neighboring countries, and Amendment II modifying Article 49 stipulated that Macedonia would not interfere in the sovereign rights of other states and in their internal affairs. These articles, referring to territorial claims and the protection of minorities, are precisely what the letter of Minister Papaconstantinou of April 6, 1993 referred to. However more than one year down the road, and faced with the reality that Macedonia would be becoming a Member State of the United Nations (based on the draft Resolution 817 (1993) of the Security Council which

¹⁶⁵ Snezana Trifunovska, *Former Yugoslavia Through Documents*, *op.cit.*, 940.

recommended Macedonia's entry and which was adopted on April 7, 1993 – the very next day), these changes did not seem to satisfy Greece.

This was a strategic letter, then, sent one day before the Security Council recommended Macedonia's membership and two days before the General Assembly declared Macedonia a Member State, leaving the door wide open for other "confidence building measures," and placing another condition for Macedonia – changing the flag, to be exact – within these measures. Yet, if one studies the one-page Security Council Resolution 817 (1993) in detail, one will see no mention of a flag. The ensuing General Assembly Resolution 47/225 declaring Macedonia's membership is even shorter and more concise. Resolution 817 (1993) clearly "notes that *a difference* has arisen over the name of the State," urges the parties to arrive at a speedy settlement of *their difference* (singular form), and recommends admission of the State under the provisional reference pending settlement over *the difference* (in singular form).¹⁶⁶ The *difference* referred to here, is the constitutional name of the neighbouring country, namely the Republic of Macedonia. *That* was precisely the *difference* that had been professed repeatedly hitherto by Greece during discussions with the European Union and the United Nations. The name was in turn linked to the question of *territorial integrity*, which was threatened, according to Greece, by the *name* and the *two constitutional clauses*, one of which was on the protection of the Macedonian minority in Greece (which according to Greece was non-existent). Considering that the two constitutional clauses had already been amended and that thus, this aspect of the territorial integrity issue had been resolved, it is logical that the Security Council referred to the only other remaining issue between the two countries that could pose a threat to the territorial integrity of Greece – to be exact the *name*. Indeed, the Resolution only obliges the two countries to settle "*the difference*," meaning *the "name issue*." To be fair, even this could be considered a bit of a stretch, considering the mandate of the Security Council is, after all, maintaining peace and security. The Security Council did leave some room for manoeuvre, however, precisely in the clause that refers to the so-called "confidence-building measures," but it is clearly not the central part of the Resolution and is directed not at the two parties but at the Co-

¹⁶⁶ U.N. Security Council 3196th Meeting, "Resolution 817, (S/RES/817/1993), 7 April 1993.

Chairmen. It reads as follows: “Welcoming the readiness of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, at the request of the Secretary-General, to use their good offices to settle the above-mentioned difference, and to promote confidence-building measures among the parties.”¹⁶⁷ Thus, this segment of the Resolution can be considered as secondary and non-binding for the two parties.

It seems to me that it is safe to conclude from all this, then, that in spite of the vague and unbinding reference to so-called “confidence building measures” in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 817 (1993), Macedonia has been implementing plenty of these throughout the years, such as amending its Constitution in 1992, changing its flag in 1995, and is even willing to change its name – under certain conditions, naturally.

It seems that, in spite of all the effort to promote confidence in view of peace and stability in the region, Greek authorities never seem to be fully satisfied. The question is what does Greece truly want from Macedonia? What fears hide behind that true goal? What is next in line in terms of “confidence-building” measures? Would Greece be more “confident” if Macedonians changed their ethnic and national identity, as well as their language?

This seems to be more and more the case, as was seen in the 2009 negotiating position of Greece, which was perhaps the most frightening for Macedonians thus far. Its contents were confided to me by one of my interviewees. Here is how it reads.

1. Greece accepts a name with a geographical qualifier that would modify the term “Macedonia”. It prefers that it should be “Northern” ...

2. Greece wants the new name to be for all purposes (*erga omnes*) – external and internal. It does not accept the concept of a name for external and internal use. ... It wants all documents, letterheads, etc., that will be used at home and abroad to bare the new name. ...

3. Greece wants the new name to be used on personal ID documents.

4. *Regarding the “adjective”, it should be discussed about its use in three cases – an adjective that determines the nation, an*

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

adjective that determines the language, and an adjective that determines the ethnicity. ...

5. ...

6. Greece wants the Greek toponyms to be officially used in Macedonia.¹⁶⁸

...

Another interviewee, namely Darko Kostadinovski, Foreign Policy Advisor to the President of the Republic of Macedonia, referred to this 2009 position the “eight points,” and suggested the following:

In November 2009, immediately after the taking of office of Greek Prime Minister Papandreu, we received eight points through our mediator, Nimetz. The public more or less knows these eight points. There were certain attempts to diminish them afterwards, but this now is my own personal opinion. In my personal view, these eight points are Greece’s honest and ultimate objective. And through these eight points, it is literally asking to influence the determinants of our identity. In other words, our deformation. A right that we naturally possess: a right that every citizen of this planet naturally has – not even every people, but every citizen. The right to self-identification.¹⁶⁹

WHEN IS ENOUGH ENOUGH?

The talks are very difficult, because in a way they are asymmetrical. Greece is a Member of the EU, of NATO, it is significantly bigger and stronger on the economic level, while we are not. From the beginning, the problem was imposed upon us... The mediation process has consisted of proposals by each party, which are most often not accepted by the other party. There were some proposals, which at least for us had a good basis to be accepted, but Greece rejected them. That means we have no methodology built, on both sides, and the negotiations boil down to accepting or rejecting. Last year our Prime Minister proposed to Mathew Nimetz a solution which we would have accepted, namely a prefix or suffix with a geographical qualifier which would be given by Greece, but which we would have the choice to put anywhere we wished. For example, before “Republic of Macedonia” or in parentheses. Or, that we give that geographical qualifier, while Greece would choose where to put it. Mr. Nimetz said this was an interesting proposal; however it was not accepted by Greece. While we proposed it. This means that from

¹⁶⁸ Excerpt from the Negotiating Position of the Hellenic Republic on the “name issue”, instructed by the alternative Minister of Foreign Affairs Droutsas, agreed with Prime Minister Papandreu, 13.11.2009, New York. Source: confidential. Emphasis added.

¹⁶⁹ Interview with Darko Kostadinovski, Skopje, 11 November 2011.

*the beginning, there is a probably an inadequate approach to the negotiations and these are two big handicaps.*¹⁷⁰

According to Miso Dokmanovic, over 240 solutions have been placed on the negotiation table by the mediators since the beginning of the “name issue” in the early 1990s.¹⁷¹ This statistic varies greatly and was most probably gathered from politicians or from the news. Ambassador Viktor Gaber had told me during his interview that he could cite me over six hundred formulations. Janko Bacev points out, on the other hand, that only five official proposals had been offered to the two parties by the mediators.¹⁷²

Dokmanovic explains that there are several issues to consider when speaking of the negotiations. These include the name itself, the range of use of the mutually accepted name, the time of implementation, the form of the change, and language and identity.

Regarding the name itself, Dokmanovic underlines the red lines of both parties. Citing the influential Greek analyst Evangelos Kofos, he states that the Greek red line, is that “none of the parties could have an exclusive right for the use of the term ‘Macedonia,’ the final *name* should include *geographic* determinant (preferably Vardar Macedonia) and a specific solution for the adjective deriving from the name. ... This position is also reaffirmed by the current Greek government which stands for ‘a compound name with a geographical qualifier for use in relations to everyone (erga omnes).”¹⁷³ So here we have the expression “adjective deriving from the name,” which did not appear anywhere in the letter by the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs or, for that matter, in any of the other official initial positions. It only became clear to the Macedonian side that the “confidence-building measures” had been stretched further to include changing the “adjective deriving from the name” in 2009, with the Greek position cited above and its contents leaked in the news. Two years later, as the reader will recall, the European Commission Progress Report on Macedonia was

¹⁷⁰ Interview with Prof. Dr. Dimitar Mircev, Skopje, 21 August 2011.

¹⁷¹ Miso Dokmanovic, “What’s in a Name?”, *op.cit.*, 46.

¹⁷² Janko Bacev, *Macedonia and Greece*, *op.cit.*, 102-109.

¹⁷³ Miso Dokmanovic, “What’s in a Name?”, *op.cit.*, 45.

greeted with collective shock and dismay by the Macedonian citizens, when they discovered that it purposefully omitted the adjective “Macedonian.”

The red line of the Macedonian side, according to Dokmanovic, is very difficult to decide, as at one point, it seemed acceptable that a geographic qualifier, such as “Vardar” (referring to the river Vardar) or “Northern” could be acceptable, however in the form of a suffix or prefix of the official name. He points out that if true, that the Macedonian side was thus willing to accept certain modifications of the name, and at the same time, that the Greek position had stepped further away from its earliest declaration in Lisbon (discussed above) in which they had said that they would recognize the country under a name that “does not include the term ‘Macedonia,’ then there was hope for a solution around geographic lines.

According to Darko Kostadinovski, Foreign Policy Advisor to the Macedonian President, the red line is simply that Macedonia does not want to discuss anything that falls beyond the scope of Resolution 817 and the Interim Accord:

What is very essential, and it is very important to know this – and the President has said this publicly on several occasions, and has even appealed to the Secretary General of the United Nations – is that we do not want to talk with our southern neighbors, about anything more than that which is laid out in Resolution 817 and the Interim Accord. So, one of the preconditions for us to reach a mutually acceptable agreement is that the two sides adhere to the framework of the talks. The framework is Resolution 817 and the Interim Accord. In that framework, nowhere is it written or asked of us to talk about anything other than overcoming the difference over the name. The difference regarding the name – a name which will be used within the framework of the system of the United Nations, and other international organizations. So nothing more and nothing less than that.¹⁷⁴

However, the Interim Accord may also be open to interpretation. Namely Article 7, Paragraph 3 states that, “[i]f either Party believes one or more symbols constituting part of its historic or cultural patrimony is being used by the other Party, it shall bring such alleged use to the attention of the other Party, and the other Party shall take appropriate corrective action or indicate why it does not consider it necessary to do so.” This could be interpreted to mean that if Greece believes that the

¹⁷⁴ Interview with Darko Kostadinovski, Skopje, 11 November 2011.

Macedonian identity constitutes part of its historic or cultural patrimony, it will bring it to Macedonia's attention, and Macedonia will have to take "appropriate corrective action."¹⁷⁵ But this would be a bit of a stretch in the today's international political world order, the reader will agree, I hope. So, what is left for Macedonia to do, if indeed Greece is trying to squeeze in that argument, is "indicate why it [Macedonia] does not consider it necessary to do so." In other words, Macedonia has to prove why it feels that it should not have to change its peoples' identity. As strange as it may sound, my research points out that this is exactly the direction in which the "name issue" is going.

The other issue that Dokmanovic discusses, namely the range of the use, regards the differences of the two sides over where this new name would be used. The Macedonian side has until now promoted a "dual formula" in which the new name would be used only for bilateral purposes between Greece and Macedonia and/or in international organizations. The Greek side has promoted an "erga omnes" formula, in which the new name would be used for all purposes. This would mean that the new name would have to apply for all countries – including those (over 136 countries) that have already recognized Macedonia under its constitutional name. This remains a point of contention, underlines Dokmanovic, pointing out that UN Resolution 817 in its wording favors the Macedonian side: "state being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations."

Darko Kostadinovski told me during our interview that "the Greek red line, namely 'erga omnes,' which they have repeated many times, is unsustainable, unfeasible – there is no international instrument which could implement their request for 'erga omnes.' Ultimately, it is not even requested in the framework under which we are leading the discussions [Resolution 817 and the Interim Accord]. This is why President Ivanov, has asked the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon on several occasions, to appeal to our southern neighbours to stick to the framework. Because everything that falls beyond the framework complicates the finding of a

¹⁷⁵ No. 32193 GREECE and THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA Interim Accord (with related letters and translations of the Interim Accord in the languages of the Contracting Parties), Signed at New York on 13 September 1995, Preamble.

mutually acceptable solution.”¹⁷⁶ Renowned professor and political analyst Dimitar Mircev, who also advises the President, told me that this would cause additional problems with the countries that have already recognized us:

*One of the requests is that the name which will be accepted, or changed, be for erga omnes use. Meaning that we must ask all countries, from which about 130 have recognized us as the Republic of Macedonia, to call us according to the new name – which is something we cannot do. And there are several countries which have already proclaimed that regardless of what we sign or accept, they don't plan to refer to us as something other than the Republic of Macedonia. Turkey for example. And there are others. So some of these requests are completely unrealistic, and thus we would erase them, to get to the main request for the change of the name.*¹⁷⁷

Thirdly, Dokmanovic discusses the time of implementation of the solution which could also be a challenge towards a final agreement. To be sure, Macedonia would probably insist that the final solution be enforced after its admission to NATO and/or the EU, while Greece insists on a solution before membership in international or regional organisations – which was a point it emphasized with the veto on Macedonia's entry in NATO.

The fourth contentious issue is the form of the change: on a number of occasions, Greek officials had requested that the final name be incorporated in the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. Whereas previously, the proposals had concerned bilateral or international areas, the proposals were now becoming for internal purposes as well.¹⁷⁸

Finally, the last point of contention pointed out by Dokmanovic is language and identity. Here, he points out that there have been a number of conflicting reports.

“In that sense, there is a strong inclination especially from the Greek side for making difference between Macedonian identity in Greece and the Republic of Macedonia. On a number of occasions, including the 2013 UN General Assembly address, the Macedonian Prime Minister Gruevski has emphasized that the Macedonian identity is at stake in the negotiations. However in September 2013 a representative of the Macedonian government

¹⁷⁶ Interview with Darko Kostadinovski, Skopje, 11 November 2011.

¹⁷⁷ Interview with Prof. Dr. Dimitar Mircev, Skopje, 21 August 2011.

¹⁷⁸ Miso Dokmanovic, “What's in a Name?”, *op.cit.*, 44-48.

coalition partner Ali Ahmeti¹⁷⁹ has stated that the identity issue is not included in the negotiations.

Therefore, several issues should be taken into consideration. Firstly, the existence of languages could not be determined by international or bilateral agreements. Secondly, the issue of identity and language is not a part of the framework of negotiations. It would be extremely dangerous to define the name of a widely-recognized and established language in a bilateral agreement between two countries. On the other hand, the Greek side insists on making difference between the Macedonian identity in Greece and the Republic of Macedonia. It could be concluded that this will be the core issue of the final solution of the “name dispute.” Both sides seem to be getting closer regarding the name with geographic determinant. Thus, the issue of the adjective deriving from the final name will remain a challenge.”¹⁸⁰

Dokmanovic concludes by saying that Macedonia does not have an alternative to the negotiations. “The bilateral relations with Greece in particular regarding the unresolved issue of the name are blocking Macedonian membership in NATO and EU. Although a number of analysts in the country have suggested drastic approaches such as cessation of negotiation or resolution of the dispute in UN General Assembly through vote of its members, it appears that these proposals do not address the main challenge for Macedonia. Macedonia is participating in the negotiations in order to become NATO/EU member and consequently, admission to these organizations would not be possible without the consent of Greece.”¹⁸¹ These, in a nutshell, were also the words of former EU Commissioner Jose Manuel Barroso.

Finally, Dokmanovic states that “the quest for a mutually acceptable solution should be reached to satisfy all the parties involved. However, unmistakable evidence in the last years has established the fact that the name is not the only issue at stake in the negotiations process. In that direction, it is not only the name which is at stake – other issues such as its range, usage as well as the issues related to identity and

¹⁷⁹ Note that Ali Ahmeti was formerly leader of the Albanian National Liberation Army during the conflict in 2001, while his party, the Party Democratic Union for Integration, has been a coalition partner in the Macedonian Government since 2008. I’d like to remind the reader here of my previous analysis of internal politics in Macedonia and the politics of neighboring states, and how this all ties in with the “name issue,” or rather, adds to the feeling of mistrust in the future.

¹⁸⁰ Miso Dokmanovic, “What’s in a Name?”, *op.cit.*, 48.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 49.

language are being raised. Nevertheless, it is evident that the issue that could not be part of the final agreement is the issue of the Macedonian identity in particular the Macedonian language.”¹⁸²

Indeed, on this last point, all Macedonians are together. The excerpts from interviews with Macedonians throughout this thesis, and more specifically in the section devoted to the Macedonian point of view, should be able to give the reader a clearer idea. But first, I would like to share with you an insider’s look into the negotiations from one of the most renowned political analysts, professor emeritus, former diplomat, and advisor to the President of the Republic of Macedonia, and member of the National Council for European Integration.

And of course, the main problem is that in both Resolutions – of the Security Council and the General Assembly – both sides are obliged to talk in order to overcome the differences regarding the name. Somewhere from 2001, however, these talks escalated into talks about the identity. At the time, the International Crisis Group came out with a proposal, which contained, of course, a change of the name, but also identity questions, such the language, the transcription of the name “Macedonia,” the brands, the codes, and so forth, the procedure for accepting the dispute... So now, instead of talking only about the name, there are talks about a list of 8 requests, on behalf of the Greeks, that we would have to accept as an ultimatum. For some talks (on the professor level, not through the negotiator Nimetz) it was said that we could go with that list of 8 requests, and eliminate the easier requests. Let’s say one of the requests refers to the referendum. We would say that this is an internal question. What is important is for our country to accept the international obligations, which will be registered in the United Nations. The next question is the Constitution – will it change? The Greeks insist that we change the Constitution, however this is an internal question. Next are the brands/labels or codes “MK” which are very bothersome, because they directly affect our foreign trade. For example, at this moment, we cannot export Macedonian wine to Germany or Slovenia, because the labels say “Product of Macedonia” and “MK.” They [the Greeks] insist that this changes ... But the legal experts say that there is a solution for these questions – codes, brands, labels, postal codes and so forth. ... So some of these requests are completely unrealistic... However, if these issues regard the identity – in other words with the name they request a change of the

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 50.

name of the language, for example, North Macedonian or Upper Macedonian and so forth – this will lead to absurdities regarding the minorities. If we change something it will lead to absurdities with the minorities. Because in Bulgaria, we cannot have a North Macedonian minority, or in Greece a minority which considers it is in South Greece, while it is a Northern Macedonian minority. And so forth. So it means that from the moment that these identity questions arose, complications started which were not foreseen by the Resolutions of the United Nations in 1993. And now we are at the level of talks regarding these identity issues. Now, we are putting pressure and trying to convince all our partners, within the European Union and elsewhere, that we do not want to talk about the identity. Accordingly, let us get back to the negotiation table, only regarding the name. If this is accepted – and I think that we can relatively easily find an intelligent solution which would be acceptable for us. In 2004 Nimetz had come to Skopje to propose the solution “Republic of Macedonia (Skopje),” which our side had accepted. But Greece rejected it. So there you have it. The second thing that is very important is the question of human rights, to which we did not until now pay too much attention to, individually, and collectively. And now it turns out that if we accept a solution for the change of the name of the country which we will impose on the citizens of Macedonia, it turns out that we are violating their human rights. And every citizen can sue the country in front of an international court because it violated its right to self-determination and self-identification...If 50,000 Macedonians sued the country for this violation, the European Union will find itself indisposed.¹⁸³

As we can see, the Greek negotiating positions are quite complicated, evolving over time, multi-faceted, and not so innocent. Indeed, they refer to not only the name, but a series of other issues which range from the postal code and labeling issues which directly affect Macedonia’s trade and thus, its economy, and touch upon the sensitive dimensions of identity, including the ethnic identity of Macedonians and their language.

The Macedonian negotiating position, for its part, which started with the letter dated March 24, 1993 regarding the draft resolution before the Security Council on the application for membership by Macedonia from 30 July 1992, disclosed the

¹⁸³ Interview with Prof. Dr. Dimitar Mircev, Skopje, 21 August 2011.

Government's dismay to find that the country would not be admitted to membership under the regular procedures. It also conveys the weak position that Macedonia was in at the time of applying, and its willingness to cooperate despite the unpleasant conditions. The mere fact that it is the Prime Minister and not Minister of Foreign Affairs who signs the letter shows how important this membership was for the country:

"Your Excellency,

I have the honour to address you with regard to the application of the Republic of Macedonia for admission to the United Nations, dated 30 July 1992 (document S/25147) and to the informal consultations of the members of the Security Council on the subject.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia I would like to express to you and to the members of the Council our appreciation for recommending my country for membership in the United Nations.

However, I wish to bring to your attention our disappointment that it has not proved possible for the Security Council to adopt the standard straightforward resolution on admission of new members.

Regardless of our concerns I would like to assure you that the Republic of Macedonia is able and willing to carry out the obligations under the Charter. We shall proceed with our policy of good-neighbourly relations and cooperation aiming at establishing our country as a factor of peace and stability in the region and in the broader international community.

I would also like to express our willingness to continue to cooperate with the co-chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia in setting up a mechanism to settle the difference that has arisen and to promote confidence-building measures with the Republic of Greece, on the clear understanding that this in no way affects the completion of the process of the admission of the Republic of Macedonia to the membership in the United Nations.

The Republic of Macedonia will in no circumstances be prepared to accept the “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” as the name of the country. We refuse to be associated in any way with the present connotation of the term “Yugoslavia.”

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,
(signed)
Branko CRVENKOVSKI
President of the Government of the
Republic of Macedonia”¹⁸⁴

Yet, twenty-two years down the road, Macedonia is still referred to as the “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.” As a follow-up letter to the one above, the Macedonian Prime Minister wrote another letter to the Security Council, dated April 5, 1993, in which he informed that the Government would submit the proposals for promotion of confidence-building measures with Greece to the Co-Chairmen.¹⁸⁵ One day later, Greece issued its letter (referred to above), in which it insisted upon the confidence-building measures. That very same day, the Security Council convened its 3195th Session and immediately sent the request for membership to its Committee for Receipt of New Members, which on April 7th (the very next day), examined the Macedonian request for membership and immediately issued a recommendation that Macedonia be accepted in membership. That same day, the Security Council convened its 3196th Session and in six minutes, brought Resolution 817, recommending membership. On April 8th, Macedonia became a Member State with the Decision of the General Assembly.¹⁸⁶ It appears that these “confidence-building measures” had been part of the talks behind the scenes organized by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee. Yet for a country so new to the international arena, it must have been impossible to know in advance, what all could be put under the label of “confidence building measures.”

¹⁸⁴ U.N. Security Council, “Note by the President of the Security Council: The attached letter dated 24 March 1993 addressed to the President of the Security Council is circulated herewith,” S/25541, 6 April 1993.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ Janko Bacev, *Macedonia and Greece, op.cit.*, 125.

In May, another set of letters was sent, this time to the Secretary-General, which underlined the positions of the two countries. In the letter dated 27 May 1993, in reference to the discussions held in New York with Mr. Vance and Lord Owen, the Greek Government, expressed its “sincere appreciation to Mr. Vance and Lord Owen for the progress so far accomplished and consider [ed], in principle, the draft presented as a satisfactory basis for establishing good neighbourly relations between Greece and the *FYROM*.” However, Greece “deem[ed] it useful to reiterate her original stand, that the word “Macedonia” should not be included in the name of the new state. Nevertheless, in a spirit of genuine compromise Greece ... suggested the adoption of the name “Slavomakedonija” which, to some extent, could meet Greek requirements, and pragmatically reflect[ed] the prevailing situation in this State. ... The name “Nova Makedonija” opted by Mr. Vance and Lord Owen create[ed] serious difficulties to Greece.”¹⁸⁷

“Slavomakedonija,” however, is quite derogatory to the Macedonian side, especially as the generic term “Slav” keeps being imposed on Macedonians by their neighbours and foreigners from as far back as the nineteenth century with the beginnings of the “Macedonian Question.” As such, most Macedonians reject this term, because the generic term “Slav” could be used to denote any peoples from the Ural Mountains down to Serbia, but at the same time, each of these peoples have their own ethnic identity. Macedonians never considered themselves to be “Slav” only, but rather, always, declared themselves as Macedonians, and always identified with the region of Macedonia. The fact that Slavs who came down to the Balkans in the 6th century mixed with all the peoples there, including the Macedonians, does not take away from them right to call themselves Macedonians.

The Macedonian response to the letter above came on May 29, 1993, and contained the following “objections in connection with certain suggestions of the Co-Chairmen.” Namely, Macedonia deemed as unacceptable Article 5 which stated that “the Republic of Nova Makedonija agrees to use that name for all official purposes”; it had reservations on the content of Article 7, which entailed undertaking not to use

¹⁸⁷ U.N. Security Council “Letter Dated 26 May 1993 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/25855/Add.1, 3 June 1993.

symbols constituting the historic or cultural patrimony of the other; and it deemed it necessary to stipulate the Macedonian and the Greek language (apart from the English language) as the languages of two parties that are to sign an international agreement.

Furthermore, Macedonia suggested that Article 8 should read as follows: “1. The parties shall guarantee the rights and obligations of persons members of national, ethnic, and similar groups in accordance with applicable international standards, in particular: (further on, besides already mentioned documents, Article 8 should include: the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National, or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and the Council of Europe’s parliamentary Assembly Recommendation on the Rights of Minorities).”¹⁸⁸

Note how the Macedonian arguments are more related to the rights of ethnic groups, and linguistic and ethnic minorities. The letter concludes with the following sentence: “We would like to emphasize our firm conviction that our constitutional name “The Republic of Macedonia” does not imply territorial or other aspirations whatsoever. Therefore, other proposals are not necessary. To the contrary, the confirmation of this name shall represent significant contribution to the requirement of resolution 817 (1993).”¹⁸⁹

The Macedonian letter, then, raises a point which has completely been ignored in the negotiations, that is, precisely, the question of the rights of minorities and ethnic groups and the recognition of the Macedonian language. Indeed, the Macedonian Government tried to get a concrete recognition of its language by asking the United Nations to add a phrase in the agreement in which it would say that the agreement was signed in the Greek and Macedonian languages, in addition to English. This again, shows the imbalanced nature of the negotiations, because whereas what seems to be crucial to the Macedonian side – namely cultural rights related issues, such as language, rights of minorities, and so forth – these have hardly ever been a subject matter of discussion. On the contrary, Greece insists that the Macedonia change its constitution in order to completely rid of any reference to protection of minorities. The final paragraph portrays, once again, the disbelief on behalf of the

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

Macedonian Government, at what is happening to them, and at the idea that the name could pose a territorial threat.

But this was not the last time Macedonia asked Greece to respect its minorities. Namely in 2008, Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski sent a letter to Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis in which he asked him to respect the rights of the Macedonian minority in Greece. The response of the Greek Prime Minister was as follows: “Mr. Prime Minister, your letter ... raises a number of non-existent and unsubstantiated issues ... There is no “Macedonian” minority in Greece. There never has been. In this respect, any allegations regarding the existence of such a minority are totally unfounded, politically motivated and disrespectful of the historic realities of the Region.”¹⁹⁰

Why all this? What is behind such a strong reaction on behalf of Greece against Macedonian independence, recognition, and membership to the United Nations and the European Union? How does the Greek side explain its fear of the Republic of Macedonia protecting its minority in Greece, if no such minority exists according to Greece? How does it explain the fact that the name of a neighbouring country which has only just become independent and which has no army, can pose a territorial threat? Below is my attempt to portray and thereby explain the likely sources of the Greek point of view through interviews, many of which referred to history which will be addressed more in detail below.

IV. THE GREEK POINT OF VIEW

“...In 2014, despite many publications, scholarly research, books, a big pool of information on the internet, a large percentage of this country’s citizens neither know nor want to accept. They rend their clothes in public anguish when they hear that somewhere, in some distant country, minority rights are being suppressed, but in their own country they muzzle their neighbors in the fervent delusion

¹⁹⁰ Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis' Letter of Reply to the Letter from Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, 19 July, 2008, Source: Embassy of Greece Press Office, Washington, DC (Athens News Agency) <http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/Content/en/Article.aspx?office=3&folder=92&article=23959>

that they are acting in accordance with some kind of national mission.”¹⁹¹

INTERVIEW ANALYSIS OF CITIZENS OF GREECE

The quote above by a citizen of Greece of ethnic Macedonian origin depicts how he feels in his own country – how he is perceived by his own neighbors and fellow citizens, who “neither know nor want to accept” that there is a Macedonian minority in Greece. Having in mind this general attitude of Greeks towards “their own” Macedonians, then, I tried to understand their approach towards the Republic of Macedonia and the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia. What I found were that most Greeks looked at the “name issue” from an historical aspect. However, what I also found was that many were either misinformed, or had a fuzzy knowledge of the past. My interviewee below, a Greek American who had come back to Greece in his retirement age and opened up a bar, depicts this clearly:

What I think of Macedonia? Well like I told you. It's part a Greece! Its' always been part a Greece, and it always really will be. I don't care if you raise your flag there. In Macedonia they're saying that history started from up there. But history never started from up there. History actually started from Peloponnese. Most of the people in Macedonia, first of all, some of them was Greeks – their grandfathers. When there was war, between Turkey, and Germany and all them...Well, with Turkey. When we won the war, they came up. The guy Kolokotroni back then, he was one of the leaders whose techniques beat Turkey. After the war was over all these people went against Greece. They were tellin' on us, our strategies, and turned them in to Turkey and Germans, so they don't get killed. They was tellin' them our plans, stuff like that, you know what I'm sayin'? They too these people, after they done, they knew who they were, they took 'em and shipped them out a Greece. And a lot of them ended up there between the borders, then. So now what they sayin' – these people are sayin' that's where the history started from because of their great grandfathers of Greece. ... To me, most of the people up

¹⁹¹ Kostas Theodorou, “Kostas Theodorou, aka Dine Doneff, speaks with Ieronymos Pollatos about non-forgetting,” viewed at website of Dine Doneff, musician: <http://dinedoneff.com/text6.html>, December 2014. Original interview (in Greek) is published on 09.04.2014 in www.popaganda.gr under the title: “A mysterious musical genius lives among us.”

*there are, I don't know, not Greeks, not Macedonians, more like Albanians.*¹⁹²

The historical period he refers to above is most likely the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. What he emphasizes several times is that the Macedonians were “traitors” who were “telling the Greek strategies to the enemy, the Turks.”

Then another Greek brought up the historical element from the period of Alexander the Great, which was indeed the most frequently brought up element. He also spoke to the idea that there is no such language as a Macedonian language. That Alexander the Great spoke Greek and therefore the Greeks were Macedonians, and that today, Macedonians are Greeks.

*We know from geography that Skopje, Bulgaria, maybe a little from Albania, was Macedonia. But was Macedonia from the Great Alexander. But they used to be Greeks, not Skopjan, not Bulgarian not Albanian. Macedonians started from Greece – from Macedonia area from Greece which is Khalkidhiki, Seres ... We don't even have the same language. How can you be Macedonians? In the village of Syria, where there was Alexander, they speak Greek – the Greek language. They are Macedonians? Macedonian is not a different language from Greek. It is the same language, with different characters. Your language is Skopians? I don't know your language. Bulgarian is Bulgarian, Romanian is Romanian, Greek is Greek. Macedonians are a little different but they are Greeks – they were 4,000 years ago, they speak that language. ... Venizelos, who was Greek politician in the early 1900s, was negotiating and he wanted the islands so had to give up Macedonia. That's why Macedonia was not part of Greece until 1913.*¹⁹³

One person I interviewed in the metro said that “*They shouldn't allow you to call yourselves Macedonia. It is like if a group of citizens decided to call themselves Genevans.*”¹⁹⁴ This brought up the element of exclusivity, which is an idea that is endorsed by the Greek government. To be precise, there can be only one Macedonia, and the “true” and “historic” Macedonia is in Greece. The others are a fake creation by Tito.

¹⁹² Interview with Yannis, American-Greek bar owner in Athens, 25 June 2014.

¹⁹³ Interview with Anonymous Greek 2, bar-manager in Lesvos, 29 June 2014.

¹⁹⁴ Interview with Anonymous Greek 4, Athens, 26 June 2014.

Another interviewee brought up the idea that “all Greeks feel the same” which portrayed a sort of feeling of solidarity amongst Greek citizens regarding the Republic of Macedonia. This same type of feeling of solidarity could be sensed in the quote opening this section, by Dine Doneff, who referred to Greek society’s attitude towards the Macedonian minority in Greece as “the fervent delusion that they are acting in accordance with some kind of national mission.” Thus, one could say that there is an element of solidarity in accordance with a national mission:

Well I still feel, like all Greeks do, that Skopje is Macedonia and Macedonia is Greek, because Great Alexander was from Macedonia. So I don't believe they can steal our name. Macedonians are Greeks. Macedonians were Greeks. They cannot call Skopje as Macedonia, because Macedonia is only one. Everything we found in Vergina, it was in Greek. When I was in Australia, 20 years ago, I knew some people there, they called themselves Macedonian, and no problem. They were Macedonians we are Greeks. But here, they want to change the borders. The same with Turkey. There are many Turks living close to the border with Turkey. We don't want Turkey in the European Union because we don't want to change the borders. That's what it's all about. Well, if they don't cause other problem, the name, I don't think it's so important. Even the language is not a problem. They have their own language.¹⁹⁵

This interviewee also brought up another interesting element, namely the idea that, if we were not living in the Balkans, then there would be no problem, everyone could call themselves what they wanted to, and even call their language what they wanted to. However, since we were in the Balkans, there was the element of security and territorial integrity. “We don’t want to change borders,” he said.

Another interesting idea that was brought up was that this was a political strategy on the part of politicians in the Republic of Macedonia, which were using the name Macedonia as a marketing strategy, in order to attract investments:

Everybody started political. It's for domestic consumption. That's what they want. They want to disorient the people. It is all about politics. Our politicians are the same as yours.... We speak the same language for 5,000 years. We don't care. The name is nothing. Absolutely nothing. Believe me it's nothing. What happened in the last 40 years? Somehow someone wake up and say, my name is Macedonia. Like tomorrow I wake up, I will say my name is Zeus.

¹⁹⁵ Interview with Anonymous Greek 5, hotel owner in Lesvos, 30 June 2014.

Somehow somebody wake up and say, ok let's do a marketing plan. Because this is a marketing plan. To brand a place without any let's say financial reason to be. Let's brand it with something that is very very known in the world. So they said, ok what do we have here around, close by. Hmm, we have Philipos, yes, ok Philipos, we have Alexander, ok let's brand it Macedonia. ... If you can explain me what happened fifteen years ago, and why your name was different, then please do. Otherwise it was just a very good marketing plan.¹⁹⁶

Also curious to note was the feeling that there was a *mistake in terms of history* – that Macedonia was wrong about history; that in Greece, citizens had been taught that Alexander the Great was Greek:

It's a very complicated and political issue for me... I believe that historically speaking, from what I know from school, maybe Macedonia, where Alexander the Great was, was also extended to the region of FYROM. However I think I disagree with Great Alexander being a national hero of the Skopian country. It's because from what I know his professor Aristotle was also Greek. In terms of history, I think there's a mistake here. I don't think it has so much impact on me. I'm not mad at Skopian people, but I think that both Greek and Skopian politicians are using this issue to make fanatics, and to bring people in a clash.¹⁹⁷

There was also the element of the neighboring country and people wanting to *steal Greek history*. This, again comes back to the exclusivity of history:

I believe they said some wrong things about the history. They want to steal our history. They built a statue of Alexander the Great in the square. But I don't really care about the name. The problem is they say that Alexander was Macedonian, and so forth.¹⁹⁸

One interlocutor brought up the idea that it is the Macedonians of Greece that have a problem with the name. As I will show later through my interview analysis with Macedonians from Greece, this was not the case. But perhaps what the interlocutor was referring to were the geographic term for the Macedonians in Greece, which the Greek government often refers to:

For the Macedonian people in Greek Macedonia, it's a very big problem for them. Because they were the first Macedonians from Magnos Alexandros and they can't take our name. It's very sensitive.

¹⁹⁶ Interview with Kosta, bar manager in Athens, and his friend, Athens, 25 June 2014.

¹⁹⁷ Interview with Anonymous Greek 7, student from Thessaloniki, Athens, 25 June 2014.

¹⁹⁸ Interview with Anonymous Greek 8, restaurant manager from Thessaloniki, 26 June 2014.

*I think that nobody can make a solution for this. Anyway you have FYROM so what do you want?*¹⁹⁹

The only Greek citizen to have a rather mellow opinion was the one quoted below:

*Well, I haven't thought about it a lot but in my opinion, I think that a name, something like North Macedonia, so like a mixed name which would be accepted both by Macedonians and by Greeks would be the best solution. So Skopje, I don't think it's a good name, in my opinion, because at this point, in all of the world is well-known the name Macedonia. So I think that's a wrong tactic from Greece. If we had had a name that could include the Macedonia term in it, I think it would be the best. I agree that Macedonia is a historic name of Greece, but although I am not an expert, I think that the ancient Macedonia included area of Skopje. So, now that it is split between two countries, it could stay the Macedonia of Greece and the Northern Macedonia of Skopje. I am generally very open-minded person, and I understand that citizens of your country would like to keep their name, so you have to find a solution somewhere in the middle in life, I think.*²⁰⁰

As we saw earlier, one of the first Greek positions was that Macedonia should not use, whether for domestic or international purposes, a name that included the word "Macedonia," while it would be ok with "Slavomacedonia."²⁰¹ The Greek position goes further to include falsification of history as part of the grounds for the dispute. As is stated on the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece, "[t]he FYROM "name issue" is not simply a dispute over historical facts and symbols. It is a problem with regional and international dimensions, given that FYROM is exercising a policy of irredentism and territorial claims fueled by the falsification of history and the usurpation of Greece's historical and national heritage."²⁰²

This is precisely what I also gathered from my interviews with Greek citizens from Thessaloniki, Athens and Lesvos, from which I have provided excerpts above.

¹⁹⁹ Interview with Anonymous Greek 11, taxi driver, Athens, Greece, 2 July 2014.

²⁰⁰ Interview with Anonymous Greek 3, receptionist at a car rental in Lesvos, 29 June 2014.

²⁰¹ U.N. Security Council, "Letter Dated 26 May 1993 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council," S/25855, 28 May 1993, 4.

²⁰² "The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 'name issue'," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic. (emphasis added: please note that FYROM is an acronym that is seen as condescending by Macedonians)

Namely, the one element which was brought up repeatedly throughout my interviews was that Macedonia wanted to steal Greek history, or was wrong about Greek history – and more precisely, ancient history revolving around Alexander the Great. The logic of most of my interlocutors went as follows: Greece was an ancient civilization, and the Greek language was 5,000 years old. Macedonia was part of that Greek history. Macedonia (the Republic) could not be called Macedonia, because Macedonia was only one, and as it was Greek during the reign of Alexander the Great, it remained a part of Greek history today, and would always be a part of Greek history. As proof of this, they pointed out that Alexander the Great spoke Greek and that today, the archaeological remains from ancient Macedonia are all in Greek. Furthermore, they all pointed out that this topic was very sensitive to the *“Macedonians” in Northern Greece* because *they* considered themselves Macedonians, and since there could be only one Macedonia there could be only one group of Macedonians and those Macedonians were Greeks. Therefore, the people from the neighboring country could not be Macedonians, as Macedonians were Greek. It follows that the *language* that these neighboring people speak is also not Macedonian, because Macedonian is in fact, Greek, and the language the neighbors speak is some Slavic language.

This is how the logic goes. In addition to the historical argument, which prevailed in nearly all (but one) of my interviews with Greek interlocutors, the following elements were also raised: that Macedonians had been traitors during the war with Turkey and therefore they had been moved to the border area – these today were the trouble-makers; that it is all about the borders – Greece does not want its borders to change; that it is all about politics – politicians in both countries want to disorient and fanaticize their citizens; that the neighbors got up one day and decided to name themselves Macedonia as a marketing plan, because the brand Macedonia was well-known; that they did not care about the “name issue”.

I also noted that some of my Greek interlocutors would change their attitude once they started getting into the subject a bit deeper, and reflecting a bit more. This happened on two occasions, where at first, my interlocutor said that there could be no name change, and then said they did not care about the name, if the history remained Greek history.

Based on my pool of Greek interviewees, I did not have enough data to make separate categories. Rather, all the interviewees saw the issue from a historical perspective, and all but one believed that the “Northern Neighbor” should not use the name “Macedonia” because this meant it was usurping Greek history. This same interviewee also referred to history however, saying that as ancient Macedonia had covered several countries, including Macedonia today, he felt that a middle solution was needed, and that “North Macedonia” seemed like a workable solution for both parties. There were also those, who saw the “name issue” as a tool used by politicians, both within the countries and outside, to win political points by the masses, but those also saw the issue from historical perspective.

I also noted that there was a lot of missing information or disinformation regarding history, and general unfamiliarity with the way Macedonians saw things, and who they really were. For example, one of my interlocutors talked about when Greece was at war with Turkey and with Germany – confusing two different time periods. Another was genuinely surprised that there was a Macedonian language. A third was convinced that Greek Macedonia had been part of Greece for longer than 100 years (i.e. before 1913). And so forth.

Based on my interviews, I concluded that historical aspects remain the most important for the Greek citizens although one Greek did say that he did not care what Macedonia called itself, as this was a purely politically used instrument. Interestingly, only one of my Greek interlocutors mentioned that “borders” were the real concern, but did not necessarily use the word “territorial threat.” In fact, none of my interlocutors mentioned “territorial threat” or “territorial aspirations” at all.

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE GREEK POSITION

Jens Reuter conveys that “[w]hen explaining their position with regard to the [territorial] threat, the Greeks most often rely on quoting statements by the Macedonian-nationalist VMRO-DPMNE, which won a relative majority at the elections in Macedonia. Without any doubt, the radical wing of this party, which holds 33 of the 120 seats in Parliament, dreams about a Greater Macedonia with Salonica as its

capital. The supporters of this party have already put into circulation appropriate geographical maps where the northern Greek province of Macedonia is also part of the Greater State which is to be established, together with Buglarian Pirin Macedonia. The radical nationalist young people greet each other with the 'Macedonia salute,' i.e. making a circle with the thumb and index finger of the left hand, symbolizing the sun of Philip II with its sixteen rays. The other three fingers remain spread – they represent the three parts of Macedonia which are to be united. However, these as well as some other nationalist follies, such as, for example, the name 'Solunka' for one of the Macedonian plum brandies ('Solun' is the Macedonian name for Salonica), should not be overestimated. The majority of VMRO-DPMNE is for respecting borders and speaks of a spiritual, not political unity of all Macedonians."²⁰³

It is true indeed, that these gestures from among a minority in VMRO-DPMNE circles do not help the Macedonian authorities' attempts to prove that they have no territorial claims. To be true, provocative expressions are present even among the general population, such as the popular saying *Solun e nash* (Thessaloniki is ours). However these expressions are used as a joke, almost as if to respond to the attitude by Greece on the "name issue". The expression *Solun e nash* in fact is usually used by those who go to Thessaloniki for weekend shopping or simply for a coffee at the Aegean Sea (as it is only a two hour drive from Skopje to Thessaloniki), as an excuse, so as not to be frowned upon for spending money in Greece – a country that gives Macedonians so much trouble. As a matter of fact, a large majority of Macedonians are not only uninterested in the idea of a Greater Macedonia – but rather the contrary: they are concerned with the survival of the Macedonia they already have. Ironically, the majority of the population still goes to Greece for the summer holidays, in spite of the often degrading treatment at the border, in the shops, and on the streets; and most succumb to the unwritten rules when in Greece – i.e. do not say "Macedonia", do not talk about your origins, speak only in English, and if possible, hide your car (or at least your license plate) in a safe place. Thus, as Reuter correctly points out, the Greek position focuses on a very small and negligible minority form among VMRO-DPMNE, which is not at all representative of the Macedonian population or government.

²⁰³ Jens Reuter, "Policy and economy in Macedonia," *op.cit.*, 41-42.

Reuter continues to state that the flag which depicted the sun of Vergina, was a more serious and understandable threat, as it was the sign of Philip II. "There are also three waves on the state's coat of arms. This could symbolically mean: the Republic of Macedonia extends to the Aegean...The Greek fear of Macedonia is not, as a matter of fact, based on the threat by a small neighboring state. There are also no longer any fears of a civil war which might break out in Northern Greece. The real fear is of the fierce enemy, Turkey of which there are suspicious that it pulls the strings in Macedonia. Thus Greek politicians speak of a 'Moslem encirclement.' By this they refer to the fact that Turkey signed an agreement on economic cooperation and an agreement on military cooperation with Albania, whose population is predominantly Moslem by religion. The circle would thus be closed by the partly Moslem Macedonia, which, in the words of Evangelos Kofos, a specialist in the Athens Foreign ministry, could become 'a pawn on the Turkish chessboard.'"²⁰⁴

So according to Reuter who cites Greek politicians, including Kofos, the Greek fear of Macedonia is actually a fear of Turkey. He also points out that Greece is weary of the rise of Macedonian nationalism, which was a natural consequence of the independence of Macedonia from Yugoslavia. According to him, "... the former Yugoslav Macedonians are no longer disciplined by a centre, Belgrade. The dream of the unification of Macedonia divided into three parts can now be dreamt aloud, without fear of any reprisals. The most important and strongest proponent of this political direction is the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, a party which has succeeded the old VMRO, but is decorated by the attribute 'Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity' (VMRO-DPMNE). The movement which, according to its own figures, has over 100,000 members, has inscribed on its flag the slogan of 'spiritual and territorial unification of Macedonia.' The Party opens demands that a new delineation of Macedonia's borders with Bulgaria, Albania and Greece be carried out."²⁰⁵ Although I do not agree with Reuter's point, and although he also immediately corrects himself in explaining that VMRO-DPMNE "failed to carry out its revisionist policy with regards to borders," this type of argument aligns the Greek

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 42.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 31-32.

official point of view. However, as Reuter points out, although in the first free elections in November and December of 1990 VMRO-DPMNE won 38 out of 120 seats in Parliament, thus becoming the strongest party, it did not carry out the revisionist border policy, and made amendments to the constitution to ensure that Macedonia had no territorial pretensions. However, "...seen from the perspective of Athens these concessions were insufficient. Greece created such a picture among its partners as if the fate of the whole Greek nation depended on whether or not it would keep the monopoly on the name 'Macedonia.' Greece saw a threat and aggression in the use of that name, regardless of how this could be achieved by the two-million state of Macedonia with its army of 10,000. The preservation of the name Macedonia was designated by the Greeks as 'preservation of postcommunist neo-nationalism.' It is hard to understand why the Greeks resorted to a total economic blockade against its small neighboring state."²⁰⁶

To give credit to the Greeks, there is reason to fear the Macedonians. As will be seen in the analysis of the foreign powers and their interests, particularly during the Greek Civil War, Macedonians played a decisive role in the war, and almost tipped the victory over to the Communist side. In fact, it was obvious from the foreign diplomatic correspondence, that the Macedonian community in Northern Greece at the time was still quite sizeable (if not a majority, although as discussed earlier, statistics are unavailable and politicized), and that had it not been for the military intervention of the United States and the United Kingdom, and the use of Napalm B, things would have ended up quite differently. The most likely scenario is the following: Greece would have remained Communist, and the Macedonian minority in Greece would have had a large stake in Greek politics; the Macedonian language would have been freely and extensively spoken in Northern Greece; Greek printing houses would have been even publishing schoolbooks and textbooks in the Macedonian language as they did in the short Communist period; and there would have been Macedonian schools, or at least schools that taught all subjects in the Macedonian language. What a difference from the present-day reality, where according to Greek politicians and official statements, "the Macedonian language does not exist and those who claim to have a

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 41.

so-called ethnic Macedonian identity are Skopians who have been brainwashed by Tito.” To be sure, the “name issue” would certainly have not been raised. In fact, provided that Yugoslavia would have fallen apart as it did in 1991, given the proliferation of cultural rights of Macedonians in Greece, the most likely scenario would have been a “rapprochement” between the independent Macedonia and Northern Greece, or Greece Macedonia. One could even go so far as to say, a “unity” between the two. Reason to fear the Macedonians indeed!

However things turned out quite differently, and today, realistically speaking, there are no grounds for fear of any kind of armed intervention or war on behalf of Macedonians.

The Greek point of view can also be established from the official stance by Greek delegations at conferences and meetings. One such occasion, which I had the privilege to be present at first-hand, was during the 56th Session of the United Nations Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), during which the Committee considered the second periodic report of Greece on its implementation of the provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. At this occasion, when the Committee Expert asked the Greek delegation why Greece did not recognize all the minorities in the country, including the “Macedonians,” the response was that “Greece firmly believed that the so-called ‘Macedonian’ minority did not correspond to the reality. There was a small group in northern Greece who spoke a Slavic dialect, in addition to Greek. A political group representing them had obtained a mere 0.1 percent of votes in a recent election. The use of the term “Macedonian” was counterfactual and clearly infringed upon the rights of more than 2.5 million Greek Macedonians. Yet, the said group could freely express itself and participate in the cultural life of the region.”²⁰⁷

Dokmanovic raises the fact that starting from 2006, when Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski was elected, the Greek government criticized the “nationalistic platform” of the Prime Minister, who “undertook a series of actions that were considered to be provocative for Greek public,” including renaming the airports,

²⁰⁷ Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights Considers Report of Greece, 6 October, 2015, available at [http://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/\(httpNewsByYear_en\)/8AE78D967582373CC1257ED6004348C1?OpenDocument](http://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/8AE78D967582373CC1257ED6004348C1?OpenDocument)

stadiums, city streets and highways with names that Greece considered to belong to Greek heritage. “Moreover, a controversial project called “Skopje 2014” was supported by the Government with the sole purpose of building public buildings at the main square in Skopje in classical style. ... In Greek view, this was considered to be a violation of Article 7 of the Interim Accord (obligation to take effective measures to prohibit hostile activities or propaganda).²⁰⁸

Janko Bacev tells us that “[T]he announcement of the Greek opposition to the international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia by the European Community because of its name ‘Republic of Macedonia’ could first be felt with the statement on behalf of the Greek Government on June 27 1991, that [Greece] would not recognize the unilateral proclamation of independence of any (Yugoslav) republic. At the same time, alongside this statement, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Antonis Samaras, also stated that Greece would not recognize any country which would bear the name ‘Republic of Macedonia,’ or any other derivatives of that name.”²⁰⁹ These were the first negative Greek reactions against the announced possibility of the independence of the Republic of Macedonia, which were most likely in response to the Draft-Resolution for the Independence of the Republic of Macedonia submitted by the leading party in the Macedonian Parliament, VMRO-DPMNE, just one day before. In addition, Samaras apparently mentions in the same statement, according to Bacev, that “Greece will never recognize the independence of a country that will bear the historically Greek name ‘Macedonia.’”²¹⁰

On December 4, 1991, the Greek Government officially announced that it rejects the request for the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia as a sovereign and independent country which had been contained in the letter of the Macedonian President Gligorov to the heads of State and Government of foreign countries, sent on December 2, 1991. In the beginning of January, 1992, prior to the important European Community Summit to be held on January 15, at which decisions were to be made on the recognition of the Yugoslav republics which had submitted requests for international recognition, the Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis visited all main

²⁰⁸ Miso Dokmanovic, “What’s in a Name?”, *op.cit.*, 43.

²⁰⁹ Janko Bacev, *Macedonia and Greece*, *op.cit.*, 35.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*

European capitals. According to Bacev, he most likely did this to remind Europeans that “the independence of Macedonia would inspire them to unite with the northern citizens of Greece.”²¹¹ Herein lays the crux of the Greek argument, as well as the fundamental disagreement between the Macedonian and Greek arguments, because, as seen above, according to the Macedonian point of view, the idea that Macedonia would somehow attack Greece in order to unite the two Macedonias is viewed as ridiculous by most Macedonians, due to the simple fact that Macedonia is a small and poor country, without a real army and without any real allies, and with a population whose last wish is to go to war.

Janko Bacev, who used to work for the Macedonian intelligence service, states that from the documents of the Office it can be seen that the for Greek government at the time, the most serious question and problem in the internal and external policy was the Republic of Macedonia and its international recognition. “All other questions of national interest (the Greek problem with Cyprus and the internal economic and other situations) were secondary.”²¹² Information from this Office also allegedly discloses that the fall of the Government of Prime Minister Mitsotakis was expected if the “name issue” was not resolved as Greece proposed: that the Republic of Macedonia change its name to “Slavomacedonia.”

The aim of the Interim Accord signed in 1995 was to appease these fears. If we observe the preamble to the Accord, it recalls the principles of inviolability of frontiers and the territorial integrity of States in the Final Act of the Conference of Security and Cooperation Europe (the Helsinki Act). It bears in mind the United Nations Charter provisions referring to the obligation of states to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.²¹³

In addition, Article 4 ensures that both countries refrain from the “threat or use of force designed to violate their existing frontier,” and “agree that neither of them will assert or support claims to any part of the territory of the other Party or claims

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 36.

²¹² *Ibid.*, 38.

²¹³ No. 32193 GREECE and THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA Interim Accord (with related letters and translations of the Interim Accord in the languages of the Contracting Parties), Signed at New York on 13 September 1995, Preamble.

for a change of their existing frontier.”²¹⁴ Thus the Interim Accord serves to reassure Greece that Macedonia would not usurp its territory. Article 6 further serves to establish this territorial preoccupation, in Item 1. However the fears of Greece, and/or the Greek point of view, are also evident in Item 2 of Article 6, in which Macedonia (the Party of the Second Party) declares that nothing in its Constitution would constitute the basis of interfering in the internal affairs of Greece, “in order to protect the status and rights of any persons in other States who are not citizens of the Party of the Second Part.” This brings us back to the question of the unrecognized Macedonian minority in Greece. Here it becomes evident that what concerns Greece is the Macedonian minority in Greece, and, to be more precise, the rights of the Macedonian minority. As was mentioned earlier, the Macedonian minority is not recognized.

Finally, Article 7 of the Inter Accord discloses another Greek fear, or point of view. Namely, the idea Macedonia is trying to usurp Greek history. Paragraph 2 states “Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of the Second Part shall cease to use in any way the symbol in all its forms displayed on its national flag prior to such entry into force.” The first flag of Macedonia was the 16-ray sun, similar to the star of Vergina which had also been as symbol used by Alexander the Great, and which was found on his sarcophagus. As a matter of fact, Macedonia did change its flag following the Interim Accord.

DID GREECE ALWAYS HAVE AN ISSUE WITH THE NAME “MACEDONIA”?

Janko Bacev reminds us that in the beginning of nineteenth century Russia [and wider], it was believed that Ottoman empire would soon collapse. This is why the Russian government gave instructions to its minister of foreign affairs, namely Ioannis Kapodistrias, to propose a solution which would foresee the founding of several balkan states after the fall of the Ottoman empire. Kapodistrias made a proposal to his government, which, as Janko Bacev points out, did not include Macedonia as part of Greece (and by Macedonia, he meant the pre-1913 region of Macedonia which includes the present-day Greek Macedonia). Indeed, he proposed that the Balkans

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Article 4.

should be constituted of one country-federation, composed of five monarchies: the “kingdom of Serbia (Serbia, Bulgaria, and Bosnia), the Hellenic kingdom (continental Greece, Peloponnese, the islands of the archipelago and the Ionian islands), the kingdom of Macedonia (Macedonia, Thrace, the islands of Imbros, Samos, and Thasos), the kingdom of Epir (Epir, north and south Albania), and the kingdom of Dacia (Moldavia and the Wallachian areas). Thus, it is interesting that the greek Kapodistrias had no pretense to include Macedonia in the Hellenic kingdom, while at the same time he gave precisely that separate kingdom the apparently historical Greek name Macedonia,” concludes Bacev. He further continues: “it cannot be assumed, that a highly educated, eminent European diplomat and a connoisseur of the situations, made a mistake. He must have acted objectively and in line with reality. The Greek Kapodistrias proposed the name Macedonia for another country, outside of Greece, and this was not considered and usurpation nor an insult to Greece, but an entirely legitimate affair. The difference now is only in the fact that today instead of a ‘kingdom’ we have a Republic of Macedonia.”²¹⁵ To make things even more interesting, Kapodistrias was later was elected as the first head of state of independent Greece (1827-1831) and is considered as the founder of the modern Greek state and its independence. This in itself shows yet another dimension of the “dynastic ties” I refer to elsewhere, and the influence these have had on the outcome of the “name issue”.

Janko Bacev also elucidates other examples in history where Greek politicians had a different point of view regarding Macedonia and the Macedonians. “...Greece had undertaken several commitments in front of the League of Nations (1919) [for example], in which it promised to respect the rights of the Macedonian population as a national minority. At the Balkan Congress of 1929, E. Venizelos, as Prime Minister of Greece, not only confirmed the existence of a Macedonian minority in Greece, but also promised that he would personally vow for the satisfaction of the rights of that minority. In his secret memorandum from February 12, 1934, the hitherto Minister of

²¹⁵ Janko Bacev, *Macedonia and Greece, op.cit.*, 32.

Foreign Affairs of Greece, Maksimos Venizeloz, stated that the Macedonians do not feel either as Greeks or as Bulgarians.”²¹⁶

In addition,

“from 1913 until 1941, numerous authors and politically minded people quite openly spoke of the significant number of Greek citizens in Greek Macedonia who spoke in a language which they called Macedonian, and they called the people who spoke this language Macedonians. The entire left almost openly recognized the existence of a Macedonian minority in Greece, while the Communist Party of Greece during one period raised the slogan of an independent Macedonia and Thrace. Serafim Maksimos, chief of the Parliamentary Group of the United People’s Front in 1927, in his speech in the Greek Parliament, said, among other things, that the basic policy of socialist parties of the First to the Third International recognized the right to self-determination to secession of every people, including the Macedonian people. In his March 1947 Declaration, the Commander of the Democratic Army of Greece and President of the Provisional Democratic Government, General Markos Vafiadis asked for full equality of the Macedonians and other nationalities in Greece. The Provisional Democratic Government of Greece in April 1949 conducted a reorganization of its structure with the admission to the rank of Minister and one Representative of the National Liberation Front of the Macedonians, Paskal Mitrevski, from the Aegean part of Macedonia. The leader of the left liberals in Greece, Ioannis Sofianopoulos, and former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, admitted in the Greek Parliament in 1950, that a Macedonian minority exists in Greece. In November 1959, when the Greek Parliament was in session, and when it ratified the Agreement of Border Cooperation between Greece and Yugoslavia, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Evangelos Averoff, mentioned a Macedonian language that was being spoken. The name ‘Macedonia’ for Macedonians was mentioned without prejudice by dominant personalities in the spiritual life of Greece, including the contemporary Greek poet Giannis Ritsos, recipient of the Golden Wreath of the Struga Poetry Evenings [and the Neustadt International Prize for Literature]. The European Parliament, in its 1977 Report, states that in Greece there are five minorities, amongst which the Macedonian minority, and that in that country, four more languages are spoken, apart from the official language: Turkish, Albanian, Wallachian, and Macedonian. The independent Member of Parliament Philinos had the courage to confirm in the Greek Parliament that the afore-mentioned

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 32-33.

minorities live in Greece. Greece, at the Third United Nations Conference for the classification of geographical names (which was, moreover, held in Athens in 1977) accepted without any reservations the Resolution of the Conference, according to which the international systems of transcription into Latin, Serbo-Croatian, and Macedonian geographical names of Yugoslavia were adopted, with the statement that in Yugoslavia the transcription of the Serbo-Croatian and the Macedonian Cyrillic letters in Latin had been applied from much earlier. In 1982, at the United Nations Fourth Conference on the same topic, which was held in Geneva, the Greek party went even further and cited that Greece supports all relevant resolutions of the United Nations Conference for the classification of geographical names and recommended the respect of all national place names [toponyms], the way in which they were written [typified], by the competent authorities for geographical names in each country. This means that Greece in 1977 and in 1982 with these approvals practically from the most competent forum recognized the name Macedonia and the Macedonian language. [It also means that it recognized the Macedonian names of the 900 or so toponyms, in present-day Greece, which were changed but which in Macedonia are still referred to by their Macedonian names.] In the middle of February 1993, 358 Greek intellectuals appeared in front of the Greek Government with a petition, with which they sought that no one contest the existence of another non-Greek Macedonia which represents reality. On March 28, 1993, during a Session of the Greek Parliament, responding to attacks from the opposition PASOK, Prime Minister K. Mitsotakis stated: 'All Governments in the country until now supported the opinion that Skopje has the right in its name to use the geographical notion Macedonia.' At this Session, Mitsotakis unveiled to the public another statement by Andreas Papandreu, from May 4, 1986 (then Prime Minister of Greece), who, speaking in front of the Greek officers in Alexandropoulos, stated: 'We are not trying to put pressure on Yugoslavia not to use the term Macedonia. It is their right as an independent country to do what they want.' There are many other documents according to which most acclaimed individuals, diplomats and scientists from the Balkan countries in official and classified documents as early as the 19th century spoke of Macedonians, a Macedonian people, and a Macedonian language."²¹⁷

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 32-34.

The Macedonian point of view on the name dispute has evolved, diversified, and gone through several phases, but remains united on one aspect: that the Macedonian identity must be preserved. This is not only what I gathered from my interviews, but what I discovered from research, including through media analysis. The following excerpt from the opening words of a conference held in 2010 in Skopje entitled “‘The Talks on the Dispute with Greece’: Demystification and Options for a Way Out” exemplifies that aspect: “We would like to discuss, most of all, what is the red line that Macedonia must not pass, because we only declare ourselves as a nation which must not accept a name which will endanger the Macedonian identity, but what does this really mean? So, let us be more clear on the question of what does it really mean to preserve the Macedonian identity with accepting any option for the name, or rejecting any option for the name.”²¹⁸

Another excerpt, from Janko Bacev, author of the book *Macedonia and Greece: A Fight over the Name*, exemplifies the feelings amongst the predominant Macedonian population with regards to the “name issue”, which stems from the idea that there is a territory that has been called Macedonia for thousands of years, and the people that have been living on that territory for thousands of years have the right to call themselves Macedonians:

“This territory carries the name ‘Macedonia,’ and it is connected with the ancient Macedonians and their glorious kingdom. It bears its name Macedonia continuously as the only country on the Balkans, from approximately the VII the century B.C. and until today, nearly three millennia. Even the ancient Greek historian Thucydides (463-396 B.C.) describes the border of Macedonia. The Greek authors themselves cite that today’s territory of the Republic of Macedonia is one hundred percent identical to its predecessor, the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, and with its 39% is settled precisely within the borders of the country, which geographically the Greek authors call Macedonia. In Macedonia, there lived the ancient Macedonians, and Macedonia was their fatherland, as a state and an organized community from

²¹⁸ Marija Risteska, in “‘The Talks on the Dispute with Greece’: Demystification and Options for a Way Out” (Skopje: CRPM and Platforma, 2010), 10.

the VIIIth century before our era, while from the Vth and VIth centuries of the new era, Macedonia is settled by Slavic tribes under different names. Throughout the historical development there occurs a permanent symbiosis between the ancient Macedonians, the Slavs and the other peoples who passed in through this territory with the name 'Macedonia.' In this context, up until the constitution of the contemporary Macedonian nation, no other people either bore or appropriated this Macedonian name. In other words, in a long and continuous historical process which lasted for centuries, the necessary conditions were created for the selection of a national Macedonian name as a vital constituent of the Macedonian national consciousness and the Macedonian nation. This happened, with its regularity and objectivity, throughout the XIXth century. Moreover, not one of the Balkan nations in the beginning of the XIXth century had been constituted as a nation. The religious affiliation determined the political and social position of the Sultan's subjects during the Ottoman rule in these territories."²¹⁹

Janko Bacev also summarizes the typical Macedonian view of what the Greek aim is: that in fact Greece has a strategic aim to prevent the Republic of Macedonia from being recognized under the constitutional name.²²⁰ He goes on to say that:

"Today, it is more clear than ever before that the Greek opposition to the name at that moment [January 1992] was not based on any realistic views of losing a territory; rather it was a wish to prolong the repression and assimilation of Macedonians who live in Greece. In this respect, Greece imposed and holds open the name question to this day, sharpening it with the questioning of the cultural and linguistic identity of the Macedonians. In this way Greece is continuously implementing a strategy for the assimilation of Macedonians, even though its explanations are that it is defending its national security and territorial integrity. Even though incomprehensible, even funny, the Greek attempts to present the Republic of Macedonia as a superpower, which, if recognized under its constitutional name would exhibit territorial claims towards Aegean Macedonia, even though Greece, with five times more citizens and an indisputably greater military and any other type of power cannot objectively be threatened by the Republic of Macedonia. However it is clear that on the road to achieving its strategic interests for completely disfiguring the Macedonian people, Greece used all possible means, and even claims for some territorial pretentions, which would mean an

²¹⁹ Janko Bacev, *Macedonia and Greece*, *op.cit.*, 31.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, 36.

armed attack from Macedonia towards Aegean Macedonia, which, on its hand, is beyond any logical sense, as in reality that would mean the Republic of Macedonia declaring war on NATO (Greece is a Member State of NATO, while according to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty from April 4, 1949, which establishes the NATO organization, the armed attack against a NATO member state will be considered as an attack on all of them. ”²²¹

AN ACADEMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYST’S ASSESSMENT

In 2014, the Macedonian Political Scientists Forum published its second collection of proceedings since 1997, in which they “dedicate special attention to the scientific stories and original scientific papers ... which elaborated all the key current issues which are presently of the greatest politico-scientific interest.”²²² One of these stories was the “name issue”. This again, proves the obsession, not only among regular citizens and the media, but also among academic circles, in Macedonia, of the “name issue”.

The following part is a reflection the points of view of some members of academia and politicians who had been invited to speak at the above-mentioned conference in 2010, two years after the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008, when Greece vetoed Macedonia’s membership in the organization, at the shock and dismay of the Macedonian delegation in Brussels and the public that watched everything on the news. Marija Risteska, Founder and President of the Centre for Research and Policy Making, opens the conference with the following words, which depict the that even two years after the Summit, the Macedonian citizens were still numbed by the NATO Summit: “Why precisely this topic? This topic was chosen by us here at the Centre for Research and Policy Making as a question for public discussion this year because, unfortunately, we were placed in a straitjacket following the decision in Bucharest and also because this has been one of the least debated themes in Macedonia in the past 17 years, while it is a topic which deserves the attention of the

²²¹ *Ibid.*

²²² Marija Vuckovik, “Foreword,” *Macedonian Political Science Forum e-Proceeding of Papers*, Year 1, Number 2, Skopje, December 2014.

entire population, media, intellectuals, academia, political actors..."²²³ To be true, talks on the name dispute have been rare and there is a whole secrecy surrounding the ongoing negotiations, which the public has been kept out of.

Several analysts have referred to anxiety as a repercussion of the "name issue" on Macedonian citizens. Ljubomir Frckoski, a renowned law professor and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, states that "if the topic is not rationalized in the dimension of exit options and rational decisions, it will be suppressed and will become an object of frustration of the nation, following the logics of collective psychological phenomena of politics."²²⁴ This, of course, is the argument that I make. Milan Netkov, former president of the Constitutional Court, opens his discussion by stating that there is a "phobia" towards the word "compromise."²²⁵ For his part, Gorgi Kimov, research consultant at BRIMA a public opinion and market and media surveys association that is a member of the GALLUP International Association, states that the second phase of the name dispute is "characterized by a high and continuous level of general national frustration of the Macedonian citizens."²²⁶ Even though through diplomacy Macedonia succeeded in being recognized by 120 countries by the constitutional name, in the public opinion, the feeling which quietly persisted among citizens was the feeling of deprivation in the realization of the sovereign right to determine their country's name for international use.²²⁷

Kimov also states that "this unfavorable long-term situation has threatened and undermined one of the essential features of the Macedonian public, in all its strata from political and intellectual elites to the normal citizens – trust – a feature that has central strategic meaning for national cohesion. Under the circumstances of chronic national frustration, the natural function of trust as a central point in the coordinating system of national sentiments of the relationship towards self and towards the others from one's own national campus gradually and acceleratedly trust was ripped into

²²³ Marija Risteska, *op. cit.*, 9.

²²⁴ Ljubomir Frckoski, in "The Talks on the Dispute with Greece': Demystification and Options for a Way Out" (Skopje: CRPM and Platforma, 2010), 11.

²²⁵ Milan Netkov, in "The Talks on the Dispute with Greece': Demystification and Options for a Way Out" (Skopje: CRPM and Platforma, 2010), 24.

²²⁶ Gorgi Kimov, in "The Talks on the Dispute with Greece': Demystification and Options for a Way Out" (Skopje: CRPM and Platforma, 2010), 33.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*

four tendencies and turned it into derivatives of mistrust which fill the entire space of public opinion with blame which, when radicalized, goes towards intolerance to a level of hostility.”²²⁸

According to Kimov, there are several phases through which the name dispute passed. He calls the first phase, which happens just after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the phase of “awakening” of the national sentiments of Macedonian citizens which had until this point been suppressed. “This phase suggests that in periods of societal and historical reversals the national acts as a powerful center of social cohesion. The reasons for which the national sentiment occurs in such a way and at such a time are simple. Namely, the national identity, through the continuity of the psychological existence of a person and through his personal experience in the depths of being, intersects with and is inextricably tied to the personal identity. That is why every threat to the integrity of both identities releases vast amounts of energy.”²²⁹ Indeed, this was the energy that I felt when interviewing the citizens of Macedonia. Take this excerpt for example.

Analysts have also pointed to the fact that the name dispute has contributed to a discord between Macedonians, with one side claiming that the name dispute should be resolved as quickly as possible in order to allow for the country to go forward and enter the European Union and NATO, and the other side blaming the latter for betrayal and arguing that the name should never be changed as this is part of the Macedonian identity. Of course, there is a gray area, and neither argument is so cut and clear. However the fact of the matter is that the name dispute has divided Macedonians. As Ljubomir Frkoski points out, “[i]t has been shown that we have some kind of problem with the topic, an uneasiness which breaks out, not in a rational discourse for discussion, but which is ... transposed into a non-discussed topic in the line of an internal clash between Macedonians.”²³⁰

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, 34.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, 33.

²³⁰ Ljubomir Frkoski, *op.cit.*, 11.

THE VOICE OF THE FOREIGN ANALYST AND THE ALBANIAN MINORITY IN
MACEDONIA

Foreign analysts have also contributed their vision of the “name dispute” and their advice to the Macedonian politicians and academia. During the above-mentioned conference, Sam Vaknin, an Israeli-born writer and editor-in-chief of the website “Global Politician” who resides in Macedonia and often has a column in one of the wider-read newspapers, says that the name dispute finds itself caught in the middle of five trends, none of which are favorable to Macedonia. One of these trends is the “clash between identity, or, the politics of identity, and the future,” he says.²³¹ Then he goes on to give the advice that many foreign analysts have given to Macedonian politicians, which is also depicted by a certain category of my Macedonian interviewees. This is the “either-or” notion which basically states that if Macedonians want to keep their identity, then they will remain isolated from the rest of the world. If they give up their identity, they will become part of the European Union and NATO, and thus, they will prosper as part of their natural nest, the European Union. The following is an excerpt of Sam Vaknin’s speech during the conference, held in front of politicians, academia and the media:

“In fact, it is not true that Macedonia is the first political subject or that Macedonians are the first group of people who were forced to give up their identity, or to redefine their identity due to a foreign, greater power. This is absolutely not true. But let me get back to my nation. In the 19th century there was a movement in Europe called “emancipation.” The Jews were forced – in fact, they were not forced, they were given a choice. The Jews were given the choice: give up your identity and name and become integrated in society, become lawyers, become members of parliaments, become wealthy people, but first you must reject the name and the identity. Or, remain Jews, but you will be excluded from society. This certainly was a civil movement, or, the movement of the French revolution. The Jews made their choice in the 19th century, they gave up their identity, they changed their name, and they faced the same choice with which Macedonia is faced today, and *this is a choice – a tragic one – between your identity and your future*. If you choose to keep your identity as it is

²³¹ Sam Vaknin, in “‘The Talks on the Dispute with Greece’: Demystification and Options for a Way Out” (Skopje: CRPM and Platforma, 2010), 43.

today, even with these red lines, which exist only in your fantasy: they do not exist elsewhere. *If you choose to keep your identity, in essence without a compromise, they you are giving up on your future. It is very simple. This is the choice ahead of you. If you choose to accept the future in the framework of the European Union, in the framework of NATO, then you will have to give up a large part of what at this moment you believe to be your identity. This is a painful procedure, but largely inevitable.*"²³²

In fact, as a small country which has been independent for a relatively short amount of time, and whose highest aspirations are to be part of the European family (EU and NATO), Macedonia and its citizens are very much influenced by “foreign” analysts. Having this in mind, the weight of the words of Sam Vaknin above should not be taken lightly, as nonsensical as they may sound. To be true, some of my interviewees (including politicians, academia, and other segments of society) echoed these same words. This was precisely their argument in defending their stance on the name dispute: they reasoned that their identity was important to them, but if they had to choose between their identity and the future of Macedonia being part of the EU and NATO, then they would choose the EU and NATO.

But perhaps Vaknin is right to point out another dimension of the conflict which I did not (and will not) go deeply into, and this is the idea that there is a conflict between an ethnically homogenous nation, or a nation which wants to be ethnically homogeneous, and a multicultural, multiethnic country. Here he refers to the Albanian minority in Macedonia, and the multiethnic model that was imposed on the political leaders by the international community with the Ohrid Agreement of 2001 following the conflict. Following a passage about how ethnically homogeneous countries were invented by Jews, Vaknin compares Macedonia and Greece in this respect. Greece, he states, adopted the model for an ethnically homogeneous country, and the model there is successful. Thus, the name dispute is a “conflict between a successful ethnically homogeneous country, Greece, and a non-successful ethnically homogeneous country, Macedonia. [Macedonia] is a multicultural and multiethnic country due to pressure from the international community. Its multiethnic character, or nature, was forced upon it, and this was not accepted very well by the majority

²³² *Ibid.*, 43-44. Emphasis added.

ethnic Macedonians.”²³³ Indeed, Vaknin is right to point out this aspect of the name dispute, especially as an increasingly larger percent of the ethnically Albanian population in Macedonia seem to be for a “name change.” As Baskim Bakiu, Senior Researcher at the Centre for Research and Policy Making notes during the conference, “a greater part of the Albanians is to change the identity of Macedonians if this is the price that Macedonia has to pay to enter NATO, having in mind that the trust towards the North –Atlantic Treaty Organisation has always been high among Albanians.”²³⁴ Bakiu had noted earlier that “... Albanians, in this seventeen year problem have been ignored in the process. ... The logical question, then, is, why should Albanians be loyal to this policy if they are not even consulted on these questions.”²³⁵ Not surprisingly, the other Albanian participants in the conference had the same view. Kim Mehmeti states that “[t]he Macedonian politicians excluded us. Macedonia led a policy of exclusion of the Albanians... I think that Macedonia should first resolve some internal problems... Politics must resolve the ethnical question, and then resolve the name dispute.”²³⁶ Finally, ethnic Albanian professor and political analyst Mersel Bilali, states that “even in a national community the referendum can be not completely democratic, as one group receives everything and the other nothing. If tomorrow we have a result and the Albanians have voted 98% [for a name change] we will practically have a complete split; the problem will completely aggravate the [inter-ethnic] relations.” All three Albanian participants also noted that the policy of “buying time” with regards to the “name dispute” was not constructive and a pure waste of time and that Macedonia needed to resolve the “name issue” as soon as possible. Thus, the Albanian factor in Macedonia, which makes up anywhere from 20% to 25% of the population, is not to be ignored. The position of the majority of the Albanian population in Macedonia is that Macedonia should change the name, as quickly as possible.

At the same time, however, it is also important to note that significant demographic and security factors have drastically changed the Macedonia at the time

²³³ *Ibid.*, 41.

²³⁴ Baskim Bakiu, in “‘The Talks on the Dispute with Greece’: Demystification and Options for a Way Out” (Skopje: CRPM and Platforma, 2010), 37.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, 38.

²³⁶ Kim Mehmeti, “‘The Talks on the Dispute with Greece’: Demystification and Options for a Way Out” (Skopje: CRPM and Platforma, 2010), 36.

of independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, as compared to the Macedonia today. To be sure, no one could have predicted that the birth rate among Albanians, which is the highest in Europe,²³⁷ would or should affect the name of the Republic of Macedonia, twenty years after independence. This demographic factor was also buttressed by the fall of Communism in Albania in 1991, from where a certain population migrated to Macedonia, and more importantly, the Kosovo Refugee Crisis of 1999, from where over 350,000 ethnic Kosovo Albanians fled into Macedonia,²³⁸ causing relative instability and contributing to the inter-ethnic crisis which followed shortly thereafter in 2001 in Macedonia.²³⁹ Although the figures are unclear and debatable, a sizeable portion of the latter settled permanently in Macedonia, or have kept Macedonia as a base and a passport source (due to the unclear status of Kosovo's independence and lack of passport thereof), while working as migrant workers elsewhere in Western Europe (the most obvious country being Switzerland). For a country with a total population of a bit over two million citizens, this was a huge undertaking with serious repercussions on the political, economic and societal balance of power.

In any case, while the voice of the minority is important, the majority of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia voted for the independence of Macedonia from Yugoslavia, and with this, for the name "Republic of Macedonia." The choice of the majority is not to be underestimated, especially having in mind that Macedonia, at the time of independence, opted for the European political model which is the nation-state based on the ethnic majority. To be true, the multi-ethnic model appears only in a few countries in Europe, such as Switzerland and Belgium, and it was only after 2001 that this multi-ethnic model was imposed on Macedonia by the international community. In any event, I have chosen not to go into that debate, and for the purposes of this thesis, I will be concerned with the viewpoint of the ethnic majority of the population of Macedonia, namely the Macedonians. The reason for this being that

²³⁷ "European Countries by Birth Rate," Maps of the World, <http://www.mapsofworld.com/europe/thematic/countries-by-birth-rate.html> (accessed on June 3, 2015)

²³⁸ Aneta Galic, "One Macedonian town's waste is another's livelihood." UNHCR, 17 March 2008 <http://www.unhcr.org/47dea6812.html> (accessed on June 3, 2015)

²³⁹ Rachael Reilly, "The Refugee Crisis in Guinea: Another Macedonia?" Human Rights Watch, 4 October, 2000. <http://www.hrw.org/news/2000/10/03/refugee-crisis-guinea-another-macedonia> (accessed on June 3, 2015)

the “name dispute” has fundamentally affected the Macedonians in Macedonia, and the roots of the name dispute derive from the history and relations between Greek authorities and the Macedonians. This was one of the things I perceived while I was testing my hypothesis from the very beginning, specifically whether the “name dispute” was a cause for anxiety among the citizens of Macedonia. Albanians remained largely unconcerned by the name dispute, and if they had a stance, it was precisely the one laid out above – that the name dispute is a waste of time and that Macedonia should change the name quickly so as to enter the European Union and NATO. As my research question was what are the root causes of the “name issue”, and what does the “name issue” mean to Macedonians, I believe that the Albanian point of view I have pointed out above should be sufficient.

Of course, one of the repercussions of the name dispute is citizens’ frustration with the way the Government has led the discussions on the name. Many have attacked the fact that the negotiations are kept secret, and that there is no public involvement. Others have also criticized the idea that “time is working to Macedonia’s advantage” and have blamed the Government putting Macedonia in a state of stagnation and isolation, due to the fact that it has not resolved the name dispute for the past two decades. As a matter of fact, a large part of the frustration among citizens points fingers at the Macedonian government. The other part points fingers at Greece.

The problem of our southern neighbor [Greece] is that its name is problematic – so it is in fact Greece that has a problem with its name. We say Greeks and Greece, for a period which they glorify the most – the antiquity – while at that time, no human being from there knows that they are “Greek.” That name doesn’t exist, and it is not even found in the language. It is not written on a single piece of stone or wood, it is nowhere – that name simply doesn’t exist ... So we go on a mission to find who gave that name, and we find out that the godfather is a Prince from Bavaria by the name of Otto. How does he come to that name? With the help of his scientists, he finds through interviews, from among the people there, under Olymp that not a single person in the interviews declares himself as a Greek – so this is the first idea of Bavaria to create a nation-state. And then, the decision is brought to call that country Greece, and to create a people. Again we come to the educational system. He uses the educational system to create a nation. He borrows the name from something that exists in the literature and in the daily language of Europe and the world, as “Greek.” However, the use of the word “Greek,” before it is used by the Bavarian Prince, does not refer to a people or a country, but to a profession. When Romans first used that word, it did not refer to a people, but rather to an intellectual. ... And then, as it happens, through every-day speech, for the limited knowledge of Europe of the 19th century, slowly the idea starts to form that the name refers to a certain country, a certain people.²⁴⁰

Margaret MacMillan, the first woman to win the Samuel Johnson Prize for *Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919*, and warden of St Anthony’s College, Oxford, starts her book entitled *The Uses and Abuses of History*, with the following wise words: “History is something we all do, even if ... we do not always realize it. We want to make sense of our own lives, and often we wonder about our place in our own societies and how we got to be here. So we tell ourselves stories, not always true ones, and we ask questions about ourselves. Such stories and questions inevitably lead us to the past. How did I grow up to the person I am? Who were my parents? My grandparents? As individuals, we are all, at least in part, products of our own histories,

²⁴⁰ Interview with Vangel Bozinovski, Skopje, February 2011.

which include our geographical place, our times, our social classes, and our family backgrounds.”²⁴¹ She concludes her introduction with the following words:

“History ... is not a dead subject. It does not lie there safely in the past for us to look at when the mood takes us. History can be helpful; it can also be very dangerous. It is wiser to think of history not as a pile of dead leaves or a collection of dusty artefacts but as a pool, sometimes benign, often sulfurous, that lies under the present, silently shaping our institutions, our ways of thought, our likes and dislikes. We call on it, even in North America, for validation and for lessons and advice. Validation, whether of group identities, for demands, or for justification, almost always comes from using the past. You feel your life has a meaning if you are part of a larger group, which predated your existence and which will survive you (carrying, however some of your essence into the future). Sometimes we abuse history, creating one-sided or false histories to justify treating others badly, seizing their land, for example, or killing them. There are also many lessons and much advice offered by history, and it is easy to pick and choose what you want. The past can be used for almost anything you want to do in the present. We abuse it when we create lies about the past or write histories that show only one perspective. We can draw our lessons carefully or badly. That does not mean we should not look to history for understanding, support and help; it does mean that we should do so with care.”²⁴²

The official reasons that the Greek side has thus far argued in favor of the “name issue,” as seen above, have amounted to two elements. One is that the name presents “territorial aspirations” by Macedonia on Greece, and the other is that it is an attempt to “usurp Greek historical and national heritage and falsify history.” It is thus almost impossible to understand the “name issue” without an historical overview.

As Basil Gounaris and Iakovos Mihailidis of the Centre for Macedonian History and Documentation of Thessaloniki, Greece argue, it was not until the Treaty of San Stefano of 1878, by which Bulgaria became an autonomous principality and annexed nearly all of Macedonia as well as eastern and northern Thrace, and after the Bulgarian annexation of Eastern Rumelia in 1885, that Greek literature started appearing on modern Macedonia. In fact, Gounaris and Mihailidis assert that the *History of the Greek Nation*, published in 1887 by the father of modern Greek national

²⁴¹ Margaret MacMillan, *The Uses and Abuses of History* (London: Profile Books, 2009), xi.

²⁴²*Ibid.*, xii-xiii.

historiography, Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, and covering the period 1204-1830 dedicated only a couple of sentences to Macedonia.²⁴³ At the time of the publication, Greece had been an independent country for over fifty years.

As a matter of fact Greek (and international) interest in Macedonia and its history only started appearing in the 1970s. It would not be an exaggeration to say that before this time period, speaking of Macedonia in Greece was not only rare, but sometimes even dangerous. To be precise, during the greater part of the twentieth century, Greek Macedonia was referred to as “the newly acquired territories,” and not as “Macedonia.” This seems logical, as the territory of Macedonia had only been acquired in 1913, almost a century after an independent Greek state with its own territory, national identity, and history had already been established. As many anthropologists have emphasized, the Greek authorities had a lot of difficulty with the Macedonians whom they acquired together with the acquisition of their new territory – hence the efforts to exchange them (via the two population exchange treaties with Bulgaria and Turkey), expulse them, assimilate them, civilize or Hellenize them, and so forth. The Hellenization of this population, as many accounts have told, proved a rather challenging task: the majority of the population remained “disloyal” towards their new country. It is no surprise then, that “Macedonia” was not a frequently encountered word, and that the Macedonians, up until the final decades of the 1900s were still considered “the enemy,” as they had been during times of antiquity. As the authors of *La Macédoine: de Philippe II à la Conquête Romaine* would evoke,

“Voilà encore quelques dizaines d’années, nous étions habitués à regarder la Macédoine antique avec des yeux d’Athéniens: les hellénistes gardaient l’écho des discours enflammés de Démosthène contre ce peuple qu’il refusait d’accepter dans le monde grec ; et notre culture classique nous avais appris à placer le cœur de la Grèce dans la Grèce du Sud, non pas vraiment en Béotie ni à Sparte, mais à Athènes, dont le rôle dans l’élaboration de la pensée philosophique, la mise en place d’une certaine démocratie, la réalisation de chefs-d’œuvre artistiques incontestables nous incitaient à juger des choses grecques, d’une manière plus ou moins consciente, en Athéniennes

²⁴³ Basil C. Gounaris and Iakovos D. Mihalidis, “The Pen and the Sword: Reviewing the Historiography of the Macedonian Question,” in *The Macedonian Question*, by Victor Roudometof ed. (Boulder: Eastern European Monographs, 2000), 101.

– d’autant que nos sources écrites étaient, très largement, athéniennes.”²⁴⁴

The authors of this work continue to assert that : “Il est vrai aussi que *les fouilles archéologiques s’étaient concentrées, depuis la fin du siècle dernier, essentiellement dans la Grèce du Sud, avec les résultats que l’on sait, alors que la Macédoine restait occupée jusqu’en 1912 par la Turquie, qui ne se souciait pas outre mesure d’en développer l’archéologie.*”²⁴⁵ Yet, decades had passed since Greece’s annexation of half of the territory of what is considered to be geographic Macedonia, before the trowel of an archaeologist hit the ground of Greek Macedonia. As one of the most renown historians on Ancient Macedonian history, professor emeritus Eugene Borza would reflect, “the frontiers of the Greek world [i.e. Macedonia] have until recently received scant attention. Scholarship – and indeed public interest – has been mainly focused on the great centers of Classical Greece...”²⁴⁶

So given the relative lack of interest in Macedonia and its history by Greek authorities for the greater part of the twentieth century, why is Macedonia so important to Greek authorities today? Why is Macedonian history now considered a central part of Greek history? How did Phillip II and Alexander the Great all of a sudden turn from Greece’s worst enemies, into Greece’s greatest heroes? When did this focus on Macedonia arise? Finally, why is the Macedonian identity so important to Greece? In other words, why do Greek authorities want to get rid of a Macedonian identity that is separate from the Greek identity? In the following section, I will examine several reasons that may answer those questions, and that derive mainly from history - or of present-day nation states’ interpretations of history.

²⁴⁴ René Ginouves *et al.*, *La Macédoine: de Philippe II a la Conquête Romaine* (Paris: CNRS Editions, 1993), 13.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.* Emphasis added.

²⁴⁶ Eugene Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 3.

WHAT A DIFFERENCE A NAME MAKES

No one can make a claim to such a bygone past, and to such a personality, because Alexander the Macedonian is a personality which belongs to the whole world. It is less important where his birthplace was because he lived and died in an entirely different part of the world. There are cities called Alexandria, who can also say he was theirs. Anyone can claim him. This is not disputable: some individuals simply belong to the whole world. You cannot give a national framework to ... someone that did so much for the entire world.²⁴⁷

In a chapter entitled “Who Owns the Past,” Margaret MacMillan identifies what is perhaps one of the most important points in the “name issue”— namely, the idea of ownership of history. To be precise, one of the Greek arguments in the “name issue” is that the Republic of Macedonia is trying to “usurp” ancient Greek history via the name: that the history of the Macedonian Empire and Alexander the Great, is “Greek” history, and that no other country is allowed to claim that history. In other words, Greece claims ownership of that part of world history. But can we really confine the stories of empires that occurred thousands of years ago, to the histories of nation-states that were born merely two hundred years ago?

As with names of people, names of states can bring prestige and open doors. It can be argued that the name “Macedonia,” has brought not only prestige to Greece, but that it has also had extremely positive repercussions on the nation state’s reputation, its political and economic prowess, and ultimately, on its identity. To be precise, the glory of the name “Macedonia” and all it brings with it must not be underestimated. As Georges Castellan explains in his introduction, it is a name that has existed nearly three millennia, and that has pervaded throughout all periods of time: “Le nom apparaît au VIII^e siècle av. J.-C. : Hésiode énumérant les fils de Zeus désigna l’un des deux comme Makedon. Le nom passa en tous cas au petit royaume autour de Pella où naquit Alexander le Grand (356-323 av. J.-C.) La formidable extension que ce dernier lui donna jusqu’à l’Inde et à l’Égypte aboutit à un empire volontiers désigné comme

²⁴⁷ Interview with Dr. Dejan Dokic, Ohrid, 6 August 2011,

“macédonien”...“Ce nom restera celui d’un royaume antique, puis devient celui d’une province romaine (mentionnée dans les Actes des Apôtres) puis d’un “thème” byzantine, dont la localisation varie selon les époques.”²⁴⁸ From 976 until 1018, another Macedonian Empire would rise under Tsar Samuel, which would quickly be quashed by the Byzantine Emperor Basil II.

If one looks up “Macedonia” in the New Testament, one will find it twenty four times – namely in Acts, Romans, Corinthians, Philippians, Thessalonians, and Timothy. If one looks up Greece, on the other hand, they will find it mentioned only twice – in Acts and Zechariah.²⁴⁹ As Jasmina Mojsieva-Guseva states “we can find data about Macedonia and Macedonians in the New Testament, in the “Book of Holy Apostles”, precisely in the known dream of apostle Paul when he was “summoned by a Macedonian and asked to come to Macedonia (Jobs, 16,9) to bring Christian faith in these areas. After his appeal, the apostle Paul with his associates (Syla, Timoteus and Luca) departs immediately to the ancient town Philippi (situated opposite the island Thassos) ... where he starts to preach his teachings “outside of the city near a river, where the inhabitants had a custom to pray...”²⁵⁰

Does the prestige a name comes with have such importance and influence in present-day politics, economics, and society? Apparently it does.

In a world of “imagined communities” to use Benedict Anderson’s phrase, each “community” strives for prestige, for a reputation as being great, grand, unique and undefeatable. Ultimately, reputation has been used to attract consumers and tourists, to win over ideologies and regimes, and even to stop wars. During the Cold War, for example, deterrence theory and the art of coercion were based on the sole perception of the abundance of nuclear power that one superpower had over the other. This *idea or perception of nuclear power* that could not really be proven acted as the sole guarantor of peace between the two superpowers for five decades.

The *idea or perception of historic grandeur* of a nation state has similar powers. Think of why people go to Greece for vacation, for instance. It is because of *their*

²⁴⁸ Georges Castellan, *Un Pays Inconnu: La Macédoine* (Crozon : Armeline, 2003), 7, 20.

²⁴⁹ *The Holy Bible*, <http://bibleresources.bible.com/>

²⁵⁰ Jasmina Mojsieva-Guseva, *In Search of Ourselves* (Skopje: Institute of Macedonian Literature, 2010), 130-132.

perception of Greece's glorious past, of Greece as the birthplace of democracy and the cradle of European civilization. If it were only for the islands and the sunny beaches, there would be many more tourists in cheaper islands. Yet every world citizen wants to see the “cradle of European civilization” at least once in their lifetime – and while at it, why not enjoy its beaches?

According to Eugene Borza, “[i]t is not a coincidence that the development of the ... archaeological sites [of the Bronze Age such as such as Knossos, Mycenae, Tiryns, and Santorini] corresponds with the growth of tourism (a major source of revenue for the modern Greek state) and that most of these sites lie within a few hours’ journey from Athens by air, land, or sea.”²⁵¹ Thus, nation states capitalize on a variety of things, including nuclear power, but also culture and history, in order to enhance their reputation. As John Comaroff would say, “ethno-commerce may open up unprecedented opportunities for creating value of various kinds, and not only for the previously well-positioned.”²⁵²

Where Macedonia comes in according to Borza, then, is that “most of the important Classical sites in the south [namely Athens, Corinth, Delphi, Olympia, and Sparta] have been dug, and while much remains to be excavated, increasing urbanization, industrial development, and large-scale agriculture will make it economically undesirable and technically difficult to explore virgin archaeological zones...The final decades of this [20th] century are proving to be a new era of fulfillment for the study of Balkan regions hitherto relatively unknown. And this is no more true for any region than for ancient Macedonia.”²⁵³

Indeed, Greek modern history, archaeology and the tourism industry did not include a focus on “Macedonia” until very recently, when they had depleted all other historical splendors and exhausted all other archaeological discoveries. Thus, one reason for the recent focus on Macedonia could be to feed the archaeological and tourism industries, and revive the interest in Greek history.

²⁵¹ Eugene Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus*, *op.cit.*, 3.

²⁵² John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, *Ethnicity, Inc.* (Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 24.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, 4-5.

The following excerpt from the Préface of the aforementioned book *La Macédoine: de Philippe II à la Conquête Romaine*, demonstrates this point clearly: “...La Macédoine nous offre, en effet, depuis maintenant une quinzaine d’années [i.e. the 1970s] et chaque année davantage, l’étonnante richesse de découvertes archéologiques, dont certaines ont renouvelé notre vision de la création artistique dans la Grèce antique, et une floraison d’études sur l’histoire ancienne macédonienne.”²⁵⁴

The importance of the glorification of past and history is perhaps even more significant to the Greek national identity than to any other nation state these days. As George Zarkadakis explains in his recently published article in the Washington Post entitled “Modern Greece’s real problem? Ancient Greece,” Greece is a “failed German project that has little in common with Pericles or Plato.” As “the imperfect reflection of an ideal that the West imagined for itself” and that was created by Otto from Bavaria, who “arrived in 1832 [appointed by the Great Powers, Britain, France and Russia at the time] in his new kingdom with an entourage of German architects, engineers, doctors and soldiers – and set out to reconfigure the country to the romantic ideal of the times.” “The profound gap between the ancient and the modern had to be bridged somehow, in order to satisfy the romantic expectations that Europe had of Greece. So a historical narrative was put together claiming uninterrupted continuity with the ancient past. With time, this narrative became the central dogma of Greek national policy and identity.”²⁵⁵

One of my Macedonian interviewees also spoke to this shocking – at least to some Europeans – claim:

The historical facts show that, that part which in antiquity is called “Helini” in fact has certain cities which we call city-states (but this is an invention of contemporary science as they were simply cities) in which there live not one people but a heap of peoples as is usually the case. From there is created the myth. But who needs that myth? Europe starts to first build its history in the 16th century. Europe’s history is first written by Julius Cesar Scaliger, mentor of Nostradamus. He writes about a Europe, which to this day is valid as

²⁵⁴ René Ginouves *et al.*, *La Macédoine*, *op.cit.*, 9.

²⁵⁵ George Zarkadakis, “Modern Greece’s real problem? Ancient Greece,” *Washington Post*, November 4, 2011.

the skeleton of the European history, even though he was criticized even in his own times (for example by Sir Isaac Newton who believed it was a false history). And in the nineteenth century Europe decides to choose its roots. The thesis is, whether the roots of Europe will be based on Macedonian culture, or on the so-called Greek culture. The decision is made on a green table, for this to be called Hellenism. There are no facts. It is a political decision.

So where is Greece's problem? Their problem is that for over 150 years, their educational system taught generations in the name of something that allegedly belongs to them but is in fact the culture of the entire Eastern Mediterranean. And when you make up a new name [Greece], you can put everything in it. And so, in order for the needs to be met of Europe's ancestry being here, everything from the Eastern Mediterranean is put in the so called "Greek" culture. In this way, Macedonian and Macedonia is thrown out, while the facts are as follows. When Athens had 25,000, Heraklea had 40,000. Just to illustrate what this city means. We began to celebrate Athens only recently – it is in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that we started to promote it as a centre for Dieties. However, in reality, Athens never had more than 25,000 citizens.²⁵⁶

My interlocutor goes on to conclude that 150 generations of Greeks were taught that they are a "higher race" – a culture with more history than anyone else, the cradle of European civilization; and that this type of education system is well known in sociology and often leads to fascism.

So are we witnessing today – along with the unpleasant "discovery" that Greece was not really what we had been taught it was for all these years – the "discovery" of another cradle of European civilization? Could Macedonia be the next European project – or is that precisely the fear? And if so, then who would *not* want to be Macedonian? Hence the "name issue" and the reason why all neighboring states would be happy to take that name and history under its umbrella. Which is perhaps one of the reasons why when any given person from any neighboring state, be it Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, or Albania will say that Macedonians were/are in fact Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbians or Albanians.

It turns out that the stakes are indeed high when it comes to the Macedonia, and all that jazz that comes with it! Especially if it is true that the Greek cover is being blown and that the entire European identity could have to rely upon the pedestals of

²⁵⁶ Interview with Vangel Bozinovski, Skopje, 10 February 2011.

the Macedonian civilization instead! With all the dynamics and heat emanating from the economic and political crises in Greece at this time, this does not seem too far of a stretch from reality. What, then, are some of the points of contest, when it comes to this glorious history (and perhaps later on down the line, not so glorious history) that have led to the “name issue”? In other words, why does Greece want exclusivity over the name Macedonia?

A GLIMPSE INTO THE HISTORIES OF MACEDONIA AND GREECE

Of all nation-states that claim to date back to prehistoric times – none have a map that connects their history to today. Of all of those academics that say their countries are the rightful descendants of ancient periods – none can claim a map. Macedonia, on the other hand, exists, even in a map of the third century before Christ. It is they who took our language and not vice versa.²⁵⁷

Although, as Chiclet and Lory state, “Les noms géographiques ont leur histoire et les territoires qu’ils désignent varient parfois,” rightfully adding that one must not confuse the Belgium of Julius Caesar with the current state that carries that name,²⁵⁸ the term “Macedonia” throughout most periods of history, from antiquity to today has referred to a region in the Balkans that roughly encompasses 66,000 km² in the Balkan Peninsula, from Lake Ohrid in the West to the river Mesta in the East, and from the Sar Planina Mountains in the North to the Aegean Sea in the South.²⁵⁹ The region now incorporates parts of Macedonia, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Kosovo, as well as Albania, with an estimated population of about 5 million. Indeed, the geographic term “Macedonia” roughly corresponds to the territory of the Macedonian Empire, before it had reached its apogee during the reign of Alexander the Great.

Those who have travelled Greece will know that without its Macedonian territory, Greeks would have to survive on olives and fish. Indeed, the region of Macedonia in Greece produces most of the country’s agricultural and energy needs, in

²⁵⁷ Interview with Vasil Ilyov, Skopje, 10 February 2011.

²⁵⁸ Christophe Chiclet and Bernard Lory, *La République de Macédoine: Nouvelle venue dans le concert européen* (Paris: Editions l’Harmattan, 1998), 15.

²⁵⁹ Georges Castellan, *Un Pays Inconnu: La Macédoine* (Crozon: Armeline, 2003), 7.

addition to providing for a renewal of the archaeological and tourism industries, as was argued before. This, of course, renders the territory all the more precious to the Greek government – and all the more so in times of economic crisis as today.

In spite of its present-day vividly reduced territory, the Macedonian Empire left a great historic legacy. At its height, during the reign of Alexander the Great, the Macedonian empire was the largest (and first) empire on European soil expanding on three continents, and encompassing 3.5% of the world's territory, expanding from the Balkans to Egypt and India. It was the most powerful state during its times. As George Castellan would say speaking of Alexander the Great, "...sa prodigieuse conquête jusqu'à l'Inde et l'Egypte lui permit d'ajouter un chapitre inoubliable a l'histoire de cette culture."²⁶⁰

According to present-day Greek history books, the Macedonians were a Greek tribe speaking a dialect of Greek. Philip II, and his son Alexander the Great, who contributed to the largest expansion of the Macedonian empire, are therefore heroes of ancient Greek history, who conquered the world and spread Hellenism. Consider the following passage from the aforementioned book published by the Centre national de la recherche scientifique in Paris at a time when M. Michel Carassou was main editor of CNRS Editions: "On peut admettre que le royaume macédonien s'était déjà établi dans ce qui sera son cœur historique au moment où s'élèvent a Vergina les plus anciens tumulus, vers 900 av. J.-C. ; et il apparaît que, dès les débuts, ces Macédoniens étaient 'hellénophones', parlant un dialecte grec intermédiaire entre le thessalien et les dialectes du Nord-Ouest."²⁶¹

According to Macedonian history books, however, the Macedonians were not a Greek tribe, but an entirely separate people, who organized themselves differently than the Greeks (they formed an empire, in contrast to the Greek city-states), who had different traditions, and who spoke a different language. The only thing that binds them to the Greeks is that they conquered the Greeks, therefore uniting them, and promoted their culture. The following conclusion by Macedonian author, Aleksandar Donski, summarizes that point of view: "There is no doubt that the Epirians and the

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 18.

²⁶¹ René Ginouves *et al.*, *La Macédoine, op.cit.*, 227.

Macedonians spoke a similar language, but neither one of them were Greeks. The entire argument that is used by pro-Greek theories about the character of the language of the ancient Macedonians, thus, is unfounded.”²⁶² According to Macedonian history books then, Phillip II and Alexander the Great were Macedonians – indeed, Alexander the Great is referred to as “Aleksandar Makedonski” and these kind of references can be found in many non-Western texts. Needless to say, the point of this thesis is not to enter a debate about which version of history portrays the truth. Indeed, as Eugene Borza points out, the debate about who the Macedonians really were is an ongoing debate among historians that will probably never be resolved due to lack of evidence on the language they spoke. His numerous books and findings, however, have pointed out that the Macedonians were a different people, with unique ceremonies, burial rituals and so forth. The fact that they were called barbarians by their Greek contemporaries at the time such as the historians Herodotus and Thucydides, and later the orator and statesman Demosthenes (who lived at approximately the same time as Alexander the Great), and the fact that they were not allowed to participate in the Olympic Games are all the more evidence that they were considered, and considered themselves, as a separate people from the Greeks.²⁶³ In response to the question “Who were the Macedonians?” Borza concludes:

“They made their mark not as a tribe of Greeks or other Balkan peoples, but as *Macedonians*. This was understood by foreign protagonists from the time of Darius and Xerxes to the age of Roman generals. Their adoption of some aspects of Hellenism over a long period of time is more important than the genetic structure of either the Macedonian population in general or their royal house in particular. Moreover, the necessity for Macedonian kings from Alexander I to Phillip II to impress the Greek world with their own purported Hellenic origins tells much more about relations between Greeks and Macedonians than any attempt to show that Macedonians were a remote Greek tribe.”²⁶⁴

Borza’s revelations on the academic debates surrounding ancient Macedonian history, as well as the final point he makes about the question on whether the

²⁶² Aleksandar Donski, *The Language of the Ancient Macedonians*, 2nd ed. (Stip: August 2-S, 2009), 19.

²⁶³ Eugene Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus*, op.cit., 62-63.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 97.

Macedonians were Greek or not, is relevant to this thesis because it portrays that the polemic about a history that occurred over 2,000 years ago, has repercussions on the “name issue” and on our understanding of this issue today. From the Greek point of view, the “name issue” is about having exclusivity over the use of a name that historically belongs entirely to Greece.

Now, we all will agree that nation-states are created on the basis of past histories of peoples that cannot possibly fit the nation-state boundaries of today – much less the idea of an ethnically clean nation. This kind of thought has been explored in depth by many authors, some of whom I will refer to in a later section. It is clear that neither Greece nor Macedonia have an exclusive right to a history that occurred over 2,000 years ago, at a time when nation-states did not exist.

Speaking of history, let us now fast forward to a more recent past that may bring us closer to the other historically-related roots of the “name issue.” Having summarized the reasons for wanting a monopoly over a name that kindles a glorious past, we will now observe the attempts to expropriate that name – and identity – from a certain people, starting from the nineteenth century and until today.

MACEDONIA IN THE AGE OF NATION-STATE BUILDING

“One day the great European War will come out of some damned foolish thing in the Balkans.”²⁶⁵

SELF-DETERMINATION

I don't think the Macedonians in Yugoslavia did not feel like Macedonians. Koneski used to say that the language is our true fatherland. The language was always Macedonian. No one ever disputed that. The main characteristic of the national identity was not disputable and everyone identified with it. Of course, in parallel there also existed the Yugoslav identity. At a time when you could be both a Macedonian and a Yugoslavian – and this did not present itself as a conflict or make people seem double-faced, but simply to be what you are but as part of a wider family. In a similar fashion to a woman who has her own family and then becomes part of another family, with what she gains another surname but these two are not

²⁶⁵ Otto von Bismarck, 1888.

*in conflict. On the other hand, it is normal that under historical conditions such as what happened to us, namely the break-up of Yugoslavia and practically constructing a new country, that there was a conscious insistence of building a strong national identity, especially considering that we are a small country. ... The only thing we have is going back to the past and mythicizing it. I don't say we don't have a right to go back to antiquity – it is completely legitimate to feel a belonging or identification.*²⁶⁶

According to Richard Hall, the concept of nationalism was brought into the Balkans from France and the German countries early in the nineteenth century. “The initial impact was largely cultural. Intellectuals made great efforts to standardize and celebrate the vernacular languages of the Balkans. In doing so, they frequently referred and connected to the medieval states that had existed in the Balkans before the Ottoman conquest.”²⁶⁷ Nadine Lange-Akhund places the beginnings of this concept in the Balkans a bit earlier, namely in the middle of the eighteenth century. At approximately this time, then, and all throughout nineteenth and until the beginning of the twentieth century, Macedonia, much like the rest of Europe, witnessed a rise of awareness for national identities and a rise in nation-state building. This had partly to do with the natural flow of events in the rest of the world, such as “the revolution of 1848 which defended the right of people to self-determination” and which “strongly influenced this western province of the Ottoman Empire.”²⁶⁸ As Macedonian literary historian Valentina Mironska-Hristovska relates, the nineteenth century was a time when Slavic tradition flourished – a time during which the Macedonian renaissance was built on the strong foundations of “education in the Macedonian language, the opening of printing houses and schools in the Macedonian language, the formation of different Macedonian organizations, the renewal of the Ohrid Archdiocese, the uprising of the Macedonian revolution, and the century old fight for the autonomy of Macedonia.”²⁶⁹

²⁶⁶ Interview with Prof. Dr. Ana Martinovska, Skopje, 16 August 2011.

²⁶⁷ Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars: 1912-1913: Prelude to the First World War* (London: Routledge, 2000), 1.

²⁶⁸ Nadine Lange-Akhund, *The Macedonian Question, 1893-1908: From Western Sources* (Boulder: Eastern European Monographs, 1998), vii.

²⁶⁹ Valentina Mironska-Hristovska, *The Macedonian Revival* (Skopje: Institute for Macedonian Literature, 2007), 5.

Mironska-Hristovska explains this rise of awareness for national identities within the context of the Age of Enlightenment within which literacy and thus, national self-awareness, was spread and extended towards the masses. “The drive towards literacy, towards artistic and scientific achievement, and towards cultural life in general, was and still is the fundamental impulse which gave and still gives the Macedonian people faith and strength in their existence.”²⁷⁰ Indeed, judging by the number of schools opened in Macedonia, not only by Macedonians, but by Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbs, in their attempt to nationalize the local population, the Macedonian population, by far received the most “cosmopolitan” education. Contrary to what many foreign authors have been quick to propose – namely that Macedonia was backward, agricultural and illiterate – Macedonian literature and literacy in this period flourished. The real reason why this nationalist movement did not graduate into Macedonian self-determination and the establishment of an autonomous state, as the other states did, was not this ill-perceived backwardness or lack of identity, but rather, the reluctance of the Great Powers of the day, such as Russia, France, Great Britain or Austria-Hungary, to take a firm stance regarding the Macedonian autonomy. This hesitancy was driven by their own interests in and visions of the region, as well as by those of their local allies, namely the Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks, and others.

In fact, the late Hans Lothar Steppan, author of an epic book *The Macedonian Knot*, who was Germany’s Ambassador to Macedonia in the 1990s after it gained independence from Macedonia, meticulously documents these interests through a systematic research in the German archives. In the preface to this volume he tells us that he became interested in Macedonian history due precisely to the controversy over the “name issue.” Following his diplomatic mission, he set out to research the facts for himself. When he entered the archives in Germany, he thought he would find a chapter or two on Macedonia. Instead, he found volumes and volumes, only on Macedonia. In an interview for the prime time news of the national channel Macedonian Television in September 2008 he says:

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

“I’ve tried to find out the background of the situation of today, and to see whether the neighboring states have a right on the Macedonian name from the Greek side; on the Macedonian language from the Bulgarian ; and on Macedonian territory. I found out that there is no legitimate right, for this, of course, as you know. But it is important to convince them that they do not have any right. It is more important to convince the European Union, NATO, and Mr. Schoeffer who thinks that it’s enough to be NATO members and to say that the others are wrong – only because they are not NATO members, they are wrong. What is this kind of negotiation?! So to find out the truth in history, maybe was not easy. It took time and money and nerves and work, but it was feasible. But to convince the opponents of the *real* background – *that* is the question. And that is the task of the politicians. ... I am born a pessimist. But one must not lose his conviction that justice may prevail... Peace without justice is unbearable, does not exist. So how can the neighbors believe there will be peace in the Balkans if they are unjustified. If they were justified, ok – even if it is to the negative consequence for Macedonia. But it is not. They are not correct. They are not right. If they had the right on their side, then sorry for Macedonia. But they have not.”²⁷¹

Ambassador Stepan was considered a great friend of Macedonia and received several distinguished awards in recognition of his work.

FOREIGN INTERESTS AND THE BIRTH OF THE “MACEDONIAN QUESTION”

It is these interests – regional and international alike – that have been blamed by both foreign and Macedonian authors alike, for the birth of the “Macedonian Question” and even the “name issue.” As we have seen, Elisabeth Barker places the origins of the name dispute in the “Macedonian Question” that, according to her, came into being in the nineteenth century, “when in 1870 Russia successfully pressed Ottoman Turkey to allow the formation of a separate Bulgarian Orthodox Church, or Exarchate, with authority extending over parts of the Turkish province of Macedonia.”²⁷² At that time, Serbia and Greece had already gained independence from

²⁷¹ Interview with Hans Lothar Stepan, *Macedonian National Television*, uploaded on September 28, 2008, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iSJKXmIsBLc>

²⁷² Elisabeth Barker, “The origin of the Macedonian dispute,” *op.cit.*, 3.

the Ottoman Empire with the help from their Great Power allies, and Bulgaria was close to doing so, thus their strife for Macedonia was not a struggle for self-determination, but rather an attempt to gain additional territory. Meanwhile, Macedonia remained part of Turkey, and Macedonians were involved in a domestic and international struggle for self-determination and for the independence of Macedonia. "This step quickly involved Bulgaria in strife both with Greece and with Serbia. The Greek Patriarch in Constantinople declared the new autocephalous Bulgarian Church to be schismatic, and the Greeks sharply contested the spread of Bulgarian ecclesiastical, cultural, and national influence in Macedonia. The Serbian government complained of Turkey's decision through ecclesiastical as well as diplomatic channels, and, after an interruption caused by Serbia's war with Turkey in 1876, also tried to fight Bulgarian influence in Macedonia. So began the three-sided contest for Macedonia, waged first by priests and teachers, later by armed bands, and later still by armies, which has lasted with occasional lulls until today."²⁷³

Barker relates that "[t]his was not the result planned by Russia in 1870. What Russia wanted was to extend her own influence in the Balkans through the Orthodox Church and through support of the oppressed or newly liberated Slav peoples. She had the choice of Bulgaria or Serbia as her chief instrument in this policy; Greece was of course non-Slav and so less suitable than either. Of the Slav nations, Bulgaria was geographically closer to Russia, and commended the land approaches to Constantinople and the Aegean, and through Macedonia, to Salonika. Also, Bulgaria was at that time not yet liberated from Turkey and so was more dependent on Russian aid and thus more biddable than Serbia."²⁷⁴ Thus, one of the earliest texts on the "name issue" argues that the source of the "Macedonian Question" were the geo-strategic interests of Great Powers and how these interests were played out by their Balkan allies. I wanted to point out here, as a side note, that Russia was one of the first former Great Powers to recognize the newly independent Republic of Macedonia, and that, under its constitutional name.²⁷⁵

²⁷³ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁵ James Pettifer ed., *The New Macedonian Question*, *op.cit.*, xxv.

James Pettifer, like many others, points to the quest for independence from the Ottoman Empire, and the various alliances these peoples and smaller nations had with the Great Powers: “In one sense, Macedonia throughout the nineteenth century was no different from its four immediate neighbours, Serbia, Greece, Albania and Bulgaria, in that all these peoples were struggling to throw off rule from Constantinople and the declining power of the Sublime Porte. In the different phases of the Eastern Question the standing of the different candidate nation-states waxed and waned, generally linked to the power of their larger non-Balkan backers and different diplomatic imperatives arising in many cases from events far outside the Balkans themselves.”²⁷⁶

The other authors in James Pettifer’s *The New Macedonian Question* also point to the “Macedonian Question” (and thus, great power geo-strategic and territorial interests) as being the source of the “name dispute” in addition to other destabilizing factors. In a similar fashion to Barker, Pettifer places the roots of the “Macedonian Question” in the year of 1878, “after the Treaty of Berlin had overthrown the short-lived ‘Greater Bulgaria’ established by the Treaty of San Stefano. He goes on to explain, as have the others, that the Treaty of San Stefano had given much of what is now Macedonia to Bulgaria and thus wetted its appetite. However since the Great Powers had been weary of this solution, and namely of a Great Bulgaria being Russia’s extended hand and having access to the Aegean Sea, they had decided to annul the Treaty of San Stefano and give back the territory of Macedonia to the Ottoman Empire three months later, with the Treaty of Berlin.

Jens Reuter also places the beginnings of the “Macedonian Question” as a Great Power dispute: “The region of Macedonia – known at the time as a geographical term with drifting borders and a variegated ethnic mixture – became an object of dispute following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. According to the Treaty of San Stefano, the whole of Macedonia – that is, the territory of the present-day Republic as well as the two regions now forming parts of Bulgaria and Greece – was to be incorporated into Greater Bulgaria, which was constituted at the time. This Treaty had an explosive effect on the atmosphere in the Balkans, which was poisoned by expansionist greed and mistrust. Only three months later, the Berlin Congress revised this decision and

²⁷⁶ James Pettifer, “The new Macedonian question,” in *The New Macedonian Question*, *op.cit.*, 16.

left Macedonia within the borders of the Osmanli Empire. To be sure, Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin envisaged some kind of 'autonomy', but in practice Macedonia was sub-divided into three vilayets (districts) and was directly administered by the Sublime Porte. The Turkish administration used the designation 'the three Vilayets' as a synonym for Macedonia. In the background was the fear that the designation Macedonia might awaken a desire for national independence."²⁷⁷

We come to concluding the following puzzling deduction: that if the "Macedonian Question" was the source of the "name issue", and if it is foreign territorial interests that lie behind the "Macedonian Question," then how come it is *Macedonia* that is accused of having territorial aspirations and *Macedonia* that needs to change its name? Where in the whole story, does the responsibility of foreign interests lie (both neighboring and other)? Throughout my research, I found foreign interests in almost every time period. I have come to realize that perhaps this should have been one of my research questions. In that case, my hypothesis would have been that the Great Powers and their interests, and their nation-state counterparts of today, have an equal, if not greater, role and responsibility in creating the "name issue". In other words, the "name issue" is also a product of foreign interests, and as long as these persist, the "name issue" will remain alive. Consequently, how should they make amends for their sins?

THE MOVEMENT FOR MACEDONIAN AUTONOMY

The movement for Macedonian autonomy certainly did not go unnoticed by the Great Powers. Indeed, many a great politician and writers, such as William Gladstone, called the world's attention to the quest of the Macedonians for self-determination. As William Gladstone would once write, in an appeal to the President of the Byron Society Hawarden Castle, Chester:

"Dear Sir, The hopelessness of the Turkish Government
would make me witness with delight its being swept out by the

²⁷⁷ Jens Reuter, "Policy and economy in Macedonia," *op.cit.*, 28-29.

countries which it tortures: but without knowledge of resources available to support the revolt I dare not take the responsibility of encouraging it in any fort or degree. Next to the Ottoman Government nothing can be more deplorable and blameworthy than jealousies between Greek and Slav, and plans by the States already existing for appropriating other territory. Why not Macedonia for Macedonians, as well as Bulgaria for Bulgarians and Servia for Servians? And if they are small and weak, let them bind themselves together for defense, so that they may not be devoured by others, either great or small, which would probably be the effect of their quarrelling among themselves.

Your very faithful, W. E. Gladstone"²⁷⁸

Through her inquiry into the diplomatic archives of France and Austria, and recent publications from Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom and the United States, Lange-Akhund discloses that the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) "became sufficiently powerful to impose a modification of the status of the region and an "internationalization" of the *Macedonian question*. The founders of IMRO wanted to liberate the province by revolution in order to create an autonomous Macedonia, a truly independent state. To reach this objective, they didn't hesitate to resort to force, violence, and terror."²⁷⁹

One such event of terror, which happened a bit later than the period Lange-Akhund covers, but which nevertheless illustrates the Macedonian revolutionary movement, is the so-called "Dynamite Attempt" in the town of Florina (Greece) in 1925, which was a bombing in the coffee shop Diethnes. The two men who had entered the café and thrown grenades fled to the Albanian border, where, according to Karakasidou's account, many *komitadjides* used to find refuge. Following this incident, almost sixty people were arrested on charges of collaborating with the *komitadjides*. Ten of these were judged by the Military Court and the rest exiled to the islands of Skyros and Andros.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁸ "Mr. Gladstone and the Balkan Confederation," *The Times*, London, Feb 06, 1897; Issue 35120; col F, 12.

²⁷⁹ Nadine Lange-Akhund, *The Macedonian Question*, *op.cit.*, vii. (italics added)

²⁸⁰ Anastasia Karakasidou, "Cultural Illegitimacy in Greece: the Slavo-Macedonian 'Non-Minority,'" in *Minorities in Greece: Aspects of a Plural Society*, by Richard Clogg, ed. (London: Hurst and Company, 2002), 134.

In fact, *komitadjides*, *komiti*, *Solunski atentatori*, and *gemidzii*, are all adjectives used to define the Macedonian revolutionaries who, among other tactics such as guerrilla warfare against the Ottoman Empire, tried to attract international attention to the Macedonian quest for self-determination through various incidents such as the kidnapping of American Protestant missionary Ellen Maria Stone (popularly referred to as Miss Stone) in 1901, the assassination of the Bulgarian Prime Minister Aleksandar Stamboliyski in 1923, or the scandalous assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia who was on an official visit in Marseilles, France in 1934, and who was killed together with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs while they were being driven in a car greeting the public.²⁸¹ The Macedonian revolutionaries were well educated (and often teachers by profession) and well-organized, frequently acting from abroad, through a network in all major capitals in Europe, and agitating the Macedonian population through schools, teachings, poetry and literature. The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization was founded in Solun (Thessaloniki) in 1893. Although its movements were able to stir a lot of noise and although they incited several proposals on behalf of the Great Powers, in the end the Great Powers chose the status quo for Macedonia, i.e. Ottoman occupation. This, in spite of the various ideas the Great Power had been contemplating for Macedonia, including: “the autonomy and independence wished by IMRO but opposed by Balkan countries and the Sultan, the establishment of an international protectorate suggested by the Great Powers and rejected by the Ottoman power, or, finally, the partition of the region desired by the Balkan governments, whose leaders, however, were incapable of agreeing on the boundaries of their territories.”²⁸² As Lange-Akhund highlights, “it is important to point out how the different options were alternately tested and how the interests and the contradictory goals of each party precluded reaching a solution to

²⁸¹ For the purposes of this thesis, it will be impossible to treat the various versions of the history and nationality surrounding the Macedonian revolutionaries, many of which are called “Bulgarians” by the Bulgarians. It will suffice here to quote Lange-Akhund who, in her introduction states: “For a long time, the history of the Macedonian movement was wrongly assimilated or confounded with the Bulgarian movement because of the ties which existed between the leaderships of the two movements;” Nadine Lange-Akhund, *The Macedonian Question*, *op.cit.*, vii.

²⁸² Nadine Lange-Akhund, *The Macedonian Question*, *op.cit.*, vii.

the increasingly violent conflict in Macedonia. ... In 1908 the Young Turks' revolution broke out ... put[ting] an end to the international efforts, undertaken by the Great Powers four years before, to impose a particular statute for Macedonia which differentiated it from the rest of the Empire.”²⁸³

A WORD ABOUT THE POPULATION

I grew up with my grandmother. That's why I speak our language – those children who didn't live with their grandparents don't speak our language. And anyway, they [the Greek authorities] didn't want us to speak our language. Whoever spoke our language was punished. They didn't like it Even today, if we speak, they call us Bulgarians. We have problems. If you talk, if you like our things, our culture, if you want to speak – nobody likes that here. It's a painful thing ... It's painful to pretend you are Greek. You cannot change – you cannot do this thing. I was born and raised with other things. Now they are telling me that I am Greek. I cannot pretend – even if I want to, something from within doesn't allow me. I can't. That's why the people here remained behind – undeveloped. Either they didn't go to school, or they didn't graduate, or they had problems. I couldn't understand them in school. So it was very painful in school ... We here say we're “from here, local”. The Greeks sometimes call us “neznam” from “neznam”: “the I don't know.” Before, when the Greeks used to come up here, with their army, they would catch our people and ask them, where are the Andari (rebels), the communists? And our people would say “I don't know, I didn't see, I didn't hear. So they called us “the I don't know”, and this name remained. I don't know, don't ask me. If you tell him (the Greek State representative), that you're “from here,” he can't say anything, he can't punish you. Because I tell most of the Greeks, that my grandfather was here – he was born here, he grew up here, he did these things and he talked like this. So what am I? You tell me. That's how I tell them.”²⁸⁴

Although a brief history of any other people would not necessitate a justification of their existence through literature, the “Macedonian Question” has protruded so deeply into the existence of the Macedonian identity, that anyone who treats this subject is obliged to define their vision of the Macedonian people – this,

²⁸³ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁴ Interview with Anonymous Hesitant Tukasni (Possibly Outspoken) 4, Arnislavci (Agathi), Northern Greece, 11 July 2011.

regardless of differing notions of national, cultural or ethnic identity, and of the fact that in present day terms, no matter what one's understanding of the Macedonian identity is, the de-facto existence of a country called Macedonia and millions of individuals in that country, in neighbouring countries, and across the globe who declare they are Macedonian (by ethnicity), disarm the necessity of questioning such an existence. In any case, as was explained in the definitions part, and as it has no doubt already been noted through the citations, Macedonians have been referred to by several names throughout history and until this day including : "Slavophones," "Slavo-Macedonians," "Slavic-Speakers," "Bilinguals," "Bilingual Greeks," "Bulgarians," "Voulgarophones," and "Skopians," to name a few. Thus any paper that refers to Macedonians requires a brief clarification. It should also be noted that the choice of how an author refers to the Macedonians is not an innocent one.

In spite of all the different designations of Macedonians however, and despite the non-negligible discrepancies regarding the percentages of different ethnicities in the region, it can be assumed that throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the majority of the population in the region of Macedonia was "Macedonian," or "Slavo-Macedonian," or "Slavophone" or whatever other term researchers, historians, anthropologists and politicians have used to denominate the local population that was clearly neither fully Greek, nor completely Serb, nor entirely Bulgarian. As a 1989 report from the Minority Rights Group entitled "Minorities in the Balkans," states,

"Assessing population figures is problematic due to the tendency to exaggerate the number of the Greeks or Slav [Macedonian] population depending on which side is making the assessment – the Greeks, the Bulgarians, or the Yugoslavs. One of the most detailed assessments is a Yugoslav one, using Bulgarian and Greek sources, just before the Balkan Wars of 1912, which saw the liberation of the areas from Ottoman rule, that there were in Aegean Macedonia [*i.e. Greek Macedonia*]: 326,426 Macedonians; 40,921 Muslim Macedonians (Pomaks); 289,973 Turks; 4240 Christian Turks; 2112 Cherkez (Mongols); 240,019 Greeks; 13,753 Muslim Greeks; 5584 Muslim Albanians; 3291 Christian Albanians; 45,457 Vlachs; 3500 Muslim Vlachs; 59,50

Jews; 29,803 Gypsies; and 8100 others making a total of 1,073,549 inhabitants.”²⁸⁵

Consider also the following excerpt from Karakasidou’s chapter in Richard Clogg’s book on minorities in Greece:

“[In] (1925), Salvanos, Chief of Staff of the [Greek] Tenth Army Division of Western Macedonia, wrote a study on the ‘ethnological composition’ of the Florina area and the possibilities for resettling refugees there. In it, he recognized that only a minority of the region’s population had pure Greek consciousness which had been strengthened through Greek propaganda during the Macedonian Struggle. Salvanos noted that the Slavophone population was divided among those with fanatical Greek sentiments (Ellinophrones), fanatic Bulgarian sentiments (Voulgarophrones), and those who were indifferent to nationality, being concerned only with maintaining their lives and livelihoods. The latter, he maintained, call themselves “Macedonians” (*Makedones*), and constituted the bulk of the region’s population (making up between one-half and three quarters of any given village’s population).”²⁸⁶

VII. SOME THOUGHTS ON IDENTITY AND THE BIRTH OF THE “MACEDONIAN QUESTION”

*It is they who have a problem. They have an existential problem, ok? That’s why it’s not important to be Macedonian – it’s a natural thing. For us it’s a natural thing. They are looking for an identity – we are not. We have an identity. It’s not important at all, I mean its natural, it’s by incidence – it’s a coincidence. Because my mother my father they were born here, and people were talking and that’s it - that’s all. Other people who need an identity, those are the kodoshi [the spies], so that they can do something. It’s a false construction. Greece is a false construction. Ours is real. This is real. The thing that’s going on here [Macedonian festival in a Greek village], it’s real, ok? It’s not fake. I’m not paid to be here – I paid out of my pocket to come here. I want to be here. When Greeks go to their festivals, they are paid. They are public servants. The cops you see [referring to the police cars parked outside the festival scene]– they are paid to be here.*²⁸⁷

²⁸⁵ Hugh Poulton, and MLIHRC, *Minorities in the Balkans* (London: Minority Rights Group, 1989), 30.

²⁸⁶ Anastasia Karakasidou, “Cultural Illegitimacy in Greece”, *op.cit.*, 129.

²⁸⁷ Interview with Nikos Kalinis, Ovcharani (Meliti), Northern Greece, July 2011.

In spite of the aforementioned indications on the majority of the population of Macedonia, western authors started to question the existence of a Macedonian identity. In fact, most of them were politically motivated. To be sure, the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries were probably the worst period for the Macedonian national self-awareness. We are yet to see what is in store for Macedonians in the twenty-first century. As the Director of the National Archives of the Republic of Macedonia, historian and professor Todor Cepreganov, would relate in the introduction to *The Macedonian Identity Throughout History*, the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries represented the beginning of the negation of the Macedonians and the Macedonian national identity – it was then that the “Macedonian Question” was born. “The year 1878 was critical, with the peace Treaty of San Stefano, with which all of Macedonia was included in “Great Bulgaria,” which had just been established. But three months later, with the Treaty of Berlin, the Great Powers decided Macedonia should once again be returned within the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire. This is how the so-called “Macedonian Question” entered through the main gates of history. The following years Macedonia became a battle field on which Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia created and helped nationalist groups with the aim to take over for them...It is precisely this period that researchers who study the question of identity have mostly focused on.”²⁸⁸ Gounaris and Mihailidis would write that “[i]nternational interest in Macedonia was revived after the 1897 Greek-Turkish war and the 1901 Ellen Stone kidnapping, and peaked following the ill-fated 1903 uprising, when correspondents of all major newspapers appeared on the scene ready to contribute their conflicting views about the ingredients of the Macedonian salad.”²⁸⁹

Today, we may well be witnessing yet another revival in the interest in Macedonia, as is evidenced by the recent literature discussed all through this thesis.

²⁸⁸ Todor Cepreganov, “The Collective Memory in the Macedonian Identity,” in *The Macedonian Identity Throughout History: Materials from the International Scientific Conference Held on the Occasion of 60 Years from the Formation of the Institute for National History, Skopje 10-12 October, 2008* (Skopje: Institute for National History, 2010), 11-12.

²⁸⁹ Basil C. Gounaris, and Iakovos D. Mihailidis, “The Pen and the Sword”, *op.cit.*, 103.

For his part, Todor Cepreganov wonders over the resurgence of the “Macedonian Question” among foreigners, who, once again, question the idea that a Macedonian identity really does exist. “In these seventeen years of transition, and before, we became a field of research in which a good number of foreign historians, anthropologists, ethnologists, political scientists, linguists, folklorists, and others, conducted study visits in Macedonia... we had been expecting that their work would be affirmative for Macedonia. However, what characterized the greater part of these articles really surprised us. With the exception of a few scholars, to our disbelief, they posed questions which really astonished us.”²⁹⁰ He then goes on to quote Victor Roudomentof who, in his Introduction to the volume he edited, entitled *The Macedonian Question: Culture, Historiography, Politics*, states the following: “how is it possible that a people without ‘culture’ or without their own ‘ethnicity’ claim their right to a specific political (i.e. national) identity?”²⁹¹ This type of questioning rings a familiar bell of a century or so ago. Indeed, one could almost replace the inquiring proposals of today and those of a century ago, without noticing the time difference. Read the following excerpt from British travel author and special Parliamentary correspondent to many exotic places, Sir John Foster Fraser, would write in a 1906 publication, for example:

“But who are the Macedonians? You will find Bulgarians and Turks who call themselves Macedonian, you will find Greek Macedonians, there are Servian [sic] Macedonians, and it is possible to find Roumanian [sic] Macedonians. You will not however find a single Christian Macedonian who is not a Servian [sic], a Bulgarian, a Greek or a Roumanian [sic].”²⁹²

Baffled by the revival of this foreign attitude towards the Macedonians, Cepreganov, subsequently tries to explain the irrationality of these questions, through citing documents of evidence of the collective memory of the Macedonian identity – “a collective memory that was used in the unity, mobilization and organization of the Macedonians in their path towards the establishment of their own state, with their

²⁹⁰ Todor Cepreganov, “The Collective Memory in the Macedonian Identity,” *op.cit.*, 13.

²⁹¹ Victor Roudomentof, “Culture Identity, and the Macedonian Question: an Introduction,” in *The Macedonian Question: Culture, Historiography, Politics* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 2000), 12.

²⁹² Basil C. Gounaris, and Iakovos D. Mihalidis, “The Pen and the Sword”, *op.cit.*, 103.

own Macedonian identity.²⁹³ He starts out with a document from 1754 of the Montenegrin bishop Vasilie Petrovik, who at the time of his stay in Russia published a history of Montenegro. “There, on the basis of collective memory, he [Vasilie] writes about the Montenegrin identity. In that context, as separate identities, he also names: the Macedonians, Albanians, Bosniacs, Serbs, and other peoples.”²⁹⁴ Cepreganov then quotes Gjorgji Makedonski, who, in 1846, wrote: “I learned the Slav alphabet from my father, Dimitrija *Makedonski*, who is named this way because we are *Macedonians*, and not Greeks ... I also took the name *Makedonski*...”²⁹⁵ In 1865, the priest Dimitrija, wrote,

“the leaders of the city Kriva Palanka selected me as priest, against the will of His Holiness, the Greek cirrus Gavrail. It was Mr. Mihail *Makedonski* who pledged for my appointment, because I am by birth a *Macedonian* and I give service in Slavic. God must have prescribed that my fatherland Macedonia suffers from the Greeks, and that they do not give us peace today, even though everyone knows that Macedonia *was an older state* from their kingdom. We had our *Slav teachers and educators, Cyril and Methodius*, who left us *our Slav alphabet*. They are by birth *Macedonians* from Solun [Thessaloniki], the celebrated capital of Macedonia. This is not recognized by the Greek bishop, so that’s why we don’t want his bishopric – we want to have our own Slavic bishop.”²⁹⁶

In addition to individual testimonies of the self-awareness of the Macedonian identity, Cepreganov lays out proof for the cognizance of the collective identity. In the following passage, he quotes the Manifesto of the Provisional Government of Macedonia of March 23, 1881:

“Macedonians, our dear fatherland Macedonia was once one of the most distinguished countries. The Macedonian people likewise, laying the first foundations of military skill, with their winning phalanges and their Aristotelian education, they civilized humanity until Asia. But our once-upon-a-time celebrated fatherland is today on the threshold of its devastation because of our mistakes and the forgetfulness of our origins. Foreign and suspicion peoples want to take over our country and to destroy our nationality which, beaming with such sparkle, cannot and never will fail... In passing from one yoke to another, however, the revival of Macedonia will

²⁹³ Todor Cepreganov, “The Collective Memory in the Macedonian Identity,” *op.cit.*, 15.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 15-16.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.* Emphasis in original.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.* Emphasis in original.

become impossible and our nation will fail. The moment is critical for Macedonia: it is a matter of her life or death..."²⁹⁷

Concerned by the same factors that worried Cepreganov, other Macedonian historians and scholars have taken to writing and evidencing in order to explain to the "foreigner" what they already know themselves – that there has been a collective memory of the Macedonian identity since at least the 18th century; that this shared national self-awareness was passed on from generation to generation for over two centuries; that the Macedonians self-identify as Macedonians, and that they have the legitimate right to do so, just like any other peoples. As Mironska-Hristova would write in anguish at the beginning of her book "[i]n spite of the strong commitments, sacrifices, the insurmountable work of the revivalists of the nineteenth century, all nations were able to achieve their aspirations ... except the Macedonians, for whom the process is still ongoing... Weren't the messages, manifestos, ideological platforms of the Macedonian revivalists of the nineteenth century, the numerous victims for the freedom of Macedonia enough?!"²⁹⁸

Consider, likewise, the following introductory passage to yet another volume published recently on the Macedonian identity:

"This collection of documents entitled *Testimonies of the Macedonian Identity (VIII-XX Centuries)* which we recommend to the Macedonian academic and wider public represents just a part of the many documents which can be found in the archives of the institutions in the world, and in which the Macedonian identity is unambiguously defined. It includes various kinds of testimonies - official state documents, reports by diplomatic representatives, constituent and programme documents of individual organizations, associations and boards, excerpts from scientific studies, books and articles in the press and periodicals ...personal statements, memories, souvenirs, travelogues, memoir notes, letters, responses and discussions on various issues..."²⁹⁹

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 17-18. Emphasis in original.

²⁹⁸ Valentina Mironska-Hristovska, *The Macedonian Revival*, *op.cit.*, 5.

²⁹⁹ Todor Cepreganov, Biljana Ristovska-Josifovska and Liljana Gushevska, eds. *Testimonies for the Macedonian Identity (18th – 20th centuries)* (Skopje: Institute for National History, 2010), 5.

The same book goes on to cite individual and collective testimonies of the realization of the Macedonian identity. The following citation, from Todor Kusev, on January 28, 1867 goes as follows:

“Mr. Editor of ‘Macedonia,’ Your newspaper, with the very name has surprised everyone in Macedonia to the extent, that everyone is running to see what kind of newspaper it is which carries the name of our country... The newspaper has angered and saddened the Greeks and Graecomans, because they have always fought for hellenizing the Macedonians, destroying the Ohrid Archdiocese – the ‘spark of our future.’ But no matter how much they toiled to stop us from going forward they could not eradicate the feeling of Macedonians to be Macedonians. Ohrid just 100 years ago was the capital of the Patriarchy founded by Justinian, and once upon a time it was the lighthouse of the enlightenment of the Slav century, but it still didn’t lag behind, because it did not lose the seed of its celebrated forefathers. (...) But this is happening not only in Ohrid. Today they are awakening and asking for their rights from all of Macedonia. They are all looking to open schools, to introduce service in the churches in the old Slavic language, not to leave the schools and national matters in the hands of one or two people who came from another place and who try in every way to stop all that is national. Everywhere they are starting to introduce trade books not in the Greek but in the mother tongue.”³⁰⁰

Janko Bacev also joins these offended Macedonian authors, in the quest to prove that Macedonians did exist and that other peoples, officials and writers did recognize this fact. Namely, he informs that in 1876, the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Andrassi, asked for the founding of an autonomous Macedonia in a kingship union with Austro-Hungarian Empire, but the Russian Counselor Gorchakov did not agree with this. Further, that the eminent French geologist Ami Boué (1794-1881) in all his knowledge and combinations foresaw a country which would contain the name Macedonia. On the basis of this, the Founder and Honorary President of the Geographical Society of Geneva, Henry Bouthillier de Beaumont (1819-1898), drew a geographical map in which Macedonia figures as a separate country outside and north of Greece. In conclusion, Bacev states, “numerous are the entries of foreign observers, ethnographers, Slavicists, historians, military

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 21.

commanders, politicians and others who did abundant field research in Macedonia, and who objectively amounted their results, conclusions, and proposals. Numerous too, are the entries that Macedonians explicitly declare that they do not want to be either Bulgarians nor Serbs nor Greeks, but only orthodox Macedonians.”³⁰¹

AN INTERLUDE WITH CURRENT CONSIDERATIONS ON IDENTITY

...The populist doctrine they [Greek authorities] have been nurturing the whole time, that the whole world is against them, and that they will be leaving EU and NATO (which is a threat they have been using since they became members)... That is why they reacted so sharply when Angela Merkel suggested that they sell an island. They boycotted all German products. They immediately went on the streets. Well, now they are selling their islands. So this is a group dynamic that is much more complex. I am not sure how they will be able to handle it. The populist political speech that their politicians have been practicing with regard to us [Macedonians] for the past 20 years, and many more years with regard to Turkey and others – I don't know how they will handle that. They are all for group psychology, because the responsibility of the media is one thing, but the politicians' responsibility is even greater. If the whole time they are talking about how they are always the victims... They have such a strongly upheld feeling of national awareness, and it is so highly identified with their religious faith and their country, that it's irrational to nurture in this era, that kind of identity...³⁰²

Through the historical analyses of Cepreganov, Mironska-Hristovska, and others, I have tried to give you an idea of the Macedonian national self-awareness and of the need Macedonians feel to explain to the “foreigner” that they exist. Perhaps this necessity can simply be summarized by the following words of wisdom by Norwegian anthropologist Thomas Hylland Eriksen: “The existence of the ethnic group ... has to be affirmed socially and ideologically through the general recognition, among its members and outsiders, that it is culturally distinctive.”³⁰³ Macedonians have to this day been left in a state of limbo with regard to the authenticity of their existence –

³⁰¹ Janko Bacev, *Macedonia and Greece, op.cit.*, 32.

³⁰² Interview with Elizabeta Buova, Skopje, 11 August 2011.

³⁰³ Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Small Places, Large Issues: An Introduction to Social and Cultural Anthropology* (London: Pluto Press, 2001), 263.

namely due the massive production of literature questioning their cultural distinctiveness, ascribing them at times to the Greeks, at others to the Serbs and the Bulgarians, throughout the past century and well into the twenty first century; but also, and more importantly, due to international politics, and the “quasi-recognition” of the Republic of Macedonia. It is as a response to the absence of this social and ideological recognition, that Macedonians have felt the need to prove themselves, through the proliferation of literature, through protestations and manifestations.

It can be said, then, that the burden of non-recognition of the existence of the Macedonian ethnic group lies partly in its non-affirmation by anthropologists. In other words, it could be argued that the responsibility of the non-recognition of the existence of a Macedonian ethnic group (or culture) lies in what anthropologists (“outsiders”) chose to write, or not to write about the Macedonians. Whereas it would be understandable that in the nineteenth century their choices were driven by colonial interests (and in that context, the birth of the “Macedonian Question” is almost comprehensible), in the twentieth century, these theories should have already made place for other, more sophisticated theories on culture and ethnic groups, and thus, more tolerant affirmative theories on the Macedonians. However, as we have just seen, this has not been the case. As is witnessed through the “name issue,” this so desperately needed affirmation by the outsider has not been forthcoming, even in the twenty-first century.

Let me explain what I mean here. Had sociocultural anthropologists written about the Macedonians (who, at the onset of the twentieth century were under the Ottoman Empire, and subsequently, starting from 1913, under Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Albania) applying the methodology of participant observation and the principle of cultural relativism,³⁰⁴ there might have been a different type of knowledge produced about Macedonia. As is evidenced by the proliferation of theories which seek to identify the Macedonians sometimes as being Bulgarians, sometimes as Serbians and at other times as Greeks, this did not happen. Rather, theories about the cultural identity of the Macedonians were inspired by territorial aspirations of

³⁰⁴ E.g. Isabelle Schulte-Tenckhoff, *L’interculturel en contexte ... anthropologique*, in *Regards sur l’interculturalité*, P. Suter et al. eds (Geneva: MétisPresse, coll. Voltiges, 2016), 53-73.

“greatness” and preconceived ideas about societal evolution, reminiscent of antiquated and colonially-charged nineteenth century understandings of culture and identity. Indeed, “la culture est l’enjeu de rapports de pouvoir.”³⁰⁵ Power relations and strategic games that rely on identity politics, as we have seen throughout this thesis, have been the problem Macedonians have faced.

I now turn to some notions on identity that have sprung up in the latter half of the 1900s, some of which marvelously portray the “Macedonian Question.” One of these is Frederick Barth’s criticisms of the limited understandings of ethnic groups (in his day) in his introduction to *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. Positing that a “simplistic view that geographical and social isolation have been the critical factors in sustaining cultural diversity” he argues that not only is it “clear that boundaries persist despite a flow of personnel across them” ... but that “stable, persisting, and often vitally important social relations are maintained across such boundaries..” To put it differently, he finds that “ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of social interaction and acceptance, but are quite to the contrary often the very foundations on which embracing social systems are built.”³⁰⁶

This conclusion is of great importance to the “Macedonian Question” and to the Macedonian identity – precisely because, as one can derive from the historical analysis above, Macedonians have been referred to as Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs, based on the idea that they were never in isolation from the surrounding peoples, and that the region thrived on interaction between different ethnicities. On the contrary, Barth would probably say to this that in spite of the “flow of personnel” (albeit its often political, propagandistic nature), Macedonians managed to keep and reinforce their ethnic identity. Thus, the pre-existing theories on ethnic identity, for which isolation was a prerequisite, might be partly to blame for some researchers’ failure to accept that Macedonians may be a separate people – to this day. Barth’s theory on ethnic boundaries also explains the phenomenon – incomprehensible to some – that Alexander the Great was not of Greek origin, even though he interacted with the Greeks and promoted their culture.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 53; see for example also Susan Wright, The politicization of “culture,” *Anthropology Today* Vol. 14, Nr. 1 (1998), 7-15.

³⁰⁶ Frederick Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (Prospect Heights: Waveland Press, 1998), 10.

Years later, Eriksen will summarize Barths's theories in a sentence: "ethnicity is frequently most important in contexts where groups are culturally close and enter into contact with each other regularly."³⁰⁷ Eriksen expands on Barth's idea, concluding that since it is through contact with each other that groups discover who they are "members of different ethnic groups must have something in common – some basis for interaction – in addition to being different. Ethnicity occurs when cultural differences are made relevant through interactions." In other words, "inter-ethnic relationships ... are dynamic and negotiable. Ethnicity must be seen as an aspect of a relationship, not as a property of a person or a group."³⁰⁸

This notion, however, further problematizes the "Macedonian Question," because, if the ethnicity of Macedonians is solely based on their relationship with the neighboring states, then the majority of Macedonians may be diagnosed with schizophrenia! The paradox of the Macedonian case is that, in spite of their insistence on their singularity, all the neighboring countries – as different as they are from each other – claim that the Macedonian identity is part of *their* identity. In other words, when a Macedonian (today) tells a Bulgarian that he is Macedonian, the Bulgarian will conclude, "Oh, then that means you are Bulgarian." Then that same Macedonian will go to a Greek and say he is Macedonian, and he will be told, "There is no such thing as Macedonian – Macedonians are Greeks." The same Macedonian may be confronted with the same (although to a lesser extent) attitude in Serbia. Indeed, many Serbs have for a long time considered Macedonia to be Southern Serbia, and therefore, Macedonians as provincial Serbs with a funny dialect. Thus, if, as Eriksen states, the ethnicity of Macedonians is an aspect of their relationships with neighboring groups, the perception of Macedonians' ethnicity will change based on which group they are interacting with. This type of diagnosis of the Macedonian, as strange as it may sound, is in fact almost an exact replica of the diagnoses that were made over a hundred years ago, at the turn of the nineteenth century. Consider this excerpt from a member of the Carnegie Endowment Commission of Inquiry on the Balkan Wars, which occurred in 1912 and 1913. This particular excerpt is from the first chapter of the

³⁰⁷ Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Small Places, Large Issues*, *op.cit.*, 262.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 263.

Carnegie Report, meant to convey the origin of the Balkan Wars and the history of the region:³⁰⁹

“The Bulgarian publicist, Liouben Karavelov, wrote the following in 1869-70: The Greeks show no interest in knowing what kind of people live in such a country as Macedonia. It is true that they say that the country formerly belonged to the Greeks and therefore ought to belong to them again...But we are in the nineteenth century and historical and canonical rights have lost all significance. Every people, like every individual, ought to be free and every nation has the right to live for itself. Thrace and Macedonia ought then to be Bulgarian since the people who live there are Bulgarians.”³¹⁰

Another important aspect of ethnicity in terms of understanding the Macedonian identity issue from both the Macedonian and the Greek side, is an aspect that Tonkin analyzed and which Eriksen evokes in his overview: “the dimension of ethnicity...which has become politically important in many contemporary societies, [which is] the appropriation of a shared history [...] that simultaneously functions as an origin myth, justifies claims to a common culture and serves to depict the ethnic group as an extended kin group.”³¹¹ Further on, Eriksen elaborates that “[b]y appealing to notions of shared tradition and history, such ideologies give the impression that the ethnic group is ‘natural’ and enjoys cultural continuity over a long period of time. In this way, every ethnic ideology offers a feeling of cultural belongingness and security.”³¹² In fact, the heart of the problem of the “name issue” is that both the Macedonian and the Greek “ethnicities” appropriate themselves one and the same history – namely that of the Macedonian Empire of the times of Alexander the Great – that functions as their myth of origin, justifies their common culture

³⁰⁹ One must note that the authors of this report have been generally labeled as having Bulgarian political leanings. As Gounaris and Mihailidis state: “In fact the committee had few chances to be as neutral as the circumstances demanded because some of its members, like Henri Brailsford, Victor Berard, and Pavel Nikolajevic Liljukov, Russian professor of history and archaeology and member of the *Duma*, were all known for their Bulgarian sympathies. Even the Chairman, D’Estournelles de Costant, a French politician, had actively opposed Greek and Serbian ambitions in Macedonia as a deputy in the French parliament in 1903;” Basil C. Gounaris and Iakovos D. Mihailidis, “The Pen and the Sword”, *op.cit.*, 109.

³¹⁰ Carnegie Endowment, *The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with a New Introduction and Reflections on the Present Conflict by George F. Kennan* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993), 24.

³¹¹ Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Small Places, Large Issues*, *op.cit.*, 264.

³¹² *Ibid.*, 267.

(within their ethnic group), and depicts them both as an extended kin group of Alexander the Great. The problem arises precisely because “ethnicity,” which in present-day understandings of society should be something unique to every group, is actually not so unique if its singularity is based on a history that is shared with the members of another ethnic group. If both ethnic groups believe themselves to be the extended kin group of Alexander the Great, and if their historic origins are believed to be the basis of their singular ethnicity, then how can they claim to be different from each other?

Here lies the crux of the “name issue,” and of the insistence of Greece on having exclusivity over the name “Macedonia.” The Greek preoccupation with the “name issue” is, from this aspect, almost comprehensible, as it demonstrates that the existence of a country and a people with the name “Macedonia” could have repercussions on the Greek identity, and precisely, on the myth of the Greek origin. Yet, one could hardly agree that this obsession is justified, and that therefore, in order to save the Greeks from an identity crisis, we should technically exterminate the Macedonians, especially having in mind that the Greeks really only gave importance to that myth as late as the 1970s.

In an interesting parallel, René Gallissot, who emphasizes the dynamic nature of identity, or identity as a process (identification) as opposed to a fixed and unchanging identity, writes: “Que l’identité soit variable fait encore scandale; du moins quand l’on touche à l’identité nationale. La traduction française de l’ouvrage d’Eugen Weber: *Peasants into Frenchmen* ... qui marque le passage comme forcé à la francisation, cette transgression de l’insertion dans le pays vers l’incorporation nationale, reçoit le titre folklorique de ‘*Fin des terroirs*’ ... : c’est qu’il n’est pas permis de dire ouvertement que l’identité française n’est pas une réalité générale et millénaire.”³¹³ In other words, that the title *Peasants into Frenchmen* was perceived as threatening enough to the French to be translated in French as *La fin des terroirs* (the *End of Local Lands*) shows that we are still living in a world which buttresses the idea that certain peoples, nations or ethnic groups, such as the French, existed forever.

³¹³ René Gallissot, Sous l’identité, le procès d’identification, *L’Homme et la société* Vol. 83, Nr. 1 (1987), 12-27.

Whereas the awareness that all peoples inevitably went through a process of “nationalization” (and thus were shaped as distinctive nations through time) is being slowly accepted, there are still those peoples that are accepted as having existed for “time immemorial,” such as the Greeks, while the existence of others, such as the Macedonians, is to this day being questioned. In spite of the fact that this people clearly exist - in the millions - and in spite of the fact that in documented written works, such as the Bible, the existence of the latter predates the existence of former. Never mind that the idea behind this accepted conviction confounds the “Greek nation,” with the “Macedonian Empire,” the “Greek City States,” and the “Byzantine Empire” to come up with this splendid unique resulting entity – the so-called “Greek civilization,” which, to go even further, is the basis of the European civilization.

Allowing one ethnic group the exclusivity of a history that another ethnic group also believes to be the basis of its origin, on the pretext that not allowing this exclusivity would create an “identity crisis” would not be fair, one will agree. This certainly does not constitute a level playing field for all players in the international political arena, if you will. In fact, going back to the idea that ethnicity is more of a result of interaction, it should be noted that the history these two current ethnic groups claim as their myth of origin, happened over 2000 years ago and championed a leader who personifies the idea of “ethnicity as an aspect of a relationship” between the Greeks and the Macedonians of that day. What may have been, to Alexander the Great, a natural reflex, such as promoting Hellenic culture yet remaining a Macedonian (and not Greek) king, is, in present-day simplistic understanding of the term “ethnicity,” inappropriate, or simply, impossible. How right – and ahead of his times – Frederick Barth must have been, to pinpoint “boundaries” and “exclusivity” as the foes of our understanding of ethnicity. Indeed, as Eriksen asserts in a subsequent analysis of nationalism, “while nationalism tends to appear as a traditionalist ideology glorifying a presumed ancient cultural tradition, this does not necessarily mean that it is ‘traditional’ or ‘ancient’ itself.”³¹⁴ One can hardly imagine Alexander the Great as “nationalist.”

³¹⁴ Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Small Places, Large Issues*, *op.cit.*, 276.

This analysis brings us back to nationalism and its parallel to ethnicity. As Eriksen asserts, “most nationalisms ... are special cases of ethnic ideologies.”³¹⁵ In my brief overview I tried to show that the Macedonian nationalism, like other European nationalisms, was born partly as a result of industrialization, the French Enlightenment and German Romanticism. In quoting Ernst Gellner and Benedict Anderson, Eriksen evokes the abstract nature and imaginary existence of the nation, which was propped by the print media and standardized education. The print media and standardized education, as we have seen before, definitely played a role in the nation building of Macedonia, as well as in the building of the other nationalities in the region, and their attempt to “nationalize” the Macedonians in their favor. Today, “the nation and nationalism appear as tools of state power in societies which would otherwise be threatened by dissolution and anomie.” ... “The nation-state offers both a feeling of security and cultural identity as well as socialization (through schooling) and career opportunities.”³¹⁶

It is precisely this sense of security that has been crumbling away in front of our eyes Macedonia today, due to the “name issue.” But it is also crumbling away in Greece. Whether it is due to just economic reasons, or as George Zarkadakis states in his Washington Post article entitled “Modern Greece’s real problem? Ancient Greece,” an identity crisis, remains to be seen. In all seriousness, however, it may be time to reconsider the direction nationalism has taken in Greece, and the European responsibility for this course that was, by all logical understandings, taken a bit too far – especially in terms of the handling of minorities. Indeed, “there is rarely, if ever, a perfect correspondence between the state and the ‘cultural group’. This fact is the cause of ... minority issues.”³¹⁷ Whereas “most empirical cases of majority-minority relationships display a combination of segregation, assimilation and integration,” the case of the Macedonian minority in Greece, after having gone through all those stages, and more, is unique in that it still suffers the denial of existence – not just as a

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 275.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 278.

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 282.

minority, but simply, as a people with their own ethnic identity, within and outside their own country.

While we may all aware that we are living in an imaginary world, it is generally regarded as inappropriate to proclaim nations as myths, partly because these myths – as hinted earlier by Eriksen and others – generate a sense of security in people, and in the international community at large. This is probably why the book *Peasants into Politics* was translated as *La Fin des Terroirs*. What is not acceptable, however, is the singling out of one nationality and the continuous deconstruction of its myth on the one hand, while accepting violations of its fundamental human rights in order to preserve the myth of another. In other words, whereas the international (academic and political) community has generally refrained from labeling nations as myths, it has overtly and continually mythicized the Macedonian nationality, and is now involved – via the “name issue” – in the technical elimination of a Macedonian nation. In addition, it has remained silent on the century-old and continuing violations of human rights of the Macedonian minority in Greece, in order to preserve the Greek myth.

If, as we have seen above, there is clear evidence of a collective memory of the Macedonian identity which can be traced from the eighteenth century to this day, and if this collective memory refers to ancient history as far back as the Macedonian empire and Alexander the Great, then why is there a collective attempt to negate the existence of this collective memory, and, ultimately, of the Macedonian identity? What gives the right to one nation to negate the existence of another nation, when the national self-awareness of both was born at approximately the same time, and when the only difference between them is that one nation managed to claim autonomy two hundred years before the other one? Who gave primacy to establishment of one state over the other – who gave an ear to the quest for self-determination of some peoples, while they turned deaf to others? And why? More importantly, what gives the international community today the right to take sides in the determination of one identity, over another? What gives any state or entity today, the right to negotiate a people’s identity? Perhaps for a large part of the European leadership it has been a question of ties and interests, and not rights.

Lawrence Herbert was asking himself why Etruria as a civilization in Europe is at the margins – in all encyclopedias, only 2-3 lines are devoted to this fascinating civilization. There is literally nothing about it. Lawrence Herbert was so fascinated by it that he went to Italy to study it archaeologically. He came at the end to a fascinating conclusion, which I agree with, and it is that Europe by inertia has learned to put everything in the Greek bag. My point in an essay was, by analogy to what Lawrence Herbert says, that Europe is now putting even such a huge civilization as the ancient Macedonian civilization in the same 'Greek bag'.³¹⁸

Greece gained independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1829, with the help of the armies of the Great Powers at the time – namely the United Kingdom, the French Empire and the Russian Empire. The first President of the new Greek Republic was the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ioannis Kapodistrias, who was himself a Greek. Following his short-lived reign due to an assassination, Greece became a monarchy.

Europe's role in the creation of the Greek myth, and thus, as a consequence, in the "Macedonian Question" and later in the "name issue" should not be underestimated. It was the Great Powers referred to in the passages above, as well as Austria, Prussia, Germany, Denmark and others that ultimately decided whether Macedonians would have their self-determination. As it appears, however, they had a greater interest in ensuring the enlargement of their allies in the Balkans, rather than the autonomy of Macedonia. What could have influenced their leanings, as Dr. Hans-Lothar Steppan evokes in *The Macedonian Knot*, are the dynastic ties that many of the Great Powers had with Greece.³¹⁹ Indeed, one glimpse at the intricately woven relations between kings, queens, princes, spouses and so forth, reveals that there is not one Great Power that did not have a royal relative – immediate or indirect – with Greece. Consider the following backgrounds of the Queen Consorts of Greece and of the Hellenes between in the 19th and 20th centuries: Amalia of Oldenburg, whose

³¹⁸ Interview with Eftim Kletnikov, Skopje, 11 February 2011.

³¹⁹ Hans-Lothar Steppan, *The Macedonian Knot: The Identity of the Macedonians as Revealed in the Development of the Balkan League 1878-1914* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2009).

father was the Grand Duke of Oldenburg, was Queen of Greece (wife of Otto from Bavaria) from 1836 until 1867; Olga Constantinovna of Russia, daughter of the Grand Duke Constantine Nikolayevich of Russia was Queen of the Hellenes (as wife of George I from Denmark) from 1867 until 1913; Sophia of Prussia (wife of Constantine I), daughter of Frederick III, the German Emperor, was Queen of the Hellenes from 1913 until 1917, and then again from 1920 until 1922; from 1922 until 1924 Queen of the Hellenes was Elisabeth of Romania (as wife of George II), while from 1947 until 1964 Queen of the Hellenes (as wife of Paul) was Frederica of Hanover, daughter of Ernest Augustus III, Duke of Brunswick (Hanover). Finally, from 1964 until 1973, the Queen of the Hellenes was Anne-Marie of Denmark, daughter of Frederick IX of Denmark, wife of Constantine. This illustrates that just by the Queens' family relations, Greek leadership had close ties with, and could influence directly, the Russian, Prussian, German, British, Romanian, and Danish rulers until the monarchy was abolished in 1973.

In fact, the first King of Greece was Otto, Prince of Bavaria, who came to rule the country in 1832 under the Convention of London, with which Greece became a new independent kingdom under the protection of the Great Powers (the United Kingdom, France and the Russian Empire). He ruled Greece for over thirty years and was known for having transferred the Greek capital from Nafplion to Athens, and having built the city's most important institutions. Greece's second King was George I of Denmark, originally a Danish prince, whose nomination was both suggested and supported by the Great Powers. George ruled Greece for fifty years (1863 to 1913) and it was during his reign famous for territorial gains, that Macedonia was acquired following the Balkan Wars.

Thus, together, Otto and George – a German and a Dane – ruled Greece during its first eighty years of existence, following independence from the Ottoman Empire. Greece remained a monarchy until 1973, and the rest of the monarchs were from the House of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg, known as the House of Glücksburg which is a German ducal house, the junior branches of which include the royal houses of Denmark and Norway. Undoubtedly, all these ties still pull some strings even to this day.

Indeed, dynastic ties run deep. It remains to be seen, however, whether Europe's blind solidarity with Greece will turn out to be positive or negative for Greece. Indeed, it seems as though the Greek bag that Lawrence Herbert had been talking about has become so packed, that perhaps it has done more harm, than good, not only to the Greek identity – but also to the country's general sustainable development, in the economic and environmental sense of the word. In the environmental and economic sense, one must rethink the sustainability of the massive tourism that Greece has endured in the past decades thanks to its myth. Clearly, from the archaeological industry aspect, and thus cultural tourism, most resources have been saturated – unless another myth is popped into the Greek bag in the meantime of course! It is beyond doubt that Greece has mastered the art of *ethnpreneurship*, to use John Comaroff's term – but at what cost? The “‘ethnicity industry’ replays critical theory as caricature, Adorno as farce, banking its future on precisely the kind of mass marketing deemed fatal to the unique, auratic value of cultural products.”³²⁰ In Greece, not only has “the sale of culture replaced the sale of labor,” to use Comaroff's words again, but more alarmingly, “the conditions under which culture is represented and alienated”³²¹ are controlled by outside, European forces.

In terms of identity, as Richard Clogg asserts in *A Concise History of Greece*,

“[t]he degree to which the language and culture of the ancient Greek world was revered throughout Europe (and, indeed, in the infant United States where ancient Greek was almost adopted as the official language) during the critical decades of the national revival in the early nineteenth century was a vital factor in stimulating in the Greeks themselves, or at least in the nationalist intelligentsia, a consciousness that they were the heirs to a heritage that was universally admired. Such an awareness has scarcely existed during the centuries of Ottoman rule and this ‘sense of the past’, imported from western Europe, was a major constituent in the development of the Greek national movement, contributing significantly to its precocity in relation to other Balkan independence movements... That an obsession with past glories should have developed is, in the circumstances, scarcely surprising. *Progonoplexia*, or ‘ancestoritis’, has been characteristic of so much of the country's cultural life and has given rise to the ‘language question,’ the interminable, and at times violent, controversy over the degree to which the spoken language of the people should be ‘purified’ to render it more akin to the supposed ideal of ancient Greek. Generations of schoolchildren have been forced

³²⁰ John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, *Ethnicity, Inc.*, *op.cit.*, 23.

³²¹ *Ibid.*, 24.

to wrestle with the complexities of *katharevousa*, or the ‘purifying’ form of the language.”³²²

All this, to preserve the idea of “Greek” as something ancient and unique – something to be admired.

As it stands, Greece really does desperately need a European bailout – in terms of its economy but also its identity. No wonder Europeans have been worried sick about Greece – more so than about any other indebted country on the verge of bankruptcy – and there are quite a few to be found within European boundaries. To be sure, it seems as though with Greece, what is at stake is not so much the economy, as the existence of the Greek – and therefore European – myth.

Let us now go back to events in history, to see how this Greek singularity was created throughout the past century. The next section will also help us grasp the roots of the “name issue” as continuity from policies starting at the beginning of the twentieth century, with the acquisition of the territory of Macedonia following the Balkan Wars (1912-1913).

VIII. THE BALKAN WARS (1912-1913)

*I see that the young don't speak the language very well. Even for me it's difficult. All my education was in Greek. I learned Macedonian from my mother, father, grandma, grandpa. Plus, we learned to whisper the Macedonian. We had a fear from the police, from the state, and every time when we would speak Macedonian, and someone we didn't know came – we would change the words. We would stop speaking Macedonian.*³²³

One of the darkest periods in the history of Macedonia happened during the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 fought over the independence and territory of Macedonia, and their subsequent conclusion with the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913. As Richard C. Hall clarifies in *The Balkan Wars: 1912-1913: Prelude to the First World War*: “The Balkan Wars were a sharp and bloody series of conflicts fought in southeastern Europe during the autumn of 1912 and the winter, spring, and summer of 1913. In the First Balkan War, the Ottoman Empire fought a loose alliance of Balkan

³²² Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1.

³²³ Interview with Petre Vockov (Petros Votsis), Ovcharani (Meliti), Northern Greece, 21 July 2011.

states, which included Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia....In the Second Balkan War, Bulgaria fought a looser coalition of Greece, Montenegro, Serbia, Romania, and the Ottoman Empire...Peace treaties signed in Bucharest in August 1913 and Constantinople in September 1913 concluded the Second Balkan War.”³²⁴ The foreign pen in the signature of these treaties, is not to be undermined. As Hall hints, describing the delegations arriving in Bucharest on July 30th to conclude the peace treaty, “Working through their ambassadors in Bucharest, the Great Powers maintained a presence at the peace talks. They did not dominate the proceedings, but they did remain very influential.”³²⁵

The repercussions of the Treaty of Bucharest on the territory of Macedonia were a division that would alter not only the territory of Macedonia but would impact the destiny of its population to this day. The division of Macedonia, following the Balkan Wars, is summarized as follows, by Christophe Chiclet and Bernard Lory in their 1998 publication *La République de Macédoine: nouvelle venue dans le concert européen*:

- “la Grèce en obtient 51,3% soit 34.356 km², avec une population estimée à 1.042.000 habitants en 1919 et les villes de Salonique, Serres, Drama, Edessa, Florina, Kastoria et Katerini.
- la Serbie obtint 38,4% du territoire, soit 25.713 km², une population estimée à 728.000 habitants en 1919 et les villes de Skopje, Kumanovo, Tetovo, Ohrid, Bitola, Veles, Stip.
- la Bulgarie obtint 10.1% du territoire, soit 6.789 km², une population estimée à 236.00 habitants en 1919 et les villes de Blagoevgrad, Goce Delcev et Petric.”³²⁶

Needless to say, with this territorial fragmentation, the population of Macedonia was also divided, and the Macedonian citizens of each of the three shares of the geographic Macedonia described above, followed their own trajectory. Serbian Macedonia (or Vardar Macedonia in geographic terms, denoting the Vardar River) would become part of the Kingdom of Serbia from 1913 until 1918, which, following WWI became the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and later, in 1930, the

³²⁴ Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars: 1912-1913: Prelude to the First World War* (London: Routledge, 2000), 1.

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, 123.

³²⁶ Christophe Chiclet and Bernard Lory, *La République de Macédoine, op.cit.*, 17.

Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and finally, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia following WWII.³²⁷ In 1991, with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, this part of the region of Macedonia would gain independence from Yugoslavia, and become the current Republic of Macedonia – and the only place in the region where Macedonians enjoy their cultural rights freely. As one of the six republics within the Yugoslav Federation, Macedonia enjoyed recognition of the Macedonian identity, relative cultural rights such as primary, secondary and university education in the Macedonian language, its own parliament and government. Out of the three shares of the divided region of Macedonia, the Macedonians in this part undoubtedly fared the best, even though communist tactics, including expulsion, labor camps and assassination, were employed for those (generally the literary and political elite) who expressed the Macedonian identity and a quest for Macedonian self-determination too overtly. Bulgarian Macedonia (or Pirin Macedonia, referring to the Pirin Mountain), would become the central location for the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, which, between 1919 and 1934 operated as a sort of terrorist organization that would use assassinations as a means to attract attention to the “Macedonian Question” and the Macedonian quest for independence. Today Pirin Macedonia still remains part of Bulgaria, while its population, of which 70% declared itself Macedonian in the 1946 census,³²⁸ is no longer recognized officially as a Macedonian minority.

Finally, Greek Macedonia (or Aegean Macedonia, referring to the Aegean Sea) is the part in which the Macedonian population fared the worst. It was at their frontiers that the First World War was fought, and it was over their population that the Greco-Turkish (1919-1922) war had consequences, namely with the “population exchange” provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne. As Chiclet and Lory recount, “...la Grèce vaincue par la Turquie kémaliste, se voit inondée d’un flux d’environ 1.300.000 réfugiés, chassés d’Asie Mineure et du Pont. La grande majorité de ces réfugiés est installée dans les ‘nouveaux territoires’ du nord du pays. En 1928, les réfugiés constituent plus de 25% de la population de la Macédoine Egéenne et dépassent même 50% dans les

³²⁷ *Ibid.*, 19.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*, 18.

régions de Drama et Giannitsa. Ces pourcentages d'immigrants sont renforcés par le départ vers la Turquie de l'importante population musulmane ainsi que d'une partie des Slaves de la région, 'échangés' avec la Bulgarie."³²⁹

Elisabeth Kontiogiorgi explains the "logic" behind these population exchanges: "with the triumph of nationalism, the flight, and finally the 'organized exchange of populations' became the distinguishing feature in the disintegration of the Hapsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Empires. Hosts of civilians were forced to flee before the hostilities, in Europe, the Balkans, and Asia Minor, and the displacement of populations became integral to the collapse of the old empires and the ensuing fervor of the emerging national states."³³⁰

In the subsequent decades following the population policies in which over a million Macedonians had been expelled from Greece to Bulgaria and Turkey, while Greeks and other ethnic groups from those countries were imported and settled on the land of the expelled, the situation for Macedonians in Greece deteriorated. In his book, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact on Greece*, Dimitri Pentzopoulos depicts the "consolidation of Greece's population, the securing of Macedonia, agricultural reform and development, the effects on Greek politics, the tensions between refugees and the host population, the development and maintenance of a specific refugee mentality, and the effects on Greek society and culture." As Michael Llewellyn Smith states in the preface to this book, "[t]hough the exchange of populations was a realistic recognition of the facts created by the war, and helped to create the ethnically compact Greece of today, it was controversial and tragic in its effects... The political effects of the exchange were as radical and lasting as the economic, shaping the pattern of Greek politics throughout the interwar period... Particularly in the urban settlements in Athens, Piraeus, and Thessaloniki, they [the refugees] formed a frustrated and socially and economically disadvantaged mass"³³¹

It is no surprise, then, that one of my interlocutors told me the following:

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, 17.

³³⁰ Elisabeth Kontiogiorgi, *Population Exchange in Greek Macedonia: The Rural Settlement of Refugees 1922-1930* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 2.

³³¹ Michael Llewellyn Smith, "Introduction," in *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact on Greece*, by Dimitri Pentzopoulos (London: Hurst and Company, 2002), 13.

*Tout le monde est au courant que ce n'est pas vrai ce qui s'est passé. C'était un essai de homogénéiser la population ici – pour donner à cette région la couleur hellénique. Bon les gens ne disaient pas peut être qu'ils étaient Macédoniens, ou je ne sais pas quoi, mais ils ne disaient pas qu'ils étaient Grecs non plus. Quand on leur demandait qu'est-ce que vous êtes ? Ils disaient nous sommes d'ici: tukasni.... Nous disons pour nous Macédoniens-Grecs. Vous, vous êtes les Macédoniens Slaves, les autres sont les Macédoniens Albanais, et puis les Macédoniens Musulmans (qui sont parti en 1922 avec l'échange des populations mais il y en avait beaucoup, et ils parlaient le Slave)...Ce que tu dis c'est théorique. On ne peut pas prouver ce qui est Grec et ce qui n'est pas Grec. Grec, ce n'est pas une question de sang. Grec c'est une question d'éducation. Etre Grec, il faut être éduqué en grec. Il faut être dans la culture et l'éducation grecques, helléniques.*³³²

I was astonished to find, during my research at the League of Nations, that some of these Macedonian “exchanged populations” who had been sent to Bulgaria, namely a group of women which formed an association called the Organization of Macedonian Women in Sofia, had petitioned the League of Nations in order to claim basic rights for the Macedonians that remained in Greece, but to no avail. Although burdened with strategically written wording displaying the (by now notorious) population games between the three neighboring countries (i.e. purposefully referring to the population in Aegean (Greek) Macedonia interchangeably as Bulgarians, Macedonians, and Macedonian Bulgarians – as if these were all the same and as if to assert that the territory these people find themselves in belongs to Bulgaria), it is nevertheless astounding that this letter – at the core a humanitarian plea - was dismissed on technical grounds:

“The first regular Congress, of the Union of Macedonian Women in Bulgaria, which took place on the 19th, 20th and 21st of June, having concluded:

- That the political regime in our homeland, Macedonia, under Greek power, continues to be inhuman, that human rights and the culture of sciences have been annulled for our brothers and sisters, that no one is allowed to pray to God in their mother tongue, and that their children are forced, against all freedom of conscience, to study in a

³³² Interview with Anonymous Hesitant Tukasni 3, Arnislavci (Agathi), Northern Greece, 10 July 2011.

language that is incomprehensible to their parents and their ancestors.

- That our schools and churches, which were homes of faith, of ideas and of sciences, and which schooled Bulgarian Macedonians into a people worthy of being collaborators of international peace and solidarity, have today been closed in a brutal manner, and have been replaced by the Greeks, capable of sowing fanaticism, crafty spirit and Greek guile, in to the hearts of our brothers and to thus prepare agents for the troubles of the Balkans.
- That Greek power uses oppressive and sadistic means to win the national persistence of Bulgarians, and being protected by the Convention of Voluntary Emigration, it uses cruelties, such as in Teurlis, Lerin, and other places, where official Greek power employs the most barbaric means and organizes mass assassinations against our brothers and sisters, and banished thousands of our compatriots and gunned down and hanged hundreds of other innocent people.
- That the Greek Government, after having rejected the minutes on the minorities, concluded between the Greek and the Bulgarian Governments on 29 September 1924 under the patronage of the League of Nations, mocked in a cynical fashion, not only the human sentiments of Bulgarian Macedonians, but also the European principles represented by the League of Nations – something which the Greek Government tried to hide by the famous a b e c e d a r.
- That due to all these reasons, our brothers and sisters from Macedonia, who are under Greek power, suffer famine and misery, are, so to speak naked and driven by fire and sword from their paternal homes and are continuously forced by the new rulers to come to Bulgaria in large numbers, to die of famine and cold and to beg, in order to give a crust of bread to their poor children. The Congress decided to pray to the League of Nations:
 - To turn its attention towards the fate of a small, courageous, and intelligent people, the Macedonians, and through its authority and intervention, to be able to alleviate their unmerited suffering.
 - To intervene in an efficient manner to stop the massacres of our brothers and sisters by the Greek Government.
 - To assure our compatriots in Macedonia who are under the Greek yoke, the right to pray to God in their mother tongue, to educate their children in a

- language in which they received their education before the fall of our country under Greek power.
- To stop the cruel banishment of our compatriots and to give the possibility to all émigrés to return to their homes.

Sofia, 21 June, 1927”³³³

In response to this letter and resolution, Mr. A.H.K. Hékime (Persian), permanent Member of the Section of Administrative Commissions and Minorities since 1926, advised the Director of the Section, Mr. P. de Azcarate Florez (Spanish) that the letter and resolution contained more than one “violent phrases” and did not recognize the sovereign right of Greece to Greek Macedonia (which, at the time of the resolution in 1927 had only been under Greek rule since 1913, i.e. 14 years). As such, Mr. A.H.K Hékime advised that it was against the 4th condition of recevability and was thus “non-receivable” and should be rejected. Mr. P de Azcarate Florez (Spanish) accepted this argument and forwarded it to Captain F.P. Walters (British), permanent member of the Secretary-General’s Office. In response to this, Mr. J.V. Wilson (New Zealand), also of the Secretary-General’s Office, agreed. Thus, the letter and resolution of the Union of Macedonian Women never made it to the League of Nations Council, and probably also never made it to Secretary General Sir Eric Drummond’s desk.³³⁴ Interestingly enough, yet another international organization – namely the League of Nations, the United Nations’ predecessor, will once again turn a blind eye and a deaf ear to the century –old Macedonian appeal for the respect of their basic human rights, especially the right to their cultural identity. It is quite distressing, isn’t it, that a letter written by women, pleading the League of Nations to help their brothers and sisters from massacres and from flagrant violations of human rights, such as the right to pray and speak in their own language, should have been so easily rejected, on the technical grounds of so-called “violent phrases.”

³³³ UNOG Library League of Nations Archives, R. 1660, Document 60993, “Situation des Bulgares en Macédoine grecque. Réunion de l’Union des femmes macédoniennes auprès du Comite national macédonien, 21 juin 1927. Emphasis added.

³³⁴ “Staff List of the Secretariat, showing Nationalities and Salaries for 1927, League of Nations, Geneva, August 1927,” In *Liste du Personnel au Secrétariat (1920-1938)*, L. of N. Impression SADAG – 1290, Archives de la Société des Nations, 19.

Pentzopoulos tells us that there was a certain political advantage for the population exchange – namely that it created a “homogenous nation” which had been foreseen by the Greek Statesman of the early 1920s, Eleftherios Venizelos, who was a key protagonist of the “Great (Meghali) Idea.” The population exchange was particularly useful in creating the homogenous nation, “as the refugees’ agricultural settlements were concentrated mainly in the strategically sensitive northern border territories, especially Macedonia.”³³⁵

Greek anthropologist Anastasia Karakasidou, also underlines this in her groundbreaking book in 1997, *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia 1870-1990*. Karakasidou writes that “Greek involvement in the contest over Macedonia and the dispatch of partisan forces there was both a reaction to Bulgarian activities in the region as well as part of the “Great Idea” (Meghali Idea), an irredentist ideology that regarded Macedonia (along with Asia Minor, Crete, East Rumelia, and Thrace) as yet unreclaimed territories of the ancient Hellenes. Many turn-of-the-century Greek irredentists had been inspired by images of the glorious Byzantine Empire (which they argued had been a Greek empire), and had hoped one day to liberate Constantinople (Istanbul) from infidel Turks. By that time, irredentists were striving to gain a dominant position of political influence in the small, independent Greek kingdom to the south.”³³⁶

The period that followed the acquisition of the territory of Macedonia in 1913, then, did not change the assimilation campaigns and propaganda wars between the Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbs for gaining the national self-awareness of the local population (the Macedonians). The following excerpt by Karakasidou in Clogg’s book on *Minorities in Greece* illustrates the extent to which propaganda was used, and, more importantly, the concern of the Greek authorities in portraying a “Hellenized” Greek Macedonia to the foreigners:

“The Greek authorities were understandably alarmed by these propagandistic developments. One report claimed that many Slavic speakers in the area had become hostile towards any ‘Greek

³³⁵ Dimitri Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact on Greece* (London: Hurst and Company, 2002), 12.

³³⁶ Anastasia Karakasidou, *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia 1870-1990* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 89.

idea' and were now 'running' for Serbian protection, hoping to have Serbia act as an intermediary on their behalf with the Greek authorities. To counter these foreign efforts to gain control of Greek Macedonia, the Greek government attempted to present a picture to the outside world that the region was definitively 'Greek.' One incident in particular serves to illuminate the anxiety of the Greek authorities. In 1926, the International Commission for the Study of Minorities in Macedonia toured the area. Government authorities directed teachers to hold Greek festivities (*epideixeis*) in the schools for the benefit of the visiting investigators. Teachers also told schoolchildren that the Minister of Education would be traveling along the Edessa-Florina railway, and that in order to please him they were to line the railroad tracks, holding Greek flags in their hands and singing patriotic marches. Students were also instructed that if approached by members of the Commission on the streets or at the railway station and asked if they knew any language other than Greek, they were to answer no. The event was reported as a great success."³³⁷

As time progressed, the situation for Macedonians who remained in Greece deteriorated. In 1936 the military dictator Ioannis Metaxas came to power, installing a dictatorship in the style of Fascist Italy until his death in 1941. The Metaxas Dictatorship was very brutal towards the Macedonians in Greece, as the following excerpt describes:

"On December 18, 1936, the Metaxas dictatorship issued a legal act concerning 'Activity Against State Security.' This law punished claims of minority rights. On the basis of this act, thousands of Macedonians were arrested, imprisoned, or expelled from Greece. On September 7, 1938, the legal act 2366 was issued. This banned the use of the Macedonian language even in the domestic sphere. All Macedonian localities were flooded with posters that read, 'Speak Greek.' Evening schools were opened in which adult Macedonians were taught Greek. No Macedonian schools of any kind were permitted. Any public manifestation of Macedonian national feeling and its outward expression through language, song, or dance was forbidden and severely punished by the Metaxas regime. People who spoke Macedonian were beaten, fined and imprisoned. Punishments in some areas included piercing of the tongue with a needle and cutting off a part of the ear for every Macedonian word spoken. Almost 5,000 Macedonians were sent to jails and prison camps for violating this prohibition against the use of the Macedonian language. Mass exile

³³⁷ Anastasia Karakasidou, "Cultural Illegitimacy in Greece", *op.cit.*, 134.

of sections of Macedonians and other 'difficult' minorities took place. The trauma of persecution has left deep scars on the consciousness of the Macedonians in Greece, many of whom are even today convinced that their language 'cannot' be committed to writing."³³⁸

The Minority Rights Group and Anastasia Karakasidou give us a similar account of that period. Forced internal displacement was one of the methods of ensuring loyalty of the Macedonian minority. As the Minority Rights Group report documented, "...over 5,000 Macedonians were interned from the border regions with Yugoslavia, and night schools were opened to teach adult Macedonians the Greek language. The repression was further stepped up after the beginning of the Greco-Italian War in October 1940, despite the numbers of Macedonians fighting loyally in Greece's armies, with, according to Yugoslav sources, some 1600 Macedonians interned on the islands of Thasos and Kefallinia (Cephalonia)."³³⁹ Karakasidou notes that "[p]rohibitions against the use of Slavic languages (in public and private) were first implemented during [this period]. Violators were subjected to steep fines, forced to drink castor oil, and even beaten. Night schools were set up in which adult men and women were taught Greek. Individuals were obliged to change their names from Slavic forms to Greek ones." ... "In 1938 ... an Athenian teacher who worked in Edessa area [Greek Macedonia] wrote a confidential report evaluating efforts to Hellenize Western Macedonia and stressed the importance of the recently enacted language prohibitions. The importance of these prohibitions, he argued, lay in the fact that on the surface, they provided for a uniform appearance, so that visitors to the area and local inhabitants alike would see and feel that it was part of Greece."³⁴⁰

³³⁸ Risto Stefov, "The Metaxas Dictatorship", in *Macedonians in Greece: 1939-1949*, June 2008.

³³⁹ Hugh Poulton and MLIHRC, *Minorities in the Balkans* (London: Minority Rights Group, 1989), 30.

³⁴⁰ Anastasia Karakasidou, "Cultural Illegitimacy in Greece", *op.cit.*

IX. THE CIVIL WAR IN GREECE (1946-1949)

It was May 18, 2002, very early in the morning, at 4 A.M. We were waiting for the bus "Mlaz Bogdanci" to take us for our first visit to the country in which I was born and about which I heard so much for fifty years, from my deceased parents. Their dream to go and see the village was great, but it didn't come true. They left me the "amamet" to go and see the village of Krushoradi [Meliti]... The bus arrived at the border. The border control was complicated, as was the attitude of the customs officers on the Greek side. One of us had to go back because the Greek border police told him to say his name and the place where he was born in Greek, but he insisted on saying it in Macedonian and said "I am a Macedonian from Kurnichevo." So they returned him. They did not allow him to pass the border. So we had to say our names in Greek. For them, I am Paskalini Vozipoulos, in Greek. I am not Velika Bozinova. Finally, we entered Greece. But we had no right to see the house of Gotse Deltchev, the Macedonian hero of the Ilinden Uprising, who fought against the Ottomans....

Auntie, auntie, I recognized you! She squeezed my hands. She had never seen me, but she recognized me. The old man from the village told her we were coming. I asked her who are you? She said, I am Foutina, the daughter of Marika, the older one. So then we walked in the village of Krushoradi. Can you imagine, I had been gone for so long, that I no longer had that closeness; I was not conscious that I had been born and raised there, when suddenly, it occurred to me, that this was my birth place! I tried to ask the villagers, but they all fled, like cockroaches. With us they spoke Macedonian, but between themselves they spoke Greek. They didn't want to be asked. Finally, I found one old woman. She told me, "come and I will show you the house of Florinka."³⁴¹

Following WWII, the Greek Civil War broke out (1946 and 1949) between the Governmental forces of Greece (royalists) and the Democratic Army of Greece (communists). The royalists were supported by the United Kingdom and later the USA. It was during this war, and on the territory of Greek Macedonia, where the Communist forces were, that napalm bombs were used for first time in Europe – by the British army.

The Communists, on the other hand, were supported by Yugoslavia, and other Communist countries at the time. The Macedonian minority in Greece fought on the

³⁴¹ Interview with Anonymous Refugee Child 4, born in Krusoradi, Northern Greece. Skopje, 14 November 2014.

Communist side, because they were promised schools in their own language, and more cultural rights. This promise was even realized for a brief period of time during the war. The Communists lost the war, however, and with them, so did the Macedonian minority. The repercussions endured by the Macedonian minority were huge. Hundreds of thousands of children were expelled or fled to neighboring countries. "According to press reports, during the months of May, June, July and August 1946 alone 5,246 people were killed, 415 heavily wounded, 1,446 tortured, 1,246 interned and 3,290 imprisoned. During the same period over 20,000 Macedonians fled Greece."³⁴² They were sheltered by the Red Cross and later were orphaned in various communist countries. The remaining Macedonians in Greece were severely punished. Many of the children who remained in Greece – whether orphans or not – were taken (sometimes forcibly) to Queen Frederica's Paidopoleis.

QUEEN FREDERICA'S PAIDOPOLEIS

When we came from Hungary, they brought us to the tobacco facility in Skopje with freight train wagons, like animals. We were kids, and we didn't know anyone – mothers, parents, relatives. Then they called out our first and last names. Otherwise I could not have recognized my mother. We used to write to each other, but we never saw photos of each other. I didn't know how she looked and she didn't know how I looked. When I came, I was 11 years old. My father had been killed in Gramos. Many from my family had been killed. My mother remarried to someone from here ... Now, regarding the name, my view is, neither a comma nor a dot – no change.³⁴³

During the civil war Queen Frederica of Greece (Princess of Hannover, Princess of Great Britain and Ireland, and Duchess of Brunswick-Lüneburg,) set up around fifty so-called *paidopoleis* (also referred to as "Childtowns," "Child's Homes" or "the queen's camps"), which were orphanage camps for the children of the two warring sides –

³⁴² Risto Stefov, "Macedonians and the Start of the Greek Civil War", in *Macedonians in Greece: 1939-1949*, June, 2008.

³⁴³ Interview with Anonymous Refugee Child 2, born in Setina/Popadija, Northern Greece. Skopje, 5 December 2014.

though the children were mostly from the Northern part of Greece (i.e. Greek Macedonia). The “queen’s camps” provided shelter, food, and education to these children, however their role has been disputed by many researchers as a means of propaganda by the monarchy through the educational program. In addition, there were allegations that many children were abducted by the Greek royal forces, and neither orphans, nor given up voluntarily by their parents. Although the accusations for abduction came from both sides of the Civil War, the following passage from Danforth and Van Boeschoten’s most recent book, *Children of the Greek Civil War: Refugees and the Politics of Memory*, makes it clear that it was most likely the Communist Party and the Democratic Army of Greece (the Partisans) that were saving the children from the war and from abduction by the Greek Army and the royalists, rather than the other way around.

“Although some parents had voluntarily sent their children to the paidopoleis, as a way to ‘save’ their children from war, and having no other option, others did not. It is equally clear that in some cases the evacuation program carried out by the Greek government was *not* a voluntary one and that some parents, particularly Macedonians and those who supported the partisans, did everything in their power to *prevent* their children from being taken, as they regarded the Greek Army and the Greek state as their enemy. When they learned that the Greek government was planning to evacuate children from their village, these parents understandably hid their children or took them to villages under partisan control so that they could be taken to Eastern Europe. Eleni Alexiou, for example, was fourteen years old in early March 1949 when the inhabitants of Dorothea, a village twenty kilometers from the Yugoslav border heard that ‘Frederica was taking the children.’ Eleni and her friends spent the whole day hiding; by evening they thought it was safe to come out and play. Then all of a sudden they heard the sound of army trucks. The children who didn’t have time to hide again were loaded onto the trucks. Eleni ran to the house of an aunt and hid in the corner of the cellar. When the soldiers came to search the house, they pounded on the floor with their rifles and realized it was hollow. One of the soldiers said, ‘You have children under here!’ And shot a burst of rifle fire through the cellar door. When Eleni’s mother fainted, the soldier said, ‘Now I *know* there are children down there.’ Just then, though, the soldiers were ordered to leave the village with the children they had already found. That night Eleni’s mother took all her children to a nearby village under partisan

control; her husband was there fighting in the Democratic Army. The next day Eleni's mother was sent to carry stretchers for the partisans. Eleni and her brothers and sisters were evacuated to Eastern Europe.³⁴⁴

In fact, my own interviews with the "Refugee Children" and the children of the "Refugee Children" make it rather clear that the Communists were trying to protect their children from the Greek royal forces and sending them away voluntarily to neighboring communist countries via the Red Cross. They were evacuated with the help of the partisans, and settled across Eastern Europe with the help of the Red Cross. These children, who were evacuated to Eastern Europe are now referred to as the "Refugee Children" and are today, already above age sixty. Many of them have come to live in the Republic of Macedonia, where they form a solid group of people.

As Irena Pavlovska, daughter of a "Refugee Child" told me:

My mother was born in 1937, in the village of German (Agias Germanos) [Greece]. She only went to school for a couple of years. They spoke Macedonian at home. Then they fled, during the civil war. My grandfather was born in 1908 ... When they had to flee, they did it overnight, very quickly. My mom's village, German, was about 2 hours away by walking (in those days) from the border. The partisans were not waiting on the other side ... so they went alone. It was mothers with babies and young children. The fathers left a bit later. The point was to save the mothers and children first. They first went to Macedonia [then in Yugoslavia] – they were settled in a very poor village called Berilovo. The conditions there were miserable. Only later, when they were taken to Voivodina (present day Serbia, then in Yugoslavia), where the conditions were a bit better. All this was organized by the International Red Cross. In Yugoslavia they decided that if the refugees are accepted by the Czech Republic, Slovakia (then Czechoslovakia), Poland, Russia, and the others, they would go there. So wherever they went, their settlement was coordinated by the Red Cross. ... In the Czech Republic, the children were divided in very small groups, and were disbursed in very small cities and distributed in orphanages. Apparently it was very well organized. You can say that those children, from today's aspect, were well brought up. There are many who stayed there – they speak our language, but they have built their lives there now. They come to Macedonia whenever they can. My grandfather's sister has three daughters – and they all live in the

³⁴⁴ Loring M. Danforth and Riki Van Boeschoten, *Children of the Greek Civil War: Refugees and the Politics of Memory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 96.

*Czech Republic. They are all married to Czech men. One of his sisters was actually active in the war, helping the Communists. The Greeks found out and she ended up in jail in Albania. All those who helped the Communists, the Greeks somehow punished them.*³⁴⁵

The issue of the “Refugee Children” had been closed and taboo until recently. However, as Vassiliki Vassiloudi and Vassiliki Theodorou point out, “The fortunes of children during the Greek Civil War (1946–1949) have recently become central to historical research. Studies based on national and international archives, memoirs, and oral testimonies shed light on the effect of political practices and rhetoric employed by both opposing factions on the ideological entrenchment and politicization of children.”³⁴⁶ This article, based on oral testimonies and written sources, explores the “fortunes of Greek children from the region of Thrace in the aftermath of World War II. During the Greek Civil War (1946–1949), fought between the Communists and the anticommunists, children were forced to leave their native villages and be interned in the “Childtowns,” special institutions developed to house them, so as to be protected from the dangerous “Other”: the Greek Communists. The paper probes issues such as the conditions of the children’s transportation from their native villages; the manner and the reasons that these relocations were organized; children’s living conditions initially in their native villages and, later, in the “Childtowns”; the informants’ feelings about their displacement, albeit interpreted through the lens of memory; and the children’s ideological formation within the framework of modernization.”³⁴⁷ What it finds is that “[t]he Child’s Homes contributed to far more than the economic resurrection of the country; it was one of the preventative policies the queen [Frederica] resorted to in order to win the hearts and minds of the nation’s youth and further inoculate them from “alien” concepts:”³⁴⁸

“The directives to those in charge of the Child’s Homes suggested that their assigned tasks be performed on the basis of the triptych: ‘God, Fatherland and King.’ The promise given by children enrolled in the Child’s Homes is also indicative of this ideological

³⁴⁵ Interview with Irena Pavlovska and her partner, Children of Refugee Children. Skopje, 12 August 2011.

³⁴⁶ Vassiliki Vassiloudi and Vassiliki Theodorou, *op.cit.*, 118.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 132-133.

orientation: “My Mother Queen, I promise to honor and love the Home you gave me, to be loyal to God and my King, to become a good Greek, a good citizen and a good farmer, to devote myself to the land of my village and always work for my country. God be my witness!’ Such values, forming the core of the “right” Greek identity, were perceived as a necessary prophylaxis against the dangerous “other.”³⁴⁹

The *paidopoleis* are an important chapter in the history of the “name issue” and its root causes, because it created a certain generation of children who, ironically, although most likely born to Macedonian parents (having in mind that most of the Communists in Greece – especially in the area that the article talks about – were Macedonian), were indoctrinated with a loyalty towards the Greek state and identity, and a hatred towards the “Other,” or the so-called “Slavic speaking Communists.” As such, many of them have become the strongest opponents against the Republic of Macedonia. Quoting Stratis Mirivilis, a renowned Greek author, Vassiloudi and Theodoru state that “Childtowns would serve as ‘camps of civilization and national [anticommunist] education.’”³⁵⁰ The estimate number of children from the northern regions of the country interned in Childtowns is thirteen to eighteen thousand children, while another twenty-five to twenty-eight thousand children (the so-called “Refugee Children”) were expatriated to the Soviet Bloc countries.

THE TIMES AFTER THE CIVIL WAR

The policy of refugee settlement in Greece continued throughout the years, and was also (as hitherto) complemented by language prohibitions, prohibitions of movement, overt enforced declarations of a nationality, employment policies, and so on. As the Minority Rights Group Report of that period shows, “[i]n the period after the civil war [1946-1949] the Macedonians were, unsurprisingly, seen as potentially disloyal to the Greek state and steps were taken to try and remove such ‘undesirable’ aliens’ from the sensitive border regions with Yugoslavia. In 1953 Decree no. 2536

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 132

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 127.

was enacted to colonize the northern territories 'with new colonists with healthy national consciousness' ... In this period it was forbidden for Macedonians to use the Slavonic forms for their names and henceforth only Greek forms could be used for official purposes...In 1954 the Papagos government resolved to remove all Macedonians from official posts in Aegean Macedonia. In the border regions with Yugoslavia peasants were not allowed to move from their villages and in 1959 in the villages around Lerin, Kostur and Kajlari the inhabitants were asked to confirm publicly in front of officials that they did not speak Macedonian. Such measures led to many emigrating to Australia and Canada."³⁵¹ The year 1959, popularly known as "year of the oaths" is vividly described in a chapter by Anastasia Karakasidou in Richard Clogg's edition, *Minorities in Greece: Aspects of a Plural Society*:

"The 1 September 1959 issue of the conservative Athenian newspaper Spharia carried an article describing what it called a 'very peculiar' ceremony that was held in the village of Atrapos (formerly Krapeshtina) in the Florina [Lerin] district on 10 August of that year. In the words of the account, 'the simple population of the village, in front of God and the people, swore that from now on they will stop using the Slavic idiom in their speech and that they will speak only the Greek language.'"³⁵²

Karakasidou goes on to quote the newspaper:

"Even before dawn on Sunday morning of the ceremony, the village streets were already filled as all the villagers, children included, made their way to the village church. This was a historic day in Atrapos. After the Doxology, the focus of the ceremony turned to the village school yard, filled with a capacity crowd. On one side of the yard were the Atrapiotes, across from whom stood one hundred representatives from other area villages, as well as military and political leaders.

Above the congregation, the Greek flag flew proudly. The military band struck up the national anthem. Those among the elderly men who had been 'Macedonian Fighters' (*Makedonomakhoi*) could not constrain their tears. The village president spoke, thanking the officials (*episimoi*) who had come to the ceremony. Then he asked his fellow villagers to take the great oath.

³⁵¹ Hugh Poulton and MLIHRC, *Minorities in the Balkans*, *op.cit.*, 31.

³⁵² Anastasia Karakasidou, "Cultural Illegitimacy in Greece", *op.cit.*, 122.

Silence fell as the villagers each raised their right hand and repeated after the president:

'I promise in front of God, men, and the official authorities of our State, that I will stop speaking the Slavic idiom which gives reason for misunderstanding (parexigisi) to the enemies of our country, the Bulgarians, and that I will speak, everywhere and always, the official (episimi) language of our country, Greece, in which the Holy Gospel of Jesus Chris is written.'

After the oath, the village teacher addressed the congregation. [...]

We have decided, with pride, all together, to stop speaking the foreign idiom which has no relation to our very Greek descent. In this way, we offer honour and gratitude to those Greek co-patriots who gave us our freedom with their blood. Long Live the King! Long Live the Greek State! Long Live our Undefeated Army!"³⁵³

In 1967, the Greek military seized power in a coup d'état, and established the Greek military junta which lasted until 1974. These years were especially trying for the Macedonian minority in Greece, during which torture was yet again used as method of punishment for exhibition of the Macedonian language or culture. Democracy was restored in 1975, however for the Macedonian minority, the denial of their ethnic identity remained.

Some periods, then, were harsher than others. The periods of the Metaxas dictatorship (1936-41) and the civil war that followed (1946-49), as well as the military dictatorship (1967-74) were probably the worst. Perhaps one of the most controversial policies, namely the expropriation of the land of the local Macedonian populations who were forced to become refugees and flee their own land, remains until today. The Minority Rights Group report documented that the property of the Macedonian refugees who fled during the civil war was confiscated by the Greek government by Decree 2536/53 which also deprived them of their Greek citizenship. "The Greek government later enacted a law so that the property would be returned to

³⁵³ *Ibid.*, 122-123.

refugees who are ‘Greek by birth’ – i.e. to those who renounce their Macedonian identity and adopt Greek names.”³⁵⁴

Chiclet and Lory would summarize the Macedonian 100-year odyssey in Greece following the acquisition of the territory at the conclusion of the Balkan Wars and the subsequent population exchanges as follows : “Ce profond bouleversement de la composition ethnique se poursuit avec la Deuxième guerre mondiale (les régions de Serres et Drama subissent une re-bulgarisation éphémère en 1941-1944) et surtout avec la guerre civile grecque (mars 1946-août 1949), particulièrement acharnée en Macédoine occidentale. La défaite des communistes grecs entraîne un fort exode de réfugiés politiques vers les pays de l’est, auquel s’ajoute une émigration économique vers l’Australie et le Canada. La communauté slave, florissante avant 1912, est aujourd’hui très réduite (environ 100.000 personnes) et en voie d’assimilation. En effet, aucun gouvernement grec n’a jamais reconnu de droits culturels à ce groupe national qui rappelle une vérité historique désagréable : la Macédoine grecque n’a pas toujours été aussi purement hellénique qu’elle ne l’est aujourd’hui.”³⁵⁵

Judge Christos Rozakis, former (Greek) Vice President of the European Court of Human Rights, would also describe the situation of Macedonians in Greece as a continuous dark chapter in Greek history in an article entitled “The International Protection of Minorities in Greece,” published in 1996 as part of a book on Greece:

“All [Greek] governments tried to assimilate the Slavophones using peaceful and violent means. Peaceful means were the Greek school and Greek Church that were constantly trying to persuade people that speaking Greek is an indication of cultural superiority. Violent means were used by the local authorities (police) that were often acting on their own initiative without having the consent of the central government. Moreover, violence was extensively used under Metaxas dictatorship. Suppression came full circle through a series of measures: Surveillance and deportation of suspects, fines-or forced drinking of castor-oil- for people caught speaking their language, but also compulsory attendance at evening schools even for the elderly people. This suppressive policy was one of the main reasons that many Slavophone Macedonians reacted against the Greek State during the foreign occupation (1940-1944) and the Greek Civil War (1946-1949). When in August 1949 the Communists were defeated,

³⁵⁴ Hugh Poulton and MLIHRC, *Minorities in the Balkans*, *op.cit.*, 31.

³⁵⁵ Christophe Chiclet and Bernard Lory, *La République de Macédoine*, *op.cit.*, 18.

around 35,000-40,000 Slavophone Macedonians, mostly from Western Macedonia, who had fought for the communist cause left Greece and settled in the countries of the communist bloc. ... Those who remained in Greece continued undergoing Greece's policy of suppression, or strong discouragement, of their language. Since 1974, though, Greece has shown a certain tolerance toward the use of the Macedonian language. However until the 1980's, the public use of Macedonian songs was discouraged if not persecuted. Until the mid-1990s, the singing of Macedonia songs was suppressed by police, and even in the late 1990s, pressure was occasionally exerted against it at the local festivals... It is only very recently, that state authorities abandoned locally the policy of harassment against the use of the language. Complaints of government harassment and intimidation directed against these persons decreased significantly since 1998 and ceased in 2000. People in Florina admit that they are currently-and for the first time experiencing "a spring of the Macedonian culture." Nevertheless, the tolerance shown in Western Macedonia has not yet been spread to other parts of Macedonia where Slavophones live."³⁵⁶

As we have seen, the acquisition of the territory of Macedonia by Greece in 1913 necessitated national awareness-building measures to strengthen the Greek nation-state, which included population exchange, expulsion, internal displacement, torture, assimilation, and even the abduction of children, among other policies. One may say that, looking back at history, these policies are not unique to Greece. Indeed, many nation-states have had to go through similar procedures in order to solidify the national awareness within their state. The Macedonian minority in Greece, however, is exceptional in that it is denied, to this very day, its basic right to an identity. As the Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis stated in his letter to the Macedonian Prime Minister in 2009 "there is no "Macedonian" minority in Greece. There never has been." (see page 250 for the full letter)

How did Greece, the so-called cradle of democracy, come to this situation, and why? More importantly, how are today's Greek official policies towards the Macedonian minority in Greece and towards the Republic of Macedonia a continuation of past Greek policies towards the once-upon a time majority population of their newly acquired territory of Macedonia? In the following chapter, I will examine some

³⁵⁶ Christos Rozakis, "The International Protection of Minorities in Greece," in K. Featherstone and K. Ifantis (ed.), *Greece in a Changing Europe: Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 2.

of the current policies the Greek authorities use at present to deny the Macedonian minority their right to an identity. In my conclusion I will try to tie the historical developments with these present-day policies, and thereby portray the essence of the “name issue,” its true objectives, and, ultimately, its absurdity. More importantly, I will try to convey the international and European scope of the issue, and the responsibilities of the Great Powers regarding this issue and the right of the Macedonian people to their ethnic identity and their self-determination throughout the century, and until this day.

X. FOREIGN INTERESTS AND THE GREEK CIVIL WAR

As I previously mentioned, I have woven the theme of recurring foreign interests in Macedonian matters throughout time, as I view this – and Macedonians view it – as an important topic, and perhaps decisive for the future of Macedonia. We previously saw that foreign interests contributed to the “Macedonian Question.” Now we will see to what extent foreign interests were involved in the civil war in Greece, which was very much also a “Macedonian affair.”

SWITZERLAND

I must admit, in an effort to choose any European country so that I could prove my point, I was partial to Switzerland, where I lived and was conducting my research. But I also chose Switzerland as an example of a foreign player that is known for its neutrality. As such, I wanted to illustrate whether or not, even the most neutral players, had a role to play in the “Macedonian Question,” and thereby, in the current “name issue.” I found, to my astonishment, that even Switzerland was not a neutral player in the “Macedonian Question,” as can be seen from the excerpt of the military report of Colonel Daniel, the Swiss Military and Air Force Attaché in Athens in February of 1949. Remember that in 1949, Greece was still engaged in a civil war between the Communists and the Royalists, and as such was the theatre of

international geo-strategic interests – namely the battle of the West against the spread of Communism. In his report, entitled “La situation en Grèce vue d’Athènes,” Colonel Daniel speaks of the Greek military “catastrophe,” and is worried sick that the Greek army was losing the battle against what he refers to interchangeably as the “bandits” or “rebels from the North.” Colonel Daniel believes that the “rebels” and “bandits” should have been “cleaned out.” At one point, he states,

“Comme je rendis compte alors, la victoire du Grammos fut mal exploitée et surtout incomplète...Dans de nombreux *milieux grecs et étrangers*, on crut la guerre pratiquement terminée, la suite ne devant être que des opérations de police...Par la suite, la situation militaire s’aggrava de plus en plus. Je cite quelques exemples: la route Larissa – Lamia ne peut plus être utilisée (ainsi, quoique la route Athènes-Salonique soit reconstruite, la liaison par terre entre ces deux villes est toujours impossible); en Epire, les rebelles circulent de nouveau librement; le Vitsi, le Vernon, le Vermion (et d’autres régions) sont fermement entre leurs mains; *le Grammos, nettoyé en été*, est partiellement réoccupé par trois brigades de ‘bandits’ obligeant l’armée à y maintenir deux divisions; sont attaquées successivement:Karditsa...Naoussa...Karpenissi...Léonidion...Serrès...Florina...des attentats à la bombe à Salonique, au Pirée et jusque dans le banlieue d’Athènes...”³⁵⁷

The majority of the “rebels” Colonel Daniel refers to, as we have seen and will see, were Macedonians. Incidentally, one of the people I interviewed had lost their grandfather in Gramos and the word Gramos itself, resonates with shivers in Macedonia.

Colonel Daniel speaks of Greek and “foreign” areas – foreign referring to the “rebel” and “bandit” territories predominantly settled by the Macedonian minority of Greece. Note how the majority of the cities mentioned by the Swiss diplomat are in Northern Greece. A greater part of the war was fought in Greek Macedonia. As a matter of fact, the majority of the fighters on the Communist side during Greek Civil War were Macedonians. As Stathis Kalyas states in *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*:

³⁵⁷ Charles Daniel, Col. EMG. Légation de Suisse en Grèce, l’Attaché militaire et de l’air, “*Rapport militaire No 2 (Athenes). La situation en Grèce vue d’Athènes*,” Athènes le 24 février, 1949. Swiss Federal Archives, Bern, 2 (viewed on December 12, 2015 at <http://db.dodis.ch/document/4080#>). Italics added ; underline and quotation marks in original.

“The Slav Macedonians made a significant, indeed a critical contribution to the communist side during the Civil War in Greece; they bore the brunt of the war, since they inhabited the regions of Macedonia where the heaviest fighting took place. Their participation in the ranks of the rebel army was very high, ‘far out of proportion to their relatively low numbers in the total population at the time’.... Their estimated representation in the DSE [the ‘Democratic Army of Greece’ as the Communist rebel army was known] ranged from more than a quarter in April 1947 to more than two-thirds in mid-1949.” By 1948 the Communist Party ‘had become almost totally dependent on the relatively small, mainly Macedonian – populated areas it held in central and western Macedonia.’”³⁵⁸

As a matter of fact, the Macedonians in Greece had also been a crucial element in the Allied forces and the liberation of Greece from the Axis powers and the fascist regime. However, this liberation also brought victory to the Communists in Greece and thus indirectly threatened the West. The Civil War, which started immediately following the end of WWII, was the aftermath of this situation. As a result, the Western powers, and notably the United Kingdom and the United States, for fear of the spread of Communism, supported the former fascist regime in Greece. This meant that the United States and the United Kingdom also fought against the Macedonians in Greece, the idea of the promotion of the cultural rights of Macedonians, and the promotion of the idea of a Greater Macedonia. This included the involvement of the United States militarily, and with a significant amount of funding, as can be seen from the Swiss diplomat’s account. “Pour 1949, les Grecs recevront dans le cadre de la deuxième année du plan Marshall, 171 millions de dollars auxquels on ajoutera encore 12 millions qu’ils ont réussi à obtenir, soit 183 millions de dollars.”³⁵⁹ This also included the use of Napalm B by the British and American forces, for the first time on European soil, as is recounted in an independent website by Matt Barret entitled “A History of Greece: ” “In January of 1949 Markos and his strategy of guerilla warfare are replaced by Nikos Zakhariades. He believes in more conventional warfare, but by now the Greek Armed forces are better equipped by the Americans who have introduced a new

³⁵⁸ Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 312.

³⁵⁹ Charles Daniel, *op.cit.*, 6.

weapon to finish off the war. It is called Napalm B.”³⁶⁰ An independent German journal relates this Great Power involvement in an even more vivid manner: “It was in the Greek civil war thus unclenched, that a new weapon, NAPALM, was used for the first time. And this repeatedly, both against civilians and combattants. Napalm was later on used widely in Korea (between 1950 and 1953) and in the Vietnam war. The Greek civil war did not only result in such war crimes as the use of napalm. Leftists were assassinated or they were imprisoned in concentration camps like Makronissos. Some of those who like, Yannis Ritsos, were imprisoned at the time, were imprisoned again by a US-supported fascist military dictatorship in the 1960s and 70s. Makronissos, Leros and Yaros were island concentration camps that can be compared with the Taiwanese island KZ called Lü Dao (or Green Island, in English). They were versions of Abu Ghraib, but not versions of Auschwitz.”³⁶¹ In August 2010 in Skopje, a commemoration of the 62nd Anniversary of the 1948 British Napalm Bombing of Gramos and Vicho was held by the World Macedonian Congress and the Association of Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia.³⁶²

Indeed, although citations on the use of Napalm B are hard to find (likely because of the implications this may have on these countries today) it is no secret, as the *The Guardian*, reveals, that the Allied Powers had a dark chapter in history in Greece, merely months after the WWII: “When 28 civilians were killed in Athens, it wasn’t the Nazis who were to blame, it was the British. Ed Vulliamy and Helena Smith reveal how Churchill’s shameful decision to turn on the partisans who had fought on our side in the war sowed the seeds for the rise of the far right in Greece today,” reads the subheading of the article entitled “Athens 1944: Britain’s dirty secret.”³⁶³

To get back to the Swiss, it can also be seen from this diplomat’s account that he considered Switzerland as an ally to the Americans, British, and Greek. Notably, he keeps referring to “we” “my colleagues” ... etc. At one point he quotes general Papagos

³⁶⁰ Matt Barret, “The Civil War” in *A History of Greece*, Available at <http://www.ahistoryofgreece.com/civilwar.htm>

³⁶¹ Josh Carter, “The Greek War of Resistance against Nazi Germany and the Civil War,” in *Art in Society*, Available at <http://www.art-in-society.de/AS14/GCW/Greek-civil-war.html>

³⁶² Commemoration of the 62nd Anniversary of the British Napalm Bombing of Gramos and Vicho, World Macedonian Congress, Skopje, August 25, 2010.

³⁶³ Ed Vulliamy and Helena Smith, “Athens 1944: Britain’s dirty secret.” *The Guardian*, November 30, 2014

who says “Il ne s’agit pas pour nous de refouler les ennemis de l’autre côté de la frontière d’où ils reviendront mais *de les détruire ou les capturer.*”³⁶⁴ After having described the situation and the idea that the Greek military was waning, Colonel Daniel concludes that “Les Américains doivent se rendre compte qu’ils font, par personnes interposées, une guerre; s’ils veulent l’emporter, *ils doivent y mettre le prix.*”³⁶⁵ He thus calls for more budgetary and military intervention by the Americans. Having in mind the tone and passion with which Colonel Daniel speaks, and the sympathies he has towards the Greek military against the “rebels” and Communists, it is easier to understand the general European sympathies towards Greece today. This, too, in a way, has contributed to a one-sided European view of the “name issue.”

THE AMERICANS AND RUSSIANS DURING THE GREEK CIVIL WAR

The American Ambassador to Yugoslavia at the time also portrays the implications and interests of the Americans in the Greek Civil War, precisely in relation to the “Macedonian Question,” and this, within the wider context of creating a stronger Yugoslavia that would act as a barrier against Stalinist Communism, and convincing Yugoslavia to change its policy of helping the Macedonian “bandits” in Greece. That would, in the long term, disable Soviet plans for using Macedonians as a destabilizing factor in the region, and at the same time act as a proof that Communism was a failing theory. In a letter to the State Department, written in Belgrade on January 31, 1949 he states:

“Re aid to Greek bandits [in reference to the Macedonian bandits in Greece that Yugoslavia was assisting], we see only slight probability of obtaining assurances while Yugoslavs still fail to acknowledge grave risks in their long-range situation. Any arrangement now entered into would be both unstable and deceptive. Actual extent present Yugoslav aid seems largely undetermined and we wonder whether we could rely on promises of interruption of supply routes to have decisive effect on Markos fortunes. We should not overlook fact that such arrangement would definitely weaken Yugoslav Government position in whole

³⁶⁴ Charles Daniel, *op. cit.*, 8. (emphasis added)

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 9. Emphasis in original.

Macedonian area now under increasing Soviet pressure from their pincer of Albania and Bulgaria.

Moreover, there is another aspect to entire theory of political concessions. We wonder whether it might not serve longer objectives our political strategy to permit Tito to maintain himself as orthodox but prosperous Communist. Cominform propaganda can cite as evil consequences Yugoslavia's desertion of Moscow only 'facts' that Yugoslavia will thereby be transformed into bourgeois colony and suffer internal economic ruin. If these assertions prove false, case against further deviations by other satellites is appreciably weakened on Communist's own terms. If what we seek over long run is liberation east Europe from USSR tyranny, demonstration that in Tito's path lies both preservation national independence and increase well-being will surely help."³⁶⁶

In fact, Acheson, who was United States Secretary of State, would confirm in a telegram sent to the US Embassy in Greece on March 2, 1949, that American interests in the region were to influence long-term Yugoslav policy towards Greece, while Kohler, the United States Charge d'Affaires in the Soviet Union would confirm in another telegram to the State Department on April 4, 1949, that Russian interests were to promote Stalinist Communism and destroy Yugoslavia, through "indirect methods" – namely "guerilla groups ... composed of Greek, Yugoslav and Bulgar Macedonians..."³⁶⁷

"When notified by Harriman that OEEC countries with whom US seeking agreement on control exports to Eastern Eur (in which Greece not included) are to be apprised revised policy US exports Yugo ... you should inform Pipinelis [Greek Permanent Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs]and/or other competent Grk officials revised US policy, emphasizing arguments ... underlying decision not to insist on political concessions from Tito at this time in advance of relaxation export and trade controls. Point out that one of main objectives in embarking on revised attitude toward Tito is to effect lasting change in Yugo policy toward Greece but that we are convinced Tito would be forced to reject any direct approach along those lines under present circumstances. We believe situation such that apparently slow and indirect route may in long run lead to most satisfactory and permanent solution."³⁶⁸

³⁶⁶ "Yugoslavia" in *Foreign Relations of the United States, op. cit.*, 860-861.

³⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 876-881.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 876.

...On balance, we inclined believe Kremlin will continue indirect methods, but expect these will be used with increasing vigor. It would be our guess that Tito is likely to face widespread guerilla activities on Greek pattern beginning this spring, concentrated on but not limited to border Macedonia. These guerrilla groups would be composed of Greek, Yugoslav, and Bulgar Macedonians, nucleus of which already in existence...Kremlin's calculation probably that while West has indicated intention of keeping Tito afloat economically under present conditions, it would be unwilling to extend such aid to point required to sustain Tito if his strength were drained over period of time by such guerilla activities."³⁶⁹

Kohler would conclude that if guerrilla tactics did not succeed, the next move would be the proclamation of an independent Macedonia.

"Of course if indirect guerilla effort should fail produce expected results over period some months, Kremlin would be obliged reconsider question more direct methods. Question possible proclamation Yugoslav Government National Liberation or independent Macedonian regime would, as we see it, be largely based on tactical or propaganda considerations on which our information too scanty to warrant speculation. In any case prospect seems to us require careful analysis and decision our ability and willingness follow through on implications our policy support Tito."³⁷⁰

As we shall see, this proclamation almost did happen. However, it was not carried out due to involvement of the United States which ensured victory of an anti-Communist (and thereby anti-Macedonian) Greece and an anti-Stalinist Yugoslavia. The element of world power interference in the relations between Greece and Yugoslavia (and notably over the question of Macedonia and the Macedonians), is evident in these secret diplomatic telegrams. Note the following telegram sent by Canon, the United States Ambassador in Yugoslavia, in which he transmits his conversation with Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs Kardelj and Minister of Finance Bebler.

"Greece: With rebels now hostile to Yugoslavia material aid is not going over. I pressed him hard for more details. What about

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 881.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

logistical advantages? Harboring, re-outfitting and returning escaped rebels? Perhaps individual frontier authorities are still doing more than Belgrade intends? He did not deny aid in past but 'now it's all different.' I found this part no very forthright. He seemed unhappy and sick of Greek involvement ... I made a little speech about contradiction in our disposition to aid Yugoslavia when Yugoslavia works against Greek independence. He said 'but we have no friends there any more' and starting talking about Hungary again. He made no mention whatever of Macedonia (which as already reported Yugoslavia thinks it has in hand)..."³⁷¹

It is clear from this account that the United States was pressuring Yugoslavia into changing its policy towards the (pro-Communist Macedonian) rebels in Greece, and using economic aid as a carrot to influence Yugoslav policy vis-à-vis Macedonians in Greece. As will be concluded in the policy evaluation section of the United States Department of State Policy Statement of September 1, 1949, "considering the Communist nature of the Yugoslav Government, it must be admitted that the accomplishment of our long-range policy objectives toward Yugoslavia is not realizable at this time..." However the State Department considers that the United States "should continue to carry out present [economic] policy in order to provide concrete examples for Tito that he will probably have a source to which he can turn for at least certain kinds of vital industrial materials no longer available to him from Cominform countries..." The situation created by the economic sanctions by the Cominform "calls for timely financial assistance, and it is in our interest to see that Tito has such credits as are necessary to keep his regime from foundering," it is said. Finally, the State Department Policy Statement concludes that:

"One or two other unresolved matters, dormant at this time in view of the Tito-Cominform rift, may later arise. The present high state of tension in Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations makes it quite impossible for Tito to achieve within the near future his long-standing goal of uniting parts of Bulgarian Macedonia with the Yugoslav Macedonian Republic, as was provided for in the Yugoslav-Bulgarian Treaty of 1947. Similarly, it is highly improbable in the present circumstances, especially in the face of the Soviet-inspired threat to form an 'independent Macedonian

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 897.

state,' that Tito will revive his former plans for the formation of a Balkan Federation under his leadership."³⁷²

On September 12, 1949, the Policy Planning Staff of the United States Department of State issued a top secret "Yugoslav-Moscow Controversy as Related to U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives" paper. Contained in it are the following "recommendations" in the event of an armed attack on Yugoslavia by one or all of the satellite States. In this event, the U.S.:

1. Should take action in the UN along the lines of the recommendations set for the in Section I above;
2. Should consult with other treaty signatories with a view to possible common action against the former enemy states;
3. Should, in the event of a military conflict of some duration, permit Yugoslavia to purchase arms in the U.S. and be prepared to furnish arms directly to Tito if political and military considerations should so warrant."³⁷³

Futhermore, it is noted in the section entitled "III. Extensive Guerrilla Operations within Yugoslavia Supported from the Outside," that:

"The most likely development in the intensified Soviet offensive against Yugoslavia, along with increased political, economic and psychological pressures, is a campaign of guerrilla operations within Yugoslavia directed and supported by the U.S.S.R. from neighboring states. Present indications are that the guerrilla effort against Tito will be focused on Yugoslav Macedonia, the weakest spot in the present Yugoslav political structure. It would be based chiefly on Bulgaria and Albania. Probably the remnants of the Greek guerrilla forces would be utilized and would operate, alongside 'Macedonian' formations, from bases in these two countries...."³⁷⁴

As noted earlier, the Macedonian minority in Greece (predominantly in the North of Greece) was very much implicated in the Greek Civil War and participated in the Communist side, as the Communists promised them cultural rights in the form of education in the Macedonian language, and even printed a children's book for the Macedonian alphabet – the so-called ABECEDAR – which had first been printed in

³⁷² *Ibid.*, 942-943.

³⁷³ *Ibid.*, 951.

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

1925. "... the nature of the Slav Macedonians' participation in the Greek Civil War (at least at the elite level) was nationalist rather than Communist. The Communists were convenient allies in a struggle that was supposed to lead to secession from Greece and a merger with the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. For the NOF 'it was primarily a national struggle, a battle for the national liberation of the Macedonians in Aegean Macedonia (Rossos 1997: 42, 43-4, 64, 42)."³⁷⁵

In a way then, the civil war in Greece was not just a political war, nor just a war about stopping the spread of Communism in the Balkans. It was also a war for rights of the Macedonian minority in Greece, and could have possibly led to the creation of Greater Macedonia – a country that would lie on the borders of the geographic Macedonia, and thus encompass areas of Greece, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. This is made clear from the Military Report of the Swiss Colonel Daniel. In fact, he explains that the resignation of General Markos, the General who united the Communists in Greece and who led all the winning battles, had to do with the fact that he refused to accept orders from the Cominform to invade Yugoslav Macedonia because a large part of his forces were Macedonians, or, as Colonel Daniel puts it, "Slavophones very attached to Yugoslavia (Slavo-Macedonian group N.O.F)."^{376 377} The Cominform had condemned Yugoslavia's Tito on June 26, 1948, but General Markos refused to comply with their orders. This, according to Colonel Daniel, was the reason for General Marko's resignation. Colonel Daniel further explains that Moscow at the time was hesitating between two solutions in the Balkans:

“ - une Macédoine autonome réunissant les trois Macédoines (grecque, bulgare et yougoslave) et s'appuyant a la Bulgarie;

- une république macédonienne dans le cadre de la fédération yougoslave.

La premiere solution se heurtait a l'opposition de Belgrade et la seconde a celle de Sofia!

L'intervention anglaise en 1944/45 fit que la Macedoine grecque echappa aux Balkaniques. ...

Suivant des renseignements absolument de bonne sources, que m'a communique un de mes collegues, a Sofia, la decision

³⁷⁵ Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 312-313.

³⁷⁶ Charles Daniel, *op.cit.*, 15.

³⁷⁷ The N.O.F. is short for "Narodno Osloboditelen Front" or in English National Liberation Front.

aurait été prise de faire la guérilla sur les frontières de Tito. Elle serait en voie d'organisation dans la région de Petrich-Nevrokop. Elle devrait agir dans la Macédoine du Vardar. De son côté, l'état-major hellénique aurait des renseignements sûrs à ce sujet.

Le but final serait la réunion des trois Macédoines au profit des Bulgares.

Markos avait l'ordre de pénétrer en Macédoine yougoslave. Il a refusé de l'exécuter. Devant cette désobéissance, il n'avait plus qu'à partir. Il est remplacé par des hommes de confiance de Zachariades qui sont des communistes de pure obédience soviétique. Ils exécuteront exactement les ordres du Kominform dans l'affaire macédonienne."³⁷⁸

He warns that there is a threat also from Albania. Thus, if the "ensemble" of information is correct, the encirclement of the south of Yugoslavia by elements in favor of the Cominform would be realized. "Il n'y a plus qu'à attendre la suite! Soumise à une pression accrue de Moscou, Belgrade devrait-elle composer avec les Occidentaux? On peut se poser la question. Des compromis sont toujours possibles."³⁷⁹

Roudometof and Robertson note that the "Communists attempted to enlist the pro-IMRO sympathies of the population in their cause. In the context of this attempt, in 1924 the Comintern recognized a separate Macedonian nationality. Still, the Comintern's Suggestion that all Balkan Communist parties adopt a platform of a "united Macedonia" was rejected by the Bulgarian and Greek Communist parties (Papapanagiotou 1992). Despite this rejection, their conservative opponents within the two states accused the two parties of plotting against the nation this led to the prosecution of the two Communist parties."³⁸⁰ Kalyvas gives a very good summary of the whole situation, as seen below:

"After the end of the occupation and the demobilization of the Communist partisans (1946-6) the reconstructed Greek state persecuted leftists and Slav Macedonians alike. Trials of collaborators were used as an opportunity for ethnically motivated persecution as well as the pursuit of all kinds of local feuds. As a result, many Slav Macedonians, both those who had

³⁷⁸ Charles Daniel, *op.cit.*, 16-17.

³⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 17.

³⁸⁰ Victor Roudometof and Roland Robertson, *Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001), 187.

participated in EAM but also many who saw action in the various collaborationist militias, fled across the border into the Republic of Macedonia, newly formed as part of socialist Yugoslavia. Whereas during the occupation many Slav Macedonians had claimed a Bulgarian identity and collaborated with the Bulgarian troops, many now claimed a Macedonian identity and looked up to Tito's Yugoslavia; many among them joined an independence movement (NOF) and a unit known as the First Aegean Brigade. Both organizations were closely allied with Yugoslavia's Communist authorities, who themselves maintained complex ties with the Greek Communists. At the mass level, there was a growing overlap between the Slavophone linguistic identity the Slav Macedonian (or Macedonian) ethnic identity, and the propensity to side with the Communist Left in 1946-49. Although the overlap was not complete, with a significant minority of Slav Macedonians siding with the Greek government it is clear nonetheless that most Slav Macedonians either collaborated with or openly fought with the Greek Communist rebels between 1946 and 1949 — 85 percent according to one estimate (Rossos 1997:63). Conversely, many Greek settlers, especially in mixed villages, supported the Greek Right. even though they had been ardent supporters of the Liberal Party during the interwar period (Marantzidis 2001).

In short, although the Greek Civil War in Macedonia was by no means an ethnic war, it took on a pronounced ethnic character. The Slav Macedonians “made a significant, indeed a critical contribution to the communist side during the Civil War in Greece; they bore the brunt of the war, since they inhabited the regions of Macedonia where the heaviest fighting took place. Their participation in the ranks of the rebel army was very high, “far out of proportion to their relatively low numbers in the total population of Greece at the time. ... Their estimated representation in the DSE [the “Democratic Army of Greece” as the Communist rebel army was known] ranged from more than a quarter in April 1947 to more than two-thirds in mid-1949. By 1948 the Communist Party “had become almost totally dependent on the relatively small, mainly Macedonian— populated areas it held in central and western Macedonia.” Importantly, however, the nature of the Slav Macedonians’ participation in the Greek Civil War (at least at the elite level) was nationalist rather than Communist. The Communists were convenient allies in a struggle that was supposed to lead to secession from Greece and a merger with the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. For the NOF “it was primarily a national struggle, a battle for the national liberation of the Macedonians in Aegean Macedonia. (Rossos 1997: 42, 43-4, 64, 42).”³⁸¹

³⁸¹ Stathis N. Kalyvas, *op.cit.*, 312-313.

Although the citation above carries some political bias, emphasizing that the Macedonian population was small compared their high proportions in the Communist forces (suggesting that the author is sensitive to population size and thus population games), it nevertheless shows how powerful the Macedonian factor was in Greece at the time. Indeed it was powerful enough to sway the direction of the war – and Communism in the region!

Thus, we can conclude that all roads – or all wars – lead to Macedonia. Again, strategic interests involving Macedonia. Having this context in mind, and the fact that Macedonia (and here I mean geographic Macedonia) seemed to be an ongoing project for neighboring countries as well as the world powers, it is easy to understand both the Greek and the Macedonian positions. The Greeks live in constant fear that a relatively sizeable part of its territory, namely the North or Greek Macedonia, could be taken away from them due to some larger geo-strategic game to serve the interests of a neighboring state or another, greater power. *This* and not the name could be the genuine “territorial threat” in their argument in the “name issue.” In a similar manner, the Macedonians live in constant fear that their cultural rights and ethnic identity might once again be compromised due to higher geo-strategic interests which may have nothing to do with being Macedonian. It comes as no surprise then, that in one of the first articles of the Interim Agreement signed between the two countries in 1995, namely Article 3, the two countries vow not to support the action of a third state: “Each Party undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the territorial integrity and the political independence of the other Party. Neither Party shall support the action of a third party directed against the sovereignty, the territorial integrity or the political independence of the other Party.”³⁸²

It is clear to see from the interview I did with a Macedonian from Greece (who asked to remain anonymous) whose father had been one of these “rebels,” that in fact, the battle was seen by them, as a war between Macedonians who were a majority in the North of the country at the time, and the Greek authorities who were seen as the

³⁸² No. 32193 GREECE and THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA Interim Accord (with related letters and translations of the Interim Accord in the languages of the Contracting Parties), Signed at New York on 13 September 1995, Article 3.

oppressor. This does not come as a huge surprise considering that the territory of Macedonia had only been acquisitioned in 1913, following the Balkan Wars – barely forty years later. This means that my interlocutor’s father had been born and raised in the Ottoman Empire, and as he was from a small village (as was the case for a majority of the Macedonians), he only spoke the local language, namely Macedonian. Following the end of the Civil War in Greece in 1949, my interlocutor told me that his father had been constantly pursued by the authorities, and was always leaving home to hide in the mountains. One day, he simply disappeared and never returned home again. Here are the words of my interlocutor:

My grandfather was from Pozarsko (Loutraki). He fled because they were going to kill him. He had a lot of sheep. He was an Andari – Macedonian rebels who fled in the mountains, who didn’t want neither the Greeks nor the Bulgarians. He used to help the Andari, tell them what is happening. The authorities beat him and tortured him several times because he wouldn’t give them his sheep nor tell them about the Andari. The last time he came back he was half-dead. They had covered him in sheep-skin and poison ivy and locked him. He still never said a word. And then one day he disappeared. We don’t know if he was killed or if he fled to your Macedonia – nothing. My grandmother was left alone with one 10 year old child, - my father. So she left Pozarsko and remarried in Crneshevo, to a Greek who did not like the Macedonians. He used to call my father (who lived with my grandmother) “Bulgarian bastard.”³⁸³

³⁸³ Interview with Anonymous Hesitant Tukasni (Possibly Outspoken) 4, Arnislavci (Agathi), Northern Greece, 11 July 2011.

PART III. WE THE PEOPLE: HUMAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS OF THE “NAME ISSUE”

XI. THE HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECT

President Ivanov, in almost all his meetings, has brought back the ball-game to the human rights court. We started to talk, after a long time, in a language which is understood by the international community and the Western democracies. This language is the corpus of human rights. Here they understand us better. President Ivanov insists all the time that we cannot come to or accept any solution which will interfere in the determinants of our identity, because this is a question of human rights. Self-identification and self-determination. And the right to dignity. These rights are in all international instruments for the protection of human rights. They are everywhere.³⁸⁴

By this point of my research, after having read and analyzed historical and political aspects, and after having heard over fifty interviews, I was convinced of the dual human rights nature of the “name issue.” Namely, on the one hand, it was the plight of a people for their right to self-determination – historically, as a people living in Europe the nineteenth century, where self-determination was the concept of the day; and today, ironically, as citizens of an independent and sovereign the Republic of Macedonia.

On the other hand, it was the plight of a minority within a European Union Member State, which has been denied, ever since 1913, its identity, and with that, all the cultural and minority rights that emanate from that right to an identity, including the right to speak its language, the right to nurture and practice its cultural traditions, songs and dances, the freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and so forth.

Since the right to self-determination – a right that is popularly referred to as Common Article 1 of the two International Covenants emanating from the Universal Declaration for Human Rights, namely the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights – is understood and assumed widely by society in the 21st century, and as I have

³⁸⁴ Interview with Darko Kostadinovski, Skopje, 11 November 2011.

already touched upon it in the political and legal part, I will not delve upon it except to restate that, from the Macedonian point of view, the “name issue” has violated the Macedonian peoples’ right to self-determination as citizens of the Republic of Macedonia. This notion will reappear throughout the interviews in the next part.

THE MACEDONIAN MINORITY IN GREECE

REPERCUSSIONS OF A CENTURY OF DENIAL OF ETHNIC IDENTITY

The big riot happened in 1989, when representatives from Greece, Australia, America, Canada, from all the associations of Macedonian refugees – the Macedonians who had been discriminated against – participated in a meeting on human rights in Copenhagen. It was a shock for Greece. Newspapers were very aggressive. That’s when we decided, in order to be transparent, to no longer be a secret committee, but to come out in the open. So in 1991, in one of the Voden (Edessa) villages, 75 delegates, activists, and members of the Committee met, and we chose a name – Macedonian Movement for Balkan Prosperity.... In 1991 Yugoslavia fell apart. So from 1991-1994, many groups, media, social anthropologists, ethnologists, the Greek Helsinki Committee, Minority Rights Group International, various Embassies, UK, USA – started visiting us here, meeting our delegates in these parts of Greece, to see what was happening. We travelled together through the villages in these parts. This was a big shock for Greece. With our contacts from European Movements, we started going higher. In Strasbourg in 1994 we were invited by the Corsican peoples, to join the Rainbow Group which had 16 representatives, all these peoples with problems – the Flemish, Scottish, Bretons, Corsicans...³⁸⁵

Here I will delve into the human rights aspects concerning the Macedonian minority in Greece.³⁸⁶ There are an estimated 200,000 ethnic Macedonians living in Greece today (100,000 according to Christophe Chiclet and Bernard Lory³⁸⁷). This, of course, is an unofficial figure, cited by various international and Macedonian human

³⁸⁵ Interview with Pavle (Filipov) Voskopoulos, President of the European Free Alliance – Rainbow Party (Political Party of the Macedonian Minority in Greece) Ohrid, 13 August 2011.

³⁸⁶ For an overview of the rights of minorities, see for example Alain Fenet, Geneviève Koubi and Isabelle Schulte-Tenckhoff, eds., *Le droit et les minorités: analyses et textes. Deuxième édition* (Brussels: Bruylant, 2000).

³⁸⁷ Christophe Chiclet and Bernard Lory, *La République de Macédoine, op.cit.*, 18.

rights organizations and members of the Macedonian minority,³⁸⁸ as Greece does not collect data on ethnicity.³⁸⁹ In any case, according to Greek policy, “Macedonians” do not exist as an ethnic identity separate from the Greek one. The estimate figure of 200,000 is a mere drop in the water when compared to the total population of Greece which is approximately eleven million.³⁹⁰ What is interesting about this figure is that it is surprisingly low, especially compared to the population of Macedonians in Northern Greece that surpass one million at the onset of the twentieth century. There are several explanations to this dubious figure. One is, that the actual number is much higher, but that due to factors such as assimilation and fear (both of which are evident from the historical analysis, and on which I will elaborate further in the interview analysis), Macedonians simply do not declare themselves as Macedonians. They have either been assimilated to such an extent that they consider themselves Greek; or they are afraid to say who they are, as the interlocutor whom I cited earlier revealed: “we learned to whisper Macedonian... and every time we would speak Macedonian and someone we didn’t know came, we would change the words – we stop speaking Macedonian.”³⁹¹

Yet, in spite of the fear and assimilation factors, if one accepts the population figure, one must recognize that the population of Macedonians in Greece has decreased by eighty percent in one hundred years. This type of extreme reduction in population size of one single ethnic group, in a country whose overall population has increased by ninety percent (from one to eleven million) in the same time period, calls for inquiry into the intent for genocide – especially having in mind the documented policies, laws, reports and official statements specifically targeting the Macedonian population that I have evoked.

The link between human rights – or the cultural rights of minorities on the one hand – and crimes against humanity, is not to be underestimated. Recently for example, I attended a lecture at the Graduate Institute, where the Public Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and the United Nations High Commissioner for

³⁸⁸ According to Pavle Voskopoulos, President of the European Free Alliance – Rainbow Party (Political Party of the Macedonian Minority in Greece), during our interview in Ohrid, 13 August 2011.

³⁸⁹ *Greece*, CIA World Factbook.

³⁹⁰ Eurostat, the European Commission’s Statistical Office.

³⁹¹ Interview with Petre Vockov (Petros Votsis), Ovcharani (Meliti), Northern Greece, 21 July 2011.

Human Rights explained how their offices collaborated. Indeed, the role of the United Nations serves to monitor human rights violations, and as the High Commissioner explained, to alert the International Criminal Court when such violations were in danger of escalation.³⁹²

What is disconcerting about what happened during the Greek Civil War is that it was at one and the same time, a civil war and an international war between former allies (the Allies, who had previously fought the Fascists together with the Communists now fought on the side of the former Fascists, now Royalists, against the Communists). In addition, it became a civil war between two ethnic groups (the Greeks and the Macedonians) in which, the military activities of certain Western states such as the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as projects of Western European royalty, such as Queen Frederica of Hanover, were directly involved. As such, the Greek Civil War represents, for Macedonians, a chapter in world history during which they were physically persecuted by the entire West, and which has built mistrust towards Western policy and politicians. This may have repercussions to this day, as seen in the interviews. On the other hand, for Western European politicians, it represents, perhaps, a chapter that they would like to forget. The fact that the Communists were former allies in the fight against fascism, and that a majority of them, especially in the North of the country, where most of the fighting took place, were all of one single ethnicity, namely Macedonians, implies that the West was not just engaged in an international fight against Communism but in a civil war that had genocidal implications. Links to genocide and crimes against humanity can be established when observing that there was a disproportionate use of force (napalm bombs) targeting civilians in a specific geographic area of the country where the majority population was Macedonian. Links to genocide can also be established with Queen Frederica's policy regarding the children of Macedonian ethnic origin during and following civil war – which, even more alarmingly, were sometimes not orphans when they were taken to one of her orphanages or so-called Child Towns (Paidopoleis). These practices were observed in more detail by Vassiliki Vassiloudi

³⁹² "Accountability as a Common Goal : Dialogue between the ICC Prosecutor and Human Rights Actors," Public Lecture, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, 3 June 2016.

and Vassiliki Theodorou, as well as Loring M. Danforth and Riki Van Boeschoten, as discussed in Chapter IX on the Greek Civil War.

As defined in the *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948)*, genocide is “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”³⁹³

As we have seen, in the past century, the Macedonian population in Greece has endured all of the acts defined under the Genocide Convention above. What can be gathered from the revelations introduced in the historical analysis, then, as well as the repercussions on the population of the Macedonian minority in Greece, is that even though on the surface, the “name issue” seems to be a relatively trivial bilateral issue that could be resolved with negotiations between the two countries under the auspices of the United Nations, its deeper analysis proves that it is at heart, the consequence and protraction of a human rights issue that is of paramount significance to present-day notions of ethnic cleansing. Ethnic purification policies (such as population exchange and forced assimilation) that were common at the beginning of the twentieth century in order to solidify newly-born nation-states, and which are no longer tolerable today, have simply been replaced by technical policies. To make things worse, these technical policies are being perpetrated not only by Greece, but by the international community at large, and more specifically, by the United Nations and the European Union. In order to understand the “name issue” then, it is crucial to understand the historical and present-day policies of Greece towards the Macedonian minority in Greece. The summary of the 1994 Human Rights Watch report, still available on the homepage of Human Rights Watch, gives a good synthesis of those policies:

“Although ethnic Macedonians in northern Greece make up a large minority with their own language and culture, their

³⁹³ Article 2, *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, 1951.

internationally-recognized human rights and even their existence are vigorously denied by the Greek government. Free expression is restricted; several Macedonians have been prosecuted and convicted for the peaceful expression of their views. Moreover, ethnic Macedonians are discriminated against by the government's failure to permit the teaching of the Macedonian language. And ethnic Macedonians, particularly rights activists, are harassed by the government — followed and threatened by security forces — and subjected to economic and social pressures resulting from this harassment. *All of these actions have led to a marked climate of fear in which a large number of ethnic Macedonians are reluctant to assert their Macedonian identity or to express their views openly. Ethnic Macedonian political refugees who fled northern Greece after the Greek Civil War of 1946-49, as well as their descendants who identify themselves as Macedonians, are denied permission to regain their citizenship, to resettle in, or even to visit northern Greece. By contrast, all of these are possible for political refugees who define themselves as Greeks. Greek courts have denied permission to establish a "Center for Macedonian Culture." Ultimately, the government is pursuing every avenue to deny the Macedonians of Greece their ethnic identity.*³⁹⁴

Since the fact-finding mission and subsequent publication of the 1994 Human Rights Watch Report, countless other fact-finding missions were conducted in Greece, resulting in numerous reports by other human rights NGOs, as well as by well-known international and regional entities, such as the United Nations Independent Expert on Minorities Issues (2008), the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (2008), and the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (2009), to name a few. All of these concluded with more or less the same findings: that the Macedonians in Greece are denied the right to their ethnic identity. The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe stated that he “remains concerned by the authorities’ refusal to recognize the existence of any other kind of minority except for the ‘Muslim’ one and the over-restrictive practice of Greek courts which by proceeding to a preventive, in effect, control of certain applicant minority associations have refused to register them.”³⁹⁵ The European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance encouraged the Greek authorities to take further steps toward the

³⁹⁴ Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, “Denying Ethnic Identity: The Macedonians of Greece,” Summary, (New York/Washington/Los Angeles/ London: Human Rights Watch, 1994). Emphasis added.

³⁹⁵ Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, *Report on Visit by Greece on 8-10 December 2008*, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, February 19, 2009).

recognition of the freedom of association and expression of Members of the Macedonian and Turkish communities living in Greece, to closely examine allegations of discrimination and intolerant acts against Macedonians, Turks and others, and to take steps to recognize the rights to self-identification of these groups.³⁹⁶

Perhaps one of the most revealing conclusions came from Ms. Gay McDougall, the United Nations Independent Expert on Minorities Issues, who concluded that:

“The [Greek] Government does not recognize the existence of a Macedonian ethnic minority living in Central and West Macedonia. They vehemently deny it and attribute political motives to those who claim it. Successive governments have pursued a policy of denial of the ethnic Macedonian community and the Macedonian language. Many consider it a modern day version of Tito’s efforts to create a myth of a Macedonian nation giving support to its expansionist claims against that region of Greece. The response of earlier Greek governments was to suppress any use of the Macedonian language and cultural activities. In recent times the harsh tactics have ceased but those identifying as ethnic Macedonian still report discrimination and harassment. They consider it of crucial importance for their continued existence that their ethnic identity and distinctiveness is respected. The Macedonian language is not recognized, taught, or a language of tuition in schools.”³⁹⁷

Further, the Independent expert relies on her conversations with the community to conclude that:

“Representatives claim the denial of the right to freedom of association, citing unsuccessful efforts since 1990 to register the organization ‘Home of Macedonian Culture’ in Florina ... Some described pressure not to display their Macedonian identity or speak Macedonian, previously banned in some villages. Despite their claim of the existence of distinct Macedonian villages, they described a general fear to demonstrate their identity. It was acknowledged that the situation had improved from a previous era, however they described a ‘softer discrimination’ manifested in general hostility and pressure on the part of authorities and the media. One participant stated: ‘I am a Greek citizen...but I am

³⁹⁶ European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, *Report on Greece* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 15 September 2009).

³⁹⁷ U.N. Human Rights Council, *Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development: Report of the Independent Expert on Minority Issues, Gay McDougall – Addendum, Mission to Greece* (8-16 September 2008), A/HRC/10/11/Add.3, 18 February 2009.

Macedonian when talking about my village, my language and my identity.’ Some recounted personal experiences of harassment including aggressive interrogation at borders. Another described being physically attacked allegedly due to his ethnic identity and membership of the Rainbow party. Another representative stated: ‘Greece does not trust the people who live here because they don’t feel Greek – they don’t speak Greek.’ Participants described experiencing problems in performing songs in the Macedonian language and traditional dances.”³⁹⁸

In her Report, Gay McDougall also refers to the laws that were adopted refusing entry and citizenship to the refugees who fled during the Greek Civil War, which I refer to in my interview analysis in Chapter IX as the Refugee Children:

“44. Community representatives highlight discriminatory laws affecting thousands who fled Greece during the Civil War (1946-1949) who were stripped of their citizenship and property. A 1982 Ministerial Decision (Law no. 106841) stated that “Free to return to Greece are all Greek by Genus who during the civil war of 1946-1949 and because of it have fled abroad as political refugees”. This decision excludes those identifying as ethnic Macedonians and is therefore considered discriminatory. Law no. 1540 of 1985 allowed political exiles to reclaim confiscated property, again establishing that only “Greeks by Genus” qualify. Those claiming Macedonian identity allegedly experience difficulty obtaining visas for visits to Greece to see relatives or attend funerals. The Greek authorities respond that visas are granted without problems and that pensioners receive their visas gratis.”³⁹⁹

Two cases that have been brought before the European Court of Human Rights exemplify the denial of the Macedonian ethnic identity, and more importantly, the reluctance on behalf of Greek authorities to change anything about this situation.

THE CASE OF SIDIROPOULOS AND OTHERS V. GREECE (JUDGED BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 1998)

The Case of Sidiropoulos and Others v. Greece, in which the European Court for Human Rights concluded that the Greek authorities were in violation of Article 11-Freedom of Assembly and Association of the European Convention for Human Rights

³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 14.

³⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 13-14.

and instructed Greece to pay the applicants for their costs and expenses, did not manage to convince the Greek authorities into allowing the opening of a “Home of Macedonian Civilization.” In April, 1990, six Greek citizens of ethnic Macedonian origin, namely Mr. Sidiropoulos, Mr. Dimtsis, Mr. Anastasiadis, Mr. Boules, Mr. Sovislis, and Mr. Seltsas, decided, together with forty-nine other people to form a non-profit-making association with headquarters in Florina, whose objects would be the “cultural, intellectual and artistic development of its members and of the inhabitants of Florina in general and the fostering of a spirit of cooperation, solidarity and love between them.”⁴⁰⁰ However when in June, 1990, they lodged an application for registration of their association under the name “Home of Macedonian Civilization,” with the Court of First Instance of Florina, the Court dismissed their request on the grounds that it “considers that the true object of the association is not the one indicated in its memorandum of association but the promotion of the idea that there is a Macedonian minority in Greece, which is contrary to the country’s national interest and consequently contrary to law.”⁴⁰¹ This response portrays the official Greek policy, but does not convey the feeling of a pluralistic, democratic society in the European Union – a country that is considered to be the cradle of democracy and Western civilization. The story continues. The six applicants appealed against the judgment of the Florina Court to the Court of Appeals in Thessaloniki, in September of that same year. That Court also dismissed their appeal on the grounds that it had good reasons to believe that “the purpose of using the term ‘Macedonian’ is to dispute the Greek identity of Macedonia and its inhabitants by indirect and therefore underhand means, and discerns an intention on the part of the founders to undermine Greece’s territorial integrity.”⁴⁰² Before coming to this conclusion, the Court goes to the trouble of explaining the history of Macedonia and the Macedonians (as seen by Greece) and convincing the audience of the Greekness of the Macedonian people and their region to such an extent, that it seems unnatural and unusual for a Court decision. In any event, in spite of the European Court of Human Rights decision in 1998 that Greece is

⁴⁰⁰ *Case of Sidiropoulos and Others v. Greece* (57/1997/841/1047) Judgment, Strasbourg, 10 July 1998, European Court of Human Rights, 8.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁴⁰² *Ibid.*, 11.

in violation of Article 11, the Home of Macedonian Civilization, remains unopened, two decades after attempted establishment in 1990. As the United Nations Independent Expert on Minorities Issues, Gay McDougall concluded in her report following her fact-finding mission in Greece in 2008, “The Greek courts refused to register the organization “Home of Macedonian Culture” in Florina on the grounds that its objective was to promote the idea that ‘there is a Macedonian minority in Greece, which is contrary to the national interest and subsequently contrary to law.’ ... Domestic court decisions have failed to conform to the European Court finding and the Home of Macedonian Culture remains unregistered. The [Greek] government notes that the application for registration of the association remains pending before the Supreme Court.”⁴⁰³

As a matter of fact, in 2015, following a complaint filed by the Greek Helsinki Monitor, the European Court of Human Rights ruled for the second time, that the decision of the Greek Court not to allow the opening of a Home of Macedonian Culture was in violation of the freedom of association.⁴⁰⁴

THE CASE OF OURANIO TOXO AND OTHERS V. GREECE (JUDGED BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 2005)

In another case, namely the case of Ouranio Toxo and Others v. Greece, the complaint against Greece was filed with the European Court for Human Rights in 2001, by the political party Ouranio Toxo, and two Greek citizens, namely Pavlos

⁴⁰³ U.N. Human Rights Council, *Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development: Report of the Independent Expert on Minority Issues, Gay McDougall – Addendum, Mission to Greece* (8-16 September 2008),

⁴⁰⁴ A/HRC/10/11/Add.3, 18 February, 2009, 13.

It should be added that the Macedonian minority is not alone in its fight for fundamental rights in Greece and it is not the only one whose cultural association has been disallowed or banished by the Greek authorities. In effect, on September 29, 2008, the European Court of Human Rights judged on the Case of Tourkiki Enosi Xanthis and Others v. Greece, in which the Home of Turkish Youth of Xanthi was dissolved on the basis of an appeal by the Mayor of Xanthi to the Court of First Instance of Xanthi to ban the association’s usage of the word “Turk.” The appeal which was accepted. Needless to say, the European Court of Human Rights found Greece guilty of violation of Article 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights again, and Greek authorities once again proved that they will not be swayed by a European Court decision, nor by numerous recommendations by the aforementioned international entities. (Source: *Affaire Tourkiki Enosi Xanthis et Autres c Grèce*, Requête N 26698/05, Arrêt Définitif, Strasbourg, 27 mars 2008, Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, Conseil de l’Europe, <http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int>)

Voskopoulos and Petros Vassiliadis. The political party Ouranio Toxo (Rainbow), founded in 1994 and whose aims include the defense of the Macedonian minority living in Greece, regularly took part in the elections since its foundation. In 1995, however, when the party leaders established its headquarters in the town of Florina, and put up a sign on its balcony with the name of the party in both Greek and in Macedonian, they were greeted by a violent protest by the town's inhabitants, which according to them, was organized by the town council and priests from the local church. On the day that this happened (13 September 1995) "the public prosecutor at the Florina Criminal Court ordered the removal of the sign on the ground that the inclusion of the party's name in Macedonian was liable to sow discord...among the local population. Police officers removed the party's sign without giving any explanation to the applicants..."⁴⁰⁵ "That evening, according to the applicants, while they were inside the party headquarters, a crowd of people, among whom they apparently recognized the mayor, the deputy mayor and certain town councilors, gathered in front of the building to shout threats and insults at them, such as "traitors," "dogs" "death to the dogs of Skopje" you're going to die" and we'll burn everything. The crowd also allegedly demanded that the applicants hand over the sign. ... On 14 September 1995 at about 1:30 AM, a number of people allegedly attacked the party headquarters, and after breaking down the door, assaulted those inside and demanded that they hand over the sign, which the applicants did. Another group entered the premises at approximately 4 AM, threw all the equipment and furniture out of the window and set it on fire. According to the applicants, throughout these events they made a number of telephone calls to the police station located some 500 meters from the party headquarters, but were apparently told that no officers were available to come out. The applicants submitted that the public prosecutor's office took no action against those involved in the incidents. However, criminal proceedings for inciting discord were brought against four members of the party, including the second and third applicants under Article 192 of the Criminal Code. The bill of indictment stated that 'they had affixed to the party headquarters a sign on which,

⁴⁰⁵ *Case of Ouranio Toxo and Others v. Greece* (Application no. 74989/01) Judgment, Strasbourg, 20 October 2005 (Final, 20 January 2006) European Court of Human Rights, 3.

among other things, the word vino-zito (rainbow) was written in a Slavic language, and had thus sowed discord among the local inhabitants...” The applicants were committed for trial...”⁴⁰⁶ The trial took place three years later, before a single judge in the Florina Criminal Court who acquitted the applicants. On the other hand, no trial was made against those responsible for the incidents, on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence. In 1999, the Indictments Division of the Florina Criminal Court considered discontinued criminal proceedings against them, even though the four party members had lodged a criminal complaint for the offenses of incitement to discord, breach of peace, destruction of property, criminal damage, trespass, threats, insults, and arson. The applicants (party leaders) appealed that same year, and in 2000 the Indictment Division of the Court of Appeal for West Macedonia in Greece dismissed the appeal. When they appealed on points of law that same year, the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation dismissed their appeal as inadmissible in 2003 – nearly a decade after the incident.

The logical conclusion to the examples we have just seen is that in a society where local authorities, church members, police, and all levels of the justice system stand firmly behind acts that the European Court of Human Rights characterizes as in violation of the European Convention for Human Rights, something must be wrong with that society. To be sure, these are just a few of the examples in which Greek authorities use power to threaten the Macedonian minority and minimize any expression of Macedonian culture or language. Consider, for instance, the case of Father Nikodim Carknjas, imprisoned for holding a liturgy in the Macedonian language. Even though he had climbed successfully up the ladder since becoming a monk in 1973 and earned the title Archimandrite, in 1992 he was expelled from the Greek Orthodox Church, under the church charges of having behaved unethically. He has filed a complaint against Greece at the European Court of Human Rights to enable the existence of a Church in which liturgy can be held in the Macedonian language. He was recently sentenced to six months in prison for an incident that happened eight years ago, that was provoked by a group of young boys who vandalized his house (throwing eggs and stones, breaking his windows and singing Greek nationalist

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

songs). He was accused that he had hit one of the boys who did this – a charge which he denies.⁴⁰⁷ This constitutes an indirect threat by authorities, which in most democratic societies would be considered as inappropriate interference in judicial matters by the executive branch.

The domestic policies targeting the identity of the Macedonian people exemplified above, the reader will agree, add another dimension to, and allow a more introspective understanding of, the “name issue” and Greek policy vis-à-vis the name (i.e. identity) of the Republic of Macedonia. Indeed, they prove that the human rights dimension is an inseparable component of the “name issue.”

Thus, I come to the conclusion that the Greek position and interests in creating and winning the “name issue,” is not innocent – that in fact, the ultimate goal is the “de-jure” elimination of the existence of a separate “Macedonian” identity within Greece, as well as outside its borders. Within, through a number of policies including population exchange, expulsion, internal displacement, torture, child abduction, assimilation and pressure; and outside its borders, through diplomatic pressure, allies, and lobbying international organizations to enforce a “technical” change that would change the Macedonian identity in the books, in their passports, and forever. This is why an essential component of this thesis has been dedicated to discussing the history of official human rights violations towards the Macedonian minority in Greece. Looking at the “name issue” through the prism of Greek history especially in relation to its Macedonian population which was once a majority, and the denial of this minority to their ethnic identity by the Greek authorities, I come to the conclusion that in fact, Greek domestic policy vis-à-vis its Macedonian minority, and Greek foreign policy vis-à-vis the Republic of Macedonia has one essential goal, and that is to eliminate the existence of a separate Macedonian identity. The reasons behind this goal, as discussed before, include the preservation of a reputation of a country with a glorious past – a country that is known to all as the cradle of European civilization and the bastion of democracy. The maintenance of the political, economic, and societal factors, including the Greek identity, that come with this reputation, as well as closing

⁴⁰⁷“Пресудата за Никодим Царкњас е дел од политиката на Грција,” *Утрински Весник*, 18.03.2009, http://www.time.mk/story_18c139c283_article_b5ae5ffc90.html

a dark chapter of history related to the Macedonian minority, are all motives that explain, but in no way excuse, the birth of the “name issue.”

THE OFFICIAL RESPONSE BY GREEK AUTHORITIES

What was the response by Greek authorities to these European Court of Human Rights Decisions and Recommendations by the regional and international human rights bodies? When world renowned human rights activist Panayote Dimitras, founder of Minority Rights Group, Greece, and one of the founders of Greek Helsinki Monitor, told me he that he had been a professor in Athens but had been expelled from the university due to his lectures and a book he published on the Turkish minority in Macedonia, I was not surprised to read the official responses on the Macedonian minority. Dr. Dimitras, who has been covering human rights issues in Greece for the last twenty-five years says:

The first issue that Greek Helsinki Monitor covered was the Macedonian minority, and that became something that we've been characterized for – positively or negatively, depending on what point of view you have. We initially made statements and written reports, later started litigating in Greek and European Courts...There is an expression in Greece: most people are advocates of human rights within limits. And limits include migrants and refugees and they exclude ethnic minorities. ...In the last 15 years, we have been the main source of information to all international governmental organisations, so the United Nations Treaty Bodies, Council of Europe, and so on, and we won more than a score of cases in the European Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee. A large number deal with Roma, but the Greek government will be more upset with cases that we won – especially the one we won this year, which they are about to try to send to the Grand Chamber – on the Home of Macedonian Civilization [Culture]. In July 2015, for the second time, the European Court of Human Rights convicted Greece for violation of the right to freedom of association, and we estimate that Greece doesn't want to implement it right now. They will try to have a referral to the Grand Chamber, hoping to have a second hearing. They won't succeed. But ... A terrible thing, if I can summarize, from day one, twenty-five years ago until now, is that it's impossible, to find interlocutors in Greece and to work constructively on ethnic minorities. They are not supposed to exist, so most people are afraid to touch on such taboo issues....Claiming the right to be recognized as an ethnic Turk in

Greece – let alone a Macedonian – is still effectively impossible in the sense that it will be counterproductive...⁴⁰⁸

Thus, even the second European Court of Human Rights Decision on the same case – the Home of Macedonian Civilization (or Culture) – will likely be ignored. These are then, the official responses by Greek courts with regard to the cases referred to the European Court of Human Rights. I would like to outline below, the official reaction to the reports and recommendations by international and regional bodies cited above, such as the United Nations Independent Expert on Minorities Issues, and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights.

In response to the Report of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, the Greek authorities issued a statement entitled “Claims on the existence of a so-called “Macedonian” minority in Greece” which went on to state that: “There is no ‘Macedonian’ minority in Greece. In this regard, Greece reiterates its position, that any recommendation by UN treaty bodies and, a fortiori, by other monitoring mechanisms, on the protection of rights of persons claiming to belong to a “minority” cannot determine the existence of a minority group or impose on States an obligation to officially recognize a group as a “minority”. The statement went on to quote the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, which had stated in the *Gorzelik v. Poland* case that “a definition [of “national minority”] would be very difficult to formulate. In particular, the notion is not defined in any international treaty, including the Council of Europe Framework Convention (see ... for example, Article 27 of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 39 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 1992 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities). Likewise, practice regarding official recognition by States of national, ethnic or other minorities within their population varies from country to country or even within countries; ... it cannot be said that the Contracting

⁴⁰⁸ Interview with Dr. Panayote Dimitras, Geneva, 23 September 2015.

States are obliged by international law to adopt a particular concept of “national minority” in their legislation...”⁴⁰⁹

The Greek authorities responded in a similar fashion to the 2009 Report issued by the United Nations Independent Expert on Minorities Issues. “Mayors from towns in the region protested the idea that people within their constituencies consider there to be a Macedonian ethnicity. The government dismisses such claims as misleading and not corresponding to existing realities. The government asserts that Macedonia was historically Greek and its inhabitants direct descendants of Ancient Hellenes. It refers only to those speaking a “Slavic dialect or oral idiom”, confined to family or colloquial use. They point out that this dialect has similarities with the language spoken in the neighboring former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The government emphasizes: ‘that there are two and a half million Greeks who identify themselves as Macedonians (Makeones) in the regional/cultural context and that attempts to usurp the name and national cultural identity by using the term “Macedonian” to describe a so-called minority are unacceptable.’ The government suggests that ‘insignificant’ numbers of votes gained by the Rainbow party is evidence of a lack of popular support for their claims.”⁴¹⁰

Finally, in 2008, the Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis, elucidated quite clearly the position of Greek authorities in a letter he wrote in response to a letter from the Macedonian Prime Minister in which the latter had asked him to respect the rights of the Macedonian minority in Greece. Here is what Mr. Karamanlis wrote:

“Mr. Prime Minister,
As you are aware for the last fifteen years Greece and your country, pursuant to the relevant decisions of the UN Security Council, have committed themselves to negotiations in the framework of the United Nations regarding the *name issue* which “needs to be resolved in the interest of the maintenance of

⁴⁰⁹ Comments of the Greek Authorities (Appendix), *Report by Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Following his visit to Greece on 8-10 December 2008: Issue reviewed: “Human rights of minorities,”* Strasbourg, Strasbourg, 19 February 2009, 15.

⁴¹⁰ United Nations Human Rights Council, *Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development : Report of the Independent Expert on Minority Issues, Gay McDougall – Addendum, Mission to Greece (8-16 September 2008),* A/HRC/10/11/Add.3, 18 February, 2009, 14-15.

peaceful and good neighbourly relations in the region” as stipulated by the Security Council in Resolution 817.

In the past few weeks the Special Envoy of the United Nations Mr. Matthew Nimetz presented some ideas that could move the negotiations forward. I regret that it is precisely at this critical moment in the negotiating effort that you have chosen to send your letter dated July 10th, 2008. ...

Mr. Prime Minister, your letter far from promoting the negotiations and the good neighborly relations with my country raises a number of non-existent and unsubstantiated issues that militate against the strenuous efforts made by Greece. It also aims at interfering in the domestic affairs of a neighboring state and deviates from the objectives of the ongoing negotiations.

There is no “Macedonian” minority in Greece. There never has been. In this respect, any allegations regarding the existence of such a minority are totally unfounded, politically motivated and disrespectful of the historic realities of the Region. As for any properties issue, any individual could make use of any legal recourse before the Courts, including the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.”⁴¹¹

What can be deciphered from these responses is that the reasoning behind them is identical to the reasoning behind the Greek official response to the “name issue.” In other words, the rationale behind Greek policy vis-à-vis the Macedonian minority in Greece is identical to the rationale behind Greek policy vis-à-vis the Republic of Macedonia’s official constitutional name, the name of the ethnic identity of the majority of its citizens, and the name of the language they speak. To be succinct, both policies imply or clearly state that there is no Macedonian people, no ethnic Macedonian identity, and no Macedonian language. In other words, according to Greek authorities, Macedonians and their language do not exist – within Greek territory, and beyond its borders. This, the reader will agree, is quite a chilling proposal for any Macedonian. Let us see, then, what is the human – Macedonian – response to these policies.

⁴¹¹ Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis' Letter of Reply to the Letter from Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, 19 July, 2008, Source: Embassy of Greece Press Office, Washington, DC (Athens News Agency) <http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/Content/en/Article.aspx?office=3&folder=92&article=23959> (italics added)

XII. THE HUMAN ASPECT

AN INTERVIEW ANALYSIS OF THE MACEDONIANS IN MACEDONIA AND IN GREECE

CATEGORIES AND ELEMENTS

I had started out my interviews with random sampling, using the snowball approach. In fact, in the beginning I looked for the ordinary citizen, whose opinion on the “name issue” was of most interest to me, especially in view of one of my hypotheses – namely that the “name issue” had caused individual and collective trauma.

It was not until I interviewed a “Refugee Child” (Macedonians who had been born in Greece but who had fled from Greece during the Greek Civil War), that I realized I needed to interview more individuals with such a background, as they had previous personal experience with Greek authorities, and thus had a unique point of view. Now that they were living in Macedonia and were free to speak their hearts and mind and could look back into their past from a distance, these persons were living witnesses of the Greek authorities’ position on Macedonians. It must also be known that these individuals – who number twenty-eight thousand, if not more – and who had been taken by the International Red Cross to orphanages all across Eastern Europe, were reluctant to speak about their past in Yugoslavia before 1991 (i.e. before the fall of Yugoslavia). This was due to the fact that following the Greek Civil War, Yugoslavia and Greece entered in good relations, and thus Yugoslavia had made arrangements with Greece not to allow the Macedonians to stir too much noise. As a matter of fact, according to one child of a refugee child, Yugoslavia had allowed the Refugee Children to settle in Yugoslav Macedonia only twenty years after the Greek Civil War. Previously, they had been transferred through Yugoslavia and were taken all over Eastern Europe, with the brunt of the refugees being settled in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Ukraine. Here is the story of his parents:

My mother was first taken to the Czech Republic, while my father was taken to Voivodina [Yugoslav Serbia]. There, in Voivodina, there are Macedonians in Bela Crkva, Sombor, and Gakovo, to this day. Then from there my father went to the Czech

Republic, where they were divided by age groups, separated from their siblings. From the Czech Republic, because there was apparently no more space, both my mother and my father (who did not know each other at the time) were taken to Tashkent, Uzbekistan (then USSR). To this day, in Tashkent, there are many Macedonians. There is a neighborhood on the outskirts of the city that is all Macedonian. Irena's (my girlfriend) father also went there. When they took them by train, they saw camels. They didn't know that in Asia there were camels as well, so they thought they were in Africa! [...] My mother studied in Ufaa – a city in the Ural Mountains, between Europe and Asia. After she graduated, she came back (to Yugoslav Macedonia) in 1960s. Yugoslavia, only then proposed the option that the refugees come “back” or at least come closer to their home places in Aegean [Greek] Macedonia to Yugoslav Macedonia. After 20 years! Can you imagine? When she came here, my mom had a hard time, because her Macedonian was a bit different from the one in Skopje, while she had studied in Russian all her life. She met my father here, who came back a bit earlier from Tashkent. He came to “Michurin” – the “Aegean Neighborhood of Skopje” as they call it. They received apartments from the Government.⁴¹²

Though the policies changed somewhat in Yugoslavia from the late 1960s, even then it was taboo for Refugee Children to talk about their past. As such, it was not until after 1991, with the independence of Macedonia from Yugoslavia, that these Refugee Children, now in their late 60s and older, citizens of the independent Republic of Macedonia, as well as of democratic Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Russia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Poland, Romania, Canada, Australia, the United States, and many other countries, started speaking about their past, organizing reunions, rediscovering their relatives and friends. I remember back in the late 1990s, seeing my mother shaking her head in disbelief, as she watched a news story covering one of the first such gatherings of the Refugee Children, organized by the World Macedonian Congress.⁴¹³ None of us had had any idea of the plights these people had suffered, nor

⁴¹² Interview with Irena Pavlovska and her partner, Children of Refugee Children. Skopje, 12 August 2011.

⁴¹³ The World Macedonian Congress is headquartered in the Republic of Macedonia, and held its first General Assembly in 1993. It dates back to 1889, when it was first established by Macedonian emigrants in Europe who initiated the idea of an independent Macedonian state, at a time when Macedonia was under the Ottoman Empire. They formed a parliament and government in exile in order

of their numbers. Here was an international gathering of doctors, lawyers, scientists, professors – worldly Macedonians from all corners of the globe, who had lived an incredible past, and whose dreams were unraveling right in front of our eyes. At last, after so many decades, they were able to gather again, to see long-lost relatives and friends – even brothers and sisters. These were unforgettable moments, for the Refugee Children, but also for those of us who watched and who had never known that among us lived a people with a silent suffered past.

This was when I started my sampling. At first I identified Macedonians who had some connection to Greece, whether they were currently living in Greece (i.e. the Greek citizens, making up the Macedonian minority in Greece), or whether they had fled from Greece during the Civil War (i.e. Refugee Child) or at another point in time (i.e. Aegean Macedonian), in order to answer my second hypothesis – this hypothesis being that the “name issue” was a bi-product of previous and current Greek policy vis-à-vis its Macedonian minority. In addition to these Macedonians with the “Greek connection” so to speak, I also made it a point to interview several other types of Macedonians, citizens of Macedonia who were of a professional background that was directly or indirectly related to the “name issue.” As the “name issue” had political, legal historical, cultural, linguistic and other aspects, I interviewed politicians, diplomats, political analysts, historians, linguists, poets, journalists, individuals involved in the preservation of cultural heritage, as well as other people who did not necessarily have one of these backgrounds, but who were outspoken regarding the “name issue.” As such, by the end of my interviews, when I reached the saturation point, I had interviewed quite a diverse pool of Macedonians. This was not the case for my Greek interviewees, for reasons discussed previously which had to do with gaining trust, linguistic issues, and so on, and which, in a way, alleviated my work as I only focused on the Macedonian point of view, which had been my initial intention.

Inspired by the seventy interviews I undertook (of which fifty eight were with Macedonians, and twelve were with Greeks), I divided the Macedonians into five large categories based on how they saw the “name issue” and/or their identity in relation to

to lobby the European and international community about the right of the Macedonian people to self-determination.

this. I also came up with about thirty elements which were recurrent across the categories which explained my interviewees' positions. Out of the five general categories, category I and II were Macedonians in Macedonia, and categories III and IV were Macedonians in Greece. Individuals in Category V were the so-called Refugee Children – Macedonians who had been born in Greece but who had been fled from Greece during the Greek Civil War (1946-1949) – and who were currently living in Macedonia. Their story was so unique and important to this thesis that I decided to put them in a separate category, which I will discuss at the end of this chapter.

I divided the Macedonians in Macedonia from the Macedonians in Greece because as I started interviewing the Macedonians in Greece, I realized from the very beginning that the issue of concern for them was not necessarily the name of neighboring Macedonia: it was their right to their ethnic identity and the cultural rights that emanated from it. More specifically, they were concerned about their right to speak their language, write and publish their books, and sing and dance their songs – openly and freely, without fear of repercussions by Greek authorities, or how this might affect their relationship to their employers, neighbors, and even friends and family. As we will see throughout my interviews of Macedonians in Macedonia, identity, in fact, turned out to be the major concern for Macedonians in Macedonia as well, although what they feared was not repercussions by the authorities of their country of birth and citizenship, but rather by the international community. In other words, Macedonians in Macedonia felt that their identity was being threatened by the representatives of European Union, the United Nations, NATO, and the Great Powers – which they alternately referred to, and which sometimes they simply summarized as the “international community” – while Macedonians from Greece felt that their identity was being threatened by their own Greek authorities.

The right to nurture and preserve their ethnic identity, then, was the major concern of all Macedonians, in Macedonia and in Greece, whether they were in Category I, II, III, IV or V. The most evident symbol of their ethnic identity seemed to be language, which came up in almost all interviews. All this will be discussed in more detail as I introduce each category.

Here then, is the division of categories:

Macedonians in Macedonia

- I) Pro Name Change
- II) Against Name Change

Macedonians from Greece

- III) The Hesitant Tukasni
- IV) The Outspoken Ones
- V) The Refugee Children

Category I (Pro Name Change) were Macedonians in Macedonia who saw the “name issue” as a threat to the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the country, and who were afraid that if Macedonia kept the name, it would never become part of the European Union and NATO, which they saw as tragic for the country. Some of these – usually the younger ones – also tended to view the “name issue” as an instrument of political manipulation by the Government in power, and were for a speedy settlement, so that “the country can move on.” The older, more seasoned individuals from this group saw themselves as “future-oriented” Macedonians, who were concerned about the future of their children. They were for a more cautious approach to a solution which would satisfy both sides. Most of these were from among the elite in the country and most of them sympathized with or were affiliated with the main opposition party against the Government in power.

Category II (Against Name Change) consisted of Macedonians in Macedonia who saw the “name issue” as a threat to their identity and as a plot by external factors (i.e. not only Greece, but the entire international community) to eliminate the existence of Macedonia as a country and Macedonians as a separate people. Most of these were for the Government to stop negotiations altogether, and to keep the name at any and all costs. This group included more or less two thirds of my interviewees in Macedonia.

Category III (The Hesitant Tukasni) were Macedonians currently living in Greece, who called themselves “tukasni” (meaning, “local,” or “from here” in Macedonian). These were Macedonians who were born in Greece and had been (and still were) Greek citizens all their lives. They spoke Macedonian, but did not

necessarily identify themselves as Macedonian. Rather, they used the word “local” to identify themselves. (Just as a side note, Greek and Macedonian are two completely different languages.) I had interviewed them during my first visit to Northern Greece, in the beginning of July, 2011. The feeling I gathered from these people was that they were very self-aware and cautious about what they said and how they presented themselves. Even the way I was introduced to them and their attentiveness when they addressed me from the beginning was restrained. It was a friend of mine – a Macedonian from the village of Pozar (Aridea), Greece – who took me one late evening, to his friend’s house for dinner. My cousin and I had just arrived in Greece from Skopje, Macedonia – a two hour drive – and were hosted as “special guests.” For the first hour, we all had polite small talk and spoke in English – even though they all knew we were from neighboring Macedonia. As the evening went by and the group of eight began to trust us, one of them admitted that he also spoke “our language.” Little by little, it turned out that they all spoke Macedonian, and all but one (the girlfriend of one of these guys) were, in fact, Macedonian.

Category IV (The Outspoken Ones) were Macedonians from Greece, who were quite outspoken regarding their ethnic Macedonian identity. In a similar fashion to Category III (The Hesitant Tukasni), they were citizens of Greece, had been born and raised in Greece, and most of them had lived in Greece their entire lives. As opposed to the Macedonians from Category III however, this group of individuals was very loud and clear about their Macedonian identity, and many were members or activists of Vinozito (Ouranio Toxo) – the Political Party of the Macedonian Minority in Greece. These individuals portrayed an aura of having had enough of being silent, and when they expressed themselves they almost gave the impression of having been freed. Some of them were literally loud, as I was interviewing them during the Macedonian “Ilinden” (St. Elijah Day) celebrations in Northern Greece, at the end of July, 2011 – only a couple of weeks after interviewing Category III. The contrast, thus, was quite impressive. As a side note, “Ilinden” is the most celebrated holiday by Macedonians all over the world, and it marks the successful uprising by the Macedonians against the Ottoman Empire in 1903. This uprising led to the establishment of the first Macedonian state, namely the “Krushevo Republic,” named after the winning battle

against the Turks in Krushevo. At this time, geographic Macedonia encompassed the present-day Greek, Bulgarian, and Albanian parts of Macedonia, as well as the Republic of Macedonia, all of which were still under the Ottoman Empire under the name “the Villayets.” It was not until ten years later, that the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, were fought, which ended with the Treaty of Bucharest, with which each of these neighboring countries, acquired a certain percentage of the territory of Macedonia. The present – day Republic of Macedonia, as discussed in the historical chapter, had been acquired by Serbia, and later became an integral part of Yugoslavia.

Category V (The Refugee Children), as mentioned earlier, were Macedonians who had been born in Greece but had fled from Greece during the Greek Civil War (1946-1949). I had the occasion to meet many of these individuals during my second visit to Northern Greece, in July 2011, when I joined a weekend trip organized by Makedon - the Association of Organisations of Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia, based in Skopje, Macedonia. We traveled by bus. Most of the travelers were above 60 years old, all had been born in Greece, and many were going back to Greece for the first time after the Greek Civil War – in other words decades later. The Refugee Children, as they are referred to today, had fled from Greece as Greek citizens when they were children – hence their name. Now they were coming back to their birthplace for the first time in their lives as elderly people and citizens of Macedonia or other countries. Following the Greek Civil War and until 2008, they had been refused entry into Greece unless they signed a document that stated that they were “Greek by Genus,” as pointed out in Chapter XI. In 2008, Macedonia signed a visa liberalization agreement with the European Union, which meant that Macedonian citizens could travel for tourist purposes without a visa requirement to any European Union Member State, including Greece. As such, these Macedonian Refugee Children could enter their birthplace without having to sign a document stating that they are Greek by Genus. We stopped in three villages: Krusoradi, Setina and Popadija. The moments when they got off the bus to see the village they had been born in, and discover the house that they had grown up in, were very touching. Many cried out of joy and recollection of memories. Others felt confusion and deep sorrow as they tried, in vain, to find or remember their house. I only interviewed them following our return

in Macedonia, as this was a unique moment in their lifetime, which I sensed should remain private.

Through my interviews in Macedonia, I concluded that there was a clash between the feeling of having a right to one's identity on the one hand, and having membership in the European Union on the other hand, and this clash had divided society between "pro-name" and "pro-EU" Macedonians, as if in the minds of Macedonians the "name issue" was inextricably linked to EU membership, and the choice was "either-or." In other words, Macedonians were convinced that they had to choose between the "past" and the "future:" either they chose to keep the name and their identity (the past), or they chose to become members of the European Union and live happily ever after in a prosperous European Union (the future). This feeling is understandable, if we recall that effects of the "name issue" have been the denial of membership to NATO (2008), the extension of a date to start negotiations for membership to the European Union since 2005 (one decade), and a "quasi-membership" to the United Nations with all the rights of a fully-pledged member-state, except the right to a flag. To paraphrase what EU Commissioner Jose Manuel Barroso had said in response to my question at his lecture at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva in November 2015, "You have no choice but to change your name. Membership in the European Union is decided upon by all Member States of the Union, who vote in unanimity. If Greece says no, you're out. So if you want Membership in the European Union, you have to change your name." These words echo the words of hundreds of other foreign politicians and analysts, who have either come to the country to say precisely that, or who reside in the country as diplomats and constantly repeat the same.

Through my interviews in Greece, I found that Macedonians were not as concerned about the name, but extremely concerned about their identity. On this point, then, all Macedonians were aligned. In Greece I also felt a clash between two groups of Macedonians, as in Macedonia. There were those who were shy or "hesitant," and those who were "outspoken." However, these two were converging, in line with what I discovered as the most interesting phenomenon in Greece – namely an underground Macedonian cultural renaissance, and a genuine enthusiasm about

the Macedonian language, songs, dances, books and so forth and other cultural manifestations of an ethnic identity. I believe that this was precisely due to the fact that the identity had been suppressed for so long. I cannot even begin to describe the zest surrounding the “Ilinden (St. Elijah) Panagjur” celebrations, where famous Macedonian folk singers and folk dance groups had been brought in to perform. Although, as one of my interviewees quoted earlier had pointed out to me, police cars and “spies” were present at the scene, they were so happy to be able to gather together, listen to and sing their music performed in public live and by Macedonian musicians brought in from Macedonia and all over the world, that they literally did not care – they had passed that stage. They had that sort of “whatever was going to happen, let it happen” attitude. This was a unique moment to enjoy, and they would not let anything spoil it.

XIII. INTERVIEW ANALYSIS OF MACEDONIANS IN MACEDONIA

CATEGORIES I AND II

I would like to emphasize from the start that from among Categories I and II (“Pro Name Change” and “Against Name Change” respectively), which comprise all the interviews I conducted of Macedonians in Macedonia (except for the Refugee Children, which I have put under the separate Category V), not one individual responded in a clear-cut manner that they were for a name change. Although I did not approach them with a yes or no question, what was interesting to note was that all of them thought they had to have a yes or no opinion, and argue it. It was as if they had been taught that there was no middle ground – that they, the population of Macedonia, had to make a choice, and suffer its consequences. I suppose this feeling was a direct result of the fact that so many foreign leaders and experts, as quoted earlier, had by now announced that “if Macedonia did not come to a speedy settlement of the issue (i.e. change its name), there would be dire consequences,” or something to that effect. As my mother once told me over the phone, “all sorts of foreigners are arriving these days telling us that if we don’t find a compromise solution, then I don’t know what...”

So when I asked the question “what is your opinion on the ‘name issue,’ ” which they took as “are you for a name-change,” the automatic first response in both categories was, “look, if I had the choice, of course I would not want to change our name.” The immediate reasoning following this response by individuals in Category I was, “but in order to enter the European Union and NATO, to have peace and security, to have a prosperous economy, and not be isolated from the rest of the world, we need to negotiate and change the name.”

In fact, no one was for a name change. But some (Category I – Pro Name Change) saw it as something that had to be done because we were *living a world of realpolitik* in which Macedonia was a weak and insignificant player and had no say in matters that had already been decided upon by the world powers; thus, if Macedonia wanted a peaceful and prosperous future, it had better give in. Others (Category II – Against Name Change) saw it as something that was sacred and part-and-parcel of the Macedonian peoples’ identity; thus, Macedonia should not give in under any circumstances, no matter what. This was *their right to self-determination*, as well as their right *as citizens of an independent and sovereign country* which had been recognized by over 130 countries in the world. Underlying the two Categories in Macedonia, then, there were two main schools of thought: one that believed that power reigned over justice (Category I Pro Name Change), and the other that believed that justice would eventually triumph (Category II Against Name Change).

One single element prevailed in all interviews in both categories, without exception. This was the element of the identity. Identity was the red line. In other words, all Macedonians in Macedonia (both Category I and Category II) clearly stated that if the name change also meant a change of their ethnic identity, then this was not acceptable. This was where we had to draw the red line and say stop. They were all explicitly unequivocal in this.

There were, of course, other elements that were shared across most interviews in both categories. These included the feeling that the “name issue” was artificial and was being imposed upon Macedonia by foreign powers (which were not limited to Greece); the feelings of fear of the unknown, unpredictability and anxiety; the feeling of injustice, of being wronged; the feeling of being tired of giving up sovereign and

fundamental rights; a feeling of mistrust towards the neighboring countries and their intentions regarding the Macedonian identity and territory; a feeling of disillusionment with and betrayal from the international community in general and the EU, UN, and NATO, specifically; suspicion regarding Greece's true objectives underlying the "name issue"; and the feeling of having to prove their right to their identity and name through history. Many interviewees also raised the fact that the Macedonian minorities in Greece, Bulgaria, and Albania were being denied their basic rights. In this respect, the reasoning entertained by those for a name change was that if Macedonia changed its name, then it would enter the EU, and thus, Macedonians in Macedonia would enjoy the freedom of movement enabling them to have more contact and strengthen their ties with the Macedonian minorities in these neighboring countries, two of which were Member States of the European Union – namely Greece and Bulgaria. Once the borders were open, no one would be able to stop the cultural exchange, and thus, rights would flow naturally. On the other hand those against the name change argued that the widespread injustice towards Macedonians in all countries had to come to an end once and for all. Moreover, if Macedonia changed the name, this would put the Macedonian minorities in the neighboring countries in an extremely difficult position – a point of no return. For, if there no longer was a country called Macedonia, with a people of an ethnic Macedonian identity, then logically, there would be no minority of such a people. Thus, the Macedonian minorities in these countries would technically cease to exist. In fact, Macedonians everywhere would technically cease to exist, and this was precisely the plot that Macedonians of Category II were most afraid of.

In total, I counted thirty or so elements, which altogether, represented what the "name issue" meant to the Macedonians in Macedonia. Whereas Categories I and II had two diametrically opposed opinions on the name change, they were surprisingly unified in terms of the elements that composed the "name issue." In other words, all interviewees used more or less the same features to explain the "name issue" and argue their position. All were unequivocally explicit in that their identity was the red line, that they would not let anyone step over. The only difference then, was that, as stated earlier, individuals in Category I were persuaded that changing the name would

mean membership in the European Union and NATO, and thus, prosperity, peace and a glorious future; while individuals in Category II were more skeptical of the international community, and, more specifically, the European Union and its plans for the future of Macedonia, especially when it came to the Macedonian identity and language. Therefore, they were against the name change, because not only did they consider it a preposterous proposal that they did not even wish to discuss and which went completely against their fundamental human rights and their rights as citizens of a sovereign country, but because they feared that this would also mean an identity change. Moreover, many of these individuals believed in the power of international justice and in the legal solution that Igor Janev, a law professor, had proposed over a decade ago.

Before I delve into the specifics of the elements I have just mentioned, I would like to give the reader a feel for types of people that generally fell into Category I (Pro Name Change) and Category II (Against Name Change) and quote one person from each, in order to portray typical rationale behind their arguments.

CATEGORY I: PRO NAME CHANGE

We would not even be concerning ourselves with the name, if it was not a hindrance for our entry into NATO and the European Union. *There are several things to consider... Does the Macedonian red line mean protecting the identity? And if so, what does that entail? ... Does changing the name mean changing the identity? ... The Macedonians preserved their identity even before they had their own country, right? We are talking about national self-consciousness, national identity. They preserved it during the Ottoman Empire. Macedonians preserved their identity when they lived elsewhere, like Bulgaria, Greece, Australia and so forth. ... Can you really negotiate about an identity, or is it a category that you simply cannot negotiate – I am what I am, while whether you recognize me or not is an entirely different story. ... Under which logic, do we have to ask of someone to recognize our identity? What we can do is to ask in our international communications, that within the framework of the international organizations like the United Nations and the European Union, we are able to preserve some elements which are associated with our identity, like the code “MK,” the Macedonian language, the country Republic of Macedonia with or without prefix/suffix, which will enable us to fight for our identity.*

And finally, if identity is the ability of a nation to preserve its language, to develop its culture, to develop its science, its art, then can you better preserve identity under the conditions of a twenty-year isolation from the European Union and NATO, or as part of the European Union and NATO? If you accept some type of compromise which is not justified, which is not in line with the Universal Declaration for Human Rights, the UN Charter, and so on and so forth, but if you admit, at the same time, that in the world, apart from rights, there exist powers, there exists political reality – not always do those who are righteous win, sometimes the more powerful win. So if in that world you make a compromise that will allow you speak Macedonian, to express yourself in Macedonian, to develop the Macedonian culture, to develop the Macedonian dispute, in the whole world, then you have to think, what is it in the framework of realpolitik, that Macedonia should do, in order to – not destroy, but to preserve and strengthen the Macedonian identity.⁴¹⁴

Changing the name, then, according to Ambassador Gjorgji Spasov, professor of political science and a former Minister of Justice, would not mean changing the identity. In fact, being part of the European Union and NATO would strengthen the Macedonian identity. In addition to this argument, he brings up the question of power and realpolitik and states that, Macedonians might well have all the rights in the world, but the world is full of selfish players and their interests, and has no place for the weak. So Macedonia must decide whether it wants to be isolated for another twenty years, or give in to the pressure exerted by the powerful. It must “bend its back” as one of my interviewees told me informally. Here is another quote which characterizes this category:

I think that we have to think about how to have a better future. We shouldn't blindly tie ourselves to the idea that the name should not be changed. For me, the most important is how Macedonia will develop.⁴¹⁵

To conclude on Category I, then, these were Macedonians in Macedonia who were very practical in their thought but often inconsistent in what they thought about the “name issue.” In general, they started out by saying that “of course, if I had a

⁴¹⁴ Interview with Ambassador Gjorgji Spasov, Skopje, 11 February 2011. Emphasis added.

⁴¹⁵ Interview with Anonymous Macedonian 1, Skopje, 16 August 2011.

choice, I would be for keeping the name.” But then they ended up saying that in fact, if we look at things practically and reasonably, we do not have a choice but to change the name. Most of these people tied the “name issue” with entry in the European Union and NATO. Their reasoning was, if we did not come to a solution on the “name issue” or stopped the negotiations, we would never be a part of the European Union and NATO, and would remain isolated and underdeveloped. Most of these people were conscious that the Greek side probably had other interests behind the changing of the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia, but still, they saw no other option, no other way out. Frequently, they did not dwell on the repercussions that the name change would have on the identity – or ruled that idea out, saying that if the name changes, Macedonians will still remain Macedonians as they have in the past. Many of them were of the *realpolitik* school of thought, and saw Greece as a very strong counterpart, with good allies and against whom there was no way Macedonia could win. For them, the most important thing was to “move on” and get the “name issue” over with, in order to enter the European Union and NATO, so that Macedonia would go forward. Most of these people criticized the current Macedonian Government and had leanings toward the opposition, or were citing what the opposition had said in the news. Almost all attacked the ongoing project “Skopje 2014” with which the Macedonian Government was building statues from all periods of history, rebuilding Skopje with cultural monuments, museums, philharmonic halls, and new public institution buildings in classical architectural style. They called this project “antiquisation” and they were against going back into history.

CATEGORY II: AGAINST NAME CHANGE

No one has ownership of history. History is only a part of a human life which it records and transmits to later generations. Everything and everybody passed through this territory. From antiquity to today, various tribes, peoples, and populations passed through here. We live here today. I, as a citizen of the Republic of Macedonia, have within me, my genes, and in my children's genes, everything that passed through this territory. This is the cultural-historical inheritance which belongs to us because we live here

*today. Whether I am from the antiquity, whether I am Slav, whether I am Turkish, or Armenian – that's a story that no one can figure out. What is important is that I identify myself as a Macedonian. My parents raised me as a Macedonian. And that's my self-identification. No one can tell me from outside that, listen, you were wrong all these years. And your parents were wrong, as were your grandparents and great-grandparents and your great great grandparents further back. They were not Macedonian. And that's why today you will have to change your name.*⁴¹⁶

According to Dr. Cepreganov, Director of the Macedonian Institute for National History, and professor of history, there is no discussion about identity – it is not only a right, but something that has been passed on from generation to generation throughout history: a cultural-historical inheritance that belongs to the Macedonians. The name has been inherited by the Macedonian people, as a people that have been continuously living on the territory of Macedonia for generations, and to this day. He also uses the term right to self-identification. While many peoples had passed through the territory of Macedonia, and Macedonians were, no doubt, mixed, they identified as Macedonians.

Notice how both individuals in the two categories focus on identity, which again, as mentioned previously, is the one uniting factor – the sacred element.

Category II, then, were individuals personally touched and hurt by the “name issue,” and who felt that it was a terrible injustice that was being imposed onto the Macedonian people – by the Greeks, as well as by the “international community” (i.e. the EU, the UN, NATO and the “Great Powers”). This category of people felt strongly that the human rights of the Macedonian people must be regained, and that something must be done in order to ensure that Macedonians keep their constitutional name. Most of them feared that changing the name would also mean changing the identity. They regarded the Greek proposal as preposterous, and they felt that the real aim behind this proposal was the de-facto elimination of the Macedonian people, language, identity, and history. Many used strong words like “this is cultural genocide,” “we are being eliminated,” and so forth. Several of them argued quite convincingly and using historical analysis, that the Greeks had falsified their history, and were living a myth

⁴¹⁶ Interview with Dr. Todor Cepreganov, Skopje, 12 July 2011. Emphasis added.

that wrongly included ancient and medieval Macedonian history, as well as half the territory of Macedonia. That was why, they said, the Greeks were so set on “erasing us” and changing history. They claimed that it was the Greeks who were after the Macedonian identity and who were stealing the Macedonian identity and not the other way around. Most of these people were for stopping the negotiations altogether and for trying to pursue other means to keeping the name, such as political lobbying of the international academic and diplomatic community and legal action through the mechanisms of the International Court of Justice. These people also frequently cited ancient history to explain their identity, to give a feeling for how they feel about who they are, to prove the continuity of the name “Macedonia” on these lands, and to prove why they should be allowed to be called “Macedonians.” For this category, human rights, including the right to an identity and to self-determination, were essential. From what I noticed, these people were generally an older generation of people and had a higher education level.

THE ELEMENTS

There were almost thirty elements that recurred throughout the interviews. These elements were phrases or thoughts or expressions of feelings that were repeated by nearly all of my interviewees. I have divided them, for clarity’s sake, into ten main themes, which, altogether, represent the Macedonian (in Macedonia) point of view on the “name issue.” Please note that Category V, the Refugee Children, appear and are quoted in this part – as they are currently Macedonians in Macedonia – as well as in the part on Macedonians from Greece, where they were born and grew up as children. In the table below, I have outlined the ten main themes as well as the elements that fall under those themes.

RECURRING ELEMENTS THROUGHOUT THE INTERVIEWS - DIVIDED INTO TEN THEMES

IDENTITY

1. No one can **erase our identity. This is our red line.**

LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

2. There was **evidence of the existence of the language** long before its codification. Thus, the language, literature songs, dances and traditions are proof of the existence of a consciousness of a Macedonian identity since the 18th century.

FEELINGS

3. Feeling of **fear and anxiety, of pressure.**
4. The feeling of **injustice. We are being wronged.** This entire affair is **absurd!** Refusal to talk about the issue. The feeling of **disbelief.**
5. The feeling of being **blackmailed.** This is a **precedent in history.**
6. A **fear of the unknown.** Every day brings new changes. **Unpredictability** is the rule.
7. The "name issue" is **artificial** and was **imposed** on us; we have no issue with our name.

RIGHTS

8. The constitutional name is a **fundamental sovereign right of a people in an independent nation state. The legal elements** are on our side – the "name issue" is in violation of international law.
9. **Our name is our right to self-determination.**

THE NAME, AND NEGOTIATIONS

10. We **never should have accepted negotiations.** We should **not even discuss this – a name is non-negotiable.**
11. If we must negotiate, the "**dual formula**" is the best solution.
12. **Referendum or no referendum?**

REALITY: REALPOLITIK, FOREIGN POWERS and THEIR INTERESTS

13. We live in a world of **realpolitik**, where **power rules over justice. Greece is strong, and Europe is its ally.**
14. The "name issue" was sparked **by foreign interests - great powers and their territorial, geostrategic and ideological aspirations.** It is **Europe that created the "name issue."** The existence of Macedonia is in confrontation with the idea of the origins of Europe.

THE FUTURE, AND MACEDONIA'S ENTRY INTO THE EU AND NATO

15. We must resolve the "name issue" in order to enter the **European Union and NATO.** We need to move on, to live for the future. The "name issue" is hindering us.
16. The **European Union plays a dirty game:** rather than saying upfront that it is they who are forcing us to change our name, they want us to commit suicide. Then they will have achieved their goal, and won't be to blame for it.
17. The **United Nations** has **no right** to do this to us.

THE FOUR WOLVES: OUR NEIGHBORS and THEIR MACEDONIAN MINORITIES

18. We are in **constant danger of the Four wolves** – neighboring Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, and Serbia – who want a piece of Macedonia, and who want to assimilate Macedonians. Whereas before they did it through schools and churches, now they are trying to do it through **subversive political means**, such as the "name issue," handing out Bulgarian (EU) citizenship, and not recognizing their Macedonian minorities. **Bulgaria does not recognize our language, Serbia our church, Greece our name and identity. And we have an unsatisfiable Albanian minority. So we have a real problem with our neighbors - if they unite, it's a recipe for a Balkan War scenario.**
19. There is a **Macedonian Minority in Greece, Bulgaria, and Albania, none of which are recognized**, and whose human rights are violated, including the freedom of association, freedom of speech, and cultural rights.

THE GREEKS AND THEIR INTENTIONS

20. It is **paradoxical**, that it is **Greece that should feel threatened**, while it is **Macedonia that is the victim.** It is they who want to change our name, not we who want to change their name. It is they who took Macedonian territory following the Balkan Wars, not we who took their territory. So why should they feel threatened?
21. The name Macedonia became a **problem for Greece only after the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991.** Ironically, until the late 1980's the name Macedonia in Greece was even **forbidden!** And now they are claiming it. Why?
22. **Greece is Europe's "cradle of democracy and civilization"** while ironically, it violates our most fundamental rights.

HISTORY

23. Greece wants **primacy over antiquity**, and exclusivity over Macedonian history. But **Greece is a myth.** The paradox is that we are being told we are stealing the name of a nation-state that was invented in the 19th century by Europe.
24. **Alexander the Great was an international**, and not a national hero. He belongs to us all. If anyone has the right to claim him, and claim ancient Macedonian history, it is us.
25. We **have a historic and territorial right to call ourselves Macedonians.** There has been a **continuity of Macedonia and Macedonians** on this territory throughout history.
26. Our **ancestors** from the 19th century **fought hard for our right to self-determination and our identity. We cannot/must not give it up so easily.**

IDENTITY

No one can erase our identity. This is our red line.

As I mentioned earlier, all Macedonians aligned behind the phrase “no one can erase our identity; this is our red line.” These had also been the words that Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski had used during his speech on the 20th anniversary of the independence of Macedonia from Yugoslavia (September 8, 2011), as quoted earlier. This same loud and strong stance was repeated to me by many of my interlocutors. One of the most concise and to the point quotes I received that illustrates this feeling was from my interview with Darko Kostadinovski, Foreign Policy Advisor to the President of the Republic of Macedonia, who concluded his interview by quoting President Ivanov. His words, and the words of the Prime Minister quoted earlier, show that the citizens and politicians of Macedonia were aligned in viewing the identity as sacred:

The essence is – and you can quote me on this as the position of the President – we do not wish to talk to anyone at all in this world about our identity – Greece included. Nor do we need an approval from them that we are who we are.⁴¹⁷

The following interlocutor’s words echo the same feeling:

We do not have to even talk about or discuss identity. And we do not have to prove it [...] I don’t like talking about identity. We are a product of everything that was settled, lived and existed as a culture on the Balkan, for x number of centuries. And now I have to argue with someone about whether or not I have a Slav feeling? Well part of me is Slav. And I feel that. In the end, I speak a Slavic language. I do not feel like a “Slavophone”. OK, yes if you break down the meaning of the word – I speak a Slavic language. But a “Slavo-Macedonian?” I cannot accept that. The identity that has been nurtured in me is Macedonian. I feel like a Macedonian.⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁷ Interview with Darko Kostadinovski, Skopje, 11 November 2011.

⁴¹⁸ Interview with Elizabeta Buova, Skopje, 11 August 2011.

So, on the one hand, there was the strong and loud stance on the identity – we do not need approval to be who we are. In addition to this, there was also the logical historical argument behind the identity, as put forward by Dr. Todor Cepreganov, below:

*Macedonia is a geographical term, a territory on which a certain people have lived, who identified and identify themselves as Macedonians, and who were identified by their neighbors as Macedonians....*⁴¹⁹

This promoted the idea that Macedonians have lived on this territory, and have identified themselves as Macedonians throughout history. Here are two other quotes exemplifying this:

*Regarding the name: it persisted throughout history. In the nineteenth century for example, I wrote an article on the literature works in reflection of the Macedonian identity. Even in their surnames, they used to put their Macedonian identity. For example, "Nikola Makedonski." And those are works written in the 1850s, 1860s and 1870s. We the Macedonians, we, the Macedonians. So we self-identified as Macedonians. Gjorgia Puleski was very clear for example: "Macedonia is one and it belongs to the Macedonians." Many other authors write this.*⁴²⁰

*Some of our nineteenth century writers and intellectuals, such as Gjorgija Puleski, Krste Petkov-Misirkov (who is born in Pella, the birthplace of Alexander the Great, today in Greece) considered that we are descendants from ancient (antique) Macedonians. This is also very important because it shows continuity of consciousness of being Macedonian.*⁴²¹

There was also the fear of losing the identity – of being crushed – related to the feeling of mistrust towards Greece and the international community and their intentions, and the feeling of an urgency to act, so as not to lose the identity. This feeling was universal among the Macedonians in Category II (Against Name Change), as well as Category V (Refugee Children) and Category IV (Outspoken Ones) in Greece.

⁴¹⁹ Interview with Dr. Todor Cepreganov, Skopje, 12 July 2011.

⁴²⁰ Interview with Dr. Valentina-Hristovska, Skopje, 16 August 2011.

⁴²¹ Interview with Eftim Kletnikov, Skopje, 11 February 2011.

The identity factor was raised by many of my interviewees themselves – in other words, I did not have to inquire whether changing the name would also inevitably mean changing their identity. They referred to it themselves. This meant several things. First, it meant that the idea that the “name issue” was tied to their identity was somewhere in the back of their minds - whether or not they were for a name change. They were, thus, aware of the 2009 Greek negotiating position, and the increasingly absent use of the adjective “Macedonian” in the European Commission Progress Reports on Macedonia, both of which had been publicized by the media. They were also aware, no doubt, of many other signs which indicated that the “name issue” was going in that direction. While some of them turned a blind eye to these events, saying no one could change their identity, they all recognized them, and talked about them while rationalizing their position on the name issue. This, in turn meant that deep down, they were afraid, and not entirely sure of what was in store for them, and not entirely trustful of what was being told to them by the so-called international community.

One of the rare interviewees who told me they had not thought about the link to the identity, characterizes the sort of conscious blindness to the idea that there was a link between the name and the identity. At the same time, however, she insisted that “we are who we are” and that no one would be able to change that.

Well, you are opening some things that I have never thought about. We are who we are. And we will remain that way. While whether Macedonia will remain Macedonia or will be called Northern Macedonia, I don't know if that will change our identity.⁴²²

By showing its “ugly face” – namely that it was a smoke screen behind which lay the interest to modify the Macedonian identity – the “name issue” inevitably also led to questions that Macedonians had never before posed themselves. These were questions on the *historic origins* of their identity. Whereas all agreed they were Macedonians, the question was, were they descendants from the Macedonians from

⁴²² Interview with Anonymous Macedonian 1, Skopje, 16 August 2011.

ancient history, or the Slavs in the seventh century? As if one could trace the lineage down to either one. This artificial and imposed question, however, created yet one more division in society. Namely, up until that point, no one had ever posed himself the question of which period their ancestors really derived from, or who their ancestors were for that matter. They were Macedonians, as had been their parents and grandparents, and that was it. Now, with the “name issue,” it was as if they were being asked by the international community to explain themselves – to explain the origins of their identity – and they were frantically trying to prove their existence. As if they were afraid that if they could not scientifically prove their lineage, then they would lose the right to the name Macedonia, and thus to their identity.

These questions, in turn, led to another split in society, which can be perceived on several levels, including the political level as well as the level of the perception of the historic origins of the identity. To be precise, this was a split between, on the one hand, Category I (Pro Name Change), most of whom were also pro-opposition and against the government, and most of whom also believed that the origins of their Macedonian identity derived from the Slavs in the seventh century and not the ancient Macedonians; and on the other hand, Category II (Against Name Change), most of whom were pro-Government, and who believed that the origins of their Macedonian identity derived from ancient Macedonian history. Whereas the former were against what they called the “antiquisation project” – namely the Government’s project with which statues and monuments were built from the antique and other periods – while the latter supported it. Whereas the former were pro-future, the latter were pro-history. As such the “name issue” divided society to such an extent, that it would not be wrong to say it contributed to the current situation where demonstrations against the Government in power are expressed in colored eggs being thrown at the statues and monuments and the buildings that represent, to them, “antiquisation,” or simply “history.” To make things worse, this “schism” was reflected not only among society, but started being discussed in academic circles as recalls one of my interviewees below. In fact, as will be discussed further down in the section on history, the “name issue” prompted an entire movement where Macedonians –

ordinary people, historians, and academics alike – tried to prove the origins of their identity, to find historical links and answers to their identity.

No one understands that the whole identity, especially in the Macedonian case, derives from the name. For some other peoples, the identity does not derive from the name, but with the Macedonian case, our identity derives from our name. And that's why, for example there is a schism in the academic circles in Macedonia – are we antique Macedonians or are we Slavs? This is also imposed on us – this is an imposed schizophrenia. For example, the Institute for National History published a history in which we are linked to the antique history. Now in the Encyclopedia of the Macedonian Academy for Sciences and History, they promote the thesis that Macedonians are Slavs. So in fact, we do not have a consensus as to what we are. It is stupid to claim that we are Slavs and not antique, because if we claim that we are Slavs, we don't have the right to the name. Our name is from before the Slavs.⁴²³

It was as if one camp was afraid that if they could not scientifically prove their lineage, then they would lose the right to the name Macedonia, and thus to their identity – the only one they had known. While the other camp was entirely against bringing up history into their lives – whether through statues or architecture. They just wanted to get on with life, and look towards the future. Below are the two juxtaposed views.

I do not agree with the term “antiquisation” that they have invented – to explain the growth of statues here in Skopje, that portray heroes throughout history. If we look at it that way, Europe is full of antiquisation. France, Germany – who until recently called themselves the Holy Roman Empire. If our “name issue” is accepted in the international legal and political arena, then the Germans could sue the French for the same reason and say that the French carry their name. Because the Franks were a Germanic tribe.⁴²⁴

We could have reached this stage with much less energy. If we didn't waste energy on works of art that prove who we are. If we were silent, we didn't buzz, didn't do overemphasized things. ... Why didn't we rebuild Skopje in a revolutionary style like Valencia for example, or Sevilla, or Brazilia? Everything new that was built was built in Baroque style, whereas Skopje could have been a place

⁴²³ Interview with Eftim Kletnikov, Skopje, 11 February 2011.

⁴²⁴ Interview with Eftim Kletnikov, Skopje, 11 February 2011.

*where you can invite all architects from the world. With that much money, and that many public institutions that are being built...Anyway, it will look nice, but what bothers me is the overly big accent on architecture from antiquity, to prove our identity.*⁴²⁵

My analysis regarding this dilemma, however, is that in the end, most Macedonians – even those quoted above – agreed with the simple thesis that their origins were mixed and could be traced to all periods of history. No one really claimed to be direct a descendant of Alexander the Great. It was just a matter of being able to prove that they had – as any other people on this Earth – an origin. We are not “trees without roots” as one of my interlocutors said. However, they had entered a vicious cycle in which they found themselves having to prove what no people had to prove, as no one was a direct descendant of any ancient people. To put it more poetically:

*We have to get out of this socio-pathological habitus, because the antique era belonged to all Europeans. There is no Athenian which will be able to prove to you that ancient Greece belongs to the present-day Greek nation. The same goes for the ancient Macedonians, the Romans and so forth.*⁴²⁶

LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

There was evidence of the existence of the language long before its codification. Thus, the language, literature songs, dances and traditions are proof of the existence of a consciousness of a Macedonian identity since the 18th century.

As the language is a very important part of the “name issue” and an integral part of anyone’s identity, I made it a point to interview a couple of people with a background in language and literature.

Prof. Dr. Ana Martinoska, who had fifteen years of experience at the Institute of Macedonian Literature, with a specialization on the link between literature and folklore – or folk literature – was one of these interviewees. Her PhD was on Blaze Koneski, who is said to have codified the standard contemporary Macedonian

⁴²⁵ Interview with Elizabeta Buova, Skopje, 11 August 2011.

⁴²⁶ Interview with Ambassador Jordan Plevnes, Skopje 22 August 2011.

language. When I asked her about the questioning of the existence of a Macedonian language before its codification by Blaze Konseki in 1945 – which is the Greek argument – here is what she said:

There are such propositions in relation to the Macedonian literature, which are connected to the existence of the Macedonian language and the Macedonian nation, which refer to whether here we have continuity, or can we call on our linguistic and cultural heritage before the formalization of the Macedonian state and the Macedonian language. I am one of those who believe that the development of our literature was atypical. Of course we cannot make simple parallels to what was happening in the other parts of Europe during the same period, but I do believe that the continuity of the Macedonian literature should be traced back, having in mind the literature from the Middle Ages. Science has already proven that there was a Macedonian redaction of the old Slavic texts at that time. We have colleagues here in the Institute who are working on that. From the Middle Ages onwards, the oral traditions – oral literature – is a major link in the development of Macedonian literature. ... This development – through the oral and not written path – is evident through the songs, the tales, and all other genres, that we sometimes do not take too seriously, such as riddles, on which I worked on significantly. Therefore, these are part of the every day life, the creativity of a people before the formalization of the Macedonian state and language. And by all the features, it is obvious that it is something authentic. ... We are talking about collective creativity here which the entire collectivity accepts as its own. ... I am talking about the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries – because it is from these periods that we have witnesses which we are able to trace. It is well known that in that period, the historical conditions have an influence on what is written, how it is written and where it is published. We are talking about a period during which in Macedonia there are no Macedonian schools, when in Macedonia the Macedonian language is not spoken officially, when in Macedonia there is no Macedonian publishing house ...⁴²⁷

Yet the language flourished. For her part, Valentina Mironska-Hristovska points out that literacy and creativity flourished at that time:

As I studied the nineteenth century, I started seeing the ties, the culturological circumstances, and so on. When you analyze the deeds of an author, he doesn't talk about himself but about the state of affairs of that period. The people I study – all of them were

⁴²⁷ Interview with Dr. Ana Martinovska, Skopje, 16 August 2011.

*revolutionaries, intellectuals, teachers – they all had several activities so that they could attain what we have today, this nation, with this name and language. Then they used to say national consciousness, now we say nationality, and we are beginning to say identity. The terminology changes but the essence remains the same.*⁴²⁸

There is general agreement among scholars that the quest for education and cultural transmission is a fundamental characteristic of human societies, whether this transmission is written or oral. This, perhaps, is one of the keys to understanding the Macedonian point of view in the “name issue.” Much of the misunderstanding regarding the existence of Macedonians and their self-identification is related to the gaps in written history of their existence, the appearance of their own literature under printing houses in foreign countries (for lack of their own), the very late official codification of their language – long after the appearance of their own written literature, and perhaps most alarmingly, the existence of foreign written literature on Macedonians that portrays a skewed version of reality, inspired by political and territorial ambitions that involved nation-state building. The combination of these factors, exacerbated the “Macedonian Question,” and continues to traumatize Macedonians through the “name issue” today. As Jane Austen would have said, the pen was simply not always in their hands.

As a matter of fact, there is increasing awareness that oral histories are just as important – if not more important – as written histories. Also, cultural practices and manifestations may be as charged with history as history books. For instance, it is through the music that we pass on and nurture our culture, our emotions and our language, and through music that we remember and are remembered. When all else fails, music prevails.⁴²⁹ This is also the opinion of Boris Trajanov, a renowned Macedonian operatic baritone and UNESCO artist for peace⁴³⁰ who was one of the initiators of the campaign entitled “Don’t you FYROM me: Say Macedonia: Call me by

⁴²⁸ Interview with Dr. Valentina Mironska-Hristovska, Skopje, 16 August 2011.

⁴²⁹ As is illustrated for example by the story of Moses Asch, the founder of Folkways records; see Isabelle Schulte-Tenckhoff, “De père en fils? Moses Asch et la collection Folkways: Entretien avec Michael Asch,” *Cahiers de musiques traditionnelles*, Vol. 16 (2003), 189-202.

⁴³⁰ UNESCO, “Nomination of Boris Trajanov as UNESCO Artist for Peace,” February 24, 2005, Available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=25698&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

my Name.” He says that it is the old folk songs that prove that there was a uniquely Macedonian language prior to 1945 (contrary to the Greek thesis that the Macedonian language and identity were created by Tito in 1945). Some of these folk songs, which predate the codification of the language, or the formation of Yugoslavia for that matter, have been recently claimed by Bulgaria. In other words, now Bulgaria claims that these songs are Bulgarian. Yet, Trajanov insists, there is a vast difference between the Bulgarian language and the Macedonian language in terms of emphasis, and hence rhythm, which falls on the first or third syllable in Macedonian, and on the second in Bulgarian. A musically schooled or talented individual can easily tell whether a song was written in one or the other language. This is because the rhythm of the words and the melody must coincide. A song that was written in one language and sung in another will sound “off.”⁴³¹ Indeed, Macedonian music is internationally well known for its melody and its original 7/8ths rhythm, and the *kaval* (a type of wooden flute).

Dance is another important cultural aspect of a people, and a way of transmitting traditions and identity from generation to generation. It has also been an important “preservation technique” for Macedonians, such as in the case of the *teshkoto* (“the Difficult One”) that Macedonians perform as a way to preserve and protect their culture, and as a demonstration of their lifelong struggle for their identity and existence. The *teshkoto* dance begins very slowly and is performed only by men. It is very long and danced very softly, deliberately, and very close to the ground. The rhythm picks up a very fast pace only on the seventh (and last) minute of the dance – as if to say, be patient, it takes time to earn your rights and your identity, but it pays off in the end. So the last minute completely changes the mood, almost from mourning to a celebration. As was described on a website created especially for this dance, “[n]o other dance from our rich folklore, mirrors as well the such painful past, deep sadness and yearning for freedom of the Macedonians.”⁴³² An article from the newspaper *Macedonian Nation* states that “The Difficult One” is a state of inner tension in which feelings are communicated using the signs and movements of the

⁴³¹ Sigurjon Einarsson, “A Name is a Name: A Film About a Nation Held Hostage Because of its Name,” Macedonia Foundation Production, 2009, Available at <http://www.anameisaname.net/EN/index.html>

⁴³² “An Analysis of ‘The Heavy One,’” by Blaze Koneski, 12.29.2013 <http://makedonskijazikosmo.weebly.com/blog/8>

legs and body, including the [slow] rhythm of these signs.⁴³³ The feelings are precisely the feelings I will touch upon, in the next part of this chapter. Macedonia nominated “Teshkoto” for the 2005 United Nations Third Proclamation of Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity.⁴³⁴

FEELINGS

Feeling of fear and anxiety, of pressure.

The feeling of injustice. We are being wronged. This entire affair is absurd! Refusal to talk about the issue. The feeling of disbelief.

The feeling of being blackmailed. This is a precedent in history.

A fear of the unknown. Every day brings new changes. Unpredictability is the rule. The “name issue” is artificial and was imposed on us; we have no issue with our name.

Of course, no one will be able to rename me, rename us, because we are the ones who determine our identity...⁴³⁵

Who is to guarantee that after they change my name my identity won't change? If, say, the name becomes Republic of Northern Macedonia, then will I become a Northern Macedonian? And will my language become Northern Macedonian? Having in mind what is happening, everything is possible. ... These days we are living history in movement. Every day brings new changes and anxiety, and you can never be sure that what was said today, will actually be.⁴³⁶

One of my interviewees who raised the element of the “name issue” being imposed upon Macedonians was Darko Kostadinovski, Foreign Policy Adviser to the Macedonian President, and a career adviser, with twelve years in the Cabinet of the President. He had previously advised two other Presidents, and he was very clear with the position of the current President Ivanov, who, as was seen earlier, was the

⁴³³ Blaze Smileski, “The Difficult One, its Roots, and its Offspring”, *Macedonian Nation*, 9 February, 2011, Available at <http://www.mn.mk/zosto-makedonska-nacija-2009>, <http://www.mn.mk/kultura/3533-Teskoto-negovite-koreni-rozbata>

⁴³⁴ UNESCO, “Nomination of Boris Trajanov as UNESCO Artist for Peace,” February 24, 2005, Available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=25698&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

⁴³⁵ Interview with Ambassador Viktor Gaber, Skopje, 2 September 2013.

⁴³⁶ Interview with Dr. Todor Cepreganov, Skopje, 12 July 2011.

first to consistently insist on putting an emphasis on the human rights aspect of the “name issue.” By doing so, he also speaks louder to the feeling that the “name issue” is imposed on Macedonians, and that they feel threatened by it. It is a violation of a human right that is seen as a power game played by a powerful on a weak player.

President Ivanov, has repeatedly come out with a very clear position regarding the “name issue.” We are faced with an imposed dispute. We have found ourselves in the middle of this dispute against our desire and now we cannot get out of it, and this is not our fault ... That is why we say – yes, we want to talk, we want to be constructive, we participate, we have ideas, we have initiatives – but only within the framework in which the discussions are being lead. And that framework is a name for the international use within the framework of the United Nations system and other international organizations. Nothing more and nothing less.⁴³⁷

Due to the perception of Macedonia being powerless and small, there was also the fear of “being crushed” as one of my interlocutors put it. This same individual – a renowned poet - had initiated, among other things, an international letter campaign through the Pen Club, to call upon the international community the gravity of this matter.

We are not powerful, we are a small, crushed tribe (I often cite Blaze Koneski who says this). This term is important for you Vera, to use this term. I also cite Blaze Koneski, where he says “our name is great, they will try to take it away from us.” So in fact, he foretold what is happening to us today... This Macedonian fight has no end. Try to finish this dissertation and publish it before they crush us.⁴³⁸

Ambassador Jordan Plevnes, poet and former Ambassador to France, explained that he felt from Greece, a national egoism directed towards Macedonia.

The “name issue” is an anti-European act. It is the very conditionality and the application of the veto principle, which the father of the European Union, Jean Monnet defined in the 1960s as follows: “if we start using the principle of veto the countries will burden themselves with national egoism.” This national egoism, is precisely what is being realized with the Greek example. That national egoism which Monnet spoke of as a barrier to the formation of the European Union, is now present as a reality in

⁴³⁷ Interview with Darko Kostadinovski, Skopje, 11 November 2011.

⁴³⁸ Interview with Eftim Kletnikov, Skopje, 11 February 2011.

*which a peace-loving country is being blocked. So we are a victim of this national egoism. It is an anti-European, anti-historic act.*⁴³⁹

RIGHTS

The constitutional name is a fundamental sovereign right of a people in an independent nation state. The legal elements are on our side – the “name issue” is in violation of international law.

Our name is our right to self-determination.

Many of my interviewees spoke of human rights, and especially the right to self-determination.

Now from the aspect of human rights, according to the Universal Declaration for Human Rights, all the constitutive elements of the European Convention for Human Rights, the Helsinki Act constituting OSCE, and all these other acts of regional organisations, all human beings are born equal, with all qualities and international civil and political rights. So all people are equal, regardless of their religion, sex, and all these other elements. So every human being, on the basis of the right to self-determination, to which group he/she will belong, has the right, together with the rest of the people, which are of the same origin, language and beliefs, to constitute a state as an international-legal entity. So the Macedonians, or the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia on the referendum on September 8, 1991, expressed themselves that the Republic of Macedonia should continue to exist as an independent and sovereign country, under the name “Republic of Macedonia.” So, one of the highest principles of democracy, namely the referendum, as a feature of direct democracy, is already fulfilled by Macedonia. And from the aspect of human rights, the imposition of an obligation to negotiate the name, the identity, and all the constitutive elements of a country, represents an implicit derogation of the fundamental human rights of all peoples who want to live in a political community – let’s say, the Republic of Macedonia – and who are citizens of the Republic of Macedonia.⁴⁴⁰

One of the most prominent views in terms of the legality of the “name issue” under international law is that of Igor Janev, whom I interviewed in Belgrade in February of 2011, where he lives, as an advisor to the Serbian Government. Igor Janev,

⁴³⁹ Interview with Ambassador Jordan Plevnes, Skopje 22 August 2011.

⁴⁴⁰ Interview with Anonymous Macedonian 2, Skopje, 4 July 2014.

a Macedonian legal expert, who had advised the Serbian Government on how to deal with the recognition of Kosovo, published an article in 1999 in the American Journal of International Law, where he analyses the legality of Resolution 817 on the “name issue.” I have referred to his article in the legal part of the thesis, which is in line with what he told me during our interview, as cited below:

My opinion is well-known. I think the “name issue” should be resolved through an Advisory Opinion which will be addressed by the United Nations General Assembly to the International Court of Justice, on the legality of the criteria during the admittance of Macedonia into the United Nations. It has to be established whether those criteria of the United Nations Charter are additional and illegal in relation to Article 4, paragraph 1, and to assess whether such conditions are illegal. In this context, when such an Opinion would be received, on the basis of the precedent of 1948, where it is said that additional criteria must not be added, nor can be voted on, I would expect that when such an Opinion is accepted by the General Assembly, which receives an answer from the Court, then the Republic of Macedonia would be established, because the provisional reference [i.e. “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”], as illegal, would no longer be able to be used. Because the conditions for the reference and for negotiations are not legal. The Court has already proclaimed itself as competent to establish for specific countries whether the criteria are additional or not, as in the case with Portugal. Portugal had a problem with the diplomatic recognition on behalf of the Soviet Union. But they [the Court] clearly said that the recognition by another country represents an additional criteria, and that it cannot be a criteria for membership. Having this in mind, it [the Court] will proclaim itself competent for the Macedonian case, and will establish, on the basis of the same criteria which it must use, that these conditions are illegal for Macedonia, and that what it can do is determine its own legal identity. Which is valid for every country. Every country only informs about its name – a separate international decision is not brought for this matter. In this sense, Macedonia will have the same right, as every other country, to secure a name or to establish a name in the United Nations.⁴⁴¹

Most of the Macedonians in Category II (Against Name Change) promote this view. Take for example, the following civil servant, who has a legal background.

⁴⁴¹ Interview with Dr. Igor Janev, Belgrade, 5 February 2011.

For me, the entry itself into the United Nations is problematic, because it breaks the jus cogens norms, in other words, mandatory principles in international law. Therefore, what Macedonia needs to do is ask for an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice, which in turn can give the opinion on whether the legitimacy of the entry of the Republic of Macedonia in the United Nations was disputable. If this kind of initiative is undertaken by Macedonia, and if the International Court of Justice gives a positive opinion, i.e. that the legitimacy of the entry was disputable, Macedonia should think about reapplying to enter the United Nations. Thus, with the new entry of Macedonia into the United Nations under the name “the Republic of Macedonia, the obligation to negotiate the name with Greece would no longer be valid.”⁴⁴²

In the end, however, he too concludes that we must negotiate, for we are a powerless little country living in a world of *realpolitik*.

However, I think that in reality this idea would be science fiction, as international law cannot be effectuated to this level, because power is the dominant category in international politics. And Macedonia is bound to negotiate, in contradiction to all the fundamental principles of human rights.”⁴⁴³

All international laws and principles have been treaded upon. The name derives from our identity. We are Macedonians. Macedonians have self-identified as Macedonians all throughout history, and have been recognized as Macedonians by their neighbors to this day. The United Nations has no right to impose upon me another name in order to accept me. I enter there as a free citizen who chose his name, and I want to be accepted under that name.”⁴⁴⁴

THE NAME, AND NEGOTIATIONS

We never should have accepted negotiations. We should not even discuss this – a name is non-negotiable.
If we must negotiate, the “dual formula” is the best solution.
Referendum or no referendum?

⁴⁴² Interview with Anonymous Macedonian 2, Skopje, 4 July 2014.

⁴⁴³ Interview with Anonymous Macedonian 2, Skopje, 4 July 2014.

⁴⁴⁴ Interview with Dr. Todor Cepreganov, Skopje, 12 July 2011.

*It is absurd to change the name. My name is Dushko. Maybe Robert is better, but my name is Dushko. The same goes for Macedonia. People here make it a problem, whereas there should not even be a discussion about this.*⁴⁴⁵

*If you are asking how I feel intimately and personally about the “name issue,” of course I will tell you that it should be Macedonia – Macedonia and nothing else. However, I was born in the Socialist Federal Republic of Macedonia, which was earlier Narodna Republika Makedonija, so these prefixes changed, but they didn’t make me less of a Macedonian when I was born during Yugoslavia. So in that sense, I am aware, if thinking common sense, that we no longer have a position and that we can push our story until the end. In other words I am aware that some type of compromise is practically necessary.*⁴⁴⁶

Many said that the negotiations should stop all together: that negotiating about our name was nonsense and in complete violation of human rights and international law. In this respect, the legal solution, which was first raised by Dr. Igor Janev, Professor of Law in Serbia and Advisor to the Serbian Government was proposed by many of my interlocutors, although sadly, most were skeptical that it would work. Igor Janev himself remained the most positive and practical about it:

*Portugal had the same situation with Russia. In fact, Russia tried to add an additional conditionality for the entry of Portugal in the United Nations. Portugal lobbied the General Assembly which asked for an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice. The Court decided that adding an additional condition for membership would be a violation of the UN Charter, and therefore neither a member state, nor an organ of the UN, can add an additional conditionality. Thus, the Security Council was stopped at the time, because of this issue, and the General Assembly took it over.*⁴⁴⁷

In fact, digging deeper one realizes that it is those who have a legal background and who know more details about the “name issue,” that believe in the legal solution. Igor Janev proposes that Macedonia do the same – that it lobby the General Assembly

⁴⁴⁵ Interview with Dushko Mihajlovski, Skopje, 15 August 2011.

⁴⁴⁶ Interview with Prof. Dr. Ana Martinovska, Skopje, 16 August 2011.

⁴⁴⁷ Interview with Dr. Igor Janev, Belgrade, 5 February 2011.

ask for an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of Resolution 817/1993 with which Macedonia was admitted to membership, but which at the same time imposes additional conditions for that membership. He argues that since the International Court of Justice ruled against additional conditions for membership, it will rule the same – based upon the principle of precedence and case law – and thus, will find Resolution 817/1993 illegal.

Darko Kostadinovski refers to the famous “eight points” which had been proposed by Greece as a negotiating position in 2009 through the negotiator Mathew Nimetz. These “eight points,” as you will recall, included requests to change the adjective referring to the language, ethnic and national identity of Macedonia, as well as to use the name for all purposes (*erga omnes*), both internal and external, including on official ID documents of Macedonian citizens. Here is what Kostadinovski says, regarding these points. It is important to note that he says this on a personal level, not as someone working in the Cabinet of the President.

The fact that demands are appearing concerning the determinants of our identity and our language, tell us that our partner does not have honest intentions for us – and we have proof of this. One of the key crucial proofs for this was Greece’s objection for us to use the term “Macedonian chairmanship in office” when Macedonia had presidency of the Council of Europe. They raised such noise and made such problems, that they portrayed their true intentions. They withdrew several times from these eight points – and some key actors in the international community tell us to forget them – but we say, no. I say, personally, that it will be a diplomatic failure if we forget these eight points. ... Because these eight points are the essential intention of Greece. This is what they truly desire. But that is impossible to achieve ... Greece entered this game, and now it is difficult to get out of it without losing face. However, in order to save face, they demand impossible conditions. Unacceptable conditions. This is simply impossible. ...⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴⁸ Interview with Darko Kostadinovski, Skopje, 11 November 2011.

REALITY: REALPOLITIK, FOREIGN POWERS AND THEIR INTERESTS

We live in a world of realpolitik, where power rules over justice. Greece is strong, and Europe is its ally.

The “name issue” was sparked by foreign interests - great powers and their territorial, geostrategic and ideological aspirations. It is Europe that created the “name issue.” The existence of Macedonia is in confrontation with the idea of the origins of Europe.

I say to the Europeans – I talked to the French Ambassador recently, and said to him “why should we change our name?” He was practically embarrassed. I said, Mr. Ambassador, you, from the West, are making a terrible mistake.⁴⁴⁹

Most of my interviewees saw the “name issue” as part of a larger plot that had other, higher, interests in the region, on the part of Great Powers and other external players. As a matter of fact, many of my interlocutors did mention Europe and the United States as the indirect culprits of the “name issue.” Mirka Velinovska, renowned journalist and historian by education, was one of them. Here is a typical example of her thinking:

China will be building the Vardar Valley. Based on all assessments, China wants to enter the hydroelectric centrals Galishte and Chebren. Because it bought itself a seaport in Greece, in Serbia it has the zones, and it needs Corridor 10 for the closest parking in Europe. Meanwhile the Americans have occupied this region as if it were their own territory. On the other hand Russia needs the Southern Stream. So what I’m telling you is that on our territory, two more big, huge players come, with whom we are at war on the level of the planet. So now, our Prime Minister will be scolded by the United States – why did he have to give this or that, or play with China and Russia? While we just want to survive. How he will play this, I don’t know, but this is the new challenge now. There’s an old tactic. When you are weak, never tie yourself to one big player. Always play on four or five cards, and follow who plays how, so that you know where to position yourself, in case you are hit by some wind. The small players have no other choice except to be highly intelligent, and to know from which side the wind will blow.⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁹ Interview with Eftim Kletnikov, Skopje 11 February 2011.

⁴⁵⁰ Interview with Mirka Velinovska, Skopje, 2 February 2011.

Although this may sound like conspiracy theory, “conspiracy theory is simply realpolitik, analyzed and understood equally well by the intellectuals as the masses,”⁴⁵¹ as states Rebecca Moore, one of the names we cite when defining conspiracy theory. It is true that in Macedonia, the majority of the population believes that higher foreign interests are at play regarding the “name issue.” Perhaps, for a people from a small country, where everyone knows everyone, and therefore everyone knows what’s *really* going on – this is a normal way of reasoning. To be true, having in mind all the past undeniable evidence of Great Power steaks in the Balkans (discussed briefly all throughout the chapters), dismissing this “conspiracy theory” or, rather, the theory of foreign interests, as I refer to it, would not be realistic. On the contrary, this is perhaps one of the most important elements in the “name issue” and whereas I touch upon it all throughout the thesis, I believe that this is worthwhile a future research project. As Moore states in reference to official reports about the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, or the assassination of John F. Kennedy, which we don’t refer to as conspiracy theories but which we identify as alternative explanations of those events, “[t]hese areas of contested knowledge raise important questions about history and truth. We have recently seen a number of debates concerning other areas of contested knowledge, such as global warming, evolution, and sexual orientation. Even the familiar understanding of the American past has come under scrutiny, with revisionists winning the battle of the history books in the Texas State school system. In an era of 24-hour cable news and Internet access, ideas and theories that once existed on the margins have gained equal weight and consideration to those vetted by traditional mainstream sources of expertise, whether in the media or in academia.”⁴⁵² It is, indeed, high time that we challenge the “familiar understandings” and the “mainstream sources of expertise” on the “Macedonian Question,” which imply, to this very day, that the Macedonian people and their language and identity, do not exist. This, especially so, in the face of the existence and living proof of millions

⁴⁵¹ Rebecca Moore, "Contested Knowledge: What Conspiracy Theories Tell Us," *Alternative Considerations of Jonestown & Peoples Temple Website*, San Diego State University, Department of Religious Studies, available at http://jonestown.sdsu.edu/?page_id=40220, last modified on March 31st, 2016.

⁴⁵² *Ibid.*

Macedonians across the world who speak the Macedonian language and identify themselves as Macedonians.

THE FUTURE AND MACEDONIA'S ENTRY IN THE EU AND NATO

We must resolve the “name issue” in order to enter the European Union and NATO. We need to move on, to live for the future. The “name issue” is hindering us.

The European Union plays a dirty game: rather than saying upfront that it is they who are forcing us to change our name, they want us to commit suicide. Then they will have achieved their goal, and won't be to blame for it.
The United Nations has no right to do this to us.

Europe is trying to convince us in a very perfidious way, to give away our name ourselves, to give it up – this is the pressure I am talking about – so that later they will say, well, you decided yourselves ...I have written about this too. My article is called “The Macedonians: the New Jews of Europe” where I make a parallel between the two, and I explain that we are witnessing a Holocaust over the Macedonians but in a very sophisticated and perfidious way, by technical and legal means. We are being erased – and we are even in a more dangerous situation, though not as harsh, not with gas chambers. But it is a type of gas chamber – they simply erase you. And now they are forcing us onto a slippery terrain, where we are forced to change our name ourselves.⁴⁵³

As I stated earlier, for individuals in Category I (Pro Name Change), changing the name was a matter of necessity, in order for Macedonia to enter the European Union and NATO, so that there could be peace, stability and prosperity. Otherwise, Macedonia risked disappearing, threatened by the “four wolves” surrounding it, and the Albanian minority from within. The danger of a Greater Albania, or another Greater “Neighbor” was greater than the danger of losing our the Macedonian identity. Renowned Dr. Dejan Dokic, quoted below, who was one of the world doctors to come up with the patented vaccine against house dust, was of this view. He practically said that if we did not negotiate a solution, then we would not enter the European Union. If we did not enter the European Union, there was danger from all sides, including the Albanian Question, the Bulgarians and the Greeks. In his words:

⁴⁵³ Interview with Eftim Kletnikov, Skopje, 11 February 2011.

This [keeping the name and the identity] is not that important if you have a country. Do you understand that what is at stake is the existence and survival of this country? What does it matter if you are a North Macedonian – at the end you really are Northern vis-à-vis the Southern Macedonian. They speak Greek. They can call themselves Southern Macedonians if they want. And our language can be Northern Macedonian. What is important is that we will exist as a country that will be a Member State of the European Union. And if you are a member of the European Union, you cannot be easily occupied or overturned, or destroyed. So what if you are Northern Macedonian. You will have a representative in the Parliament, and all your bodies. You will be part of a big family. On the other hand, you risk losing this country, because of the expansionist policy in the Balkans. In order for this to happen, the biggest factor of stability for the Americans are the Albanians, and their tendency to live together in one big country will one day be achieved. This means changes of the border. And once it is changed from one side, then the Bulgarians will say that they too have a part of Bulgaria in Macedonia. The Greeks will say the same. And in the end there will be nothing left from Macedonia...We must enter the European Union and we have to survive. We survived so many years, that now we must survive. We will disappear with this birth rate and the emigration.⁴⁵⁴

Remember, at the time of this interview, the United Kingdom was still part of the European Union and the word “Brexit” had not yet been conceived. For many Eastern Europeans, becoming part of the European Union had been the equivalent of the “American dream.” This was no less true for Macedonians, who dreamed of becoming part of this one big happy (or so they thought) family. No one could possibly imagine that a country would want to exit the European Union, let alone that the European Union itself could one fall apart.

Another interviewee who exemplifies this future-centered view is the following:

I think that most of the “problems” that have been imposed on us by the Greek neighbor are fake and that tomorrow, if we make a compromise with the name, they will invent another “problem” which will hinder our development on purpose. We have to think

⁴⁵⁴ Interview with Dr. Dejan Dokic, Ohrid, 6 August 2011.

like a business firm. We cannot be burdened with the name. We have to look forward."⁴⁵⁵

There were others who had had enough and just stopped caring. All they did care about was the future – jobs, and to enjoy life. Many had already left Macedonia in the hope of finding a better life and a higher salary in the European Union. Indeed, in order to be able to do so, many of these had applied for Bulgarian (EU) citizenship, thus “selling their souls” to another “devil” so to speak, and giving up their identity to a neighboring country for a better future. Indeed, since its entry in the European Union in 2007, Bulgaria had grasped a new window of opportunity for reviving its nineteenth century identity politics, and was handing out Bulgarian citizenship to Macedonian citizens like hotcakes – provided that the latter signed a document saying they were “of Bulgarian origin.”

Others – who did not manage to leave the country – had reached a state of “denial” as one of my interlocutors had explained – and refused to know what was going on in the country, about politics, and especially about the “name issue.” These refused to watch television or discuss the “name issue” seriously – to a point that they ridiculed the very subject. In fact, they had developed a sarcastic attitude which was so recognizable that, when I asked whether I could interview them, I knew from the gesture of their hand and head, that they were Category I (Pro-Name Change). It was as if they had all drunk a “future potion” which had convinced them that “getting out” of the country – or having the country join the European Union – was synonymous to having a better life, a more prosperous future, a higher paid job, and so forth. It meant “being able to breathe” as one interlocutor put it. And many blamed the politicians for this situation – in general all politicians, and more specifically, the Government currently in power in Macedonia. These were, undoubtedly, also syndromes of a nation in isolation – a quarantined people – for which, once again, the “name issue” was to blame, if not entirely, then certainly, to a great extent. As one interlocutor summarized:

I think that the Macedonian side has not had a clear strategy on how to act in a situation when you are being denied, and how you

⁴⁵⁵ Interview with Anonymous Macedonian 1, Skopje, 16 August 2011.

will speak in unison to the world. The elite are incapable of sitting on the same table and putting down five points around which they will agree. Or making a platform, and saying, we stand behind this platform, and this is the way we are going to work whoever comes to power. Instead, what they do is one person goes and auctions the name, so that now our name is a whole sentence in the UN (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), while the other one comes and says, no I don't agree, I think we should be Macedonia – but why not Northern Macedonia? Well you cannot change these things from one day until the next! And the third one will say I will give the right to the Macedonian people to say what they think through a referendum. Well, dear politicians, if you massage the Macedonian people a little more – half the country has already left Macedonia, and the other half which remains will say, even if you call us “Cactus Macedonia” we won't give a damn.⁴⁵⁶

Here is a reaction to this aura of future-addicted citizens, by a Macedonian who had left the country decades ago, and who had decided to return upon his retirement.

I left to live in Germany and was gone for forty years. Now that I am back, I realize people here have changed. They don't care anymore – about our identity, our past... They are without a compass, without a sense of being. They just care about money, about consumption. Perhaps they are burdened with financial problems. ... On the other hand there are those who go to another extreme, who go overboard with the patriotism. So on the one hand you have those, and on the other, the ones who don't care about anything. There is total disinterest.⁴⁵⁷

⁴⁵⁶ Interview with Elizabeta Buova, Skopje, 11 August 2011.

⁴⁵⁷ Interview with Dushko Mihajlovski, Skopje 15 August, 2011.

THE FOUR WOLVES: OUR NEIGHBORS AND THEIR MACEDONIAN MINORITIES

We are in constant danger of the “Four Wolves” – neighboring Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, and Serbia – who want a piece of Macedonia, and who want to assimilate Macedonians. Whereas before they did it through schools and churches, now they are trying to do it through subversive political means, such as the “name issue,” handing out Bulgarian (EU) citizenship, and not recognizing their Macedonian minorities. Bulgaria does not recognize our language, Serbia our church, Greece our name and identity. And we have an insatiable Albanian minority which is sparked by neighboring Albania and Kosovo. So we have a real problem with our neighbors - if they unite, it’s a recipe for a Balkan War scenario.

There is a Macedonian Minority in Greece, Bulgaria, and Albania. In two of the three, these minorities are not recognized. In all of them, their human rights are violated, including the freedom of association, freedom of speech, and cultural rights.

The argument goes like this: Greece plays with our name, language, identity, constitution, flag and other symbols. Albania plays with the Albanian minority in Macedonia, and sparking animosities. Serbia plays with the church – it does not recognize an autonomous Macedonian Orthodox Church. Bulgaria plays with our citizenship. The Greater Bulgaria aspiration has been reignited and is being realized through the issuance of Bulgarian (i.e. EU) citizenship, under the condition that the individual declares that he/she is of “Bulgarian origin,” as mentioned earlier. The irony of this is that the longer the “name issue” goes on, the more Macedonians feel precarious about their future, and the more apply for Bulgarian citizenship as a way out – to find jobs in the EU market. Acquiring Bulgarian citizenship has become a business for many proxies, who are easily contacted in Macedonia, and who, in a matter of a year, to two, can get you a Bulgarian citizenship, for a certain amount of money. Thousands of people, especially the young, are acquiring European Union passports this way. Thus, thousands are declaring that they are “of Bulgarian ethnic origin.” The repercussions of this situation remain to be seen. But this is the same type of policy that Greece used on the Refugee Children, who had to sign that they were “Greek by genus” in order to be able to re-enter Greece, after years decades, to see their home-towns and families. Among the government and the population in Macedonia, there is a silent fear that as these trends continue, soon, on paper, there

will be no Macedonians left! One half will have declared themselves as “of Bulgarian origin” in order gain EU citizenship so as to leave the country and work anywhere in the EU where they could find jobs. The other half will have declared themselves “Greek by genus” so as to be able to re-enter Greece for the first time after the Greek Civil War and seek their land titles, or simply see the house they grew up in and remember their parents before having to flee as refugees. The “little Macedonian” thus once again faces that century old quandary – “Greek by genus?” or “of Bulgarian origin?” Indeed, identity and population politics are far from gone in the Balkans. And before you know it, Greece and Bulgaria will be claiming territorial right on Macedonia based on the “ethnic origins” of these citizens. To be true, as Pavle Voskopoulos points out, as Macedonia steps closer to EU membership, Greek and Bulgarian policies on the “name issue” and on the Macedonian population (both in their own countries and in Macedonia) are gaining strength and converging.

Once they make us change our name, they won't have Macedonians over there, and the Bulgarians will resolve their problem with Pirin Macedonia [the part of Bulgaria which has a Macedonian minority]...Remember the Bulgarians reacted recently and said, if the name changes they will also have problems. Now they [the Greeks and Bulgarians] are uniting again around a common goal. And I think they will insist on this, because the existence of Macedonia, a Macedonian language culture, and all this, does not stand in one place. The European Union is with open borders, and will lead to the mixing of populations. These populations are in contact. However much Greece tries to forbid it, it won't be able to if Macedonia enters the European Union.⁴⁵⁸

Added to the Greek-Bulgarian scenario above, was the fear of some of the members of the Macedonian minorities in these countries, which, as some of my interviewees pointed out were “greater priests than the pope himself.” In Greece, these were the Graecomans, which were briefly mentioned in the historical analysis part, and which will be referred to again in the interview analysis of Macedonians in Greece. These were Macedonians who had been given high posts in return for keeping an eye on the local population and ensuring that the latter respected the laws prohibiting the Macedonian language and names – and the profession of a Macedonian

⁴⁵⁸ Interview with Dr. Todor Cepreganov, Skopje, 12 July 2011.

ethnic identity. These were referred to, by some of my interlocutors in Greece, as spies, and by others as Graecomans. Some of them, however, as can be seen from the excerpt below, which was a story related to Greek anthropologist Anastasia Karakasidou, remained more Macedonian than Graecoman in the end.

“One day, while en route to a nearby village on the administrative errand in the company of a Greek [i.e. non-local] policeman, the Graecoman and the Greek encountered a local farmer out ploughing his fields. Having difficulties with a recalcitrant ox, the farmer was cursing the beast in Slavic. The Greek policeman summoned him over to them and began writing a fine. When the policeman asked the man for his name, the latter, in confusion, gave him two different names.

The policeman became angry and asked if the man were making fun of him. He then grabbed the man, forced open his mouth, and extinguished his burning cigarette on the farmer’s tongue.

As the man screamed in pain, the Graecoman village president grabbed the Greek policeman by the throat and lifted him up in the air. ‘Don’t you ever let me catch you doing that again,’ he warned. ‘I will beat you to the pulp (tha se spaso sto ksilo).’⁴⁵⁹

One of my interlocutors who was a Refugee Child told me that the in the Greek parliament there were seven Graecomans. The same went for Albania and Bulgaria, where some of the Macedonians who had earned higher positions of power, were “More Bulgarian than the Bulgarians,” or “More Albanian than the Albanians.” I refer to this “spy” factor as I analyze the other categories as well.

Certainly, the issue of the Macedonian minority in Greece, as well as in the other neighboring countries, came up again and again. To such an extent, that even the foreigners living in Macedonia were aware of it. Take, for instance, the following quote by an Austrian diplomat, working for the Austrian Development Agency:

The discussion focuses on the name of the Republic of Macedonia, and on the adjective that should be used to determine the origin of products, the people, the name of the language. But behind that I would say there are strong economic and rational considerations. Such as issues of compensation and re-appropriation of property of Macedonian minority in Greece. There

⁴⁵⁹ Anastasia Karakasidou, “Cultural Illegitimacy in Greece”, *op.cit.*, 137-137.

have been similar claims in Central Europe between Czech Republic and Germany. This is an issue which could pop up once the whole thing gets going. Maybe Greece wants to suppress this. Also there are discussions between Poland and Germany. Probably Greece is not really ready to deal with their history in full extent, which includes expulsion of other minorities, including Albanians and Turks. So this needs time – you cannot force a country to cope with its history. They need to grow into it themselves. Some countries some nations are doing it a bit earlier, some a bit later. This is a process of maturing, of growing up. This takes time, we should not force it – otherwise it won't be a complete and genuine process.⁴⁶⁰

In fact, the Macedonian minority in the neighbouring countries was, according to many of my interlocutors, and based on my research, the source of the “name issue”.

The Macedonian minority in Greece is part of the problem. Once the name is changed, the identity of Macedonians is changed, and this will get rid of Greece's problem with its minority. They fear the Macedonian minority because they expropriated their land, they settled refugees they brought in from Asia Minor and Bulgaria on their land, and now, with human rights, they may have to give these lands back to them....The fear of the existence of Macedonians is big. There are autochthonous Macedonians who live in Greece - who are Greek citizens, but ethnic Macedonians. And as much as Greece tried to assimilate and demobilize this people starting from 1913 and even before, with the propagandas, we are witnesses today that they could not finish that process until the end. However, it is well known that Greece, as well as some other Balkan countries, does not recognize the existence of any other minorities - except for the Muslim minority. ... So Europe, while seeing, pretends it is blind.... However, with the solution of the changing the name, which could lead to changing the identity, the language and all this, for the Greeks there will be no more problem. Once we, Macedonians change everything, their Macedonians over there will be something else. Their aim is simply to erase the name Macedonia.⁴⁶¹

Europe ruthlessly sides with Greece, which, it is well known, undertook all kinds of genocidal activities towards Macedonia and the Macedonians – you can statistically enumerate these actions in your thesis. For example 1948, the bombing of children – the refugee children. After this kind of catastrophe, Europe is not only silent but

⁴⁶⁰ Interview with Christopher Opancar, Ohrid, 10 August 2011.

⁴⁶¹ Interview with Dr. Todor Cepreganov, Skopje, 12 July 2011.

*has undertaken an attack against the name of the country. Which means that if the name changes, this people no longer exists. That is why Greece is denying the right to the refugee children (who are now in their 60's and over) to go back, to take back their land titles, to even have a birth certificate. And so on – we all know this game.*⁴⁶²

*Everyone knows why they [Greece] want us to change our name. They will more easily resolve their problem with us. With the Macedonian minority in Greece. They won't have a problem at home. They are afraid of what is going on in Kosovo – Kosovo gained independence from Serbia, and they think the same will happen to them. So they want to prevent. Now in fact, we are paying the consequences of the Macedonians in Greece, because they are seeking their rights over there. What I cannot understand however, is how our politicians and diplomats were unable to convince European politicians and diplomats about what is going on in Greece. How, they tell us to be "European" in terms of the Albanian minority here [i.e. give them their rights], while on the other hand, the Europeans themselves aren't "European."*⁴⁶³

Here is an excerpt from an interview with a Macedonian from Albania who is also a human rights activist for the Macedonian minority in Albania.

*My name is Milan Filo. I'm from Korca, Albania. Originally from the village of Vrbnik, Albania. My family name was Filevci, probably with some ancestry from here in Ohrid. My grandmother is from Kostursko (Kastoria), in Aegean (Greek) Macedonia. We found her in the documents of Kostur. I was born in Albania, and I went to school under the Communist regime. Till 1991 I worked for a year in the forestry school, and left to become a businessman, and that is what I do, ever since. I am a member of the "Macedonian Alliance" – the Macedonian Party in Albania – it is a registered party. Until the 4th grade, we studied in the Macedonian language. So the Communist regime (Enver Hodxa) allowed us to study in Macedonian. After the 4th grade, it was in Albanian. While today, my children do not study Macedonian. The schools were closed down after the fall of Communism.*⁴⁶⁴

We are many. If we go to Sandanski, the Bulgarian part... Also from the Albanian side of Debar, here are 32 Macedonian villages in Albania. There is a graffiti in a Macedonian village in

⁴⁶² Interview with Eftim Kletnikov, Skopje, 11 February 2011.

⁴⁶³ Interview with Sashe Ivanovski, Ohrid, 1 August 2011.

⁴⁶⁴ Interview with Milan Filo, Ohrid, August 13, 2011.

Greece. It says, in Greek: "We are many, but when will we find each other?" (laughing)⁴⁶⁵

The key is that only Albania does not deny the Macedonian identity. Except in Gora. As opposed to Bulgaria and Greece. So it is a paradox that under authoritarian closed regime in Albania, the Macedonians had more rights than in a Greece that had a so-called democracy and that was a part of the European Union since 1981. So Albania recognizes minorities and identity, while Greece is a so-called democracy, and it does not recognize another identity or minority. The same goes for the Bulgarians.⁴⁶⁶

THE GREEKS AND THEIR INTENTIONS

It is paradoxical, that it is Greece that should feel threatened, while it is Macedonia that is the victim. It is they who want to change our name, not we who want to change their name. It is they who took Macedonian territory following the Balkan Wars, not we who took their territory. So why should they feel threatened?

The name Macedonia became a problem for Greece only after the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991. Ironically, until the late 1980's the name Macedonia in Greece was even forbidden! And now they are claiming it. Why? Greece is Europe's "cradle of democracy and civilization" while ironically, it violates our most fundamental rights.

They manage, even in the middle of a huge economic crisis, and now the refugee crisis – to keep their policies against the Macedonian language and identity strong and running. On the one hand, they do propaganda for Greek history (i.e. an luxurious exhibition in London on Ancient Greek history which must have cost fortunes in the middle of the economic crisis), while on the other hand, they keep international and regional organizations on their toes. Every time there is a conference that is organized, they manage to convince the conference organizers to withdraw the nametag for Macedonia, or not pronounce the language, and so forth.

You know what someone from the Council of Europe told me two years ago? That never before had the Greek propaganda been stronger than it is today. Because their Ministry of Foreign Affairs, public figures, academics, civil servants accept the anti-Macedonian thesis – in fact it is part of their work! That platform

⁴⁶⁵ Interview with Pavle (Filipov) Voskopoulos, President of the European Free Alliance – Rainbow Party (Political Party of the Macedonian Minority in Greece) Ohrid, 13 August 2011.

⁴⁶⁶ Interview with Pavle (Filipov) Voskopoulos, President of the European Free Alliance – Rainbow Party (Political Party of the Macedonian Minority in Greece) Ohrid, 13 August 2011.

is part of their work. And somehow they always manage, in international forums, where our language is accepted, they manage to convince the organizers to take down our language, or our name tag. Didn't this happen at the Council of Europe where they took down our language and turned it in to "fyromian" or "non-existent"?⁴⁶⁷

The idea that the name never posed a problem for Greece until Macedonia gained independence from Yugoslavia was repeatedly raised by my interlocutors. The reason, as hints my interlocutor below, becomes even more fuzzy, when we find out that not only was Macedonia *not* the name of the Greek province until 1988 or so, but that the name Macedonia was forbidden in Greece for a long time. Ms. Kletnikova, in the interview cited below, quotes former German Ambassador to Macedonia Hans Lothar Steppan on this. Incidentally, Ambassador Lothar Steppan became a hero in Macedonia thanks to the book he wrote following his diplomatic mission in Macedonia, namely *The Macedonian Knot*. This is one of the rare recent "foreign" books which, without ambivalence, points out the existence of an ethnic Macedonian identity and language prior to the nineteenth century and upholds the Macedonian view on things.

*Greece wants to claim the name Macedonia, in order to set in stone its falsification of history. With this, it will forever set in stone that Alexander the Great was Greek, that this history belongs exclusively to Greece, and that Macedonians are Greek. While paradoxically, until 1988, it was forbidden to even say the word "Macedonia. In his book *The Macedonian Knot*, Hans Lothar Steppan writes that until 1988, Greece forbade anyone to call its Northern Province Macedonia, and sanctioned people who spoke the word "Macedonia" and "Macedonians." From 1988, Greece turned its politics around, and started to redirect the name "Macedonia" as a geographical term. In fact, in this way they follow the example of Bulgaria, which also claims that "Pirin Macedonia" is just a geographical term and has nothing to do with a people of another ethnicity. They claim that Pirin Macedonians are Bulgarians but with a Pirni dialect. That is why our situation is very frightening – namely because our neighbors are uniting with each other with the aim of destroying Macedonia.⁴⁶⁸*

⁴⁶⁷ Interview with Elizabeta Buova, Skopje, 11 August 2011.

⁴⁶⁸ Interview with Fimka Kletnikova, Skopje, 11 February 2011.

Another element behind the entire mistrust in Greek intentions, derives from the knowledge that the power in Greece has been held by the same families for generations. Thus, those who, as seen in the historical part, issued the decrees that punished Macedonians for speaking Macedonian, changed the place names and forced the Macedonians to change their names, signed population exchange treaties with neighboring countries, collected children in the paidopoleis, and so on – those are the fathers and grandfathers of today’s politicians. As a Refugee Child told me,

Those in power in Greece are still the same. In our times it was their grandfathers, then it was their fathers, and now it’s their children. So they are all the same families. Karamanlis, Papandreou...⁴⁶⁹

Finally, as Ambassador Plevnes states below, most Macedonians are shocked at the injustice coming from a country that is supposed to be the cradle of European civilization.

Macedonia’s position in the Balkans is such that, as a great European actor said to me, you have a wonderful country, “mais elle est dangereusement situee.” These anti-European forces, which in a way prevented the Balkans from entering Europe, come from a country which entered first from among the Balkan countries, and that is very sad. But I believe that all this one day will be overcome.⁴⁷⁰

HISTORY

Greece wants primacy over antiquity, and exclusivity over Macedonian history. But Greece is a myth. The paradox is that we are being told we are stealing the name of a nation-state that was invented in the 19th century by Europe.

Alexander the Great was an international, and not a national hero. He belongs to us all. If anyone has the right to claim him, and claim ancient Macedonian history, it is us.

We have a historic and territorial right to call ourselves Macedonians. There has been a continuity of Macedonia and Macedonians on this territory throughout history.

Our ancestors from the 19th century fought hard for our right to self-determination and our identity.

⁴⁶⁹ Interview with Anonymous Refugee Child 4, born in Krusoradi, Northern Greece. Skopje, 14 November 2014.

⁴⁷⁰ Interview with Ambassador Jordan Plevnes, Skopje 22 August 2011.

To put it in simple terms, Greece wants to have primacy over antiquity. That everything that happened here in these territories during antic times was Greek, that there was nothing else except classical [Greek] antiquity. The West is aware of when Greeks started to put Alexander the Macedonian in their written work, and when they started to create history – namely the nineteenth century, so that today they are able to impose this “name issue.” However in spite of these kinds of attempts, the impartial historians in the West, write things as they are. But Greece is a country that has already been well established years back, behind it stand the United Kingdom, the United States, they were involved in this, and they cannot now go against the very monster they created.⁴⁷¹

The idea that Greece wanted prevalence over all time periods of history prevailed among all my interlocutors. This bothered many of my interlocutors. While some spoke of Greece’s preoccupation with ancient history, still others pointed out that the same was true for the Byzantine period. As a priest who studies precisely that period, put it:

Such a thing as a Byzantine Empire does not exist. What exists is the Roman Empire, and the Eastern Roman Empire. The Western Roman Empire with the capital in Rome and the Eastern Roman Empire with the capital in Constantinople. And until the end of the 6th, beginning of the 7th century, the official language in the Eastern Roman Empire was the Roman, or, in other words, Latin language (and after that Hellenic). Saints Cyril and Methodius were Romeans. But that was an Empire, and everyone who was a citizen of that Empire, was a Romean, regardless of whether or not he was Hellene, Macedonian, Slav, Syrian, Copt, and so forth. When the Turks conquered Constantinople in 1453, they said that all peoples who live in the Eastern Roman Empire, were Rum millet. What does that mean? Romei. Rum millet means a Roman people. In essence, in that way there was an identification between Rum millet and Christian. By Rum millet and Romei, one understood Christian. Now the whole story is, when the Greeks gained independence from the Ottoman Empire in the 1830s and they started to form a nation, they mixed two stories: One was about antique Greece (i.e. the mythology), and the other was about the Eastern Roman Empire, i.e. Byzantium. So they invoked Constantinople. They invoked the Megali idea to renew the Eastern Roman Empire – however the Eastern Roman Empire is not just Greek, and there were not just Greeks there. There were Bulgarians, Serbs, Macedonians, and so on,

⁴⁷¹ Interview with Dr. Valentina Mironska, Skopje, 16 August 2011.

*Albanians... It is much more complex. With the opening of the Megali idea, they wanted to renew the idea of the Eastern Roman Empire, but by invoking ancient Greece. In other words, to Hellenize all the people on these parts. The idea was that with the fact that you are Orthodox or Christian, in that manner through the faith you will be Hellenized. That was the Megali idea.*⁴⁷²

While all agreed about the Macedonian history, some individuals insisted that one should not involve history in the “name issue,” while others kept going back to history as a reference point, in order to prove their Macedonian identity. Here is a quote from the former:

*Now we have to think about this with a cold head. Those are past times. We should not go into the past, like the Greeks and the Bulgarians do. Bulgarians have an Institute on Macedonia! And now so do the Greeks.*⁴⁷³

There was also the element of exclusivity of history, which, for most Macedonians, was something that no nation could have. Many argued, as quoted earlier, that Alexander the Great was such an international persona that no nation-state should have the exclusive right to him. Take a look, for example, at the following quote by an intellectual property law expert who was shocked that the Star of Vergina had be placed under intellectual property protection by the Greeks:

*In the 1990s, Greece placed an intellectual property protection over the Star of Vergina [the sixteen ray sun used as a symbol by the ancient Macedonians] in the World Intellectual Property Organization, as a trademark – a country emblem under the section of trademarks. In the Paris Convention on Industrial Property there is an article which protects this. However, there is a Macedonian archeologist who says that it is not possible for the Greeks to protect that sign, because that sign belongs to the whole Indo-European civilization. It was prevalent a long time ago in Eastern civilizations. So they cannot have the exclusivity which WIPO guarantees over that sign. And yet the Greeks protected it. And now, no other country has the right to have that coat of arms or emblem, which has the sixteen-ray sun. I also think they cannot have exclusive property rights on it. They cannot have exclusivity, as much as we cannot have exclusivity.*⁴⁷⁴

⁴⁷² Interview with Father Ivica, Ohrid, 7 August 2011.

⁴⁷³ Interview with Elizabeta Buova, Skopje, 11 August 2011.

⁴⁷⁴ Interview with Mirjana Todorovska, Skopje, 16 August 2011.

The historical element arose during nearly all the interviews I conducted, though for most of category I (Pro Name Change) it seemed like people were allergic to history, and for category II (Against Name Change), people were history addicts. It is a fact, however, that the “name issue” cannot be analyzed without analyzing the historical aspects. Thus, in order to get to the heart of the matter, I interviewed several historians. The first historian I interviewed was the Director of the National Institute of History, whose work I have cited in the section on the history, and part of whose interview is below:

...The name Macedonia ... in the historical context, has no interruption, from the period of antiquity and up until today, in spite of the attempts by some countries and some leaders to ensure that that name is forgotten. In spite of all these attempts, to this day, the name Macedonia remains, and is carried by the Republic of Macedonia. Whoever does research on anything that happened throughout history up until the Balkan Wars, will meet the name Macedonia, in every document in all archives of Western Europe and the Balkan countries. Regardless of all the turbulences that occurred around the question of whether the Macedonians were Macedonians, or Bulgarians, Greeks or Serbs. Nevertheless, there was never an interruption of the name Macedonia and Macedonians. Even if you look at British documents, French, Austrian, German – in all these documents, you will find that these are Macedonians, not Greeks, not Bulgarians, not Serbs. That this people had its own specific history, its own traditions, folklore, culture, which differs from that of other peoples.⁴⁷⁵

Another individual, who although not a historian by profession, had written three books on Macedonian history, went along the same lines.

I think that no Macedonian should accept any change of the name, because we are one of the rare nations that has existed for so long. If it existed that long, and it still exists, it means that no one should disrupt this.⁴⁷⁶

Finally, Dr. Dokic reasserts the idea that Alexander the great was an international and not national hero.

⁴⁷⁵ Interview with Dr. Todor Cepreganov, Skopje, 12 July 2011.

⁴⁷⁶ Interview with Mendo Veljanoski, Ohrid, 18 August 2011.

With such an ancient past, no one can claim a person. Because Alexander Makedonski (the Great) is a person that belongs to the whole world. His very birth is perhaps not as important – because he the lived and died in an entirely different part of the world. So everyone can say he's that or this nationality. Some persons simply belong to the whole world. You cannot give a national framework to everyone, especially someone who did so much in international terms.⁴⁷⁷

An interesting observation I noted as I was interviewing historians, conservationists, architects, among others, was that it was obvious that they had struggled with the “name issue” – that it had brought them angst and a desire to explain, to clarify in a scientific manner, who they were, who were their ancestors, where they came from, and why they were being denied not just by Greece, but by certain European countries which they had previously learned to respect. This desire brought many of them to dig deep into the mysteries of history, to find an explanation for their being, to rationalize why they, like most of the population in Macedonia, felt Macedonian; to find the untainted history – not the one they had been taught during Yugoslav times nor the one that had been taught to Europeans by official textbooks. Here then, is what that view sounds like:

The problem with the name has two standing points – one is ours, one is theirs ... What is our problem? For fifty years, in fact eighty years, from 1924, we had an educational system which was built towards forgetting Macedonia (in Yugoslavia). In other words, we were to become Yugoslavs. Macedonia had a republic, meaning a certain statehood, but through the educational system, people's heads were filled with all kinds of other information, the least of which information about Macedonia. For example, when studying architecture, you come to learn the absurdity that your architecture starts in nineteenth century; a second absurdity is to come to learn that your literacy begins in the ninth century, or in 1945 with the codification of the language by Blaze Koneski. This has been carefully put in the system so as to make you feel that you have fallen from somewhere into some civilization, and now you have yet to mature or to prove yourself. And this is the syndrome from which

⁴⁷⁷ Interview with Dr. Dejan Dokic, Ohrid, 6 August 2011.

*all Macedonian intellectuals suffer. They have been brainwashed deep down, from age 7, in school.*⁴⁷⁸

Journalist Mirka Velinovska underlines this point.

*The problem with the name has a history and it's not from now. The problem with the name is more of a symbol of real political consequences, or European and international politics. When it was decided to create modern Europe, at the moment when Greece was formed, as soon as they took as a foundation of European civilization the Greek antique society.*⁴⁷⁹

This theory also explains why during the times of Yugoslavia, Macedonia did not pose a threat to Greece. Although a topic I did not delve into earlier for reasons of being concise, Tito allegedly had an agreement with Greece, to keep the Macedonian issue low-key. In fact, this is likely why so many of the Macedonians active in the academic, literary and artistic spheres ended up in Goli Otok – the notorious labor camp.

Vangel Bozinovski was part of a group of people I interviewed at one sitting, during a Sunday brunch. This group – it was obvious – were intellectuals who had pondered this subject matter for years, and tried to find answers through books, history, logical reasoning. For it is true that for a long time – and in fact, as Bozinovski points out, throughout the Yugoslav period, Macedonians were taught not to think too far back. However most of these gentlemen were in their eighties, and one could sense that they had grown up in different times and that they had seen other stories, other histories. I almost imagined them, as they spoke about how they had deciphered this or done that research, as the type of group you would have found sitting in Café de Flore in Paris during nineteenth century...

Our second problem is that we were all surprised when [the “name issue”] happened to us because we thought we had a problem with everyone else, but not with the southern Greek neighbor. When we realized this, I myself, Vasil Ilyov, and other intellectuals, we started to research it – not inspired by the name, but rather by the feeling that there was something illogical in the educational system. We reached a point where we discovered that Macedonia is in fact

⁴⁷⁸ Interview with Vangel Bozinovski, Skopje, 10 February 2011.

⁴⁷⁹ Interview with Mirka Velinovska, Skopje, 2 February 2011.

*the only name, the only entity in Europe, which hasn't changed its name since the Neolithic times to today. Thus, if we are looking for our origins, we don't have the need to appeal to other names or some other history. For example, England, in order to be England, ties itself to Vikings, Saxons, Normands, Britons, and then at the end, they obtain some kind of origin. Or the French tie themselves with the Gaelic and so forth. While Macedonia is in fact the only one that doesn't have to do this. And all of a sudden, the name becomes problematized.*⁴⁸⁰

This category of Macedonians dug into not only Macedonian, but also ancient Greek history, and they generally tended to find that Greek history was invented by Europe, and that Europe was protecting the Greek point of view because it's entire *raison d'être* dependent upon this story it had made up about Greek history. Europe, according to this category, tended to put everything – all history, including the Macedonian history – in the “Greek bag” while completely negating other histories, including the Etruscians, as the poet Kletnikov had once told me. In fact, the European myth lay on the Greek myth. Bozinovski had said that “Greece and the Greek nation was a German idea,” and continued to explain the details of how this was so – namely through the ideas of the Bavarian Prince Otto, as was mentioned earlier throughout the text.

Most of the people in this group dismantled the current way we viewed history, as Vasil Ilyov did by saying: “It turns out that Aristotle never wrote a book – the only thing that for 2,000 years the whole world has been discussing of Aristotle is a 5 page leaflet. However now, the academic world of philosophy is very critical of Aristotle and of his ideas, saying that his philosophy is the least organized...”

Thus, these people analyzed history, dismantled currently held views, and proposed other – erudite – explanations of history, in order to explain the “name issue,” or, more concretely, why Macedonians should be allowed to keep their name and their identity. They were strongly against any name change, and had an even more voiced opinion regarding the identity, which, as they saw it, would change if the name changed. Thus, in order to protect the Macedonian identity, Macedonia had to protect its name.

⁴⁸⁰ Interview with Vangel Bozinovski, Skopje, 10 February 2011.

Another interesting person who falls in this group is Dr. Vasil Ilyov, born in Kostur (Kastoria) in present-day Greece. He was also (as most Aegean Macedonians) one of the Refugee Children and throughout his life, while growing up, he lived all over Eastern Europe. He graduated from the University of Kiev, Ukraine, with a BA in architecture and an MA and PhD in the restoration of cultural monuments. He is author of the website www.unet.com.mk/ancient-macedonians, as well as of information published on the internet by Risto Popovski. Dr. Ilyov believes that the Macedonian language is 102,010 years old. He needed 43 years of Macedonian culture, architecture, history of literacy, history of art to figure this out. The first architectural objects in Macedonia are from the prehistory, and there are artifacts to prove this, he states:

Looking at the name descriptions of the Greek Gods, Zeus, Atina and so forth in the Greek encyclopaedia, I could not find a single description of the actual name – of where it came from, of the etymology of the name. In fact, this is because the etymology of the names of the Gods is not found in Greek, but in Macedonian. In fact, if the Macedonian empire was the first empire or state on European soil, they must have had a language. And if they had a language, then that language must have persisted throughout time. If it persisted throughout time, then what many peoples speak today in Eastern Europe may be rooted in that language – and not in a dialect that was brought down by the Slavs in the 7th century. This language was used much before the Slavs came, and the archaeological findings and scripts I have been able to decipher, do point to numerous similarities between the scripts and the present-day Macedonian language. One could claim that the first language then came from the Slavs in the north. However, it does seem more logical that it was the Slavs who adopted certain language, and that language came from the south, because thus far, all the scriptures have been found in the South, i.e., in Macedonia.⁴⁸¹

Dr. Ilyov belongs to a group of scientists who are not popular with political authorities, neither in Macedonia nor outside of Macedonia. Whether it is because they think that what he says is completely out of this world, or because this historical burden would be too heavy to carry – just as the historical burden seems too heavy for the Greeks at this time – is for them to say. However, before we disqualify this group of scientists as “senile old people” it is worth to mention that, first of all, they are all

⁴⁸¹ Interview with Dr. Vasil Ilyov, Skopje, 10 February 2011.

PhDs with significant years of work behind their backs, and with no political interests whatsoever. In fact when I asked Dr. Ilyov whether he was being financed by the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts or the Government, or in some way being helped, he told me that the only way he was being helped was that now his work was not being obstructed.

Secondly, had their findings been so insane, then no government would have bothered to censor them. Yet, Dr. Ilyov waited three years to publish a text in which he had deciphered one of the oldest poems in the world, written on Mammoth tooth, in the most northern part of the Ural. “‘Uralu’ he told me, “means ‘next to the rake’.” (In Macedonian “u” means at, or close by, while “ralo” means rake). When we look closely, the form of the Mountain Ural looks like a rake. This Macedonian word, dates from 41,000.”⁴⁸² Professor Belchev, another scientist in this camp, for example, had written over 30 books about the ancient Macedonian mythology. Twelve of his books were about Orpheus Gropius. “In Macedonian we say Orfei Gropei. Oros, comes from gora, which means mountain. However, for 25 years he was not allowed to publish his books under the Yugoslav communist system.”⁴⁸³

To conclude, the “name issue” has perhaps had an unexpected adverse effect. Namely, instead of suppressing the existence of a Macedonian identity, it has actually resulted in the proliferation of Macedonian history buffs and the boom in the research of non-conventional history, which, however much debated, is becoming more and more respected in today’s world where it is well known that much of the conventional history we read was not as innocent and unbiased as it was made out to be. Today, the quest for different views on history, and the proliferation of findings which tend to disprove conventional wisdom, has a respected place in society, and will undoubtedly gain more and more ground as the balance of power shifts and as the globalized world progresses.

Below is a quote from another unique individual in Macedonia – and architect who has sometimes been dubbed as the “Gaudi of Macedonia.”

⁴⁸² Interview with Dr. Vasil Ilyov, Skopje, 10 February 2011.

⁴⁸³ Interview with Dr. Vasil Ilyov, Skopje, 10 February 2011.

I am a free artist who in his art gives all his love to Macedonia. I have made a house behind the Parliament, which is entirely wrapped in the Macedonian sun. At the left side of the façade is Alexander Makedonski (Alexander the Great). The house is original and leaves an eternal trace which will be in Macedonia. My second piece of art is my second house, which I also dedicate to Macedonia, and in which I make eternal the Macedonian music, because our music is unique in its rhythm and the way it is performed, and the world should know this.⁴⁸⁴

*Alexander, 2,000 years ago, went to India with all peoples from the Balkans. This was cosmopolitanism without a precedent. Today, in the 21st century, we are fighting about whose he is, why this country built a statue of him, why antiquity, and so forth. So we are arguing about absurd things. Instead of making of Alexander a story that unites us – as he did in the past – we are quarreling about him. Alexander should be a synonym of unity not division. Someone told me that there was a statue of Alexander in Belgium; there are many Alexandrias and Macedonias in the United States. Why don't the Greeks complain about that?!*⁴⁸⁵

Historian Nikola Zhezhov, who specialized on the “Macedonian Question” in the Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations between WWI and WWII, says that:

The roots of this imposed “name issue” are found far back in history. They date from the end of nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. They are complicated problems that have been accumulating throughout history. What is being presented today as official Greek policy is the result of all these past problems from Greek-Macedonian history. Behind the request to change the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia lies not a problem tied to the name, but to the national identity of the Macedonians. This is a problem which is tied to the request which already came once from Greece in a package, to change history – to erase parts of Macedonian history that are related to identity issues. It is tied to the Greek request to change the adjective “Macedonian literature and language.”⁴⁸⁶

In Greek historiography, there is a phrase called “The Macedonian Struggle” or the “Struggle for Macedonia” (Makedonikos Agonas in Greek) and in fact, this is where the

⁴⁸⁴ Interview with Zoran Iliev “Roger,” Skopje, 3 May 2013.

⁴⁸⁵ Interview with Dr. Todor Cepreganov, Skopje, 12 July 2011.

⁴⁸⁶ Interview with Dr. Nikola Zhezhov, Skopje 31 August, 2011.

problem begins. They try to portray the struggle of the Greek Andarti in the beginning of the twentieth century in Aegean Macedonia as a "Struggle for Macedonia" [in English it has been translated as the "Macedonian Struggle"]. And that's from where the Greek conquest for the name "Macedonia" begins more intensively. Everywhere in these Greek documents on the Andarti you see "Macedonian Struggle,"- but a struggle for Macedonia as a geographical concept, not as a national concept. This distinction is very important. And the first conflict in this context is the clash between the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (VMRO) and the Greek Andarti forces. This was the first Greek tryout of the concept of "the Macedonian Struggle," if you will, and it met with resistance by VMRO. Through this "Macedonian Struggle," Greece tried to erase from the map of Aegean Macedonia, all those who did not declare themselves as Greek or Macedonian in the geographical sense of the word. We are talking about a period before the Balkan Wars, when Macedonia functioned as a province in the Ottoman Empire, in its ethnic geographical boundaries, with, to a large extent, a compact Macedonian population on all parts of the ethno-geographic map of Macedonia. And that ethno-geographic map comprises of: the present day Republic of Macedonia; the Aegean part of Macedonia which after 1913 and the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest was occupied by Greece; the Pirin part of Macedonia which after the 1913 and the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest was occupied by Bulgaria; and a small part of the present-day territory of Albania. That is the ethno-geographic territory of Macedonia – not state boundaries. Macedonia never was in these boundaries as a state. But in these territories that I have just enumerated, the Macedonian population was a majority – this has been proven by all statistical analyses. Even though, of course, there were not only Macedonians, but other peoples as well. However the Macedonians represented a majority, even though there were statistical attempts to prove otherwise, i.e. to prove that there was a Greek, or Serbian, or Bulgarian population. But these are falsified statistics by Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian ethnographers.⁴⁸⁷

⁴⁸⁷ Interview with Dr. Nikola Zhezhov, Skopje 31 August 2011.

SUMMING UP THE INTERVIEW ANALYSIS OF MACEDONIANS IN MACEDONIA

We are very afraid. Our whole family – we are taking this whole situation to heart and it really hurts. ... Last year I went to Slovenia at the Bled Conference of the Pen Club with the purpose to bring a declaration from writers from four continents, and the President of the World Pen Club. They signed this declaration, 70 writers from all continents: that Macedonia has a right to its name. We sent it to Brussels, to Greece and to our own Prime Minister, Nikola Gruevski. So we have to act.⁴⁸⁸

What becomes evident is that all Macedonians agree on the various features that compose the name issue. Both Category I and Category II agree that this is a precedent in history that is unfair, imposed and unjust; that there are combined elements of foreign Great Power, European interests and neighboring countries interests involved in its artificial creation; that the “name issue” has historic dimensions, including, ancient history pertaining to Alexander the Great, as well as the history of Europe beginning from the nineteenth century with the era of self-determination and nation-state building; that their basic human rights, including the right to self-determination, are being violated with the “name issue”; that the “name issue” is in complete and total violation of international law and principles, including the United Nations Charter; that the European Union and the United Nations are blackmailing them into changing their name; that they are living in a world of realpolitik, where power and interests most often prevail over justice; and that they are being forced to make an inhuman choice between their rights and their future.

There is one major point of agreement, and one major point of disagreement. The point of agreement is that the identity is the red line. If the name change entails a change of the identity of the Macedonian people and their language, then there is no discussion: Macedonia should not change its name. However, if the name change does not entail a change of the identity, then there was a certain group of individuals (Category I) that would opt for a name change. Even within this category, however, there are variations and ambiguities: whereas some were only for a “dual formula” in which the changed name would only pertain to Greece, others would accept the “erga

⁴⁸⁸ Interview with Eftim Kletnikov, Skopje, 11 February 2011.

omnes” formula, given that the prefix or suffix does not enter in the identity – however that may be translated or put into practical terms.

Aside from the content that composed the elements and categories of my interviews, there were also feelings that prevailed, and that I captured not only in words, but through the tone of my interlocutors, and the gravity with which they discussed this issue. I presume that the reader, too, was able to capture these feelings. These were the feelings of frustration, of injustice, of betrayal and bewilderment. They were feelings of a person who had self-esteem which he had to push down by rationale. They were the feelings of a person who knows he has rights, yet is persuaded that there is no justice. They were the feelings of powerlessness and a perplexity at the realization of being blackmailed.

Here was an entire nation being told by leading representatives of the key international and regional organizations in the world, that they had to change their name – and possibly their identity – in order to be part of the world. They were being forced to make a choice between a prosperous, peaceful, and non-isolated future, and their own identity. Into their considerations for this choice, many worried about the future generations – their children. This dilemma, imposed from the outside, had not only created conflicting thoughts within each individual, but conflict on the national collective level. This had resulted in individual and collective trauma. This trauma, as witnessed by the words in the interviews, which I purposefully cited in paragraph style – in order to give the reader a sense of the tone – is a direct result of the “name issue” and as such confirms one of my two hypotheses, namely that the “name issue” has caused collective and individual trauma among the Macedonians in the Republic of Macedonia. I was able to support this, not only through my interviews, but through the research I conducted in the political analysis, all of which coincided with the elements I drew from the interviews. In other words, as I come to the end of this thesis, I have come to realize that the same elements I had previously researched and tried to document as a scientist from literature, newspapers, and other primary and secondary research, came up in each individual interview. This meant that I too, had been a victim of this collective and individual trauma induced by the “name issue” and its creators. The same feelings and impulses I had had, when I started researching and

reading, were mirrored in almost all the interviews I conducted. As a final note, then, I would like to cite one of the most renowned journalists and political analyst and historian, Mirka Velinovska, who tries to reason why “we, Macedonians, are how we are,” as she talks about “the pain we, Macedonians are in,” as a result of the “name issue” and of the resulting feeling of denial, betrayal, blackmail, injustice, disbelief, absurdity, and fear, it has inflicted upon us.

“What is most scary are the seven stages through which a man passes, in his pain. First, is negation, then not accepting, then suppressing, until finally, it all comes to an explosion. If you suppress that pain for too long, if you don’t ventilate it, you are not sure when it will explode. That’s the breakdown of a persona.”⁴⁸⁹ This is exactly the psychological state – a breakdown – in which Macedonians as individuals, and Macedonia as a society, have arrived at, since the beginning of the “name issue.”

XIV. INTERVIEW ANALYSIS OF MACEDONIANS FROM GREECE

CATEGORIES III, IV AND V

I struggled hard to divide the categories of Macedonians in Greece. This was because the individuals I have defined under Category III, and who defined themselves as “tukasni” were not that straightforward in defining themselves. This probably was a result of the level of trust, and for the most part, I had only just met them. It was probably also due to the fact that perhaps they were at a point where they were choosing between two “identities.” I could tell for example, that had I interviewed them a year before, they would have been even more reluctant to talk. Now, they were already being interviewed. Perhaps tomorrow they will be in Category IV – the Outspoken Ones.

CATEGORY III: THE HESITANT *TUKASNI*

⁴⁸⁹ Interview with Mirka Velinovska, Skopje, 2 February 2011.

This category of Macedonians involved Macedonians born and living in Greece, who called themselves *tukasni* in Macedonian or *dopii* in Greek (meaning “local,” from here) when I asked their ethnic identity and their mother tongue. Thus, though I interviewed them in Macedonian, they did not (or did but with caution and/or rarely) pronounce the word “Macedonian.” Rather, they identified their ethnic identity and their language as “from here” (they used the terms *dopii* and *tukasni* interchangeably). Those were the Macedonians who, as I concluded in Part II on the Historical Aspects, had been assimilated to such an extent – or feared repercussions to such an extent – that they preferred to play it on the safe side and not cause any turbulence which may get them into trouble with the authorities, their employers, their neighbors, or even their friends and families. They practiced self-censorship, as musician Dine Doneff, one of them – a Macedonian from Greece – put it. They were also very much integrated into Greek society, and, understandably, somewhat confused as to where to stand, as most of them bore no real ties to neighboring Macedonia, except for the language – which, often, they were not even aware was the same. They had been born and schooled in Greece, they worked in Greek, and their friends and neighbours spoke Greek. They were fully immersed in Greek society and were citizens of Greece, with all the rights and obligations that this entailed. On the other hand, they had been raised, in the privacy of their homes, in another language, which they had “learned to whisper” as one interlocutor told me, as this language had been either forbidden, or taboo – depending on when they were born. When asked about the “name issue” then, some said they had no opinion, as according to them, this was an affair to be resolved by politicians and not by them. Others seemed either reluctant to state their opinion, or confused and undecided about their opinion.

SLAV OR JUST MACEDONIAN ? ELEMENTS OF DISINFORMATION OR MISUNDERSTANDING

One of them, for example, told me that he did not really know what the true intentions of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia were. According to his knowledge, the Macedonian Government and people insisted that Macedonians were

Slavo-Macedonians, and he did not agree with this thesis. He did not consider himself as *Slavo-Macedonian*, and did not want to be associated with the word *Slav*. When I told him that, in fact, we did not consider ourselves Slavs, but simply Macedonians – even though obviously we were mixed with Slavs – he exclaimed euphorically, as if he had had a moment of epiphany, that in this case our problem was resolved! Both they and we were Macedonians and that was it!⁴⁹⁰ What was evident from his reaction – and he was a well-educated and well established Macedonian in Greek society – was that there was a lot of misinformation about the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, its citizens, what their real intentions were, and how they really saw themselves in terms of ethnic identity. Below is an excerpt from my interview with another individual from this category. The interview was conducted in Macedonian:

Me: You speak Macedonian. This place – your birth place and where you live – is about 25 km from the Greek-Macedonian border. I'm interested in knowing what you feel about yourself. Are you Macedonian or Greek?

Anonymous Hesitant Tukasni 2: Laughing. Greek. That's what they (the authorities) say - that we are Greek. Look, we are dopii.

Me: But dopii means "from here", "local". It's not an ethnic denomination. I'm interested in knowing what the Macedonians think about the "name issue". Macedonians in Macedonia, Greece, Albania, Bulgaria... What do you think about that problem –that Greece wants to change the name of our country?

Anonymous Hesitant Tukasni 2: I don't know. What should I tell you. That's politics.

Me: If the name of the Republic of Macedonia changes, will it change the identity of the Macedonian people? Will the Macedonians tomorrow no longer call themselves Macedonians but FYROMIANS or Northern Macedonians?

Anonymous Hesitant Tukasni 2: Look, let me tell you what I think. What we are speaking is not Macedonian, it is Slav – that's our language.

Me: But that kind of language doesn't exist.

Anonymous Hesitant Tukasni 2: Why not? Isn't it the same as Russian and Serbian? You are Slav, aren't you? Serbs, how do they say "hello," "how are you"? Isn't it the same? We're just talking – I'm telling you what I think.

⁴⁹⁰ Interview with Anonymous Hesitant Tukasni 3, Arnislavci (Agathi), Northern Greece, 10 July 2011.

Me: So what do you think about the “name issue”? What should be done about it?

Anonymous Hesitant Tukasni 2: Nothing. What should be done about it.

Me: Do you think that the Macedonian language will be lost, because if you don’t speak it, we don’t speak it...Your mom says you don’t speak Macedonian anymore.

Anonymous Hesitant Tukasni 2: Look, we speak Greek here. But we know the Macedonian because here there are Bulgarians, Turks, and so on.

Me: But if you don’t study it won’t you forget it?

Anonymous Hesitant Tukasni 2: Well, probably. But where should we study it?⁴⁹¹

THE FORBIDDEN LANGUAGE ELEMENT

“I belong to the generation of those used to hearing one language at home and another in public places. The older generation, particularly the women, didn’t speak Greek. In the purely rural villages of the Greek part of Macedonia the Greek language was hardly evident, whilst the local (Slavic) language was almost universal. In mixed villages, however, and especially in the cities, the demonized mother tongue remained locked in the house. We used to switch into Greek every time we came out to meet other people in the neighborhood. Children, on the other hand, used to teach their grandparents and parents their newly acquired language (modern Greek), sometimes simply passing on what they learnt at school. Although it’s been decades since state endorsed repression used any means it could, aided by television, to Hellenize even the most remote villages, my mother tongue (Slavic Macedonian) is still nurtured and cherished in many homes. I communicate with my parents in this language.”⁴⁹²

Interestingly, these Macedonians were not concerned about neighboring Macedonians stealing their identity, as they themselves referred to themselves and their language as “local” and not Macedonian. Thus, they were not the “Macedonians” which the Greek authorities refer to when they state that the “Greek Macedonians” would be offended if another people – namely the “Slavs” or “Skopians” from the

⁴⁹¹ Interview with Anonymous Hesitant Tukasni 2, Crneshevo (Garethi), Northern Greece, 10 July 2011.

⁴⁹² “Kostas Theodorou, aka Dine Doneff, speaks with Ieronymos Pollatos about non-forgetting,” viewed at website of Dine Doneff, musician: <http://dinedoneff.com/text6.html>, December 2014. Original interview (in Greek) is published on 09.04.2014 in www.popaganda.gr under the title: “A mysterious musical genius lives among us.”

neighboring country – called themselves Macedonians. Just as a reminder, the Greek authorities have stated that the term Macedonian is used to identify the people living in Greek Macedonia. Although they classify it as a “geographic” and not an “ethnic” qualifier, they still claim exclusivity to this term.

My interpretation is that the Macedonian identity was not an issue for these individuals in the Greek Macedonian category as they had a sense of mixed identity – Greek but “local.” This “local” meant from here. They spoke Macedonian, but they had different views regarding the ancient Macedonian history than that of other Macedonians in Greece and in Macedonia. These individuals could be classified in two subcategories: one would be of those Macedonians who stayed and benefited from the situation or the country’s policies, as opposed to their relatives who fled. Some of them, for example, settled or took over the houses of their relatives who fled. Such is the example of a Refugee Child I spoke with, who came back to her home village after sixty years for the first time, only to find that her relatives were avoiding her and pretended no one was in the house when she knocked on the door.

Thus, it is not in the interest of this subgroup to all of a sudden have all these past relatives coming back, digging around for land titles, and so on. Back in the day these Macedonians used to be called “Graecomans,” or “spies.” As a Refugee Child whom I interviewed told me, apparently there were even Graecomans in the Greek Government and Parliament:

An interesting thing to know is that Papandreou – the previous one – his first wife was Macedonian. Now this one, she is Greek. They also say that Dora Bakoyani was Macedonian. In the Greek Parliament, there are seven Macedonians, but they are so dangerous – there is no greater Graecoman than them...That’s the bad thing about some of our people – in order to get to power they will give up everything.⁴⁹³

This practical side goes hand in hand with the “name issue” and identity question, because if these Macedonians, in whose interest it is not to have their relatives - Macedonians from neighboring Macedonia and beyond - crossing the borders without fear and having equal access to European Union laws and policies, on

⁴⁹³ Interview with Anonymous Refugee Child 4, born in Krusoradi, Northern Greece. Skopje, 14 November 2014.

an equal footing as they, then this might change their circumstances. It might even lead to them having to give back their house! So it makes sense that these Macedonians line up with the policies of the Greek state, as these policies protect them. One of these policies, for example, as was seen in the historical analysis, was that former Greek citizens who had fled during the Civil War could only come back if they declared themselves “Greek by genus.” This meant that Macedonians, who had been born in Greece but fled, could not come back into Greece. Or else, they had to identify themselves as Greek, which some practical individuals did, while others were too proud to do so. In any case, this policy discouraged many to come back into Greece and reclaim their land titles.

Another subcategory of these individuals is those who simply have a divided view – a dilemma between their two identities – and they have chosen to keep their Macedonian identity at home, and amongst close friends, as was the case when I went to interview a group of friends and discovered, a good two hours later, that they all spoke Macedonian. These dilemmas are no doubt, due to a variety of factors, which go beyond the scope of this thesis, as they have psychological underpinnings and ramifications. However, it would not be wrong to say that they are also symptoms and remnants of past policies, when state authorities were so harsh on Macedonians that they “learned to whisper the Macedonian,” as one interlocutor told me. These were the times when, if caught speaking Macedonian, one would have to pay a fine and endure a punishment, such as having to drink castor oil. As a result, many grew up with an innate fear of showing their Macedonian side, and perhaps even embarrassment, as children.

One could say that these dilemmas are also telling of the influence – on Greek Macedonians – of present Greek policy vis-à-vis the Republic of Macedonia, and the way it depicts the neighboring country and its inhabitants as enemies of “Greek Macedonians.” The Greek Macedonians are, after all, Greek citizens, and if they personally did not deal with the displeasures of past policies – or if their parents hid this from them – then they have a tendency to trust their own government, for this is what is known to them. The neighbouring country, and its citizens, one must remember, were for a long time an “unknown” as they were not allowed to cross over

into Greece for a long time, and then, when they were, they were considered “Yugoslavs.” I remember vaguely having gone to Ser (Serres) on holidays as a child, and my parents being surprised and retelling the story on and on about the hotel owner who had been silent for all our stay, and who had told them discretely, during our last day, in Macedonian, that he was Macedonian – but that this was to be kept between them. Thus, he could only trust these neighbouring Macedonians just before they left. He did mention to them, however that he had enjoyed hearing them speak.

Thus, the identity of these Greek Macedonians is rather complicated, as several individuals in this category had mixed feelings of patriotism and Greekness while at the same time belonging to another sub-group that they simply called “local.”

This category of people calls for a more thorough analysis, in a similar fashion to the ones done by Anastasia Karakasidou with the populations in three villages in Northern Greece, or Danforth Loring with the Macedonians and Greeks in Australia. For the purposes of my thesis, however, the analysis I did was enough to establish that these people’s ambiguities about their own identity were remnants of past policies that influence present Greek domestic policy vis-à-vis its Macedonian minority, as well as Greek foreign policy vis-à-vis the Republic of Macedonia on the “name issue,” and thus, more generally, Greek policy on the identity and language of Macedonians in Greece, Macedonia and elsewhere.

The views regarding ancient history of these same Greek Macedonians (from Category III) were more complicated, and some of their ideas of history aligned with the official Greek state – namely that ancient Macedonians were Greeks and that Alexander the Great was Greek. One of my interviewees had pointed out to me that that all the archaeological discoveries of that time were written in Greek. “Why weren’t they in Macedonian if Alexander was Macedonian? For one language to exist, he said, it has to have been written somewhere.”⁴⁹⁴ I did not know how to explain to him that the language he was speaking had not been written in Greece for a long time, and yet, he was speaking it – it existed.

On the name, one of my other interviewees, whom I quoted earlier, was a bit confused as his logic was that “we can’t both be Macedonians as you are Slavs, not

⁴⁹⁴ Interview with Anonymous Hesitant Tukasni 2, Crneshevo (Garethi), Northern Greece, 10 July 2011.

Macedonians, and we are Greek Macedonian.” So when I pointed out to him that I don’t consider myself Slav, but rather Macedonian only, and that I had nothing against him calling himself Macedonian, he jumped with joy, exclaiming, “Ah, donc vous aussi vous ne vous considérez pas comme Slaves? Alors on n’a pas de problème, dans ce cas on est les deux Macédoniens !”⁴⁹⁵

This implies that the Greek authorities’ depiction of neighboring Macedonians as Slavs, and the strategy of dividing the Macedonians in neighboring Macedonia from those in Greek Macedonia have worked.

Paradoxically, then, while some of these Greek Macedonians had a problem with the name and/or identity, and most aligned with the Greek point of view of ancient history, they spoke Macedonian, and welcomed me rather warmly, though with a touch of precaution, and much curiosity. Many of them called the language “the language from here” or the “local language” and they said it was an unwritten, spoken language – a language used by Greeks, Turks, and all the peoples in the region. As one of my interviewees said,

Je comprends un peu mais je ne sais pas si c’est votre langue que je parle. Moi je vous comprends mal quand vous parlez entre vous, tandis que nous, comme c’est une langue pas écrite, on n’a pas des mots scientifiques... c’est le vocabulaire simple à cause de la vie quotidienne. La plupart des mots proviennent d’autres langues. Il y a beaucoup de mots grecs parce que quand on ne connaît pas le mot on le remplace par le grec. Il y a aussi des mots turcs qui restent. Des mots albanais aussi. Vous savez ici dans le passé, les populations étaient bien mixtes. C’est-à-dire, on avait un peu de tout. Mes arrière parents, parlaient trois ou quatre langues couramment. Ce n’était pas seulement le “tukaski”⁴⁹⁶, la langue des gens. C’est une langue simple, de communication. C’était la langue dans les bazars, dans les agoras, quand on allait faire des courses tout le monde parlait ça – les musulmans les chrétiens. Mais bon, dans les villes, tout le monde parlait le grec – les commerçants parlaient le grec.⁴⁹⁷

⁴⁹⁵ Interview with Anonymous Hesitant Tukasni 3, Arnislavci (Agathi), Northern Greece, 10 July 2011.

⁴⁹⁶ *Tukaski*, meaning the language of here, in Macedonian. By now I heard this word in several versions – *tukasno*, *tukasni*, *tukasi*, *tukaski* – to describe the language and the ethnic identity of the Macedonians in Greece. The word always had the root of the word *tuka*, meaning “here” in Macedonian. As already mentioned, sometimes they also use the word *dopii* which in Greek means “locals”, “from here”.

⁴⁹⁷ Interview with Anonymous Hesitant Tukasni 3, Arnislavci (Agathi), Northern Greece, 10 July 2011.

This same interviewee went on to tell me that his family were traders, and that they were very literate, city people, who kept documents as far back as the 18th century. He had the marriage certificate of his great grandparents from the late 1700s, which was in Greek, because, as he said, the language of the church was Greek, and all who were educated went to church. Indeed, during the Ottoman Empire, as we saw earlier, the Turks did not divide people according to ethnicities, but rather religious affiliations. Thus, in the beginning all those who were Christian Orthodox were under the Greek Orthodox Church, which had been authorized by the Ottoman Empire. Later, the Ottoman Empire also authorized the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, which created a lot of animosities between the two, and a battle for conquering the local people. My interlocutor continued to explain why the marriage certificate of his great-grandparents from the 18th century was in Greek:

Pourquoi c'était en grec ? C'est parce que tous les gens qui étaient bien formés – qui allaient à l'église et qui savaient lire, je crois que c'est l'église qui a maintenu la langue grecque ici, et bien sur l'écriture, car ils avaient l'écriture en lettres grecques. Et comme ça ils écrivaient, un très bon grec, je dirais. C'est vrai que j'ai quelques lettres en "tukaski" mais c'était des petites notes comme ça, en écriture grec, mais dans la langue d'ici, qui disaient que ma grand-mère était née en 1885... bon, ils écrivaient comme ça, des petites lettres. Dans la maison, surtout ils parlaient le "tukaski".⁴⁹⁸

Some of this also had to do with the "level" of contact these Greek Macedonians had had with their neighbors. It was rare, however to come across Greek Macedonians who were completely hostile to neighboring Macedonians. Whether this was due to simple curiosity, or a feeling, or some knowledge in the back of their minds, I cannot be sure. The only Greeks who appeared visibly hostile towards Macedonians from neighbouring Macedonia – based on my interviews with Macedonians and not with them – were the ones that had been settled in that region from abroad, namely with the two population exchanges with Bulgaria and Turkey (with the post-Balkan War Greek-Bulgarian Convention on the Exchange of Populations, which involved over 1 million people, and the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish

⁴⁹⁸ Interview with Anonymous Hesitant Tukasni 3, Arnislavci (Agathi), Northern Greece, 10 July 2011.

Populations signed at Lausanne, in 1923 which involved the exchange of 1.5 million people).

What was true of Greek Macedonians, as Pavle (Filipov) Voskopoulos, leader of the Rainbow Party, or Vinozito (Ouranio Toxo) – the Party of the Macedonian Minority in Greece, which promotes the rights of the ethnic Macedonian minority in Greece, told me during the interview, was that people lacked general trust. People were weary of even their neighbours and friends, not to mention Macedonians from neighbouring Macedonia. After a century of techniques used by the state and local authorities, such as infiltrating spies from among the local population, and rewarding them respectable local or state posts, such as schoolmasters, church officials, and mayors, as was seen in the historical part, it was logical that people were not trusting. As one of my interviewees (Outspoken Ones) during the fair in Greece, told me “The police cars you see here, they are spies! They have a problem with their identity. I don’t have a problem with being Macedonian. They do.”⁴⁹⁹

Indeed, these Macedonians (Hesitant Tukasni) even had a feeling of mistrust towards the Rainbow Party, because allegedly, its affiliates and members were followed by spies, or had spies infiltrated among them. I found, thus, that the “Graecoman” problem was not just history, but a persistent fear among Macedonians living in Greece today. Consider the following two passages from one and the same person – who had visibly had problems with the Greek authorities for being Macedonian, but who, at the same time, was cautious about sympathizing with the Rainbow Party, perhaps precisely due to this same fear:

There is a lot of nationalism here. The Greeks have done nothing for me – even though I have lived here all my life and so have my parents and grandparents – all of us. While they brought in Russians, and they gave them money. They gave money to the so-called Greeks they brought in from Turkey – the Madziri as we call them. They gave money to the Roma. To us – they gave nothing. They took our fields. They would give us one goat and take the whole field.⁵⁰⁰

*We have a problem with Ouranio Toxo [Vinozito-Rainbow].
... Ouranio Toxo ask what are you? Are you not Macedonian? If you*

⁴⁹⁹ Interview with Nikos Kalinis (Outspoken One), Ovcarani (Meliti), Northern Greece, 21 July 2011.

⁵⁰⁰ Interview with Anonymous Hesitant Tukasni (Possibly Outspoken) 4, Arnislavci (Agathi), Northern Greece, 11 July 2011.

say you are not, then they say, ok, don't come to our gatherings... I don't like this kind of thing. They split the people. I don't agree with their politics... It's not because they will be angry. But it's because I will lose my job. And then, what will I do? Who will come to tell me – ok if you have a problem, we are here? Who will help me? You have to argue, to quarrel. If you quarrel, and if you are with Ouranio Toxo, there are also State spies and they will make a big problem. You have to be careful.⁵⁰¹

A TALE OF TWO IDENTITIES AND THE BEGINNINGS OF A MACEDONIAN REVIVAL

As I mentioned earlier – and this forms my first hypothesis, the “name issue” is causing individual and collective trauma – the Macedonians I interviewed in Macedonia all had a controversy within them, and among them. On the one hand, they all wanted to be able to keep their identity. This was the so-called red line. However on the other hand, they equally wanted to live in a country that would not be isolated from the rest of the world, and in a country that would have prosperity and security. This world to them (probably also due to ignorance and propaganda), was synonymous to membership in the European Union and NATO. The European Union meant prosperity and freedom of movement, and NATO meant security. So there was a clash within them, as they all had to choose between something that was so intimately part of them – their identity – and the future. There was a clash among them, in society, among the “future-looking” (Category I-Pro Name Change) and the “past-looking” (Category II-Against Name Change). One of the things I noted when analyzing my interviews, was that, in general, the younger the interviewees were, the more they opted for EU and NATO rather than their identity.

However, when I interviewed the Macedonians in Greece, I came to a slightly different conclusion. On the one hand, they too, were in a way forced to make a difficult decision between two choices. One was to be an accepted part of the Greek society while hiding or even denouncing their mother tongue and their “other” identity. The other was to proudly confess their Macedonian identity and language, at

⁵⁰¹ Interview with Anonymous Hesitant Tukasni (Possibly Outspoken) 4, Arnislavci (Agathi), Northern Greece, 11 July 2011.

the risk of being looked down upon in Greek society, losing their friends or jobs, and being the “black sheep” in society so to speak. Here too, among the Macedonians in Greece, there existed not just the internal clash – the clash within each of them – but a clash between two types of Macedonians in Greece: those who simply wanted to retain the status quo (i.e. go about your business at home, but don’t speak the Macedonian language outside of your home and don’t claim your Macedonian identity overtly), and those who were outspoken and loud and clear about the fact that they were ethnic Macedonians. Those who belonged to the first camp were those I interviewed who spoke in Macedonian and said they were speaking *tukasni*, the language “from here,” and whom I have labelled “The Hesitant *Tukasni*.” Those in the overt camp were those like Pavle (Filipov) Voskopoulos, who founded the Rainbow Party of the Macedonian Minority in Greece, whose story I referred to in Chapter XI, who had made an informed choice to be ostracized from Greek society in order to fight for his rights. Pavle was a perfect example of a “black sheep.” Here too, however, as in Macedonia, there was no clear-cut division between the two categories. Pavle was also a Greek citizen who needed to get on with life, work, raise a family, and so forth. In the “The Hesitant *Tukasni*” category there was a lot of uncertainty and ambiguousness. Within them, I could feel a fine line between wanting to overtly speak or even promote their language and identity, and simply not disclosing it out in the open to others which they did not know. Here too, as in Macedonia, had they not had to make a choice, Macedonians in Greece would have rather been both: citizens of Greece as well as ethnic Macedonians, who could speak their language, sing their songs, and tell their stories freely, without fear of any repercussions. The biggest fear in both Macedonia and Greece, among all four categories (i.e. in Macedonia, Category I and II – Pro Name Change and Against Name Change, and in Greece, Category I and II – The Hesitant *Tukasni* and the Outspoken Ones), was the fear of the unknown: the fear of what would happen if Macedonia did not enter the EU; the fear of what would happen if I lost my job or if I told my friends that I am Macedonian.

Interestingly however, in Greece, the trend among the youth was reversed. Whereas for the older people, who had lived their Macedonian identity in silence, there was no real need to “stir trouble” anymore, as they had learned to live their

“double lives” and were not going to change them, now at 70, it was the young who were getting more and more excited about their Macedonian side. Songs were being sung, books were being written, and the Macedonian language was being spoken in underground cafes and places. There was a re-naisance of the Macedonian identity in Greece. Whether it was due to the fact that this identity and language had been suppressed and hidden, or the fact that now, in an era of the internet and communications, these young people were finding out more and more about themselves and their past, and discovering so many others who had the same life story (sometimes even neighbours or friends who had not, until then, “blown their Macedonian cover” so to speak), the enigma of being Macedonian was all of a sudden becoming not just a trend, but even a silent revolution. Perhaps what gave this movement a push was precisely the fact that it had been a secret for so long that was now being revealed. People – especially the younger generations – were discovering their roots, they were getting together in underground groups, writing about it, listening to that music, talking that language which, hitherto, they had only pronounced inside their homes, with their mothers and grandmothers – because they had been taught this way, and because it had been either forbidden, or taboo. Now they were doing it in cafes, though never openly: you would never see a website or a link saying “Macedonian brunch Sundays at 7:00 PM at Giorgi’s Café,” for example. It was always a word by mouth, underground type of activity – which made it even more stirring, mysterious, and powerful. One such Macedonian from Greece, who is in his 20s, and who only understands a little bit of Macedonian but does not speak it, is on his way to making a documentary about all this.

Another such Macedonian from Greece is a musician who lives between Munich and Voden (Edessa). In the past five years, he issued several albums, playing old Macedonian music, which became a hit among young Macedonians in Greece, and which is being passed on through secretive channels. During my first field trip to Greece in 2011, for example, I was handed one of his albums by one of my interviewees, as a good-bye gift. Speaking to the “dualism” within these Macedonians from Greece, perhaps the front page of this musician’s website says it all: “As time passes by and we gather experience, we realize that reality differs from truth.

Generally speaking, I can say that Dine Doneff is the truth, and Kostas Theodorou the reality.” Here, he speaks of himself. Except Dine Doneff is his Macedonian name and identity, and Kostas Theodorou is his Greek name and identity. Dine continues to explain, in an interview with another Macedonian from Greece, Ieronymos Pollatos:

“[I.P.] Who is Dine Doneff?

[D.D.] That’s a difficult question... Dine Doneff is me, i.e. Kostas Theodorou. As time passes by and we gather experience, we realize that reality differs from truth. Generally speaking, I can say that Dine Doneff is the truth, and KostasTheodorou the reality. The writer Skaribas put it in a nutshell;“generalizations save”.

[I.P.] At what point did Kostas Theodorou and Dine Doneff meet?

[D.D.] Since I can remember remembering, there has always been an inner dialogue between these two. All my years at school it was impossible for me to express my hidden identity, since reality demonized it. Coming of age, things became more difficult, and the necessity of surviving and integrating into Modern Greek society drew “borderlines”. I could already sense, even in leftist and anarchist circles, this rejection of “otherness”. Meanwhile, this anguish, intuitively, began to pervade the music I was writing. In Nostos (“Longing”), my first recorded work, I had already implanted some encrypted clues. In Rousilvo, the very theme of the project itself gave me the power to externalize what had been churning inside me all those years.”⁵⁰²

Incidentally, Ieronymos Pollatos is the author of a book along the same lines. Yet another Macedonian from Greece wrote a book entitled *The Repressed Language*. Dine refers to both books in the interview, stating that:

“Maybe, if *The Repressed Language* (Η Απαγορευμένη Γλώσσα), the book by Tasos Kostopoulos – both a thorough investigation of the historical documents, and also a dispassionate and courageous record of the issue – had come into your hands before you sent your book to Skidra, (Vertekop), you might have expected your book would not be read by the present inhabitants,

⁵⁰² “Kostas Theodorou, aka Dine Doneff, speaks with Ieronymos Pollatos about non-forgetting,” viewed at website of Dine Doneff, musician: <http://dinedoneff.com/text6.html>, December 2014. Original interview (in Greek) is published on 09.04.2014 in www.popaganda.gr under the title: “A mysterious musical genius lives among us.”

just because the title uses its old (Slavic) name. Especially by those whose memories are afflicted by self-censorship, and all this, without considering the national allergy to the names of “allophones”. *We lived and still live in this area of our origin and birth as indigenous foreigners. We are somehow consigned to the corner of the Macedonia-fighters and the Hellenization-streets* (Μακεδονομάχων και Εξελληνισμού γωνία – in original) (an anomaly and irrelevance in our own country).⁵⁰³

This excerpt shows how these Macedonians from Greece feel about themselves, about society, and about doing the taboo thing - writing about themselves the “other” society, speaking out loud, whether through books or music or other means. It portrays the feeling that these people who dare to do so are courageous; that non-Macedonians in Greek society do not want to deal with – and refuse to accept – this other society; that even Macedonians from Greece, “whose memories are afflicted by self-censorship” do not want to deal with – and refuse to accept – this other society; that they feel there is a “national allergy” towards them, and they are referred to here as “allophones” meaning those who speak/understand all languages; and that they still live as “indigenous foreigners.”

The feeling of being amongst these people was indeed, powerful. It was as if, to use a well-known proverb, the Greek “emperor had lost his clothes.” Meanwhile an underground society had built up a Macedonian revival ready to cause a social revolution about the Macedonian identity in Greece.

CATEGORY IV: THE OUTSPOKEN ONES

The other Macedonians in Greece – the Outspoken Ones, who were not afraid to openly disclose their Macedonian identity – had already undergone their own revolution. This was more of a human rights, legal and political battle, which, they are slowly achieving, step by step, though with many hardships and risks, but significant success thus far. The unmistakable success story is namely the establishment of the

⁵⁰³ “Kostas Theodorou, aka Dine Doneff, speaks with Ieronymos Pollatos about non-forgetting,” viewed at website of Dine Doneff, musician: <http://dinedoneff.com/text6.html>, December 2014. Original interview (in Greek) is published on 09.04.2014 in www.popaganda.gr under the title: “A mysterious musical genius lives among us.” Emphasis added.

European Free Alliance – Rainbow Party (Political Party of the Macedonian Minority in Greece), which is referred to as *Vinozito* in Macedonian, and *Ouranio Toxo* in Greek.

Primus inter pares is Pavle (Filipov) Voskopoulos, who founded the Rainbow Party. As I have already referred to the vicissitudes that surrounded the establishment of the Rainbow Party, in Chapter XI on the human rights aspects, I will not dwell on its details here. I would like to quote Pavle, however, to give a gist of his thoughts and personality.

If you bring the Greek representative to a narrow passage, you know what he will tell you? He will have to show his nationalism and say – we don't accept your identity. So, he will admit that in fact it is not the name of the country, he is interested in, but he is interested, firstly, in not recognizing the Macedonian identity (Macedonianness) and second, in redefining the Macedonian identity (Macedonianness). What I am telling you now is very important. Before, they tried to make us part of the Slav component. So they tried to redefine Macedonians as Slavs. Now they want to redefine Macedonians as Greeks. You will see them calling you "Slavo-Macedonian". Then why don't we call them Turko-Greeks? Because they have many Turkish customs, traditions, cuisine. And he will say no – because I only want to be Greek. Really? You want? Well it's your right. Even though you have Turkish, German, Slav, Roman – everything that passed through here. And yet you want to call yourself Greek. And then with what right are you picking at your neighbor who wants to self-determine or self-identify. Because this is how he understands his Macedonianness – as you understand your Greekness, in spite of the fact that you have Turkish, Slav, Vlach, Albanian and I don't know what in you.⁵⁰⁴

As one can tell from this quote, and the ones that will follow, this category of Macedonians – in contrast to the previous category – were loud and clear. Not only was there was no discussion that their identity was Macedonian – but they knew and were outspoken about the identity politics they had been subjected to. In fact, it was they – or more precisely, the founders, members and supporters of the Rainbow Party – who had raised awareness on this issue and on the rights of the Macedonian minority in the international community. It was Pavle and his associates who had succeeded to establish the Rainbow Party through the “back door” – literally by

⁵⁰⁴ Interview with Pavle (Filipov) Voskopoulos, President of the European Free Alliance – Rainbow Party (Political Party of the Macedonian Minority in Greece), Ohrid, 13 August 2011.

becoming a Member of the European Free Alliance, and going through the European Parliament. These Macedonians had fought long and hard for their right to express their identity and speak their language, and were bold as they had already reached tremendous steps in that direction. Their fruit of their activities can be seen at their website: <http://www.florina.org/rainbow>. The stance of this category of Macedonians on the “name issue” was also strong and unambiguous. An interviewee who clearly exemplifies that stance is Nikos Kalinis, who, incidentally, partly lives in Brussels and Dublin and works for the European Commission.

There is no issue about the name – the name issue is a non-issue, ok? What is the importance of being Macedonian? It's a natural thing, there's nothing important about it. If you start talking about it, this is important, that is important, nothing is important. You wake up in the morning, have breakfast and then you go to your work and then you come back. Just, that's it.

They don't want to erase just the Macedonian identity. They want to erase the Arnauti (Albanian) identity, the Vlach identity, the Turksih identity. They have created their own myth. Greekness, as seen today, it's a myth. I feel very concerned about the real Greeks. I have some Greek friends. I have not only the opportunity, I have the honor to work together with Greek people. And they are very happy to hear that I speak Macedonian. Those are the real Greeks. They are the Greeks from the islands.⁵⁰⁵

Another individual in this category is Petre Vockov (Petros Votsis), biology teacher and author of several textbooks and novels, including *The Little Macedonian*. In the beginning, he was quite direct regarding the name, but when I told him that many Macedonians wanted Macedonia to be in the European Union, he suggested that if Macedonia had to negotiate, perhaps a geographic qualifier would do no harm:

The name has to be Republic of Macedonia. I say they shouldn't put it on referendum. But there could be a little bit of a difference – something that could differentiate Greek Macedonia from Macedonia. Even if it becomes Northern Macedonia – this implies that there is also a Southern Macedonia. So we won't lose anything. That's what I think. So as to be able to enter the European Union. But there too, you won't see any “air” as they say in Turkish. Look at us, where we are now, and all

⁵⁰⁵ Interview with Nikos Kalinis, Ovcarani (Meliti), Northern Greece, 21 July, 2011.

this time we have been in the European Union. And look where we are going.”⁵⁰⁶

When I asked him why he thought the Greek authorities had a problem with the name of the Republic of Macedonia, here is what he had to say:

Because you will enter the European Union. Either you will enter, or we will get out of it. I’m from the village of Crevo. The whole village is Macedonian. Both my parents are from here. I’m born in 1943. I have written a book about it. It is called The Little Macedonian, and it is translated in Macedonian, and Czech. I wrote it in Greek but the dialogues are in Macedonian – the Macedonian we speak here. I have been speaking Macedonian since I was a child. I studied in Athens, where I told to many the Macedonian problem. From 1962, I was in Athens. That’s what I could do then, and I did it. I could speak with my friends, and the Greeks didn’t have that much trouble with Macedonia then, mostly because Tito had an agreement with the Greeks. But from the 1990s, when Macedonia gained independence from Yugoslavia, then Greece started hurting, and many of my friends turned against me. Until then, they said, leave him alone, let him tell his pain. But when Macedonia became independent, when the “knife entered the bone,” they didn’t see me with sympathetic eyes.”⁵⁰⁷

Petre Vockov was one of those Macedonians who were conscious and afraid that the language and the culture would disappear. I had quoted him earlier on, when he said “we learned to whisper the Macedonian.” Concerned that “the young don’t speak the language very well,” he did the only thing he could do: “I write a lot of documents about our culture, so that things remain.” In a very subtle, yet deep way, Petre asked for help – from me as someone who came from Macedonia. His plea, evidenced below, is directly related to the request that had been made by Greek authorities for Macedonia to change its Constitution. As a reminder, as a pre-requisite for recognition by the European Community, Macedonia had been subjected to several conditions, one of which was amending the articles in its Constitution pertaining to the Macedonian minority in Greece:

“I believe that political groups should come to power in Macedonia that will teach the Macedonian language to students

⁵⁰⁶ Interview with Petre Vockov (Petros Votsis), Ovcarani (Meliti), Northern Greece, 21 July, 2011.

⁵⁰⁷ Interview with Petre Vockov (Petros Votsis), Ovcarani (Meliti), Northern Greece, 21 July, 2011.

here. This can happen, if you can help. Not schools. The Greek government would never allow that. I mean teachers who can come here to teach, and groups – political, cultural – to teach Macedonian. It shouldn't be very public. If you enter the European Union, this will happen by itself.”⁵⁰⁸

Here, then, lies the argument that many have made and that I too have raised – namely that what Greek authorities are afraid of is the spread of the Macedonian language and culture. Perhaps some of my interlocutors correctly pointed out that even Macedonia changed its name, it would not enter the European Union. For the aim was not to allow it to enter the European Union – if it did, then there would be more and more cultural exchange, and thus, no way of stopping the Macedonian identity.

Another concerned Macedonian I interviewed from this category was Patos Lakov, the Mayor of Ovcharani (Meliti), where I was conducting the interviews and where the Macedonian Panagjur (festival and fair) was being held on the occasion of Ilinden (St. Elijah Day).

This music you can hear every year on these kinds of days. From 1983 we began to sing Macedonian songs. Until then it was forbidden. We don't have a problem from the police. We here, on the territorial part of Greece that is called Macedonia (51% of Macedonia) we feel Macedonian. The Greeks have a mistake. It's a big mistake. They don't want more nations. They want just one nation. They want a big state with one nation. They shouldn't be ashamed and afraid to admit that they have seven nations in Greece. How is it possible that all states recognize their nations in the world, while Greece is the only country in the world that doesn't do that? First, it has to recognize us as Macedonians. We are neither against the state nor against the laws. All we want is to learn our language – to keep ours. Greece thinks that with the pressure it is doing against us, and not recognizing us, it will win. But this is just like the cat- it only whines. Someday, it will be uncovered.

...
Greeks have been working on the name “Macedonia” for a long time – for fifty, a hundred years. Because Greece lives from this territory. For example 50% of the agriculture comes from here. They are fighting for history which they wrongfully portrayed in school till the 6th grade. Because after the 6th grade, they start to learn other things. Until the 6th, they study whatever they are given. They

⁵⁰⁸ Interview with Petre Vockov (Petros Votsis), Ovcharani (Meliti), Northern Greece, 21 July, 2011.

thought that with the history as they taught it, if they give the name, they will lose the history. They are wrong. They won't lose the history – keep the history as you had it, recognize Republic of Macedonia, and when you are good with your neighbours you are also good with your wife. I think that Greece doesn't like Macedonia, Bulgaria, Albania, Turkey – so let Greece ask itself, is it good? It is not possible that the others are wrong and it is right.

...
God is watching. Macedonia will be. Whatever Greece does, and whether or not Macedonia is in the EU or not, Macedonia will be. The politicians have one mistake. Whether it will be Northern or Democratic or whatever name that separates the countries, they will never be able to separate the people. You can see that here right now. We have been fighting for this thing [the festival] since 1983 – we will go until the end! We will reach the maximum. We hear what the journalists are saying – that it should be Northern Macedonia. We want it to be just Macedonia. Every family has a mother country. And we are proud that since 1991 we have a country. We may not be citizens of that country, but we are Macedonians.

...
The friends should open their eyes and see the truth. It cannot be day and night. It can be either day, or night. Or Greece, or Macedonia. It cannot be Greece-Macedonia. Greece wants to be both Greece and Macedonia. Well, that doesn't work. Let them sit on one place. Do they want to be Greece or do they want to be Macedonia? What did they do all these years for Macedonia? Come on, tell me? That they exiled and killed our people? Why did I, who am 54 years old, learn Greek at all in school? Because he wanted me to be Greek. But I kept my Macedonian – because I cannot betray mother and my father. You will see today that the young also speak.⁵⁰⁹

⁵⁰⁹ Interview with Pande Ashlakof (Panayiotis Anastasiadis), Mayor of Ovcharani (Meliti). Ovcharani (Meliti), Northern Greece, 21 July 2011.

CATEGORY V: THE REFUGEE CHILDREN

I think that Pavle [Pavle Voskopoulos, leader of the Rainbow Party] is doing a lot over there, but how much he is able to accomplish, I don't know. All I know is that they need our support from us Macedonians here. It would be great if the Macedonian government could help, but they are not allowed to.⁵¹⁰

THE AGE FACTOR, MEMORIES AND THE PRESERVATION OF IDENTITY

The Refugee Children category, which I have already introduced in previous passages, was perhaps the most interesting category of individuals I interviewed – not only because of the unique perspective they had which derived from having been born in Greece, and fleeing Greece as refugee children during the Civil War, but also because they formed a rather large cohesive mass which, at their age, had many distinctive stories to tell, yet they told them in a very soft, mellow tone. Additionally, these individuals were interesting because they lived in Macedonia, but always spoke of their past in Greece. It was as if they had left their souls in their birth places, when they fled.

This category was most sensitive to the identity question, and manifested a vivid fear of losing their identity. This fear was no doubt related to the feeling of mistrust towards Greek authorities, which they had acquired in their childhood. Perhaps they feared that the same would happen to them again, this time at the hands of the international community. What gave me reason to believe these preoccupations was a comment that came from at least two of them, and that put me in an uncomfortable position. Namely, they said that they were worried that they would soon die. But they alluded to this idea not as a matter of personal distress, but as a sad reality that was inevitable and that would profit the Greek interests and their policy vis-à-vis the Macedonians, if one can put it that way. In other words, so conscious were these individuals of the fact that they were the only living memory of a past that

⁵¹⁰ Interview with Anonymous Refugee Child 2, born in 1938 in Setina/Popadija, Northern Greece. Skopje, 5 December 2014.

had to be told – of a truth that must not be forgotten – and of a culture and language that must be passed down, that they were literally afraid to die.

Here is what one of them said to me:

They say we should change the name so that we enter the European Union – but even then they won't even let us in the EU! That's the thing! Greece's goal is that we do not exist. What is in their way is the population that is left there, in Greece. But these are older generations, over 70 years old. And now they are waiting for them to die. ... As one Parliamentarian told us once, during an Aegean Reunion, you, Aegeans – Macedonians who were born in Greece – you need to leave your children with your memories, you need to tell them about events, you need to record yourselves, so that there is proof. So that the future generations know their roots and origins. And he was right. We are all about 60 now. In 10, 20, 30 years we will die.⁵¹¹

This quote epitomizes the general awareness among the Refugee Children, but also among society in Macedonia overall, that as these older generations faded away, the truth about what had happened, and about who they really were, would fade with them. And this would add yet another bonus point to the Greek strategy of denial of the ethnic Macedonian identity. This “age factor”, as it were, added to that fear of losing the identity.

This “age factor” had, in turn, prompted a collective rush among the Refugee Children in Macedonia and all over the world, to transmit the memories to the younger generations. Witness of this is when, during wone of my interviews, the nephew of one of these Refugee Children, in his early 30s, lingered around the house with curiosity while I interviewed his grandmother, listening attentively and adding details here and there – manifestly having heard these stories many times before.

This trend of passing down historical and family knowledge was also visible when I interviewed Irena and her partner, also in their early 30s, who were vividly interested when I asked to interview them, and who enthusiastically recounted the lives of their parents. I did not detect this type of eagerness, for example, when I interviewed Macedonians of the same age who had no links to the Refugee Children.

⁵¹¹ Interview with Anonymous Refugee Child 2, born in 1938 in Setina/Popadija, Northern Greece. Skopje, 5 December 2014.

But this conscious passing on of the memories of the Refugee Children was also happening on the national level, where awareness – on the political level – of the Macedonian minority in Greece was higher than it had ever been before. To be sure, this was also due to the fact that both the President of the country, Gjorgje Ivanov, and the Prime Minister, Nikola Gruevski, were children of Refugee Children. Indeed, as I mentioned earlier, both had been outspoken and proactive regarding the rights of the Macedonian minority in Greece.

It was in this spirit – to counter of the “age factor” so to speak – that more and more documentaries were produced and transmitted on the national television channel which related this forgotten chapter of history. One particular documentary which caught my attention was entitled “Witnesses” – the outcome of a government project entitled “Evidencing, photographing, recording and archiving video-materials and conversations with Macedonians expelled from Aegean Macedonia in the 20th century.” The project had been started in 2010 by the Cinematheque of Macedonia, in collaboration with the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Institute of National History, the Organizations of the Refugee Children and Macedonians of Aegean Macedonian origin, and Macedonian Radio-Television.

It was in fact, thanks to this documentary, that I met Alexandar Gjorgjiev, another child of a Refugee Child, who worked for the Ministry of Culture, and who had been at the initiative of this project. I would be remiss not to give him credit here, as it was he who ultimately introduced me to this category of people and who, thereby eased the immediate establishment of a high level of trust which, as a “non-Aegean” Macedonian, I may not have had. Though I did not interview him, he was the perfect example of these children of Refugee Children who, restless that the older generation would soon leave this world, worked tirelessly on projects that would conserve their memories, and created fora for bringing together people and entities who would contribute to the collection of memory.

MEMORIES OF BAD TIMES

One of the people I met through Alexander was Tashko Jovanov, President of Makedon - the Association of Organisations of Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia,

which acted as a sort of umbrella organization for various groups of Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia, including the Refugee Children.

I am proud to have this function to represent Aegean Macedonians and Refugee Children. We have made a lot of progress. I come from Setina. Since we used to hide the partisans in our village, it was attacked in 1948 by the Greek nationalists. We had to pack in five minutes and we fled. It was difficult. The first night, we were settled in the army barracks of the Yugoslav Army on the Yugoslav side on the border. We slept there, and then in the morning, trucks came and took us to Brailovo. My brother in the meantime, had already fled in 1947 because he was tortured a lot by the Greeks. They hung him from the legs down, interrogating him and beating him. After that he lay six months in hiding in the mountains, then fled.⁵¹²

The story that Tashko relates about his brother is best explained in the excerpt below by Vassiliki Theodorou and Vassiliki Vassiloudi in their article “Childhood in the Maelstrom of Political Unrest,” which I also referred to in Chapter IX:

“In an attempt to avoid persecution, many leftist citizens took to the mountains and joined the newly established D.A.G., camping in mountainous areas near the borders with Bulgaria. Their close relatives, pressed by the police, followed suit. The records of the International Red Cross and other sources reveal that many of the wives, sisters, or mothers of people who had joined the Resistance were either displaced or interned in camps, very often along with their children. These mothers had to take care of their children’s nutrition, as the state did not provide them with a stipend. As a result, a number of children, from birth to twelve years old, spent part of their lives in unfavorable conditions, either in prisons or internment camps. In central Greece, special institutions were set up to cater for children whose mothers were imprisoned. Those between the ages of ten and twenty who were arrested as guerilla collaborators constituted another category of internees. As persecution was reaching a climax, living in the rural areas of Greece became increasingly difficult, especially for those with guerilla relatives.”⁵¹³

Another individual – child of a Refugee Child – also brought up the element of torture during the Civil War.

⁵¹² Interview with Tashko Jovanov, Refugee Child, Skopje 5 September 2011.

⁵¹³ Vassiliki Vassiloudi and Vassiliki Theodorou, *op. cit.*, 124.

From what my parents and grandparents tell me, the Civil War in Greece was between the Communists on the one hand and the Royalists on the other hand ... The latter were helped by the British and the French. Unfortunately, they used this war to ethnically cleanse the Aegean (Greek) Macedonia of Macedonians. They successfully did this – through physical expulsion, or assimilation. Physically, through threats and torture. For example, a teacher, relative of mine, taught children in Macedonian. They tortured him, tied him to a jeep and then dragged him through the village. He was killed in such a horrible manner – as a warning so that the others do not study Macedonian. So under the banner of the war, they succeeded in expulsing the Macedonian population.⁵¹⁴

Torture and genocide were words that were often used by my interlocutors. Though I have referred to them in several pages, they would deserve a more thorough and specific research, and could be a possible topic I will embark upon for future research. Here is how another Refugee Child summed up the story:

What can I tell you, it was a genocide that happened to us over there. That is why they don't want to recognize us in any way – neither as a country nor as a people. Ours is a stolen history. The entire genocide they made on the Macedonian people, they did with the knowledge of Europe. My family had a big house there, but I didn't go last year because I was afraid from Golden Dawn. They were very aggressive last year. We all have houses there, but this is why the Greece has that policy towards us.⁵¹⁵

ENTRY, CITIZENSHIP AND LAND TITLES

As mentioned earlier, the “name issue” also has a “property component” to it. Namely, most of the Refugee Children fled without documents – documents as to who they were, where they were born, and where they lived. These documents – birth certificates and land titles – are precisely the documents that Greek authorities have refused to give to the Refugee Children.

⁵¹⁴ Interview with Irena Pavlovska and her partner, children of Refugee Children. Skopje, 12 August 2011.

⁵¹⁵ Interview with Anonymous Refugee Child 3, Skopje, 9 November 2014.

In 2008, Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski wrote a historic letter to Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis, in which he referred to the Refugee Children and asked that they be allowed to travel to Greece, to claim back their properties, and to be allowed to obtain Greek citizenship. He also asked the Greek Prime Minister to recognize the Macedonian minority in Greece. The response by the Greek Prime Minister is that the Macedonian Prime Minister raises non-existent and unsubstantiated issues. Prime Minister Gruevski's letter – and its response – incarnates the very essence of the “name issue” as I have tried to describe it in this thesis, and deserves full attention in this context. I have quoted it almost in its entirety below.

“Dear Mr. Karamanlis,

I write to You with respect to two exceptionally important topics. If resolved, I am convinced they will amend many historical injustices; injustices that can be felt even today, and will improve the lives of many individuals. Surely, it will positively influence towards bringing the ties between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece closer.

Namely, in late 1940s, during the civil war in Greece, several hundreds of thousands of citizens and entire families in the whirlwind of war abandoned their homes, properties and the country in which they were born, as refugees.

A huge portion of these people, most of the ethnic Macedonians born in Greece, came to live in then SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), more precisely in the part of present Republic of Macedonia, and stayed here forever, probably due to the fact that they spoke the same language and felt they belonged with the Macedonian people. Some of them had been displaced in other European states, and in USA, Australia and Russia, but those who had moved are also mostly ethnic Macedonians, they speak the same language as our own, they feel they belong to the same Macedonian nation, whereas most of them own double citizenship - Macedonian and from the country they reside in.

Unfortunately, many decades later, after abandoning their birthplaces and residences, even after the war was over, they were not allowed i.e. forbidden to return to their hometowns, in their own houses and properties. Neither they, nor their successors were allowed to come back. As far as I am informed, during the early 1980s, several laws were adopted in Greece, under which they were deprived of their properties. You would

concur that these laws are not in accordance with the standards of EU, NATO and with international human right standards. Today these citizens, now nationals of the Republic of Macedonia, even though born in Greece, are discriminated on three accounts. Firstly, they are not able to claim back their properties; secondly, they face serious obstacles for traveling in Greece and thirdly, they cannot, as any other citizen born and raised in Greece, obtain the right of having double citizenship under Greek legislation - one Macedonian and one Greek - in times when Greece permits the right of double citizenship. Taking into consideration that in the past decades, the countries' democracy was developing, whereas your country become a member of EU and NATO - institutions where special attention is paid to human rights and standards for guaranteeing private ownership - I expect that You as Prime Minister will take measures to right these injustices caused to myriad of people whose destiny was painful. In the Republic of Macedonia these people are organised in several civil associations. During several joint meetings, they urged me to address You as Prime Minister of the neighbouring country, they feel they are discriminated by.

The second topic for which I would like to ask You, and my belief is that You will be fully engaged in order to assist, is recognizing the Macedonian minority in the Republic of Greece and ensuring basic rights in compliance with international standards on education in the mother tongue (in Macedonian), nourishing cultural traditions and customs through various forms of organisations, regulating the use of the Macedonian language in local institutions in Greek municipalities with significant percentage of ethnic Macedonians, including other possibilities that any other democratic country ensures to their citizens, who are of ethnic origin that is different from the dominant one.

....

Mr. Prime Minister, both You and I are not able to change history and the past. But with good will, we can right many injustices from the past and certainly we can influence in establishing a much better future for our citizens, unless we deal the real issues unbiasedly.

I hope I would hear from you soon,
Nikola Gruevski”⁵¹⁶

⁵¹⁶ “Source: “Gruevski’s letter to Karamanlis - I expect you to take measures in amending injustice caused to Greek-born ethnic Macedonians.” *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 14 July 2008. Found at <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/57436/gruevski-s-letter-to-karamanlis-i-expect-you-to-take-measures-in-amending-injustice-caused-to-greek-born-ethnic-macedo.html>

The “name issue” thus, as seen through the prism of the Refugee Children, takes on an even more concrete dimension.

NAMES

That year when you were with us in the bus – that was first time I went back. After sixty-three years! Well, I was young – only three years old. They took me to Hungary, I was there for eight years, and then came back to Yugoslav Macedonia. Everything was organized by the Red Cross. We studied Greek and Macedonian there. They considered us as Greek Macedonians. I was born in 1945 in Setina. Back then they gave me the name Zara Bejkova. But then, I don't know why, while I was still in Hungary, in the 3rd grade, they sent me documents to change my name. In the village they all knew us as Bejkovi. Some from among my relatives kept the old name and others changed it. Most of my family and relatives left. There is one that stayed – my uncle, my brother's father. He was a Greek soldier. When you stay there, you get Greek land.⁵¹⁷

The first time we were allowed back in Greece was in 2002. It was Tashko who organized us – all these years it has been him who organizes the trips. When we stopped at the Greek side of the border (Dojrani), the border policeman came in the bus, and asked who speaks Greek. We were all a bit reluctant...some of us spoke but were not sure what to say. Others didn't. I for example, was brought as a baby – so I didn't speak the Greek language at all. My husband knew Greek, because he was one of the Refugee Children that had been taken to Hungary by the Red Cross, and there he was adopted by a family. Then, when he started school, he studied both Greek and Macedonian. Anyway, the policeman shouted again, asking the whole bus who spoke Greek, and my friend raised her hand. She went out with the policeman and when she came back, she told us that he had said we should all come out of the bus to the counter, one by one, and say our names in Greek: father, mother, name, surname, village of birth, and where we were going. So when my friend said Vera Dimitrova, the policeman corrected her, Vera Dimitros? And so on.⁵¹⁸

⁵¹⁷ Interview with Anonymous Refugee Child 2, born in 1938 in Setina/Popadija, Northern Greece. Skopje, 5 December 2014.

⁵¹⁸ Interview with Anonymous Refugee Child 4, born in Krusoradi, Northern Greece. Skopje, 14 November 2014.

As we have seen before, the names of people and places had been forcibly changed through a decree. The paradox was that now that these Refugee Children – who had lived abroad almost their entire lives – were allowed to enter and see their childhood homes, they were also forced to recall the bad memories along with the good. For many of these people, going back was a dream. But the minute they stepped in that country, they were reminded of why they had fled.

A FINAL WORD ON THE MACEDONIANS FROM GREECE

The enemy is fear. We think it is hate, but it is fear.

Mahatma Gandhi

To conclude, it is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that there might be an underground Macedonian renaissance or social revolution going on in Greece at this time, ready to explode at any moment. It is, if we can put it in these words, a reawakening of the Macedonian minority in Greece. It is perhaps the fear of this potential explosion that motivates, more than anything else, the Greek authorities' insistence on changing Macedonia's name and its citizens' ethnic identity and language. Because, as seen earlier, if there is no Macedonian language or ethnic identity in Macedonia, then there can be no individuals in Greece with such a language and ethnic identity. If there is no Macedonian language or ethnicity in Greece, then the Macedonian minority in Greece is non-existent. Rather, the individuals stirring the problem are a fake mass of individuals (Tito's creation), infiltrated by a foreign country (Yugoslavia and now Macedonia), who are stirring a revolution and who must be stopped by all means, including the use of force. This would explain why, as discussed earlier, Greek authorities insisted from the very beginning, on the security and territorial integrity aspects of the "name issue." If it were necessary, Greece would potentially be able to use that force, and would have the backing of its allies to do so, if the Republic of Macedonia was not a Member State of the European Union or NATO. If the Republic of Macedonia did become a Member State of the European Union and NATO, however, things would get much more complicated. As an interviewee told me earlier, if one wages war against a NATO Member State, they wage war against all

Member States of NATO. Were Macedonia to become a Member State of the European Union, it would be able to uphold the rights of Macedonian minorities in a much more robust fashion: there would be no chance of negating the existence of a Macedonian minority in Greece – unless of course, the Republic of Macedonia changes its name and the identity of its people and their language, in which case, of course, if no majority exists, how can there be a minority?! Furthermore, if the Republic of Macedonia does become a Member State of the European Union, then Greece will be able to control its borders as it has done until now – a case in point being the refusal to allow Tashko Jovanov, one of my interviewees, and President of Makedon, the Association of Aegean Organisations in Macedonia.

Thus, the “name issue” is a smoke screen for Greece’s problem with its Macedonian minority. Resolving the “name issue” (i.e. changing Macedonia’s name and the name of its people’s ethnic identity and language), would resolve the problem of the Macedonian minority in Greece, and the potential of the underground revival I described earlier, from becoming a whole-scale social revolution. This was the conclusion I arrived at, following my analysis of the interviews I made with Macedonians in Greece and the so-called Macedonian Refugee Children (or their descendants), in other words, Macedonians who had been born in Greece but who had been fled during the Greek Civil War. As such, based on these interviews, as well as on my historical analysis, I was able to prove my second hypothesis, namely that the “name issue” is a direct result of the Greek past and present policy vis-à-vis its Macedonian minority in Greece.

CONCLUSION

Now we are facing a slippery, perfidious, terrain – USA, Europe – who are saying, change your name so that you are at peace with Greece, while the identity will not be changed. Whereas that’s the very first effect of the name change – once they change your name, which is your main sign – it will change your identity. In Latin “nomen est omen”: “the name is the sign”. So when they erase your name they erase your sign, because even the dead man has a sign. Once you erase his name off the stone on his grave, even he won’t exist, because the name identifies him – and therefore it is engraved on the stone forever. The same can be said for an entire people – perhaps it is a drastic example. But we are being served this very perfidiously, and in the trap fall academics, intellectuals, and so forth, and we are being told that we should think of the future – not to get burdened with the past. While T.S. Elliot, the famous American poet says, “the present is a lot of past and a little bit of future.” So you can’t without the past, because the past is the foundation of some kind of existence, a civilization. It’s the source. So if they threaten our name they threaten our source.⁵¹⁹

The revelations from Greek history that concern the Macedonian minority in Greece and the general development of the Greek nation-state and the Greek national self-awareness point to the conclusion that the “name issue” is a smoke screen for many hidden truths. For one, as mentioned earlier, they reveal that there is a single aim behind the two seemingly different Greek policies – one foreign policy vis-à-vis the Republic of Macedonia, and the other domestic policy vis-à-vis the Macedonian minority in Greece. That aim is the technical elimination of a separate ethnic Macedonian identity.

Through the analysis of primary and secondary documents and the relevant scholarly literature, as well as interviewing, I attempted to show that the Greek position – and ultimately their goal – is that neither does a Macedonian language exist nor do a Macedonian people speaking that language and bearing the Macedonian ethnic identity exist. Combined, the excerpts from official legal and political representatives and enforcement authorities of the Hellenic Republic I cited make it clear that the official Greek stance is that a “Macedonian minority” does not exist in

⁵¹⁹ Interview with Eftim Kletnikov, Skopje, 11 February 2011.

Greece, because a “Macedonian people” and a “Macedonian language” do not exist – neither within Greece nor outside of Greece: they were both invented by Tito and the Communists.

But if neither the Macedonian people nor their language exist according to Greek authorities, then why have they gone through all the trouble of denying their existence? Who, then, are these so-called “Slavic speaking” people who make up a minority in Greece and who are the majority population of neighbouring Macedonia? Is it really possible that Tito could have invented millions of such people? And could it really be that these people would have kept their invented identity all the way to up Australia and Canada and from generation to generation? Highly unlikely.

You see, the problem Greek authorities have is not the name Macedonia, but the Macedonians themselves. Because if it was true that neither the Macedonian people nor their language existed for Greek authorities, then the question is, what has been the ultimate aim in creating the “name issue?” Or, in other words, is the name really the only thing the Greek authorities are compelling Macedonia to change? To be more precise, in addition to the constitutional name of the country, are the ethnic identity of the Macedonian people and the adjective defining their language also on the negotiating table? Through my analysis, I came to the conclusion that yes, indeed, the Greek position is ultimately about altering not only the name of the Republic of Macedonia, but about changing the ethnic identity, the national identity, and the language of the Macedonian people worldwide. This, if I may say, is quite a big international project, and the fact that it involves the European Union and the United Nations among the key players, should ring an alarm bell.

Time will tell whether the international academic and political community will one day recognize the importance of being Macedonian, or whether it will ignore it, as it has in the past. Time has already told so much. Throughout these pages I have attempted to convey the importance of being Macedonian through historical interpretations, political and legal considerations, human rights implications, collective manifestations and individual concerns. One element that has recurred through all these parts, that has driven the direction of the entire thesis, that held it together and that persisted until the very end, was the element of the right to an

identity as a human right. The undeliberate perseverance of the human rights element has undoubtedly shed a different light onto the “name issue” which has been depicted by so many from the outside as a trivial matter. This is all the more relevant, as these outsiders and foreigners (i.e. the so-called international community) are not innocent passers-by, but rather individuals implicated in the “name issue” and influencing its outcomes. These are politicians, diplomats, academics, scholars and analysts whose understanding (or misunderstanding) of the root causes of the “name issue” and its consequences on the Macedonian people is a pivotal factor for the future of these peoples’ lives and the perseverance of their country.

As things stand, it seems like there is no way out of the “name issue”, unless a drastic step is undertaken and a drastic change happens in international political affairs. In terms of political aspects, nationalism is on the rise in Greece, and this means that any issue that is seen as threatening the Greek identity or territory or history, would spark even more tension within Greece. No politician would be foolish enough to shoot himself in the foot by “resolving” the “name issue” by “giving in to Macedonia,” when the entire population is against Macedonia. Macedonia, too is going through its own renaissance, and a rise in patriotism, as a relatively new country. People are very sensitive to the identity, in particular because they have suffered from being denied their identity in the past, and now that they have their own country, they are scared to death that they will lose it. The interests of third parties (neighboring countries, EU Member States, Russia, United States, and so on) in the region continue to flourish, and this in turn, changes the dynamics of the “name issue.” In particular, it seems as though the “name issue” is kept as a “joker” card, for various initiatives and policies, whether they include stabilizing or de-stabilizing the region.

In terms of historical aspects, history and the perceptions of historic realities and historic heroes, as well as the claims for exclusivity to these heroes remain the greatest challenge. The only way forward on this front would be to rewrite historical myths in both countries, and /or to have one common myth. Both options are highly unlikely.

On the legal aspects, potential legal solutions exist, and these favor the Macedonian side. However the stalemate is on the political front. The ultimate aim of

Macedonia is to become a Member State of the European Union and NATO, and whether or not it wins a legal solution, will not change the veto power that Greece holds in both organizations. As such, even if there is a legal solution to the “name issue”, this would probably not change (or it might even worsen) the Greek position vis-à-vis Macedonia’s entry in the EU and NATO. In fact, the only eventual hope in changing the Greek position in this respect would be pressure from the international community – from its allies within the EU and NATO. And so once again, we turn to the power of the foreigner.

As I come to a close of this research, I ask myself, as perhaps the reader may be asking, what, then, is the added value of this topic to academia? Why is the “name issue” important? What added value have I brought to research and diplomacy?

There is more than one added value this issue brings to academia. For one, it is a highly topical and globally relevant issue – an international dispute, concerning not just the bilateral relations between two countries, but the European Union and the United Nations, as well as other international organizations.

Secondly, it is a complex issue with layers of root causes that have yet to be untangled, and with interests that run much deeper than the technical change of a name. In this respect, my research contributes to enlightening academia, diplomats and the wider public about the fact that the “name issue” is not merely about the name of a country, but also about the ethnic identity of the Macedonians, and ultimately, about a form of ethnocide, that is, the deliberate and systematic destruction of the culture of an ethnic group, through technical and diplomatic means, such as conditions for membership in regional and international organizations. To be sure, anyone who will have read into this thesis, will see that introduces, without actually saying so, a new form of ethnocide that could be referred to in the future as “technocide:” the elimination of the existence of a separate ethnic group through the elimination of the name of that ethnic group, the name of its language, and the adjectives defining its ethnic and national identity from the books – from all written texts – national, international, at home and abroad – and for all purposes. Indeed, what is not written never happened, the maxim goes. Looking in retrospect, I cannot blame politicians such as former Swiss President Joseph Deiss, for their dismissal of

the “name issue” as unimportant and trivial. I can only thank them because their opinions epitomize the general lack of knowledge about the “name issue,” and the magnitude of its scope.

Perhaps my research will contribute, some day, to a more informed perception of what is much more than a technical skirmish. By shedding light on the identity and ethnocidal (or “technosidal”) aspects of the “name issue”, I hope to give it the weight it merits. Perhaps then, someone will lend an ear to the Macedonian story.

A third added value of my research to academia is novelty. My research exposes an aspect (or a root cause) of the issue that has been generally ignored – whether purposefully or not – by both academia and politicians. This is precisely the aspect of domestic Greek policy both throughout history, and today, regarding the Macedonian minority in Greece. The general obliviousness of a century of policies in Greece that have contributed to the dramatic decrease in the population of Macedonians is suspicious, to say the least, especially in today’s context of international relations where human rights are omnipresent. This is all the more true when there is evidence of European complicity in some of these policies. My thesis strives to fill this lacuna by demonstrating that the root causes of the “name issue” are a historic attitude of denial by Greece towards its Macedonian minority, and its continuation into a policy of denial of the ethnic Macedonian identity today, within, as well as outside its boundaries. That the domestic policy vis-à-vis a minority in one country, which derives from the assimilationist – and sometimes genocidal – policies in the past, has had repercussions – via lobbying and international alliances – on the right of the majority in another country to its self-determination. That this denial of the right to self-determination is a de-jure, and ultimately, de-facto technical elimination of an ethnic group – namely the Macedonians.

Additionally, this thesis cuts across several fields, which gives additional weight to the issue it addresses. As such, it brings new ideas not just to the political scientist or the diplomat, but also to the international lawyer, the human rights activist, the anthropologist, and even the psychologist. It is true that in one respect, the multiple character of this thesis may have diluted a little bit from the substance of each of its parts. But at the same time this is a natural response to the very research

question I started out with, namely, “what does the ‘name issue’ mean to Macedonians?” The very fact that this work was so multifaceted reflected the pervasiveness of the “name issue” to Macedonians. Conducive to this is the wide spectre of possibilities for further research that this thesis opens up.

The legal or human rights analyst may be interested in the right to self-determination of the citizens of an independent, sovereign nation-state recognized by over one hundred and thirty nation-states under its constitutional name, “Republic of Macedonia,” and all the repercussions this would entail, were Macedonia indeed forced to change its name. Another option is to analyze the right to an identity in the international world order – both as a right in and of itself, and as a right pertaining to a minority in a Member State of the European Union, the United Nations and NATO, and as a right pertaining to a people that comprise the majority of an independent nation-state in Europe. Perhaps even more fascinating for a legal expert would be to analyze the international criminal law aspects of the historical events that occurred to Macedonians between 1913 and today, the involvement of Western powers in these events, and the implications of the “Macedonian Question” and the “name issue” in this respect.

I started out this thesis with the idea that that I would explain the “name issue” as perceived by Macedonians themselves to “the foreigner.” It turns out that “the foreigner” has been involved in the “name issue” all along. As I reflect back upon my research, I realize that not one part was written without a thought on the foreign interests, involvement, or interpretation. This started out as interests of Great Powers and neighboring countries in the territory of Macedonia and the subsequent creation of the “Macedonian Question,” in the nineteenth century; continued throughout the 20th century with the proliferation of literature by self-named “specialists” on Macedonia and its inhabitants, and the resulting foreign political, military, economic, and other involvement in Macedonia, as well as interpretations of its name, its peoples ethnic and national identity, their language, and other cultural matters; and still goes on, in the twenty-first century, with international politicians running a shuttle diplomacy back and forth to Macedonia to “resolve” the so-called “name issue.” I have come to the late but still valid conclusion, that “the foreigner” is an integral part of the

“name issue,” and that further analysis would necessitate the extent and dimensions of his implications. On a final note, I would like to close this thesis with the following quote from an individual who has inspired me because he never lost hope, faith, and courage – an individual who personifies that constant feeling of the need to explain to the “foreigner,” which many of us feel – and which was the reason why I embarked upon this academic journey – but which ultimately creates the paradox of the “name issue.” As if to say, if only the king knew...

The first thing you should know is something that is valid in the whole world, in all conventions, all principles, is the right to self-determination and self-identification. The “name issue” is against my basic human right. Meaning if I want to be called like this, that is my right, and period – no questions asked. The second thing is, it is absolutely destructive for a man to discuss how he will be called, because of the wish of a 2nd 3rd or 4th person. It is unacceptable. But because we are living in an international community which has a lot of hypocrisy sometimes – for example, there are people who say there shouldn’t be war, and then they create wars... So there is no ideal world, in Europe, in the Balkans, in the world. It is not ideal. By the logic of things, all principles should be respected.

If I were you, I would argument so as to expose in front of the international community what the 2nd 3rd or 4th person really proposes, when they speak of the name. Because the situation is interesting. No one else on the planet contests the Macedonian identity. This is a fact, if you go to Sweden, Germany, Chile. If you say you are Macedonian, no one will tell you a thing. The only ones that contest this are Bulgaria and Greece – they are the only ones. So when you are sitting on a table as a Macedonian, with a Greek, Bulgarian, German, Swedish, American, Argentinian, you have to argument, you have to explain to the foreigners where the problem lies – where the pressure lies. You have to explain about the violations of human rights.⁵²⁰

I do hope that I have explained in a manner that has been heard and understood, and that has conveyed this pressure that weighs upon us – this burden that denies the importance of being ... Macedonian.

⁵²⁰ Interview with Pavle (Filipov) Voskopoulos, President of the European Free Alliance – Rainbow Party (Political Party of the Macedonian Minority in Greece) Ohrid, 13 August 2011.

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ANNEX I: TABLE OF INTERVIEWS

CONDUCTED BETWEEN 2011 AND 2015, IN MACEDONIA, GREECE, SERBIA, AND SWITZERLAND

Interviews conducted in Skopje, Macedonia and Belgrade, Serbia, in February, 2011									
No.	Name of Interviewee	Date and Place of Interview	M/F	Age or Year of Birth	Place and Country of Birth	Ethnic Background	Current Place and Country of Residence	Current Profession	Academic Background
1	Mirka Velinovska	February 2, 2011, Skopje, Macedonia	F	50	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Journalist – Columnist and Investigative Journalist	BA, History
2	Igor Janev	February 5, 2011, Belgrade, Serbia	M	38	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian	Belgrade, Serbia	Professor and Advisor to Serbian Government	PhD International Law
3	Vangel Bozinoski	February 10, 2011, Skopje, Macedonia	M	45	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Architect, Speaker, Macedonian Radio Television	BA, Architecture, MA Historic Preservation
4	Vasil Ilyov	February 10, 2011, Skopje, Macedonia	M	70	Kostur (Kastoria), Greek Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Retired Architect, Preservationist, and Writer	BA, Architecture, BA and PhD, Restoration of Cultural Monuments
5	Eftim Kletnikov	February 11, 2011, Skopje, Macedonia	M	59	Negrevo, Malesh Region, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Poet, Essayist, Literary Critic, Translator, Anthologist	BA, Philosophy, Specialization in France
6	Fimka Kletnikova	February 11, 2011, Skopje, Macedonia	F	55	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Writer	BA
7	Gjorgji Spasov	February 11, 2011	M	55	Negotino, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Professor, former Minister of Justice, former Ambassador	PhD, Political Science
Interviews conducted in Northern Greece / Aegean (Greek) Macedonia on July 9-10, 2011									
I met one of these people in Skopje, Macedonia in May 2011, together on a cultural event at which guests from Greece had been invited. This particular Greek guest happened to be of ethnic Macedonian origin – and when I told him about my research, he invited me and my cousin to his home village in Greece. Most of the people I interviewed in his home village were his acquaintances, and they all wished to remain anonymous.									
No.	Name of Interviewee	Date and Place of Interview	Sex	Age or Year of Birth	Place and Country of Birth	Ethnic Background	Current Place and Country of Residence	Current Profession	Academic Background
8	Anonymous (Outspoken One) 1	A city in Northern Greece,	M	45	A city in Northern Greece	Macedonian	Northern Greece	Doctor (Pediatrician)	MD

		July 9, 2011							
9	Anonymous (Hesitant Tukasni) 2	A village in Northern Greece, July 10, 2011	M	38	A village in Northern Greece	"Tukasni" (from here/local)	Northern Greece	Construction Worker	N/A
10	Anonymous (The Hesitant Tukasni) 3	A village in Northern Greece, July 10, 2011	M	40	A city in Northern Greece	"Tukasni" (from here/local)	Northern Greece	Businessman	BA
11	Anonymous (Hesitant Tukasni or Outspoken One) 4	A village in Northern Greece, July 10, 2011	M	38	A village in Northern Greece	Macedonian and "Tukasni" (from here/local)	Northern Greece	Construction Worker	N/A

Interviews conducted in Northern Greece / Aegean (Greek) Macedonia, on 21-22 July, 2011

These interviews were conducted during one of the most important Macedonian holidays celebrated by Macedonians all over the world, namely "Ilinden," or St. Elija's Day, commemorating the Macedonian uprising against the Ottoman Empire, and the short-lived Krushevo Republic. In Aegean (Greek) Macedonia, during the past few years, there has been a lot of enthusiasm accompanied with a myriad of festivities surrounding this holiday, with the revival of the traditional Macedonian "Panagjur" (music festival and fair) which is celebrated in all villages in Greek Macedonia (and which was previously banned). One of the most famous "Panagjurs" is the one in the village of Ovcarani (Meliti), where I went.

No.	Name of Interviewee	Date and Place of Interview	M/F	Age or Year of Birth	Place and Country of Birth	Ethnic Background	Current Place and Country of Residence	Current Profession	Academic Background
12	Nikos Kalinis	July 21, 2011, Ovcarani (Meliti), Greece	M	1970	Village of Ovcharani (Meliti), Northern Greece. (In the Lerin (Florina) Prefecture, Macedonia Region.)	Macedonian	Brussels, Belgium, Dublin, Ireland, and Ovcharani (Meliti), Greece	European Commission, Brussels and Dublin	MA, Veterinary Inspection
13	Petre Vockov (Petros Votsis)	July 21, 2011, Ovcarani (Meliti), Greece	M	1943	Village of Crevo (Irthi), Northern Greece. (In the Lerin (Florina) Prefecture, Macedonia Region.)	Macedonian	Athens and Florina (Lerin), Greece	High School Professor, Biologist, and Author (textbooks and novels)	Athens University, Biology

14	Pavle Filipov (Pavlos Voskopoulos)	July 21, 2011, Florina (Lerin), Greece	M	45	City of Lerin (Florina), Northern Greece. (Capital of the Lerin (Florina Prefecture, Macedonia Region.)	Macedonian	Lerin (Florina), Greece	Architect, Founder and President of the Rainbow Party: "Vinozito" (Ouranio Toxo) – the Party for the Macedonian Minority in Greece	BA, Architecture
15	Panayiotis Anastasiadis (Pande Ashlakov)	21 July, 2011, Ovcharani (Meliti), Greece	M	55 (1956)	Village of Ovcharani (Meliti), Northern Greece. (In the Lerin (Florina) Prefecture, Macedonia Region.)	Macedonian	Ovcharani (Meliti), Greece	Mayor of the Village of Ovcharani (Meliti)	Primary School, Greece
16	Anonymous (Hesitant Tukasni) 5	21 July, 2011, Ovcharani (Meliti), Greece	M	1963	Village of Ovcharani (Meliti), Northern Greece. (In the Lerin (Florina) Prefecture, Macedonia Region.)	Macedonian	Lerin (Florina), Greece	N/A	High School?
17	Petros Vasilijadis (Pece Panishev until 1936)	21 July, 2011, Ovcharani (Meliti), Greece	M	1956	Village of Eksi-shou (Turkish) or Dolnovrbe ni (Macedoni an), or Ksino Nero in Greek, Northern Greece.	Macedonian	Dolnovrbeni (Ksino Nero), Greece	Activist of the Rainbow Party	BA, Philosophy Moscow, Russia
18	Nako Cvetciev	21 July, 2011, Ovcharani (Meliti), Greece	M	1940	Stip, Macedonia	Macedonian (half from Aegean (Greek) Macedonia	Stokholm, Sweden since 1973	N/A	N/A

Interviews Conducted in Ohrid and Skopje, Macedonia July - August 2011

No.	Name of Interviewee	Date and Place of Interview	M / F	Age or Year of Birth	Place and Country of Birth	Ethnic Background	Current Place and Country of Residence	Current Profession	Academic Background
19	Elizabeta Buova	Skopje, Macedonia, August 11, 2011	F	40	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian and Vlach	Skopje, Macedonia	Civil Servant, European Integration Expert	BA, English Philology, MA, Balkan Studies
20	Irena Pavlovska & Zoran Krivoseev	Skopje, Macedonia, August 12, 2011	F	30	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Johnson Matthey Employee & Gorenje Employee	BA, Economics, MA, Business, & BA/MA Engineering
21	Todor Cepreganov	Skopje, Macedonia, 12 July, 2011	M	50	Stip, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Historian, Professor, former Director of the National Institute for History	PhD History
22	Christopher Opancar	Ohrid, Macedonia, 10 August, 2011	M	42	Vienna, Austria	Austrian/Croatian	Vienna, Austria (used to live in Skopje, Macedonia)	Austrian Development Agency Employee	BA and MA, Agricultural Studies and Ecology
23	Pavle Filipov (Pavlos Voskopoulos)	13 August, 2011, Ohrid, Macedonia	M	45	City of Lerin (Florina), Northern Greece. (Capital of the Lerin (Florina Prefecture, Macedonia Region.	Macedonian	Lerin (Florina), Greece	Architect, Founder and President of the Rainbow Party: "Vinozito" (Ouranio Toxo) - the Party for the Macedonian Minority in Greece	BA, Architecture
24	Milan Filo	Ohrid, Macedonia, 13 August, 2011	M	1964	Village of Vrbnik, Albania (on the border with Greek Macedonia)	Macedonian	Korca, Albania	Businessman and Member of the Macedonian Alliance Party in Albania	Tirana University, Agriculture and Forestry
25	Dushko Mihajlovski	Skopje, Macedonia, 15 August, 2011	M	1945	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian	Hamburg, Germany (42 years), and Skopje, Macedonia (born and retired)	Retired Mechanical Engineer	BA, Mechanical Engineer
26	Ana Martinoska	August 16, 2011, Skopje, Macedonia	F	40	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Professor at the Institute of Macedonian Literature,	BA Literature, MA Folklore, PhD Blaze

								Specialization on Macedonian Folk Literature	Koneski and Folklore
27	Valentina Mironska – Hristovska	August 16, 2011, Skopje, Macedonia	F	40	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Professor, Researcher Unit for Macedonian Literature in the 19 th century, Institute for Macedonian Language	PhD, 19 th c Macedonian Literature
28	Mirjana Todorovska	August 16, 2011, Skopje, Macedonia	F	33	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Assistant Professor, American College, Skopje	PhD, Intellectual Property Law
29	Anonymous Macedonian 1	August 16, 2011, Skopje, Macedonia	F	35	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Assistant Professor, American College, Skopje	PhD, Banking
30	Ray Power	August 17, 2011, Skopje, Macedonia	M	36	London, United Kingdom	British	Skopje, Macedonia	Businessman, Founder and President of British Business Group, and other businesses in Macedonia	Defense Communiatio ns
31	Sashe Ivanovski “Politiko”	August 1, 2011, Ohrid, Macedonia	M	28	Kratovo, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	News Anchor / TV Show “Politiko”	BA, Electrical Engineering
32	Dejan Dokic	August 6, 2011, Ohrid, Macedonia	M	55	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Professor and Doctor (Allergist, renowned for patenting a vaccine against domestic dust)	PhD Medicine, MD
33	Father Ivica	August 7, 2011, Ohrid, Macedonia	M	43	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian Orthodox Church Speaker	PhD, Theology
	Mendo Veljanoski	August 18, 2011, Ohrid, Macedonia	M	60	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	World Paragliding Master Instructor and author of	BA, Music

								three books on Macedonia	
34	Zoran Iliev "Roger"	August 20, 2011, Skopje, Macedonia	M	38	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Free Artist and Architect ("the Macedonian Gaudi")	BA
35	Dimitar Mircev	August 21, 2011, Skopje, Macedonia	M	60	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Professor Emeritus, former Ambassador, Author, Advisor to the President of the Republic of Macedonia	PhD, Political Science and International Relations
36	Nikola Zhezhov	August 31, 2011, Skopje, Macedonia	M	40	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Professor and Head of Department, University of Sts. Cyril and Methodius	PhD, History
37	Jordan Plevnes	August 22, 2011, Skopje, Macedonia	M	55	Sloestica Village, South-West Macedonia	Macedonian	Paris, France	Poet, UNESCO Artist for Peace, former Ambassador	MA
38	Mitko Panov	September 1, 2011, Skopje Macedonia	M	38	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Professor and Researcher, Institute for National History	PhD History
39	Viktor Gaber	September 1, 2011, Skopje, Macedonia	M	62	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Career Diplomat, former Ambassador, Author of a book on the "name issue"	BA, MA, Law
40	Tashko Jovanov (Refugee Child)	September 5, 2011, Skopje, Macedonia	M	65	Village of Setina, Northern Greece. (In the Lerin (Florina) Prefecture, Macedonia Region.)	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	President of Makedon, Association of Organisations of Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia	N/A
41	Vlado Naumovski	September 3, 2011, Skopje, Macedonia	M	60	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Former Minister, former CEO Macedonian Bank for Reconstruction and Development	PhD, Economics

Interviews Conducted in Skopje, Macedonia and Geneva, Switzerland, October-November 2011

42	Darko Kostadinovski	November 11, 2011, Skopje, Macedonia	M	40	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Foreign Policy Advisor to the President of the Republic of Macedonia	BA, MA International Affairs?
43	Mile Kolevski	October 20, 2011 Payerne, Suisse	M	50	Gevgelija, Southern Macedonia (on the border with Greece)	Macedonian	Payerne, Suisse	Member of Association of Macedonian Clubs in Switzerland, Businessman	BA

Interviews Conducted in Ohrid and Skopje, Macedonia, July 2014

No.	Name of Interviewee	Date and Place of Interview	M/F	Age or Year of Birth	Place and Country of Birth	Ethnic Background	Current Place and Country of Residence	Current Profession	Academic Background
44	Gorian Lalchevski	Ohrid, July 20, 2014	M	1979	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian	London, UK	Sales and Marketing Director in a Global Company	BA, Economics
45	Panta Mihailovski	Ohrid, July 21, 2014	M	1980	Hambourg, Germany	Macedonian /German	Hambourg, Germany	Sales Manager in Germany	BA, Economics
46	Anonymous Macedonian 2	Skopje, July 4, 2014	M	1978	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Civil Servant	Lawyer, International Law and International Politics

Interviews Conducted in Skopje, Macedonia, 2014

I had met most of the interviewees below (most of them "Refugee Children"), during my second visit to Greece, namely in July 2011, organized by Makedon: the Association of Organizations of Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia. In fact, it was with them that I travelled in the bus, and stayed in the hotel, in order to attend the Macedonian Panagjur (Fair and Festival) on the occasion of "Ilinden," in Ovcharani (Meliti), Greece. It was during that same festival that I had also met members of the Macedonian minority in Greece, who were more in Category IV (Outspoken Ones). The "Ilinden" Panagjur was a sort of all-Macedonian gathering, where Macedonians from all over the world got together. What was unique and touching during my first contact with these individuals, was that they entering Greece for the first time after the Greek Civil War (1946-1949), when they had been forced to flee from Greece. As the moment was very personal – and many even started to cry – I was unable to interview them at that time. I only interviewed them a couple of years later, in 2014, in the days following another festivity, this time in Skopje, Macedonia, uniting Macedonians from Northern Greece and from the Republic of Macedonia.

No.	Name of Interviewee	Date and Place of Interview	M/F	Age or Year of Birth	Place and Country of Birth	Ethnic Background	Current Place and Country of Residence	Current Profession	Academic Background
47	Anonymous Child of a Refugee Child 1	Skopje, November 6, 2014	F	1944	Skopje, Macedonia (Parents, Husband from Northern Greece)	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Retired	N/A

48	Dusko Mihajlovski	Skopje, December 19, 2014 (St. Nicholas Day Celebration)	M	1943	Skopje, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Retired	Engineer
49	Risto	Skopje, December 7, 2014	M	1942	Dojran, Southern Macedonia (on the border with Greece)	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Musician, Famous Folk Singer, Composer, and Song-Writer	BA, Musicology, Tenor
51	Risto Mackovski	Skopje, November 10, 2014	M	1937	Brajcino Village, Macedonia	Macedonian	Las Vegas, United States	Engineer	Engineer/Businessman
52	Anonymous Macedonian 3	Skopje November 9, 2014	F	1950	Prilep, Macedonia	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	School Teacher	Macedonian Literature
53	Anonymous Refugee Child 2	Skopje, December 5, 2014	F	1936	Village of Setina/Popadija, Northern Greece. (In the Lerin (Florina) Prefecture, Macedonia Region.)	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Retired	N/A
54	Anonymous Child of a Refugee Child 3	Skopje, November 9, 2014	F	1954	Skopje, Macedonia (Parents from Village of Setina, Northern Greece. (In the Lerin (Florina) Prefecture, Macedonia Region.)	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	N/A	N/A
55	Anonymous Refugee Child 4	Skopje, November 14, 2014	F	1937	Village of Krusoradi, Northern Greece. (In the Lerin (Florina) Prefecture, Macedonia Region.)	Macedonian	Skopje, Macedonia	Retired	N/A

56	Anonymous Refugee Child 5	Skopje, November 14, 2014	M	1938	Village of Ovcharani (Meliti), Northern Greece. (In the Lerin (Florina) Prefecture, Macedonia Region.)	Macedonia	Skopje, Macedonia	Retired	N/A
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Interviews Conducted in Athens and Lesvos, Greece, June-July 2014

These interviews were conducted during a study visit on migration with a group of students from the University of Geneva.

No.	Name of Interviewee	Date and Place of Interview	M/F	Age or Year of Birth	Place and Country of Birth	Ethnic Background	Current Place and Country of Residence	Current Profession	Academic Background
57	Yannis	Athens, Greece, June 25, 2014	M	1940	Athens, Greece	Greek American	Athens, Greece	Bar Owner	N/A
58	Anonymous Greek 2	Lesvos, Greece, June 29, 2014	M	1976	Lesvos, Greece	Greek	Lesvos, Greece	Bar Manager	N/A
59	Anonymous Greek 3	Lesvos, Greece, June 29, 2014	M	1979	Lesvos, Greece	Greek	Lesvos, Greece	Car Rental Company Employee	N/A
60	Anonymous Greek 4	Athens, Greece, June 26, 2014	M	1984	Athens, Greece	Greek	Athens, Greece	Random Guy in Metro	N/A
61	Anonymous Greek 5	Lesvos, Greece, June 30, 2014	M	1954	Lesvos, Greece	Greek	Lesvos, Greece	Hotel Owner	N/A
62	Kosta and Friend	Athens, Greece, June 25, 2014	M	1977	Athens, Greece	Greek	Athens, Greece	Bar Manager	N/A
63	Anonymous Greek 7	Athens, Greece, June 25, 2014	F	1990	Thessaloniki, Greece	Greek	Thessaloniki, Greece	Student	BA in Law
64	Anonymous Greek 8	Athens, Greece, June 26, 2014	M	1956	Thessaloniki, Greece	Greek	Athens, Greece	Restaurant Manager	N/A
65	Anonymous Greek 9	Athens, Greece, June 27, 2014	M	1950	Athens, Greece	Greek	Athens, Greece	Shop Owner	N/A
66	Anonymous Greek 10	Athens, Greece, July	M	1965	Athens, Greece	Greek	Athens, Greece	Syriza Party	N/A

		2, 2014							
67	Anonymous Greek 11	Athens, Greece, July 2, 2014	M	1960	Athens, Greece	Greek	Athens, Greece	Taxi Driver	N/A
68	Anonymous Greek 12	Lesvos, Greece, July 1	M	1982	Lesvos, Greece	Greek	Lesvos, Greece	Waiter in Fish Restaurant	N/A

Interviews Conducted in Geneva, Switzerland, December 2015-January 2016

No.	Name of Interviewee	Date and Place of Interview	M/F	Age or Year of Birth	Place and Country of Birth	Ethnic Background	Current Place and Country of Residence	Current Profession	Academic Background
69	Panayote Dimitras	Geneva, September 23, 2015	M	1942	Athens, Greece	Greek	Athens, Greece	Human Rights Activist, Founder and Spokesperson of Greek Helsinki Monitor	PhD, Political Science
70	Anonymous American	Geneva, January 10, 2016	M	1974	Illinois, United States	American	Geneva, Switzerland	International Organisation	N/A

* I distinguish between three groups of Macedonians from Greece. The first and second group (Hesitant Tukasni or Outspoken Ones) live in Greece, while the third (Refugee Children) live in Macedonia. The first group is those who do not outright declare themselves as Macedonians but speak the language. These I have denoted as the “Hesitant Tukasni” and they are Category III of my analysis. The second group is those who loudly and clearly denote themselves as Macedonians. I have denoted these as the “Outspoken Ones” and they make up Category IV of my analysis. The third group (Category V in my analysis) are those who were born in Greece or whose parents were born in Greece, but who had to flee during the Greek Civil War (1946-1949). These are denoted as Refugee Child. All these denotations are in the first column “Name of the Interviewee,” where the interviewee had decided to remain anonymous. Where the interviewee did not remain anonymous, I have not placed a category under their name in the table, out of respect of privacy. The “ethnic” column is their ethnicity that the interviewee declared.

* As the reader Greek authorities had adopted laws that forced all place names as well as names of individuals to be changed into Greek names. However, in informal settings Macedonians –both from Greece and from Macedonia – still went by the Macedonian names. Therefore, place names in Greece are the names as they were told to me by my interviewees. As most of my interviewees used the Macedonian name of the place, I have used the Macedonian place names, and put the Greek place names in parentheses right beside them, for the purpose of clarification and consistency. Lerin (Florina) is the city of Lerin as Macedonians refer to it, and Florina in Greek. Where available, I also put both the Greek and the Macedonian names of my interviewees, as many of them used both of their names.